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Summary 
 
This study used a qualitative research design incorporating principles of social 
constructionism, hermeneutic dialectic method, Neo-Socratic dialogue and 
philosophy for reporting the tacit and social knowledge constructions underlying 
particular ways of knowing that inform the experiential reality of love in the 
practice of nursing and midwifery. The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, that 
culminated in his magnum opus of the ‘metaphysics of otherness’, provided the 
theoretical underpinning for the interpretation of the experiences nurses and 
midwives believed were examples of love in their clinical practice in Australia, 
Singapore and Bhutan. 
 
What is love in nursing and midwifery? The answer is moral responsibility. The 
relational context has a nurse and midwife constantly exposed to patient     
situations that give rise to expressions of love as moral responsibility. It is a       
form of love that centres on the ability of our being, or at least the possibility of   
our being, to transcend its everyday form to a metaphysical state of being        
moral. It enables a nurse and midwife to transcend the isolation associated with 
their personal being as a self-project, to be ‘for’ the patient as a first priority. But 
while the ‘Goodness’ of the ‘Good’ assigns the nurse and midwife responsible    
and is expressed to their personal being in the form of the ‘urge to do’, ‘what to   
do’ in caring for the patient is a matter of living out the command to be   
responsible and will be different for each nurse and midwife. However, no      
matter the outcome, love as moral responsibility will always leave a nurse and 
midwife feeling there is still more to be done in being responsible. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background. 
 
1.0 Introduction. 
 
This dissertation provides an answer to the question of what is love in nursing 
and midwifery. While the background to this study demonstrates that nurses 
and midwives believe their professional practice contains expressions of love, 
there is uncertainty about the relation of love to caring. In acknowledgment of 
the link between love and caring, the dissertation explores the extant literature 
on caring and its relation to the concept of love. Next, the study design 
describes the framework used to enable nurses and midwives to explicate their 
understanding of the love embedded in their clinical practice. The conclusions 
drawn by nurses and midwives, regarding love in nursing and midwifery, are 
then subjected to a philosophical analysis using Emmanuel Levinas’s 
philosophy of the ‘metaphysics of otherness’. In the final analysis it is my thesis 
that the form of love that is exemplified in the practice of nursing and midwifery 
is moral responsibility. 
 
The demography of the study shows that 56 nurses and midwives participated 
in 6 Neo-Socratic dialogues that were held in Australia, Singapore and Bhutan. 
The background and professional experience of participants was varied and 
reflective of the diverse specialty fields of nursing and midwifery that included 
Aged Care, Child and Adolescent Nursing, Accident & Emergency, High 
Dependency, Critical & Coronary Care, Intensive Care, Acute Medical and 
Surgical Nursing, Operating Theatre & Recovery Room, Day Surgery, 
Oncology, Rehabilitation Nursing, Palliative Care, Midwifery, Women’s Health, 
Mental Health Nursing, Community Nursing, Naturopathy, Nurse Administration 
and Nurse Education, in urban and remote area locations. Each of the 6 Neo- 
Socratic dialogues is reported and used as data for construction of the thesis. 
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1.1  Background to the Study. 
In 1992 the then Liberal State Government of Victoria, Australia implemented a 
mechanism for determining the financial resourcing of the acute health care 
sector called ‘Casemix Funding and Diagnostic Related Groupings’ (DRGS). 
The implementation of ‘Casemix Funding and DRGS’ resulted in the 
quantification of health care. While the effects of this policy have been wide 
spread, the principle change has been to the way in which health care is 
delivered and health service costs controlled. 
 
Given registered nurses are the people charged with the provision of care and 
represent the largest body of health care professionals within any acute hospital 
and community setting, it is easy to understand why this group was the prime 
target for change. With human resources comprising approximately 80% of all 
hospital and health agency budgets, the registered nurse population at this time 
was an easy target for budgetary reduction. While there was a fear that the 
introduction of ‘Casemix Funding and DRGS’ would result in a reduction of the 
number of registered nurses, this was not the case. Instead, the number of 
registered nurses across the State of Victoria slowly increased (2005). 
However, the introduction of ‘Casemix Funding and DRGS’, did give rise to the 
casualization of the nursing workforce, which peaked in 2001 with 60.2% of 
registered nurses working part-time in the State of Victoria (Australian et al., 
2005). Because of the introduction of ‘Casemix Funding and DRGS’ the hospital 
environment where acute care nursing occurs changed. Today, nurses must 
care for a more debilitated and complex patient population in a shorter 
timeframe than ever before. 
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However, little serious attention has been given to the other side of the ledger 
with regard to the impact these paradigmatic changes have had on the human 
caring role within this new system of health care delivery; specifically, the 
impact these changes have had on the human caring role of nurses in the acute 
care hospital sector. 
 
Anecdotal discussions with nurses since the introduction of ‘Casemix Funding 
and DRGS’ have shown that the nurses are highly critical of the changes these 
funding models have imposed on their caring practices. Without exception they 
openly express their concern at the quantification of health care and 
consequently nursing. Nursing has long been identified as both an art and a 
science. Nurses say that Casemix Funding and DRG models support the 
science of nursing and have impacted in negative ways on their practice of the 
art of nursing. The process of learning an art requires both mastery of theory 
and practice. If a nurse is to learn the art of nursing, that individual is not only 
required to learn the theoretical knowledge related to nursing (the science of 
nursing), but must also become competent in the practice of nursing where the 
blend of the two (art and science) gives rise to the development of the intuitive 
nurse practitioner, which is central to nursing as an art. Anecdotally, many 
nurses see the quantification of nursing as detracting from an individual nurse’s 
capacity to practice nursing as both an art and a science. For many nurses, 
Casemix Funding and DRG models have upset the balance of nursing as both 
an art and a science. The shift of nursing more toward a science of health care 
has resulted in them feeling distressed, confused and aggrieved at what they 
believe is the undervaluing of the human act of caring. 
 
In addition, the community has voiced, and continues to voice, its concern 
about the standards of care expected from hospitals and community caring 
agencies. Since the introduction of ‘Casemix Funding and DRGS’ the press has 
been littered with articles addressing a variety of concerns, including for 
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example, the downsizing of the health care sector, unreasonable waiting times 
in accident and emergency departments, the severity of health funding budget 
cuts, closure of rural hospitals, health professional retrenchments, difficulty in 
accessing suitable health care services, problems with early discharge and the 
resultant increased morbidity, increased readmission rates, the increased stress 
health care professionals face in providing health care within a ever declining 
budget and environment, the difficulties of recruiting nurses with a general 
nurse shortage, and the premature retirement of nurses from the nursing 
profession. 
 
This said, is it any wonder that it is difficult to engage registered nurses in 
dialogue about anything else but that which they identify as helping them with 
‘getting all the work done’. It is a perception that is supported by my current 
experience of teaching registered nurses’ at the Post Graduate level, where 
nurses who work in specialities that involve ‘high’ science find it difficult to focus 
their thinking on nursing as an art and, in fact, actively resist it. Nurses do not 
devalue the tenets of holistic care, but find that, the increased acuity and 
medicalization of acute care, the short stay of the patient population, and the 
changing nature of the nursing workforce, have caused nurses to focus more on 
the ‘work tasks’ of nursing (involved in the science of nursing) as opposed to 
the holistic care needs of the patient (involving, in part, the art of nursing). 
Given this environment, the responsibility for the holistic care of the patient has 
been distributed among nurses and other health care workers to the point  
where a nurse’s individual responsibility for, and management of, the total care  
of the patient has been lessened. Consequently it comes as no surprise that 
nurses report that they hold in high esteem those of their colleagues who are 
able to embrace the responsibility of the patient as if the patient was them. But 
what is the quality of this nursing care that enables these people to engage 
another person in this way? For me, listening to my colleagues and discussing 
these ideas, the term ‘caring’ fails to capture the essence of what I and other 
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nurses appear to experience when in a relationship of the type just described, 
whereas the term ‘love’ seems more apt; not that the relations spoken about 
here occur everyday by every nurse because clearly this is not the case. While 
there are some nurses who are uncaring, equally there other nurses who are 
able to enact the role of a registered nurse and midwife in a way that is more 
than caring. 
 
While the concept of ‘love’ appears in some literature and theories of caring 
(Watson, 1985, 2003, Ray, 1988, Eriksson, 1990, Eriksson, 1994), it remains to 
the most part poorly described. In discussions with nurses and midwives about 
‘what it is to care’, all believed love was an integral component of their caring 
yet were unable to articulate the basis on which these beliefs were founded. 
From these anecdotal discussions it could be postulated that while nurses and 
midwives may intuitively understand that many of the feelings and actions 
inherent in the caring relationship are expressions of love, conscious 
recognition does not occur. The literature provides some explanation for why 
expressions of love in caring remain largely hidden from view in nursing and 
midwifery. Montgomery (1991) argues that nursing is in a paradoxical position. 
On the one hand nurses as caregivers are supposed to care deeply for the 
patients in their care but on the other-hand are not to become ‘too involved’ with 
these same people. Montgomery (1991) claims actual nursing practice may in 
fact be more caring and more involved than orthodox theory and formal 
professional discourse indicate. Furthermore, Jacono (1993) suggests that 
while caring may be central to the discipline of nursing, feminist thinking has 
caused nurses to fear caring. As a result, this fear has resulted in a shift in the 
orientation of nursing from a ‘caring for’ or providing direct hands on care role 
toward a ‘caring about’ or providing resources role (Jacono, 1993). Jacono 
(1993) captures one important reason as to why the exploration of love is 
largely absent from the literature; ‘. . . nursing is searching for a way of practicing 
(i.e. a definition of caring) that serves others without being subservient’. Linking 
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the concepts love, caring and what it is to be a nurse and midwife appears to 
support a subservient view of the nurse and midwife role in a profession trying   
to rid itself of subservient images. Thus, the exploration of the concept of love 
and its relationship to caring is important for the emancipation of nursing and 
midwifery and also the identification of what nurses and midwives understand to 
be an expression of love that is specific to their professional practice. 
 
 
1.2  Study Question 
‘What is love in nursing and midwifery?’ 
 7
Chapter 2:  Discursive Analysis of the Extant 
Literature on Caring in Nursing and 
Midwifery 
 
 
 
2.0  Introduction 
Given that love and caring would seem to be closely linked concepts, I 
will begin by exploring the literature on caring to see what light it might throw on 
the research question. While some of this literature will not be obviously linked  
to the idea of love in the contemporary use of the term it is none-the-less 
important to the construct of love as presented in this thesis. There is an 
abundance of literature on caring in nursing, and therefore scholarship that is 
repeatedly cited in the literature, and generally accepted as the primary     
literature on caring as it relates to the idea of love, is the focus of this review. 
Accordingly, the challenge here is to present the philosophical ideas of the    
many authors in a way that presents mainstream thinking about caring and love   
in a way that offers more than a cursory glance. Some scholarship about caring 
and love in general is included because it has been cited in the literature in 
nursing and midwifery. Only that literature published in English or translated has 
been used. As stated, not all the scholarship on caring in nursing and midwifery  
or love is reported on here, nor is literature that relates to the ‘non-caring’  
practice of nursing and midwifery. Of note is the seminal work of Janice Morse, 
Joan Bottorif, Wendy Neader, and Shirley Solberg (Morse et al., 1990), Kristen 
Swanson (1999), and John Paley (2001) which has been used to background     
this overview. With this in mind, a report of the thesis of each of 21 scholars 
Margaret Dunlop, Simone Roach, Anne Griffin, Madeleine Leininger, Marilyn 
Ray, Patricia Benner, Judith Wrubel, Sara Fry, Howard Curzer, Anne Boykin, 
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Savina 0. Schoenhofer, Milton Mayeroff, Jean Watson, Katie Eriksson, Sally 
Gadow, Rosemarie Rizzo Parse, Nel Noddings, Stan van Hooft, Olivia Bevis, 
Delores Gaut, and Kristen Swanson, forms the foundation for this discursive 
analysis. 
 
2. 1  Discursive analysis 
Margaret Dunlop (1986), in her seminal work which explores the possibility of 
caring being a science, offers insight into the concept of caring and its  
relationship to love. This work commences with the identification of the socio -
historical construction of caring and love as part of the role of middle class 
Victorian women where the usage of the word caring involved a form of love; 
love as personalized affection (1986, 1992). It includes a view that the 
socialization of women in general, in the private domain, has love as an integral 
part of caring (Dunlop, I 986). 
 
Dunlop (1986) demonstrated that nursing has taken upon itself to translate love 
into the public domain. She noted that the depersonalization of health care is 
witness of the separation of caring from love, in the traditional usage of these 
terms (Dunlop, 1986). However, Dunlop (1992) later noted that the problems 
associated with the separation of caring and love are, in part, resolved by that 
scholarship which gives rich meaning to caring. 
 
Accordingly, the translation of love to the public domain has resulted in love 
becoming indirect in that the nurse ‘. . . acts as if they were the one who greatly 
loved the patient’ (Dunlop, 1992: 24). ‘The as if is important in marking a 
transition from the “love” of the private domain to the “caring” (in the emergent 
sense) of the public domain’ (1986: 663, 1992: 24). Thus Dunlop (1992, 1986), 
says ‘as if’ provides the means for both the closeness and the distance of the  
nurse to the patient that is present in the practice of nursing. Because caring      
has become institutionalized and public, love as personalized affection is no 
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longer present in it. The separation of the self from the patient by way of the ‘as 
if’ suggests that the closeness and distance chosen in the nurse-patient relation    
is a conscious decision and a reflection of ethical norms. However, is it possible 
that decisions about the degree of involvement in the project of the patient is 
something that is not always consciously thought about? What is more, is it also 
possible that the limits of the closeness, which Dunlop (1992, 1986) speaks  
about, is more than caring and different to her definition of love as personalized 
affection. Dunlop’s identification of ‘as if’ suggests that there is a moral 
component to love that is translated into the physical act of caring, but this is an 
idea that is not taken up in her thesis. 
 
Simone Roach, like Margaret Dunlop, was one of the early scholars who 
contributed to thinking about ethics and human caring in nursing in the 1970’s, 
80’s and to a lesser extent in the 1990’s. Roach’s (1984, 1992)    
conceptualization of caring accepts the Hiedeggerian idea that care is     
primordial and while it can only be associated with identified personal attributes 
such as Roach’s five C’s (compassion, competence, conscience, confidence      
and commitment), it cannot be reduced to some form of specific action (Roach, 
1984, 1991 , 1992, 1998). As a result, the professional skills, knowledge, and 
experience that a nurse brings to bear on their relationship with the patient is  
what makes caring unique in nursing and thus enables the identification of    
certain activities as ‘caring’ (Morse et al., 1991). In this sense caring is   
‘expressed in specific moments as particularized in concrete behaviors’ (Roach, 
1992: 47). 
 
An important point of Roach’s (1984, 1992) conceptualization of caring in 
nursing is that caring is not identified as unique to nursing but instead is made 
unique in nursing through its application. Accordingly, caring is understood to   
be unique in nursing only in that it is developed in people who fulfill the role of 
nurse (Roach, 1991, 1992). For Roach (1984, 1991, 1992), harnessing the 
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human ‘desire to care’ and its application to the professional roles and 
responsibilities of nursing, is what makes caring in nursing unique. 
 
To this end, Roach (1 984, 1 991 , I 992, 1 998) has identified five attributes of 
professional caring, or put another way, five things nurses do when they are 
caring in nursing. The first is ‘compassion’ which is derived from the Latin, 
paticum, meaning to suffer with. Roach (1992) says this involves the sharing  
with another their feelings of brokenness, fear, confusion, anguish and the like 
that occurs by full immersion in the condition by being present to the other 
person. It is understood to be a person’s awareness of their relationship with 
another, which makes possible the nurse sharing in the suffering of the patient 
(Roach, 1984). 
 
The second trait is ‘competence’, and is defined as the ‘state of having the 
knowledge, judgment, skills, energy, experience and the motivation required to 
respond adequately to the demands of one’s professional responsibilities’   
(Roach, I 984: 22, 1 992: 61). In nursing, as with any health related profession, 
compassion operates from the competency appropriate to the needs of the     
patient (Roach, 1984, 1991, 1992, 1998). The two traits are central to any 
conceptualization  of  professional  caring  because,  as  Roach 1984:  22, 1992: 
61) says, ‘competence without compassion can be brutal and inhumane, [and] 
compassion without competence may be no more than a meaningless, if not 
harmful, intrusion into the life of a person or persons needing help’. Clearly, 
Roach (1984, 1992) understands caring in nursing is only made possible by the 
compassion that is lived out in the competent response of the nurse to the    
human needs of the patient. However, this conceptualization suggests that       
even though it is not desirable, it is possible to be compassionate at the same    
time as being incompetent, but that, according to this model, this would not be 
professional caring because caring in nursing requires both competence and     
also compassion. 
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The third attribute in Roach’s schema is ‘confidence’ and is defined as ‘the 
quality which fosters trusting relationships’ (Roach, 1984: 23, 1992: 62). Here 
Roach is making the point that the relationship between the patient and the    
nurse comprises respect and trust to act in their good. The role of the nurse is 
understood by the patient to require professional standards and moral attributes 
that enable them to know that the nurse will always act in ways that foster their 
wellbeing. Roach (1984: 24, 1992: 63) says that ‘caring confidence fosters trust 
without dependency; communicates truth without violence; and creates a 
relationship of respect without paternalism or without engendering a response 
born out of fear or powerlessness’. However, while Roach has identified the    
idea that an act of caring requires the patient to have trust that the nurse will act 
for their good, there is no explanation for why this should be the case. 
 
‘Conscience’, the fourth attribute, is understood by Roach (1984, 1991, 1992, 
1998) as a state of moral awareness in the nurse that causes them to    
intentionally respond in a deliberate, meaningful, and rational way to what 
matters. However, there are also occasions where a nurse may respond to        
what matters without rational thought because should they have rationalized   
their intention they may not have responded at all. Can our moral awareness, or 
human desire to respond to what matters, also occur preconsciously? For      
Roach (1984, 1992) conscience is the call of care that manifests itself as care. 
What makes one person respond to the call and another not or in a different    
way, however, is what makes the conscience moral as opposed to innate. In      
this context the conscience can only be innate in that everyone possesses one,    
but each person’s response is different, which is the ground of the moral     
person. However this raises a question regarding the response of nurses where   
the call to action is not something they thought about; where in fact they have    
no recollection of considering the matter at all? 
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The fifth and final attribute of caring in nursing is identified as ‘commitment’. 
Roach describes commitment as ‘a complex affective response characterized      
by a convergence between one’s desires and one’s obligations, and by a  
deliberate choice to act in accordance with them’ (Roach, 1984: 25, 1992: 65). It 
is where choosing is relegated to second priority because the commitment one  
has is synonymous with what would be chosen. It is where a person is drawn 
consciously and willingly to a course of action (Roach, 1984), that is, the 
commitment is such that whatever is required for the patients’ good is never 
considered a burden because it is not identified as burdensome. But how can    
this be so when the self is its project? What is this form of commitment that 
potentially would enable a burden, while not considered a burden, to be so 
burdensome that it could result in the demise of the nurse’s self-project? Is it 
commitment that would enable such a state of being as a nurse, particularly   
when Roach herself hints at this state of being as the state of being moral? 
 
While Roach (1992) speaks about caring in terms of the calling forth of the  
innate ability to care she also alludes to the idea that caring has a moral      
element to its nature. In her schema of caring the concept of ‘conscience’ is    
used to describe the primordial call to care and, while it is a call that requires a 
response, different people respond in different ways thus making the desire a 
moral one (Roach, 1984, 1992). For Roach (1984: 27), ‘caring is living in the 
context of relational responsibilities - responsibilities to self and to the other’; a 
responsibility that is moral. The postulate is that there exists a primordial call to 
care but the definition of this motivation is not hypothesized. 
 
Anne Griffin (1980), an educationalist, offers insights into caring in nursing that 
are consistent with Roach’s beliefs. They both understand caring as a primary 
mode of being human (Griffin, 1980, 1983, Roach, 1984, 1992). The two    
authors also explain caring from the perspective of the ‘context’ of nursing, and 
both seek an understanding of professional caring that is effected in the 
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performance of the specific roles and responsibilities of being a nurse (Griffin, 
1983, Roach, 1984, 1992). While Roach identifies 5 activities of caring, Griffin 
identifies two broad categories called, ‘activities’ and ‘attitude and feelings’ 
(Griffin, 1980, 1983). 
 
However, other than a brief commentary, Griffin (1983) offers no explanation 
about the activities of caring in nursing other than to say they comprise of 
‘assisting’, ‘helping’, and ‘serving’. More though is said about the attitudes and 
feelings component of her postulate. Like Roach, Griffin (1980, 1983) 
understands that caring is made known not by the specific activities nurses 
undertake as part of their role and responsibilities, but in the ‘way’ they are 
undertaken, that is, ‘a nurse’s activities in relation to a patient may be called 
caring only because those acts are performed in a certain way; as expressions      
of particular emotions’ (Griffin, 1983: 291). For Griffin (1980), the category 
‘attitudes and feelings’ relates primarily to the moral attitude of respect for the 
person of the patient which is given expression though the implementation of 
various nursing activities which she describes as assisting, helping and serving 
during the provision of health care. According to Griffin (1980), these caring   
acts are underpinned by the moral emotion of ‘respect’ for the dignity and 
autonomy of the patient. Unfortunately, Griffin (1980) offers no description that 
makes clear the extent of the respect for another person’s dignity. Just how far     
a nurse or midwife is willing to go out of respect for the dignity of the patient that 
is defined as caring is unknown. 
 
Although much of the content of Griffin’s thinking about caring relates to innate 
human drive and moral attributes, it also contains views about the impact of 
emotion on the caring relationship. More particularly, Griffin (1983) believes that 
the emotional component of caring is what energizes and licenses the 
interpretation of the nursing activity as caring. The view taken is that emotions  
are conceptually linked to reason and appraisal of situations, where the degree 
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of exposure a nurse has to the plight of the patient impacts on the way the      
nurse feels toward that particular patient (Griffin, 1983). 
 
One type of emotion identified by Griffin (1983) is affection. Affection ‘refers to 
the desire for another’s welfare and happiness as a particular individual - not  
from a sense of duty or benevolence’ (Griffin, 1983: 292). In this conception of 
affection, affection is interpreted as being ‘concerned’ for the person of the 
patient, which is different to being concerned for every patient. It is about 
individuating the caring relationship. The concept of affection, as offered by 
Griffin (1983), does not require the nurse to ‘like’ the person nor is it reliant upon 
the character of the individual being amenable to the nurse. In fact affection is  
not a prerequisite for caring at all because of the irrational nature of its content. 
More notable is the point that affection and liking may be present in a caring 
relationship, can effect the kind of a relationship a nurse has with a patient, and 
that these emotions exist in the caring of nursing outside any sense of duty or 
feelings of benevolence. As Griffin (1983: 293) writes, ‘. . . in the caring act of 
nursing, one sees a person in a reactive (subjective) way. . .‘ which is to identify 
emotion as a component of caring in nursing. Here, Griffin (1983) adopts the 
Heideggerian view of care (Sorge) in that things matter to us because mattering 
structures our world. It determines our interest in things and our relations with 
people. While Heidegger’s ideas around mattering are not fully explained,   
Griffin (1983) believes it to be the foundation of caring, that is, mattering gives 
rise to the emotional component of caring and is what energizes and licenses     
the interpretation of the nursing activity as caring. 
 
Next, Griffin (1983) links the idea of affection to the emotion of mattering, with 
affection being the desire for a person’s welfare and happiness. It is what 
individuates our mattering, and in this case, identifies the person from the   
patient. Consequently, Griffin (1983) feels that on occasion it is our mattering  
that gives rise to a deep connection between the nurse and the patient and 
 15
hence could be interpreted as a ‘kind of love’. This idea suggests there is a  
quality to mattering that gives rise to the human response known as love. It is    
not love in the romantic sense and it is not caring because it is a form of love    
and a love that is specific to the practice of nursing. However, the content of this 
mattering that is a kind of love is not explained. 
 
While Griffin understands caring as consisting of two main aspects, an activity   
or technical component and an attitudinal and feelings component, she also 
identifies the impact of the relationship of the nurse on the patient. Griffin (1980, 
1983) says that the moral principle of respect for the dignity and autonomy of a 
person is what gives rise to the emotional component of caring that energizes, 
motivates and enables a nurse to ‘see’ what a patient needs. It is where a nurse 
continually uses ‘perception’ and ‘judgment’ to understand the reality of the 
patient’s situation (Griffin, 1983). 
 
Although Griffin identifies a moral component to caring in nursing she 
acknowledges that there is still much to be learnt about the quality of the 
relationship between the nurse and the patient (Griffin, 1980). She believes that 
because nurses are increasingly confronted by more complex and integrated   
ways of responding to patient needs, and on occasions connecting deeply with 
patients, the ‘. . . dominant emotion in caring is in fact a kind of love’ (Griffin, 
1983: 294). Other than this overview little more can be said about how Griffin 
conceptualizes the concept love and its relationship to caring except that it 
contains both an emotion and moral quality to its character. 
 16
Madeleine Leininger is a nurse anthropologist who offers a theory of cultural 
care diversity and universality that represents much of her thinking about the 
concept of ‘caring’ over an approximate 50 year period (Leininger, 1991a). 
Similar to Roach and Griffin, Leininger (1988a, 1988b, 1991a) also understands 
care as a trait that all humans share (generic care). Specifically, she believes 
caring is an essential human need that is necessary for the full development, 
health maintenance, and survival of the species (Leininger, 1981c, 1988a,      
1988b, 1991a). Leininger (1988a, 1991a, 2002) postulates that while caring   
exists in all the peoples of the world it is culturally unique. 
 
Leininger uses an ‘ethnonursing’ research method, ‘ethno’ referring to a people 
centered approach, or a particular culture, with a focus on worldview, ideas, and 
cultural practices related to ‘nursing’ phenomena (Leininger, 1991a). She 
identified the cultural meanings, interpretations, expressions and behaviors of 
people from a range of cultural backgrounds about care and identified three 
different types of care, ‘generic care’, ‘professional care’ and ‘professional 
nursing care’ (Leininger, 1991a). 
 
Leininger suggests that in order to deliver ‘culturally congruent care’ nurses   
need to understand the different individual and group cultural interpretations of 
care that she has labeled ‘generic care’ (Leininger, 1988a, 1991a). Once this is 
understood, this ‘cultural care knowledge’ can be combined with the nurse’s 
individual ‘professional knowledge’ to deliver nursing care that better meets the 
needs of the individual or group (Leininger, 1988a, 1991a). In this way 
‘professional nursing care’ is understood to be the; 
‘cognitively learned humanistic and scientific mode of helping or enabling 
an individual, family, or community to receive personalized services 
through specific culturally defined or ascribed modes of caring    
processes, techniques, and patterns to improve or maintain a favorably 
healthy condition for life or death’ (Leininger, 1988a: 9). 
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Given this perspective, it would seem that Leininger like Roach and Griffin 
identifies the ‘context’ of nursing to be critical in defining caring. 
 
All three authors (Leininger, Roach and Griffin), seek an understanding of 
professional caring as it relates to the performance of the specific roles and 
responsibilities of being a nurse. However, Leininger specifically focuses on 
‘cultural care knowledge’ and its place in the professional care dimension of 
nursing. As she states, ‘the goal of the theory is to improve and to provide 
culturally congruent care to people of different or similar cultures in order to 
maintain or regain their well being, health, or face death in a culturally 
appropriate way’ (Leininger, 1991 b: 39). 
 
For Leininger, the phenomenon of human caring is both universal and culturally 
expressed and therefore caring patterns are transculturally different. In  
developing an understanding of ethnonursing as it relates to caring, Leininger 
(1988c) found professional caring behaviors, activities and processes were 
interpreted differently among nurses of different cultural backgrounds. Equally 
she found nurses shared similarities in their understanding of the concept of 
helping or assisting others in need, or anticipating the needs of ‘care recipients’. 
Plus, she also found that most care recipients expected nurses to help them or 
anticipate their caring needs. However, any philosophical explanation for the 
goodness that would underpin such expectations is absent from this theory. 
 
Leininger’s ‘ethnocaring’ and nursing care data revealed 28 constructs related     
to caring, namely, comfort, compassion, concern, coping behaviors, empathy, 
enabling, facilitating, interest, involvement, health consultative acts, health 
instruction acts, health maintenance acts, helping behaviors, love, nurturance, 
presence, protecting behaviors, restorative behaviors, sharing, stimulating 
behaviors, stress alleviation, succurance, support, surveillance, tenderness, 
touching, trust, and one called ‘others’ to complete the list (Leininger, 1981a, 
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1981c, 1988c). For Leininger, these concepts represent the basis for 
understanding ‘professional nursing care’ and the development of theory about 
nursing and human caring. However, this list of concepts presented by    
Leininger (1981a, 1988c) is little more than a list because there is no theoretical 
exploration of the concepts offered or how they relate to ‘professional nursing 
care’. In Leininger’s (1991b) publication of her ‘theory of culture care diversity 
and universality’, these concepts are not included, which is suggestive of the    
fact that their exact relationship to caring in nursing remains unclear. It would 
therefore seem that ‘caring’ is little more than a summative term used to cover   
all or most of the behaviors identified by Leininger. More specifically, Leininger’s 
postulates around the concept of love and the related ideas of compassion, 
concern, interest, involvement, presence and so on, as listed above, have no 
content that enable a more incisive exploration of her theoretical ideas. 
 
This said, Leininger (1991a) does attempt to make known the general tenets     
that underpin her perspectives about caring in nursing. 
‘Care is nursing, care is healing, care is the nurse’s way of being with    
and helping people, care is the heart and soul of nursing, care makes the 
difference in weliness or illness states, and care can cure’. (Leininger, 
1991a: 40) 
What is Leininger’s rationale for adopting these concepts? Again, Leininger 
offers no substantive philosophical explanation about these ideas that are     
central to her theory. For example, in brief, it appears that she is saying firstly that 
because ‘care is nursing’ whenever a person is caring they are by inference 
nursing and this is clearly not the case. Secondly, that because ‘care is the  
essence of nursing and the central, dominant, and unifying focus of nursing’ 
(Leininger, 1991a: 35), nursing does not occur without caring. However, it is 
general knowledge that not all nursing activities are done in a caring way, if this  
is correct then, according to Leininger, such activities would not be considered 
nursing, which is also not correct. Thirdly, that ‘care is the nurse’s way of being 
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with and helping people’, which suggests there is a moral component to all 
nursing interactions. Just what is this way of being that is caring exactly, and    
just how far a nurse is will to go in helping a person, is for the most part 
unknown. Thus, it is difficult to explore Leininger’s thoughts on caring, and in 
particular love and morality, in any substantive way because she does not 
provide philosophical explanations about the tenets on which she has built her 
theory (Leininger, 1981a, 1981b, 1988a, 1988c, 1988b, 1990a, 1990b, 1991b, 
1991a, 2002). 
 
Madeline Leininger was not alone in exploring the concept of culture as it 
relates to nursing. While Leininger sought to understand culture as the wider 
context of care in nursing Marilyn Ray has focused on the impact of the cultural 
systems that operate within bureaucratic health care organizations on caring in 
nursing. In particular, Ray (1988a, 1988b, 1989) explores the meanings and 
values of human caring (as a trait) in health care organizations and has 
developed a ‘Caring Classification System’, a substantive theory of ‘Differential 
Caring’, and a formal ‘Theory of Bureaucratic Caring’, the later two 
acknowledged but not examined in this review. 
 
Ray’s ‘Caring Classification System’ of bureaucratic caring (Ray, 1988a) is the 
result of the exploration of the cognitive perceptions of both health care 
workers/professionals and patients about caring in nursing in hospital. She 
identified four categories of caring behaviors, ‘psychologic’, ‘practical’, 
‘interactional’, and ‘philosophic’ (Ray, 1988a). In brief, the ‘psychologic’ category 
consists of both affective (e.g. empathy, concern, feeling, loving, compassion), 
and cognitive (e.g. teaching, meeting needs, knowledge, observation, 
decisions, assessment, evaluation, problem solving) caring characteristics 
(Ray, 1988a). From her description it would appear that when a nurse 
expresses an attitude of love in professional nursing they are exhibiting a 
behavior that is caring, but what is the content of the psychologic category that 
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includes love as an affect of caring? The second category is described as 
‘practical’ and is related to both the social organizational system (e.g. 
economic/money! budget, organization/coordination), and the technical notion 
of caring (e.g. skill) (Ray, 1988a). The third category of caring characteristics 
was the ‘interactional’ group with communication (talking) the most significant 
feature (Ray, 1988a). The physical subset of the ‘interactional’ category is 
associated with ‘doing for’ comfort (physical, and touch), while the social subset 
related to ‘doing with’ communication (e.g. talking, interacting (sharing), 
listening, helping, involving, reassuring, supporting) (Ray, 1988a). The last 
category in the taxonomy was ‘philosophic’ and consists of three characteristics, 
spiritual (e.g. concern, faith), ethical (e.g. attitude, responsibility, holistic care, 
trust, individual care, respect), and cultural caring (e.g. some understanding of 
cultural care, equity in cultural care) (Ray, 1988a). 
 
The significance of this early research was that it made known the effect of the 
modern health care bureaucratic system on caring in nursing. In particular, it 
identified the changes to the beliefs of nurses about caring in Western styled 
health systems. For example, it revealed that health care workers/professionals 
understood the use of technology as caring (Ray, 1988a). This said, Ray also 
identified the ethical shift of caring in nursing from an ‘other-orientation’ to more 
a ‘self-centered’ orientation, with nurses no longer seeing themselves as 
completely dedicated to the causes of patients, physicians and the organization 
(Ray, 1988a). Hence Ray (1988a: 110) believes that ‘the political, legal, and 
economic systems of bureaucracy, although not negative in themselves, dwarf 
the more universal, positive elements of ethico-spiritual-humanistic caring’. To 
this, Ray (1988a: 111) herself makes the call for nurses to ‘work toward the 
construction of deeper levels of meaning of caring knowledge within 
contemporary institutional cultures’. 
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Patricia Benner and Judith Wrubel, are two nursing scholars who have 
featured in the literature on caring in nursing for several decades. Of note is 
their development of a theory of caring in nursing titled ‘the primacy of caring’ 
(Benner and Wrubel, 1989). At the outset of their discussion Benner and 
Wrubel (1989: 1) clarify their definition of caring as, ‘caring ... means that 
persons, events, projects, and things matter to people’. They say that ‘caring is 
a word for being connected and having things matter . . .‘; it ‘. . . sets up the 
conditions that something or someone outside the person matters and creates 
personal concerns’ (Benner and Wrubel, 1989: 1). In this description of caring, 
Benner and Wrubel (1989) make the assertion that caring is primary. It is what 
gives rise to what matters, and what matters gives rise to the response of stress 
and resultant coping. However, Benner and Wrubel (1989) offer no explanation 
about the motive for caring or its individuated quality; caring simply exists. If 
caring gives rise to what matters, why do different things matter differently to 
different people? While linking caring and mattering seems appropriate, their 
explanation of the ideas does not enable the reader to understand the origin of 
caring as they present it, nor the degree of mattering possible nor, moreover, 
that part of mattering that can be considered caring. What is the philosophy 
underlying their position on caring? 
 
It would seem that a more plausible explanation would be that caring and 
mattering exist in a dialectical relationship, that is, ‘mattering’ gives rise to the 
motivation required ‘to care’, and caring involves having an effect on what 
matters. Mattering is what gives rise to stress and coping is the response. 
Moreover, that something matters is what gives care its impetus and force, that 
is, a person cares about or for something or someone because those things 
matter to them. In this way mattering points toward the self while caring points 
away from the self. A person cares about X because X matters to them, and, 
because X matters to a person they are vulnerable to X’s fortunes. For these 
reasons, ‘mattering’ can be considered a prerequisite of caring and that different 
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‘mattering’ gives rise to different types of caring. However, Benner and Wrubel 
do not engage in this type of idea exploration and so it is difficult to fully 
understand their postulates with regard to caring and mattering. Even in this 
epigrammatic examination of the ideas the foundation of mattering remains 
unexplained by them. 
 
Care and caring as described by Benner and Wrubel (1989, Benner, 1994), is a 
requirement of human being, a part of ‘what it is’ to be human. So caring is 
ontological. It is a point also made by Edwards (2001: 168) who states that 
Benner’s and Wrubel’s (1989: 68) claim that ‘caring is the most basic human 
way of being in the world’ supports the interpretation that they are speaking of 
care in terms of an ontological view. These ideas stem from the thinking of the 
philosopher Martin Heidegger (1962) and his concept of ‘Dasein’ which is about 
being-in-the-world, the inescapable reality of being situated in a world that has 
to be dealt with, and that things in that reality matter (Benner and Wrubel, 1989, 
Edwards, 2001). Thus Benner’s and Wrubel’s (1989: xi) claim that ‘caring is a 
basic way of being in the world…‘supports the interpretation that what they are 
speaking about is ontological care which is basic to ‘what it is’ to be human. 
 
As a human trait, caring makes possible people being connected in different 
ways to different things. To this end, Benner and Wrubel (1989: 1) say that 
caring is a term that is used to describe a variety of ‘. . . involvements from 
romantic love to parental love to friendship, from caring for one’s garden to 
caring about one’s work to caring for and about one’s patients’ (Benner and 
Wrubel, 1989: 1). This description suggests they understand care to be an all 
encompassing term, one that describes a range of things that matter to people 
and the different relationships (involvements) they have (Benner and Wrubel, 
1989). The suggestion here is that because the mattering of things differs, so 
the caring that follows also differs; that because things matter to a person and 
that a person cares for and about things, the person caring is vulnerable to the 
 23
fortunes of these things that matter to them. As stated above, Benner and 
Wrubel (1989) believe that caring creates the possibility that things outside of 
a person are of concern, and that this concern gives rise to all sorts of 
involvements (relationships) that create new possibilities, including the 
vulnerability and risk associated with the concern for the fortunes of another. 
They explain this by saying that ‘mattering’ establishes what is meaningful to a 
person, what concerns a person, and what then provides the motivation to act 
in a particular way in the situation that confronts them (Benner and Wrubel, 
1989). Accordingly, caring is understood to be specific and relational, each 
relationship unique in terms of the perceived care required and offered (Benner, 
1984, Benner and Wrubel, 1989). Is it possible that specificity takes their 
concept of caring away from the institutional form to that of love? 
 
At a practical level, Benner and Wrubel (1989) believe that because caring is 
about what matters, it gives birth to stress, the response of coping, and the 
consequence of risk and vulnerability to the self. While there is little discourse 
about their ideas of risk and vulnerability to the self, what is said relates to self 
preservation and the need to moderate one’s responses in order to reduce the 
felt vulnerability and risk. Benner and Wrubel (1989: 2) refer to this as 
‘controlled caring’, where ‘. . . the person dictates fully what matters and 
exercises the freedom to stop caring when the person or project is threatened’. 
As ‘. . . caring is the essential requisite for all coping’, it appears the more 
something ‘matters’ to a person the greater the ability to respond to the 
associated stress, vulnerability and risk to the self (Benner and Wrubel, 1989: 
2). There is an acknowledgement that caring has consequences for the nurse,  
in that the possibilities that caring creates give rise to many and varied feelings, 
from pain and loss to moments of joy and fulfillment (Benner and Wrubel, 
1989). 
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However, contrary to the idea of self preservation as described above, Benner 
and Wrubel (1989) say that, because caring is specific and relational, it enables 
the nurse to focus on the event or person rather than the threat to the self- 
project. This connection and concern for another is what they say is primary in 
caring because it ‘. . . sets up the possibility of giving help and receiving help’, 
and it sets up the conditions for a relationship of trust and feeling of being cared 
for (Benner and Wrubel, 1989: 4). What they appear to be saying is that in 
some situations, a person, by not concentrating on the threat to the self, is able 
to forgo their own good for the sake of another. It is not that the threat to the self 
is not real but simply not acknowledged as a threat. The threat therefore could 
be quite real and result in harm to the self, yet the ability of a person to sacrifice 
their own good is not explicated by Benner and Wrubel (1989), except to say 
that it appears to be dependent on the perceived risk and vulnerability to the 
self. What is more, the relationship one person has with another brings about a 
variety of cares (mattering) that are unique and have significance to those 
involved. Therefore the response of the person caring is dependent on the type 
of relationship, the perceived threat to the self-project, and the possibilities of 
giving and receiving help, which together make explicit what is required by the 
one caring. While this is one explanation, is it equally possible that what matters 
to a person comes from outside of their everyday being in another form? 
 
Sara T. Fry is a nurse academic who a has postulated a view that the value 
foundations of nursing are located within the existential phenomena of human 
caring in the nurse-patient relationship (Fry, 1989a, 1989b). Her scholarship on 
caring incorporates elements of both caring as a human trait and caring as a 
moral imperative (Fry, 1989a, 1989b). Reporting on her early thinking about 
caring, Fry (1989a, 1989b) claims that caring ought to be the foundational value 
of ethics in nursing, and that caring ought to be considered from the moral- 
point-of-view of people, as opposed to some idealized conception of moral 
action, behavior or system of justification. 
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To support her opinion, Fry (1989b) turns to the scholarship of Nel Noddings 
(1984), who says that ethical caring arises from the relation where the nurse 
and patient meet each other morally. It is a relation that is motivated by the 
ideal of caring itself and not an appeal to ethical principals. As such, caring 
represents the attitude of being moral and is not an attitude that begins with 
moral reasoning (Fry, 1989b). Continuing with the ideas of Noddings (1984), 
Fry says, that ethical caring is based on the notions of ‘receptivity’ (confirmation 
by the caregiver of the one cared for), ‘relatedness’ (the relation of the caregiver 
to the other person as a fact of human existence), and ‘responsiveness’ 
(commitment of the caregiver to the one being cared for). For these reasons, 
Fry (1989a, 1989b) supports Noddings’ (1984) belief that an ethic of caring 
represents a theoretical framework that is able to address the realistic nature of 
the nurse-patient relationship; a relationship that is characterized by a nurse’s 
caring being inseparably linked to the patient’s status as a human being (Fry, 
1989a, Fry, 1989b). Together, Fry (1989a, 1989b) and Noddings (1984) claim 
that ethical caring is the relation in which one person meets another morally. 
What is the moral state of being that enables two independent beings to have a 
relation that motivates an ideal of caring? Could love play a part in this relation? 
 
In order to further her thinking about caring, Fry (1989a, 1989b) turns to the 
ideas set out in the moral-point-of-view model (Frankena, 1983). In this model 
caring is understood to be the basis of all normative human judgments (Fry, 
1989b, 1991), that is, caring requires a person to not only accept a particular 
view of morality but to also enter the moral arena itself. It requires a person to 
live out the morality in their life rather than simply accepting a particular view 
(Fry, 1989a, 1989b). 
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The moral-point-of-view model is based on the idea that a person not only 
subscribes to a particular moral perspective but that the attitude or the 
precondition that underlies that perspective is what motivates the taking of the 
moral point of view (Fry, 1989a, 1989b). As such, there is always something 
that moves a person to approve or disapprove of another, which is the attitude 
or precondition that serves to motivate a person, in this case, a nurse (Fry, 
1989a). However, exactly what is meant by the attitude or precondition that 
generates the moral-point-of-view is not explained, a point also made by Fry 
(1989a, 1989b). What is said is that the attitude or precondition ‘. . generates a 
moral-point-of-view of caring or. (Fry, 1989a: 97), as Frankena (1983: 71) in 
Fry (1989a: 97, 1989b: 19, 1991: 164) puts it, ‘a Non-Indifference about what 
happens to persons and conscious sentient beings as such’. 
 
The idea that the attitude or precondition of a person serves to motivate a moral 
point of view seems consistent with the notion postulated earlier that ‘mattering’ 
motivates caring. So there exists in a person an attitude or precondition that 
gives rise to a moral point of view where things, events and persons outside of 
the self matter and thus give rise to differentiated caring. However, this thought- 
provoking analysis does raise some further questions, namely; is it possible that   
a patient may matter to the nurse to the extent that they would give up their own 
welfare for that of the patient; what is the attitude or precondition that would 
enable the nurse or midwife to place the welfare of the patient first; what is the 
extent of the mattering that would enable this to occur; just how far would a 
nurse or midwife go with the things, events and persons outside themselves 
that matter; and, as I repeat, what is the moral state of being of a nurse or 
midwife, the precondition that is able to motivate this ideal of caring? 
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Fry (1989a, 1989b) holds the view that, given the context of nursing practice, 
any theory of nursing ethics must incorporate a recognition of the uniqueness of 
the nurse-patient relationship. Moreover, ‘. . . it should adopt a moral point of 
view that focuses directly on this relationship. . . ‘ a relationship where caring is 
understood to arise from an attitude of respect for the dignity of the patient 
rather than an appeal to moral principles (Fry, 1989b: 20). However, in her later 
scholarship, Fry (1991) acknowledges that she has rethought her ideas on 
caring, which has resulted in an acknowledgment that there is valid reason for 
incorporating ideas about autonomy and beneficence, that dominate medical 
ethics, in a model for nursing, which in her early scholarship she rejected. To 
this end, Fry (1991, 1993) proposes a pluralistic model of caring that includes 
both an obligation and covenant models of caring in nursing. 
 
Specifically, Fry (1991) says that an obligation model of care makes clear the 
types of behavior that can be expected in the nurse-patient relationship. It also 
defines the compassion and the acts of caring in nursing. As she (Fry, 1991: 
165) states, ‘one cares in order to produce some good or to create some benefit 
for another individual’. However, in a note of caution, Fry (1991) says that such  
a model has the limitation of relegating care to an interpretation of human good, 
when, in fact, there are occasions where what is good for a patient is 
undetermined. While there is an acknowledgment that elements of the 
obligation model have relevance to the caring of nursing, it only offers a limited 
explanation (Fry, 1991). 
 
Different to the obligation model is the covenant model. The covenant model 
features the ‘fidelity’ that arises from the covenant made between people who 
stand in particular relationships to one another (Fry, 1991). Accordingly, Fry 
(1991, 1993) claims that authentic nurse caring is not based on what is good for   
a patient, but on the maintenance of the fidelity between them. 
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In proposing a pluralistic model, Fry (1991) is able to incorporate elements of 
each model, the compassion and doing for others of the obligation model and 
respect for persons and protection of human dignity contained in the nurse- 
patient relationship of the covenant model (Fry, 1991). Combining these ideas, 
Fry (1991) says, makes possible the development of theory about caring in 
nursing, that is, theory that acknowledges caring as a mode of being and part of 
the natural state of human existence and human relatedness, theory that 
acknowledges the attitude or precondition of caring, which gives rise to a moral 
point of view, and theory that acknowledges the moral and social ideals of 
caring that are embedded in the health care context in which nursing functions 
(Fry, 1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1993). Thus, according to Fry (1991, 1993), caring is 
both a moral phenomenon and also a human phenomenon, that if brought 
together in a practical ethic of human caring, will provide guidance for nursing 
practice. While on the surface this may seem plausible the philosophy 
underpinning these views has not been forthcoming by Fry. The moral and 
human phenomenon that enables caring in nursing and midwifery is little more 
than an interesting idea. 
 
A more specific critique of the thesis of Fry (1989a) is offered by the 
philosopher Howard Curzer (1993). While not reporting here on the entirety of 
his critique, of particular note is his belief that Fry fails to present a plausible 
argument for how the concept of care can be used as a foundation on which to 
build an ethics of nursing that is different to ethics in general and also the ethics 
of specific disciplines, such as medicine. What is more, he says that Fry’s use 
of the thinking of Noddings (1984) and Frankena (1983) is misguided and, 
rather than supporting her basic thesis, they work against it. Especially when 
Frankena (1983), speaks about care as universal care which is consistent with 
mainstream ethics as opposed to a specific discipline. What is more, Curzer 
(1993) says that if care means non-indifference, it does not support Fry’s thesis 
that care is a central concept for nursing ethics. 
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Care, as spoken of by Frankena (1983), is a universal concept and one that is 
familiar to any branch of ethics. While the role of care in each branch of ethics 
would differ, the central concept would be the same. Curzer (1993) says that 
this trivializes Fry’s thesis that care is a central concept for nursing ethics. 
Second, care as described by Noddings (1984) involves emotional attachment, 
which Curzer (1993) says presents nursing with significant problems, because if 
accepted, it could be argued that care is a vice rather than a virtue because it 
can foster favoritism, injustice, inefficiency, lack of objectivity, and burnout. 
Curzer (1993) suggests that it is perhaps more accurate to understand care as   
a virtue and a disposition that enables relationships to be formed and 
maintained with the ‘right people’, with the ‘right feeling’, for the ‘right reason’. 
Here the ‘right people’ means those patients who the nurse has a relationship 
(Curzer, 1993). The ‘right feeling’ is not related to equal, minimal, or massive 
emotional attachment of a patient to a nurse, it is less (Curzer, 1993). The ‘right 
reason’ for caring is neither merely a means to an end but rather both a means 
and an end (Curzer, 1993). Thus Curzer (1993) believes that rather than 
applying the ideas of Noddings (1984), which involve emotional attachment in 
caring, it would be more accurate to speak of a caring relationship as something 
that involves friendship. Curzer (1993) suggests that the concept of friendship, 
rather than caring, is central to nursing ethics. With these thoughts in mind, 
perhaps it would be more plausible to develop an understanding of the moral 
and human phenomenon that enables caring in nursing and midwifery, as 
opposed to an ethics of nursing. 
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Anne Boykin and Savina 0. Schoenhofer are two nurse scholars who have 
developed a theory of Nursing as Caring, which is premised on the idea that ‘.. 
all persons are caring’ (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 2001b: 1). They say ‘caring is 
an altruistic, active expression of love, and is the intentional and embodied 
recognition of value and connectedness’ (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 2001a: 
392). While much of their discourse relates to this definition there is no obvious 
explanation that says how caring is altruistic or an active expression of love; nor 
do they explain the nature of human connectedness that is caring. 
 
Boykin and Schoenhofer (2001b, 2003) write that caring is an essential 
characteristic and an expression of being human. The idea postulated is that 
being a person means living caring, because they say that it is through caring 
that our being becomes known (Schoenhofer and Boykin, 1998b, Boykin and 
Schoenhofer, 2001b, 2003). In this conception of caring, caring is said to be a 
process where over time each of us grows in our innate ability to express our 
self (fundamentally, potentially, and actually) as caring (Boykin and 
Schoenhofer, 2001b, Schoenhofer and Boykin, 1998b). It is an ideal to which 
we aspire and one that has its origins in our commitments, or more 
fundamentally our beliefs, to which we are devoted (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 
2001b). For Boykin and Scheonhofer (2001b), it is our commitments as a caring 
person, or at least an awareness of them, that directs the ‘oughts’ of our actions 
and makes caring as presented here, ethical (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 2001 b). 
 
Caring is understood to involve the authenticity of the carer, which is who I am  
as a caring person in the moment of the relation, and encapsulates the   
relational responsibilities understood in living caring (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 
2001b). According to Boykin and Scheonhofer (2001b: 4), ‘when being with self 
and others is approached from a desire to know the person as living caring, the 
human potential for actualizing caring directs the moment’. Therefore, the more a 
person develops knowledge of their caring, or put another way, the more they 
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authentically care about themselves and others, the more they are able to be 
aware of the interconnectedness of caring persons and truly be with the another 
person in the fullness of their being (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 2001b). 
 
If caring is, as they say, an ideal to which we aspire and one that has its origins 
in our commitments and beliefs to which we are devoted, is there a limit to what  
I would do as a nurse in acting out my devotion to caring for another? It is 
unclear what the interconnectedness of humans is that has one person 
committed to the extent of having relational responsibilities for another person. 
This description of caring hints at there being no limits to the responsibility one 
person has for another. Should this be the case, would that responsibility 
equate to caring or would it be something else, that is, not only what I as a 
caring person may feel I ought to do as a response to my commitment to 
another person but also what I must do? So, where the interconnectedness of 
the nurse and the patient is of the quality of being present to each other in the 
fullness of their being, what their responsibility is to each other is less than 
obvious. 
 
In applying these ideas to the nursing context, Boykin and Scheonhofer (2001b) 
say that the relationships of nursing are of a covenant nature and emphasize 
personal engagement and the freedom of the individuals to choose their 
commitments. Such relations, they claim, authentically represent the bond 
between the nurse and patient because ‘nursing as caring reflects an 
appreciation of persons in the fullness of personhood within the context of the 
nursing situation’ (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 2001b: 8). 
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Nursing as caring gives rise to nurturing relationships, where both the nurse 
and the patient engage in living out their caring as whole beings, and in doing 
so, create new possibilities for their growth (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 2001a, 
2001b, Schoenhofer and Boykin, 1998b). In other words, the nurse engages a 
relation with the patient with the intention of knowing them as a caring person 
and then responds by creating appropriate ways of knowing and of offering 
nurturance that are consistent with their uniqueness and the situation at hand 
(Schoenhofer et al., 1998a, Schoenhofer and Boykin, 1998b, Boykin and 
Schoenhofer, 2001a, 2003). Using Boykin’s and Scheonhofer’s (2001b, 2001a) 
terminology, it is through the nurse and the patient ‘living caring and growing in 
caring’ that the nurse is able to know the patient and therefore better able to 
identify the ‘call for nursing’. As Boykin and Scheonhofer (2001a, 2001b) write, 
the call for nursing is a call for ‘caring nurturance’, which gives rise to specific 
caring responses that are aimed at improving the situation of the patient. While 
the idea of ‘living out caring’ suggests there is a moral quality to it, this is not 
identified. 
 
According to Boykin and Schoenhofer (2001b, 1998), in order to achieve such 
‘caring nurturance’, the nurse must be willing to risk entering the patients world 
and equally the patient must be willing to allow the nurse into their world if the 
nurse is to come to understand how they can be supported, sustained, and 
strengthened in their unique ways of living and growing in caring. It is where the 
nurse brings to the relation their knowledge of the person as a unique being that  
is then applied to the situation in which the person is located so making the 
caring unique (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 2001a, 2001b). ‘A call to nursing is for 
specific forms of caring that acknowledge, affirm, and sustain the other as they 
strive to live caring uniquely’ (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 2001b: 18). As a result, 
the nurse comes to know the patient in ever deepening ways that enable the 
caring to be specifically tailored to their situation (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 
2001b). However, in this explanation one is left to speculate on what is the 
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content of the ‘call’ to nursing. 
 
In such a relation there is a presence that develops between the nurse and 
patient, which Boykin and Scheonhofer (2001a, 2001b) call ‘authentic presence’ 
because it captures the idea that the nurse is intentionally being with the patient  
in the fullness of their personhood. The caring that results through ‘authentic 
presence’ is said to be the initiating and sustaining medium of nursing the 
person of the patient (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 2001b). It results in a specific 
expression of caring nurturance that is aimed at sustaining and enhancing the 
welfare of the patient. This response evolves as the nurse clarifies their 
understanding of the call to nursing through presence and dialogue (Boykin and 
Schoenhofer, 2001a). While the activity of ‘authentic presence’ is spoken about, 
the foundation that makes possible this type of relation is not. In this theory of 
caring, why does a nurse seek out this type of a relation with the patient when 
they are first a self-project? 
 
According to this view of caring, the nurse’s responses are unique and created 
for the moment and involve sensitivity and skill in communicating caring (Boykin 
and Schoenhofer, 2001a). The nurse-patient relation is one in which each 
encounters the other, which Boykin and Scheonhofer (2001a, 2001b) say is the 
ground for nursing, what they label ‘caring between’. This ‘caring between’, they 
believe ‘is the loving relation into which nurse and nursed enter and cocreate by 
living the intention to care’. Where expressing self and recognizing the other as    
a caring person occurs, it is what enables nursing to be lived out in its fullest 
sense (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 2001a: 394). However, the relation of love to 
caring is ill-defined. Furthermore, it seems ‘caring between’ requires two people 
who are willing and able to establish a relation that is of love but there is no 
clear description of the loving relation that is made possible by a ‘caring 
intention’. While the theory involves the idea of reciprocity this also is not 
discussed. 
 34
So not to be confused, their claim is not that caring is unique to nursing but that 
caring is uniquely expressed in nursing because of the relation and the context 
in which it occurs (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 2001b). As Boykin and 
Scheonhofer (2001b: 19) say, ‘nursing another means living out a commitment 
to knowing the other as caring person and responding to the caring other as 
someone of value’. All in all, their theory of Nursing as Caring focuses on the 
idea of personal theorizing about caring experiences, trusting that each person 
will examine the content of those experiences as they come to know 
themselves as caring person’s (Boykin and Schoenhofer, 2001b). While this 
description of caring places the relation between the nurse and patient centre 
stage it seems to rely on there being a reciprocity of caring. However, there are 
occasions in nursing and midwifery where the relation between the nurse and 
midwife and patient will not be reciprocal instead it will be one-sided such as in   
a case where the patient is unconscious, uncooperative, or unable to participate 
because of some type of debility such as a mental health problem. Nonetheless 
caring is still said to have occurred. Together these ideas suggest there is a 
moral element that underpins caring in nursing and midwifery. The question that 
remains is what might this moral foundation be that enables a relation to be 
one-sided where there is no reciprocity; might it be love? 
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Milton Mayeroff is an intellectual who is often cited in the early scholarship of 
caring in nursing but it is to be noted that his theory of caring is a generalized 
description and not specific to nursing. For Mayeroff (1971), caring is 
considered a process of which its content is in the present. It is a way of relating 
to another person that helps them grow and actualize their self. In this view, 
caring is a means to an end in that it is specifically aimed at helping another 
grow, that is, in order to be caring a person one must be able to relate to 
another person in such a way that the other person is seen as an extension of 
their self (Mayeroff, 1971). However, this union of self and other that Mayeroff 
(1971) speaks about is a union of separate beings and one that is respectful of 
their integrity. It is a respectfulness that is characterized by a focus on the other 
person’s growth, and while bound up with ones own sense of well-being, is not 
the motivation for ones action nor is it the source of ones satisfaction because 
the focus is on the other person. 
 
In terms of nursing, the relatedness of caring has the nurse identify the potential 
in the patient for growth and the nurse’s need to satisfy those growth needs. It 
is as though the nurse has been entrusted with the care of the patient, which 
causes the nurse to respond to the needs of the patient in a way that is guided 
by those needs for growth and not the nurse’s interpretation of them (Mayeroff, 
1971 ). As Mayeroff (1971 : 5) states; 
‘any direction that I may give the other is governed by my respect for its 
integrity and is intended to further its growth, and I show that respect by 
the interest I take in determining whether my actions do in fact further 
growth and by being guided by what I find’. 
 
Hence caring requires commitment to an unforeseeable future. It requires our 
devotion because devotion, Mayeroff (1971: 5-6) believes, is shown by our 
being ‘there’ for the other, which expresses itself in our willingness and our 
persistence to overcome difficulties and is an expression of our will. 
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What is more, this devotion that Mayeroff (1971 : 6) speaks about, gives rise to   
a particular type of obligation. It is; 
‘a constituent element in caring, and I do not experience them as forced 
on me or as necessary evils; there is convergence between what I feel I 
am supposed to do and what I want to do’. 
 
To exemplify this point, Mayeroff (1971) says, it is like the father who takes his 
child to the doctor in the middle of the night; he does not see it as a burden 
because he is simply caring for his child. Thus Mayeroff believes that in order 
for a nurse to care for a person they must be able to engage in a relationship 
that is motivated out of respect for the integrity of that person and one that is 
characterized by the nurse’s commitment, perseverance, selflessness, devotion 
and willingness to do what is required in order to respond to their needs for 
growth. 
 
From this description it appears that there is no limit to how far a nurse may go 
in acting out their commitment, perseverance, selflessness, devotion and 
willingness to do what ever is needed to assist the growth of another. It is 
different for each person because how far the nurse will go is governed by the 
nurse’s respect for the integrity of the patient. While the example above of the 
father caring for his child supports these ideas, it also hints at there being 
something more to the relation that is other than caring. In the example offered 
by Mayeroff, where it is stated that the father is simply caring for his child, an 
alternative perspective can be postulated; it equally could be said that the father 
cares for his child because he loves his child. Loving his child is the reason that 
he is able to care the way that he does, he cares for his child in a way that is 
without limit — there is nothing he would not do for his child in fostering its 
growth, even the sacrifice of his own welfare. What is not spoken of here is the 
relationship of love to caring, in this case, the respect of the integrity of the 
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other that love requires. 
 
At a more practical level, Mayeroff (1971) believes that because caring involves 
helping another person to grow, it therefore requires encouragement and 
assistance for them to care for themselves. It requires help for that other person 
to become responsive to their own needs and to be responsible for their own 
life (Mayeroff, 1971). In nursing it requires the nurse to know something about 
themselves and the patient such as their needs, strengths, and limitations. It 
requires the nurse to possess the ability to be reflective of their success or 
failure in helping the patient, so in the future they can better help the patient 
(Mayeroff, 1971). To this end, Mayeroff (1971: 12-20) identifies several 
ingredients he believes are necessary for caring, they comprise; 
• Patience: ‘Patience is not waiting passively for something to happen, 
but is a kind of participation with the other in which we give fully of 
ourselves’ (Mayeroff, 1971: 12). 
• Honesty: ‘Honesty is present in caring as something positive, and not as   
a matter of not doing something, not telling lies or not deliberately 
deceiving others.’ ‘To be honest with oneself. To care for the other I must 
see the other as it is and not as I would like it to be or feel it must be. If 
I am to help the other grow, I must respond to its changing needs’. 
(Mayeroff, 1971: 13) 
• Trust: ‘Caring involves trusting the other to grow in its own time and in 
its own way. It appreciates the independent existence of the other, that 
the other is other’ ‘Trusting the other is to let go; it includes an element 
of risk and a leap into the unknown, both of which take courage’. 
(Mayeroff, 1971: 14-15) 
• Humility: ‘Being always ready to learn about the other. That an others 
existence is for them and not for our purposes’. (Mayeroff, 1971 : 17) 
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• Hope: ‘ . . . it is rather an expression of the plenitude of the present, a 
present alive with a sense of the possible’. ‘It is hope for the realization of 
the other through my caring...’. (Mayeroff, 1971: 19) 
• Courage: ‘Trust in the other to grow and in my own ability to care gives 
me courage to go into the unknown, but it is also true that without the 
courage to go into the unknown such trust would be impossible 
(Mayeroff, 1971: 20). 
It is these personal qualities, Mayeroff (1971) suggests, that are central to 
successful caring for another person. Nonetheless how they relate to nursing is 
a matter of interpretation. 
 
Mayeroff (1971) also believes that for caring to exist there must be selflessness 
on the part of the carer. This is not a selflessness that is typified by a demise of 
one’s own project but ‘a selflessness that goes with being absorbed in 
something I find genuinely interesting, that goes with being more myself’ 
(Mayeroff, 1971). It is a selflessness that is characterized by a heightened 
awareness, a greater responsiveness to both the other person and oneself, and 
the fuller use of one’s distinctive powers that help the other person grow, which  
at the same time, also helps one’s own growth (Mayeroff, 1971). Or, put 
differently; 
‘by using powers like trust, understanding, courage, responsibility, 
devotion, and honesty I grow also; and I am able to bring such powers 
into play because my interest is focused on the other’. (Mayeroff, 1971: 
21-22) 
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Of note is that the selflessness inherent in caring is made possible because of 
the ability of a person to be absorbed in something outside of their own project. 
While the selflessness Mayeroff speaks about may result in a cost to the self, 
because of their absorption in the other, it is not interpreted by them as 
something lost, but just the opposite. It is something gained, for it enables them  
to do what they want to do in being more themselves. It appears that the 
selflessness of caring has a net benefit for both the self and the other. How 
does this explain those actions of a person where their selflessness or 
absorption in the other is to a level where there is a demise of their own being? 
Is this still caring? For example, is it caring if a person jumps off a bridge into 
the raging water to save a person when they cannot swim, or is it something 
else? Can the selflessness of caring be of this quality, where there is neither an 
expectation of reciprocity nor concern for their own welfare? How is it possible  
to place the welfare of another before the self as its project? 
 
However, given Mayeroff is not theorizing specifically about nursing, application 
of these ideas is cautioned, as Mayeroff suggests that caring requires a degree 
of competency on the part of the one caring. For example; 
‘if I am to care for the other, I must be able to cope with it; I must be up to 
caring for it… I must be capable of caring for this other’. (Mayeroff, 
1971:24) 
 
This is a point that would sit comfortably with any professional nurse or midwife 
in that a prerequisite of caring is professional competency. On the other hand, 
Mayeroff (1971) contends that a necessary prerequisite of caring is the capacity 
for the other person to ‘grow’ and if this is not possible then the suggestion is 
that caring may also not be possible. 
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‘If caring is to take place, not only are certain actions and attitudes on my 
part necessary, but there must also be developmental changes in the 
other as a result of what I do; I must actually help the other grow’. 
(Mayeroff, 1971: 28) 
 
While the term ‘growth’ is not specifically defined, it would appear that it is 
related to developmental growth, which is supported by his offering of the 
example of tending a person with extensive brain damage who is ‘unable to 
grow in any meaningful sense’. The claim is that while the nurse may be 
interested in helping this person’s welfare, they cannot care for him in the sense 
of helping him grow, therefore caring cannot take place. While consistent with 
his idea that caring is helping a person grow toward self-actualization, it seems 
that this definition limits caring to a physical helping role that has no existential 
capacity. 
 
Although tenets of Mayeroffs theory on caring may have relevance to a 
profession like nursing and midwifery, other components, as mentioned above, 
do not apply. Mayeroff’s theory is about caring in general and therefore the 
application of the ideas contained within this theory to nursing and midwifery 
should be seen in this light. In terms of this theory of caring, little can be said 
about how it makes known caring that is specific to nursing and midwifery 
because some of its elements fall short of offering an adequate explanation of 
the situations confronting nurses and midwives. 
 
Jean Watson is a nursing scholar who offers a ‘Theory of Human Care’ that 
has as its central tenet, caring as an intersubjective human process and the 
moral ideal of nursing (Watson, 1985). In response to this belief, Watson (1979,   
1985, 1988, 2001, 2003) identified 10 ‘carative factors’ that were later 
restructured to include more the spiritual dimension and an overt evocation of 
love and caring that is now labelled ‘clinical caritas processes’. It is ‘clinical 
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caritas’ or ‘caritas processes’ that Watson (2001) believes better attends to the 
intersubjectivity of human-to-human relatedness and the infinity and mystery of 
the human condition, but more on this later. As an overview, Watson’s (1996, 
2001) ‘Theory of Human Care’ consists of three essential elements, (1) the 
transpersonal caring relationship, (2) ‘clinical caritas process’ (formerly ‘carative 
factors’), and (3) the caring occasion/caring moment that together focus on the 
human-to-human encounter between the nurse and the patient that reflects 
their shared humanity. As Watson says, ‘the theory is about a different way of 
being human, a different way of being present, attentive, conscious, and 
intentional as the nurse works with another person’ (Fawcett, 2002: 215). 
 
More specifically, Watson’s (1985) conception of transpersonal caring holds that 
all humans are in relationship to each other and morally committed to the 
protection and enhancement of each others dignity. It is a relationship that has 
an individual move beyond their ego self and the specific moment to deeper 
connections of a more spiritual type (Watson, 1999, 2001, 2003). As Watson 
(2001: 347) says; 
‘transpersonal caring seeks to connect with and embrace the spirit or 
soul of the other, through the processes of caring and healing and being 
in authentic relation, in the moment’. 
 
In other words, people engage in what Watson (1996: 151) describes as a 
‘special kind of relationship’ that is typified by high regard for the whole person 
and their being-in-the-world. It is a ‘spontaneous’ relationship, one 
characterised by what is called a ‘caring moment’, which is where the nurse and 
the patient enter the ‘lived experience’ of each other and connect with the 
infinity of their humanity (Watson, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2003), that is, the nurse 
forms a; 
‘... union with the other person on a level that transcends the physical, 
and that preserves the subjectivity and physicality of persons without 
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reducing them to the moral status of object’. (Watson, 1985: 68) 
 
Watson (1996) says that in the ‘caring moment’ there is a ‘caring 
consciousness’ where the nurse is able to detect the patient’s condition and so 
respond. Hence transpersonal caring not only influences the caring 
consciousness of the nurse, a consciousness that focuses on the uniqueness of 
self and other, it goes beyond the ego-self and the present to a deeper, spiritual 
and cosmic level of concern and connectedness that Watson (1996, 2001, 
Watson, 2003) believes makes possible alternative or new forms of healing. 
However, one is left to question the accord of a consciousness of caring that 
enables a nurse and midwife to have a say in caring as dictated by an ego 
concerned about its self and the caring that issues from beyond the ego-self 
where the self is not a concern. 
 
Equally, the ideas contained in transpersonal caring could help explain existing 
nursing encounters that appear on the surface to be something different to the 
general conceptualisation of everyday caring. What is more, it is postulated that 
the uniting or the coming together of people through transpersonal caring frees 
them from the feeling of isolation and separation, because the union of feelings 
enables self-healing, discovery of inner power and control, and the personal 
meaning of existence (Watson, 1985). Watson (1990) believes that it is 
essential that the inseparable connections between people and nature be 
acknowledged if expanding the ontology of personhood beyond identifying the 
other as object and as separate from others and nature is to be achieved. 
Accordingly, Watson has identified that the transpersonal relation of the nurse 
and the patient is more than a relation of caring for it also includes love, but 
exactly what Watson understands as love is at this point not fully explained in 
her theory. Notable though is the fact that she has restructured her theory of 
transpersonal caring and has care and love on an equal footing in the 
description of the nurse-patient relation. 
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In view of this, the second element to the ‘Theory of Human Care’ is what was 
originally called the ‘carative factors’ now reconceptualised and presented as 
‘clinical caritas processes’ and the means for achieving transpersonal caring 
(Watson, 1985, 1996, 2001). While in her original work Watson (1996) does not 
claim the ‘carative factors’ as new, she does claim her model offers a language 
and structure for practising transpersonal caring. Both the original ‘carative 
factors’ and newly defined ‘clinical caritas processes’ characterise the human 
caring and loving process that occurs during a caring occasion; where the nurse 
and patient share an intention, a will, a relationship and actions that 
demonstrate their commitment to caring and loving as a moral ideal aiming to 
preserve humanity (Watson, 1979, 1985, 1988, 1996, 2001). 
 
In her new conception of the ‘Theory of Human Care’, Watson (2001) says that 
the replacement of the carative factors with ‘clinical caritas’ or ‘caritas 
processes’ enables ideas of love and caring to come together in a new 
understanding of transpersonal caring. It harnesses the idea that nursing is a 
life-giving and life-receiving enterprise and one that invites us into new 
relationships with ourselves, thinking about life, nursing, and our relationships 
with others (Watson, 2001). Thus the ‘clinical caritas processes’ represent the 
‘core’ of nursing and the utility of the caring-loving process. They are those 
aspects of nursing that actually potentiate therapeutic healing processes and 
relationships affecting both the one caring and the one-being-cared-for that are 
actualised in the moment where the nurse is being with the patient (Watson, 
1997, 1985, 1988, 2001). 
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Watson’s (2001 ) ‘clinical caritas processes’ differs from her original ‘carative 
factors’ in that they contain an obvious spiritual dimension and overt evocation  
of love that the ‘carative factors’ did not. However, similar to comment made 
above, further elaboration of the content of the ‘clinical caritas processes’, in 
particular, the caring-loving process, is needed if they are to provide nurses and 
midwives with a clear account of how these ideas of caring and love apply to 
the practice of nursing and midwifery. 
 
Watson’s (2001 : 347) 10 ‘clinical caritas processes’ comprise: 
1. The practice of loving kindness and equanimity within the context of 
caring consciousness. 
2. Being authentically present, and enabling and sustaining the deep belief 
system and subjective life world of self and one-being-cared-for. 
3. The cultivation of one’s own spiritual practices and transpersonal self, 
going beyond ego self, opening to others with sensitivity and 
compassion. 
4. The development and sustenance of a helping-trusting, authentic caring 
relationship. 
5. Being present to, and supportive of, the expression of positive and 
negative feelings as a connection with the deeper spirit of self and the 
one-being-cared-for. 
6. The creative use of self and all ways of knowing as part of the caring 
process; to engage in the artistry of caring-healing practices. 
7. Engaging in a genuine teaching-learning experience that attends to unity  
of being and meaning; attempting to stay within others’ frame of 
reference. 
8. Creating a healing environment at all levels (physical as well as non- 
physical, subtle environment of energy and consciousness, whereby 
wholeness, beauty, comfort, dignity, and peace are potentate). 
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9. Assisting with basic needs, with an intentional caring consciousness, 
administering “human care essentials,” which potentate alignment of 
mindbodyspirit, wholeness, and unity of being in all aspects of care, 
tending to both embodied spirit and evolving spiritual emergence. 
10. Opening and attending to the spiritual-mysterious, and existential 
dimensions of one’s own life-death; soul care for self and the one-being-
cared-for. 
 
The third element to Watson’s ‘Theory of Human Care’ embodies ideas that 
surround the concept of ‘human care transactions’ and includes the ‘actual 
caring occasion’, ‘intersubjective caring occasion’, and ‘transpersonal caring 
moment’ (Sourial, 1996). As Watson (1985: 58) states: 
‘transpersonal human care and caring transactions are those scientific, 
professional, ethical, yet aesthetic, creative and personalized giving- 
receiving behaviors and responses between two people (nurse and 
other) that allow for contact between the subjective world of the 
experiencing persons (through physical, mental, or spiritual routes or 
some combination thereof)’. 
It is these human care processes that make possible human care transactions, 
or to use Watson’s language, the engagement of ‘caritas processes’ in an 
‘actual caring occasion’ makes possible an ‘intersubjective caring occasion’ 
where a ‘transpersonal caring moment’ can occur (Watson, 1985, 2001). As 
Watson (2001 : 348) says; 
‘the nurse seeks to recognise, accurately detect and connect with the 
inner condition of spirit of another through genuine presencing and being 
centered in the caring moment; actions, words, behaviours, cognition, 
body language, feelings, intuition, thought, senses, the energy field and 
so on, all contribute to transpersonal caring connection’. 
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It is where the nurse and patient come together and present each other with the 
opportunity to choose how to be in the relationship - what to do with and in the 
moment of their meeting (Watson, 1985, 2001). The suggestion here is that 
there is a consciousness associated with the meeting of the subjectivity of the 
nurse and the patient. While this may be true, it does not help explain the 
proposal of a primordial relation where as a consequence of the nurse-patient 
relation the nurse acts without thinking or being aware of a choice about what to 
do with and in the moment of their meeting. Watson (2001, 2003) also says that 
should the caring occasion be transpersonal, the nurse and the patient will feel 
a connection at the spiritual level of their being which enables deeper levels of 
love and caring than that of mere physical interaction. The time of nurse-patient 
coming together and the subsequent decision regarding the type of relationship 
to be formed is the time when a transpersonal caring moment can occur 
(Watson, 2001). As such, transpersonal human care is said to happen from 
person to person in an I-Thou relationship that is based on the notion of 
reciprocity where there is symmetry of attitudes, and responsibilities (Watson, 
1985, 2001). For the nurse the task becomes one of responding to the humanity  
of the patient, which Watson (2002) says is the ultimate goal of nursing and 
nurses. Transpersonal human caring enables both the nurse and the patient to 
engage each others subjectivity, but should they not wish to do this they run the 
risk of being reduced to the level of object (Watson, 1985). While the motive of 
reciprocity underpins the mutuality involved in the nurse-patient relationship, the 
motive underpinning the quality of the relationship decided on between the 
nurse and the patient is unclear. Does the connection at the spiritual level, for 
example, have to be something felt and is the basis of the relation necessarily 
always one of reciprocity with symmetry of attitudes and responsibilities or 
could it also be a primordial meeting of our being’s subjectivity where there is 
asymmetry of responsibility and no expectation of reciprocity? Could this 
primordial responsibility be a form of love? 
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As mentioned above, in her later work, Watson (1999) extends her theorizing 
about transpersonal caring to focus more on the spiritual aspect of caring, in 
particular, ‘being-in-relation and its associated multi-dimensions and planes of 
existence in the universe’ (Watson, 1999: 97). In this expanded conception of 
transpersonal caring Watson (1999) says that caring is an explicit global 
ontology of being-in-relation and the moral starting point to caring for self, 
others, nature and the universe. What is more, it requires a unity of caring 
consciousness that comprises mind-body-spirit and nature, and ‘cosmology of 
oneness of consciousness’ (Watson, 1999: 97). It is where both the nurse and 
the patient are able to use the universal energy field or universal spirit and its 
associated healing potentials and wholeness (Watson, 1999). To this end 
Watson (1999: 111) believes that; 
• ‘The whole caring-healing consciousness is contained within a 
single caring moment. 
• The one-caring and the one-being-cared-for are interconnected; 
caring and healing are connected to other humans and to the 
higher/deeper energy of the universe. 
• Human caring-healing processes (or the non-caring, non-healing 
consciousness of the nurses or other practitioner) are 
communicated to the one-being-cared-for. 
• Caring-healing consciousness is spatially extended; such 
consciousness exists through space. 
• Caring-healing consciousness is temporally extended; such 
consciousness exists through time. 
• Caring-healing consciousness is dominant over physical illness 
and treatment’. 
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Accordingly, Watson’s (1999) ideas about ‘transpersonal caring-healing’ are 
more than that which occurs between people, it goes beyond the individual to a 
unitary connectedness that incorporates both the metaphysical and spiritual 
dimension, transcends time and space and physicality and can result in new 
possibilities for healing and wholeness. However, given the somewhat nebulous 
nature of her theory it is not surprising that this work has attracted some 
criticism. Critics make various observations of the ideals postulated by Watson 
saying that the language used is often unclear and the linkage of ideals not 
easy to follow, which together make the notions contained within the theory 
hard for clinicians to understand, apply, and achieve (Barker and Reynolds, 
1994, Cohen, 1991 , Kuhse, 1993, Morse et al.,1991, Sourial, 1996). Perhaps 
Watson herself acknowledges that there is some validity in these criticisms as 
her new scholarship is directed toward developing trans-theoretical discourse 
that, in her words, will allow ‘for some necessary convergence of extant theories 
to better solidify and inform nursing’s metaparadigm’ (Fawcett, 2002: 219, 
Watson and Smith, 2002: 460). Whether this will provide more clarity of ideas 
about her theory and scholarship is yet to be seen. 
 
However, in terms of this scholarship a further criticism can be made of 
Watson’s ‘Theory of Human Care’ as it relates to the use of the terms ‘love and 
caring’ as presented in one of the basic premises on which her theory has been 
developed. Watson (1985:50) states that she believes; 
‘People need each other in a caring, loving way. Love and caring are two 
universal givens. To paraphrase Teilhard de Chardin, “Love (and care) 
are the most universal, the most tremendous, and the most mysterious of 
cosmic forces. . . It is the primal and universal psychic energy.” These 
needs are often overlooked, or even though we know we need one 
another in a loving and caring way, we do not behave well toward each 
other. If our humanness is to survive we need to become more loving, 
caring, and moral to nourish our humanity, advance as a civilisation, and 
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live together. As a beginning we have to impose our own will to love, 
care, and be moral upon our own behaviour, not on others’ behaviour. 
We need to love, respect, care for ourselves, and treat ourselves with 
dignity, before we can respect, love and care for others and treat them 
with dignity’. 
 
As illustrated in this seminal work, Watson (1985) does not explain in any depth 
the meaning behind the use of the terms care and love. For example, the word 
love has numerous meanings and forms of common use that make it a concept 
that is easily misinterpreted when applied to the ideas presented in this theory. 
This problem is further exacerbated when two such confusable terms (love and 
care) are used together. In the later development of her theory, where Watson 
(2001) introduced the idea of ‘clinical caritas processes’, and placed love on an 
equal footing to caring, the concept of love and its relation to care or loving 
caring processes remain subject to this potential confusion. For example, in the 
‘clinical caritas process’ ‘practicing loving kindness’ suggests that love may be 
linked to the idea of goodness which leads one to question the origin of the 
kindness that is practiced as loving by a professional nurse or midwife. 
Similarly, in her (Watson, 2003) more recent scholarship, the terms ‘love and 
caring’ continue to be used together suggesting they are inseparable; one 
cannot be caring without being loving and visa versa. For example, Watson 
(Watson, 2003: 199) says ‘by attending to, honoring, entering into, [and] 
connecting with our deep humanity, we find the ethic and artistry of being, 
loving, and caring’. In this conception, love and caring are presented as the 
means for living out our humanity, but again, just what the content of love and 
caring is at this point in time is not fully explained. 
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These criticisms aside, this scholarship provides a general explanation of the 
inclusion of ‘love and caring’ in nursing and midwifery, as for example, the; 
‘…relationship between love and caring connotes inner healing for self 
and others, extending to nature and the larger universe, unfolding and 
evolving within a cosmology that is both metaphysical and transcendent 
with the coevolving human in the universe’. (Watson, 2001: 345) 
 
Given that these ideas are new to Watson’s thinking, it is reasonable to expect 
that they will be explicated in further detail in the future, which in part, has 
begun (Watson, 2003). In this later publication, Watson (Watson, 2003) clarifies 
her thinking about love by suggesting that love is something that occurs as part 
of the process of caring, such as a ‘loving presence’ in caring. Here, love is 
presented as a way of being in the caring moment and an expression of our 
humanity (Watson, 2003), but her statement ‘perhaps it is love that underpins 
and connects us. . . ‘ is yet more evidence that her ideas about love as they 
relate to her theory of caring are still evolving (Watson, 2003: 200). 
 
Katie Eriksson is a nurse scholar who has developed a theory of caring in 
nursing that takes the view that caring is the essence and central focus of 
nursing practice (Eriksson, 1990a, 1991, 1992e, 1992d, 1997b, 1997a). 
Explicating Eriksson’s theory is made somewhat difficult because much of her 
scholarship is reported in the Scandinavian literature with only a small amount 
published in the English language. However, it is clear from available writings 
that she promotes the search for knowledge that looks for answers to 
ontological questions that surround what is the ‘. . . inmost being of caring reality’ 
(Eriksson, 2002: 62). She (Eriksson, 1990b, 1991 , 1992e,1992b) uses motive 
research to identify the ontology of caring, for as she says, ontology deals with 
exiting entities in a certain reality that makes possible the identification of the 
fundamental characteristics of caring, and in this case, caring in nursing. To this 
end, Eriksson supports the development of ‘caring science’ and has postulated 
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a theory of caring (incorporating ideas about love), that is based on the 
assumption that the aim of caring is to alleviate the suffering of the other person 
through the promotion of healing and health (Eriksson, 1990b, 1992a, 1994, 
2002, Naden and Eriksson, 2000). 
 
What is more, her theory of caring is situated in an ontological model of health 
which consists of three dimensions, ‘health as behaviour’, ‘health as being’, and 
‘health as becoming’ (Eriksson, 1994). ‘Health as behavior’ relates to the idea of 
having health, where to be healthy is to have some objective criteria applied to 
oneself that enables judgment to be made about the state of being alive 
(Eriksson, 1994). For example, living in a healthy way by demonstrating health 
supporting behaviors that are aimed at ‘having health’, such as regular health 
assessments to check against problems of illness. Eriksson (1994) comments 
that the extreme of this dimension of health is that people can become totally 
focused on illness prevention to the point of avoiding anything that could 
threaten their health. 
 
The concept of ‘health as being’ is different to health as behavior’. ‘Health as 
being’ centers on the notion that a person desires fulfillment of their needs and 
is in search of a state of equilibrium, of harmony of their physiological, 
psychological and social selves, of harmony between their body and soul, and 
of harmony between the internal and external forces that constantly impact on 
them (Eriksson, 1994). Eriksson (1992d) says people functioning in the 
dimension of health concentrate on the fulfillment of their human needs in order 
to reach a state of harmony and balance in their life. Yet different again is the 
idea of ‘health as becoming’. Here health is postulated as the ‘. . . growing 
toward a deeper oneness’ and is based on the assumption that a person is 
always in a state of becoming something and as a consequence is constantly 
being shaped and reshaped by both internal and external forces (Eriksson, 
1994: 9). To this end, the dimension of ‘health as becoming’ requires people to 
 52
conduct their own health. 
 
Thus for Eriksson (1992d: 5), ‘health is motion, a dynamic movement, and man 
(sic) is not constantly in the same dimension, at the same level of health, but 
moves between them’. It is a conception of health that is situated in a holistic 
model that focuses on the interrelated nature of a person that has both a 
physical and spiritual component to their being where to be healthy is equated 
with physical, mental and spiritual wholeness (Eriksson, 1992d). To this end 
Eriksson (1992d) claims that such a multidimensional view of health challenges 
ideas of caring in nursing. 
 
Consistent with her conception of health Eriksson’s theory of caring in nursing 
centers on an ontological belief that a human being is a whole of body, soul, 
and spirit, and is basically religious and in suffering (Eriksson, 1989, 1991, 
1992e, 1994, 2002, Naden and Eriksson, 2000). The theory is made up of five 
intertwined concepts which include; what it is to be a human being - patient, 
carer/nurse; the nature of suffering and health; caritas motive and the ethics of 
caring; caring as compassion, invitation, commitment, faith, hope and love; and 
caring as a communion (Eriksson, 1990a, 1992e, 1994). In this conception of 
caring, caring is seen as something that is both natural and primordial; and 
something that results in the unselfish relation of one with another where there 
is a genuine desire to alleviate the suffering of that other (Eriksson, 2002). 
 
Eriksson (1994: 12) makes the point that ‘caring is in itself ethics’, which comes 
to life in the relationship one person has with another, and that a person’s 
ethical foundation combined with their disposition establishes their ethical 
standpoint and reflects the different depths of human relations and caring for 
people (Eriksson, 1994). Equally it is also acknowledged that, while a 
fundamental ethical standpoint is central to a person’s integrity, different 
motives such as the social motive, humanistic motive, and the caritas motive, 
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result in different relationships that include how far a person is prepared to go in 
sacrificing their own selves in caring for another person (Eriksson, 1994). 
 
In short, the social motive centers on social responsibilities and the desire to 
intervene to correct unacceptable behavior but it does not extend to taking care 
of another person (Eriksson, 1994). As distinct from the social motive, the 
humanistic motive is based upon humanity and goodness, and for example, 
enables a nurse to take responsibility for meeting the basic human needs 
required to sustain life but stops at the nurse being prepared to take 
responsibility for the person’s life (Eriksson, 1994). Different again is the caritas 
motive which urges the nurse to act from love and compassion and urges, for 
example, the nurse to take responsibility for the good of the other (Eriksson, 
1994). It is the caritas motive that Eriksson (1 994) says is ‘the core of caring’. 
 
Her views about caring in nursing are built on the premise that there is 
‘caritative caring’, which Eriksson (1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1992e, 1992b, 1994, 
2002) says has its origins in human love and the idea of mercy and charity, 
which are the basic motives for caring. Thus ‘caritative caring’ is the application 
of the motive of ‘caritas’ in the conduct of caring, in this case, caring in nursing 
(Eriksson, 1990a). Put another way, the basic motive of caring can be no other 
than the caritas motive, for it is the core of caring (Eriksson, 1991, 1992e, 1994, 
2002). As to what is the ‘human love’ that underpins ‘caritative caring’; it is not 
fully explained. 
 
The caritas motive invites a person to care and includes the ethical motive of 
respect for the absolute dignity of the human being, and is that which gives rise  
to a person being responsible for both their own and others’ lives (Eriksson, 
1994). In this view (using Eriksson’s language) the ‘mission’ of a person is to 
serve the other, to exist for the sake of the other that is only realized when their 
suffering has been responded to in a way that restores them to their ‘mission’ 
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(Eriksson, 2002). Yet, what is the state of our being that has a person, or in this 
case a nurse, ‘exist for the sake of the other’? What makes this possible? 
 
The starting point for the caritas motive is compassion, which is given birth in 
meeting the suffering of the other person and the responsibility and the desire 
to do good (Eriksson, I 992e, I 994, 2002). Where does this good that a person 
desires come from? What is its form and why is the good a desire of mine? 
While the idea of the good is a premise on which Eriksson’s theory is built there 
is little by way of a description that makes known what this good is that a 
person desires. 
 
Compassion, according to Eriksson (1994: 13-14) ‘emerges in the meeting 
between suffering and love’ and is the force that motivates a person to care. It 
involves the invitation to a relationship where the nurse’s attitude is ‘I am here 
for you’, which Eriksson (1994: 14) says causes the ethical to appear as a result  
of the correlation between the invitation offered to the patient and the way in 
which the patient is accepted into this relationship. It is a relationship that is 
characterized by what Eriksson (1991, 1992e, 1992c, 1994, 1997a) calls the 
‘caring communion’. 
 
While all forms of caring are understood to be variations of human communion, 
‘caring communion’ gives caring its context, source of power and meaning 
(Eriksson, 1991, 1992e, 1992c, 1994). The central point is that joining in 
communion means creating possibilities for the other as though they were your 
own possibilities. It is the ability of the nurse to do good for another person, to 
minister and give the whole of their self (Eriksson, 1991 , 992e, 1992d, 1992c, 
1994, 1997a). ‘Caring communion is a creative act which can imply different 
forms and contents, but it is characterized by intensity, openness and 
possibilities’ (Eriksson, 1991: 14). How is this possible? What is the communion 
that would enable a nurse to have a relation with a patient that would enable 
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them to give the whole of their self to the good of another? As stated above, 
why should I desire to do this good? How is it possible that I am able to sacrifice 
my self-project for the good of the patient and is this something that is desirable 
of a nurse? 
 
Given the significance of the commitment, it is not surprising that Eriksson has 
identified the pre-requisites needed for a caring communion. They include a 
genuine, mature, and professional attitude that is characterized by 
responsibility, genuineness, courage and wisdom and the ability to presence 
themselves with the patient (Eriksson, 1990a, 1991, 1992e, 1992d, 1994, 
1997a). From the nurse’s point of view, there is meaning in being present and 
giving something of oneself for the purpose of something very important in the 
actual situation (Eriksson, 1991). From the patient’s point of view, it means 
being special, someone important to another person, someone’s responsibility, 
a willingness for them to do good for me (Eriksson, 1991). Thus for Eriksson 
(1992e) true caring is not a form of behavior, nor is it a feeling or a state; it is an 
ontology. It is a way of living, for as she says, it is not enough to just be there or 
to share. Caring is more; it is the way and the spirit in which it is done. 
However, as to why it should be done is not fully explained. 
 
The verb caring is used here to also encapsulate the idea ‘to respond’; that is, 
caring is a response that is triggered by the identification of the suffering of 
another person (Eriksson, 1991, 1992e). In this conception of caring, suffering 
is understood to be the point at which caring begins (Eriksson, 1992e). 
According to Eriksson (Lindstrom and Eriksson, 1993, Eriksson, 1993, 1994, 
1997a, Eriksson and Lindstrom, 1993), suffering is a state of being that 
incorporates a sense of dying and has neither meaning nor purpose.  
Regardless of the perspective, there is only one common denominator to all 
suffering and that is that a human being is to some degree cut off from their 
personal identity and the experience of wholeness (Eriksson, 1991, 1993, 
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1997a). Eriksson (1997a) says that to suffer is to be estranged from oneself, 
both one’s inner demands and possibilities. It results in a person being driven 
by external contradictions amongst the search for a harmony where ‘to become 
in suffering is a struggle between hope and hopelessness, between life and 
death’ (Eriksson, 1997a: 77). 
 
Added to this idea of suffering is the notion of love, where Eriksson (1993, 
1994, 1997a) says that in order to experience suffering a person must know 
love because love is a condition for human growth and development, and it is 
through suffering that a human being is able to be in contact with the basic 
conditions of life and thus grow to understand the meaning of suffering as a 
feeling. For Eriksson (1992a, 1992e, 1993), living through suffering is what 
enables a person to find purpose and meaning in their suffering, and is what is 
at the heart of all forms of caring in nursing. Here suffering is understood to be 
the basic category of all caring for according to Eriksson (1992a: 123), ‘suffering 
gives caring its own character and identity and all forms of caring aim in one 
way or another to alleviate it’. ‘True caring is not just an abstract thought, 
philosophy or ideology: it is work of the most concrete kind, encountering 
suffering in true situations’ (Eriksson, 1992a: 123). 
 
As stated above, Eriksson (2002) regards the patient as a unique being that 
comprises body, soul and spirit; spirit meaning spiritually existential, spiritually 
religious, and spiritually Christian. The claim is that ontologically, every human 
being and therefore every patient, fundamentally longs for something beyond 
their own selves, be it a god or abstract other (Eriksson, 2002). In explicating 
this idea as it relates to nursing, Eriksson (1987, 1990c, 1991, 1992e, 1994, 
Naden and Eriksson, 2000) says the core of caring comprises of nurturing, 
purging, playing, and learning in a spirit of faith, hope, and love, which together 
form the content of what she calls ‘caritative caring’. 
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of specific note, the verb ‘purging’ is interpreted to mean to nourish, to clean, 
to see to, and show interest in, presence and shelter (Eriksson, 1990a). Also 
the verbs ‘to nourish’ and ‘to clean’ capture the belief that caring is to engage 
in activities that support being human, a being that has physical, mental and 
spiritual needs (Eriksson, 1990a). 
 
What is more, Eriksson (1994) holds that health is faith, hope, and love and 
that in order for a person to grow they require faith, hope, and love. Faith 
assists in adopting a trustful position towards existence, hope is the motion 
between hope and hopelessness and is related to ‘not giving up’ and belief in 
the future, and love is devoted claimless care and caring of one for another 
(Eriksson, 1994). Together these ideas represent the basic assumptions of 
Eriksson’s theory of caring in nursing. 
 
Basic assumptions of Eriksson’s theory are that: 
1. The human being is fundamentally an entity of body, soul, and spirit. 
2. The human being is fundamentally a religious being, but not all human    
    beings have recognised this dimension. 
3. The human being is fundamentally holy. Human dignity means    
    accepting the human obligation of serving with love, of existing for the      
    sake of others. 
4. Health means a movement in becoming, being and dying, and   
    striving for integrity and holiness which is compatible with bearable  
    suffering. 
5. The basic category of caring is suffering. 
6. The basic motive of caring is the caritas motive. 
7. Caring implies alleviating suffering in charity, love, faith, and hope.  
    Natural basic caring is expressed through tending, playing, and  
    teaching in a sustained caring relationship. 
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8. A caring relationship forms the meaningful context of caring and   
   derives its origin from the ethos of love, responsibility, and sacrifice,    
   that is, a caritative ethic. (Eriksson, 1991 : 4, 1992e: 202, 1992d:  
   6-7, 1992b: 1, 2002: 62) 
 
Of note is Eriksson’s (1990a) claims that the concept love has in recent times 
been reduced to mean just the need of an individual to get satisfaction from 
love, predominately sexual needs gratification or love as an expression of 
empathy from the nurse’s side. Rather, Eriksson (1992e: 204) says ‘.. . caring is 
based on human love’, or put another way, ‘caring is naturally human, a 
concrete form of human love’ (Eriksson, 1992d: 2). For Eriksson, the term love 
has a far deeper meaning than that which is commonly understood and, to this 
end, her position on love accords with the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas’ view 
that the word love has been corrupted to the point that it is better to say 
‘responsibility for the other’ in order to make clear the idea (Eriksson, 1990a: 4, 
1992b: 9) that ‘man’s essence is love’ (Eriksson, 1990d: 4). In short, Eriksson 
(1990a, 1992b) claims that Levinas’ notion of ‘responsibility for the other’ is in 
fact what combines love with caring, highlighting the point that love is totally 
ethical. Accordingly, developing an understanding of the concept love as the 
responsibility for the other and its link to caring is something that will be 
explored in this thesis. 
 
Eriksson (1990a) claims that the concept ‘love’ applies to nursing and is given 
expression through the caritas motive, caritative caring and caring communion.  
In this conception love is said to ‘just exist’ in a caring culture with the central 
dimensions of love being honour, generosity, genuineness, affirmation, 
understanding, freedom, not abandoning (Eriksson, 1990a). The point made is 
that ‘.. .caring is love’ (Eriksson, 1990a: 206, 1992e: 206), and therefore it is 
legitimate to ask question what is the love that is caring or more specifically 
what is the love that is love in nursing and midwifery? 
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In summary, Eriksson (1992e: 204) claims that ‘caring is based on love’ and that 
‘the basic structure for all kinds of caring is the relationship between the patient 
and the nurses’ (Eriksson, 1994: 17-18). Thus caring is a natural manifestation 
of human love and is based on the motive of caritas, through which compassion 
awakens a desire to alleviate another’s suffering (Eriksson, 1994). The basis of 
every kind of caring is, therefore, unconditional caritative ethics, a responsibility 
and a desire to do what is good (Eriksson, 1994). The question that emerges 
from this scholarship is what kind of love is it that is specific to nursing and 
midwifery? 
 
Sally Gadow’s theory of ‘existential advocacy’ embraces the notion that caring 
as the moral ideal of nursing is concerned with the protection and enhancement  
of the dignity of the patient (Gadow, 1985). Here, dignity is used to capture the 
idea of a being having integrity, that is, ‘. . . a being has dignity when it gives to 
itself its meaning and so creates for itself integrity’, integrity implying ‘... both the 
coherence which meaning gives to experience and the origin of that meaning 
within, rather than outside, the individual’ (Gadow, 1985: 32-33). 
 
To achieve this, Gadow (1979, 1985, 1989) says, requires embodiment of both 
the nurse and the patient, because embodiment enables intersubjectivity and 
thus regard for the patient as subject rather than just object, which means to 
respect their freedom to transcend all the forms of categorization and 
expectation that would cause their objectification. Thus the ideal of existential 
advocacy is expressed when a nurse assists a patient to authentically exercise 
their freedom of self-determination (Gadow, 1979). As Gadow (1979: 82) says,    
it is where a nurse helps a patient to be; 
‘. . . clear about what they want to do, by helping them to discern and 
clarify their values in the situation and, on the basis of that self- 
examination, to reach decisions that express their reaffirmed, perhaps 
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recreated, values’. 
 
Here, the nurse attends to the patient as a whole, a person of unity, a person 
that is more than a definition of a single problem, categorization or system 
(Gadow, 1979, 1995). 
 
In this context, caring in nursing is understood as a commitment to protecting 
and enhancing the dignity of the patient. It is attending to what Gadow (1985) 
calls their ‘objectness’ without reducing them to the status of object. Here, 
objectness means that which has been ‘lifted out of the lived immediacy of 
experience’ or that which is objectified as is the case of a disease type or type 
of a disease (Gadow, 1985). Gadow’s (1985) point is that objectification in this 
way is aimed at overcoming the indignity of the problem for the patient so 
enabling the restoration of the patient’s integrity which has been compromised. 
Importantly though, Gadow (1985) makes clear the object-subject relationship 
in caring for a patient when she says that therapeutic activities aimed at dealing 
with the objectness of the person if linked with activities that are aimed at 
protecting the patient from being treated as an object, constitutes a caring 
relationship. 
 
Equally she notes that, in the modern clinical context, the objectification of the 
patient is often so complete that the subjectivity of the patient is almost 
extinguished. It is a point powerfully made in her quoting of a patient’s 
experience of health care exemplified in the dictum of my body becoming the 
body (Gadow, 1989, 1995). The patient describes his experience with a leg that 
wouldn’t move and a surgeon who considered himself a carpenter. ‘I regarded 
my leg as a thing, and he regarded me as a thing. Thus I was doubly thinged, a 
thing with a thing’ (Gadow, 1989: 539). The view put is that objectification of the 
patient can be so complete that the person is reduced to the status of object 
with little acknowledgement of the subject. In this case, the surgeon saw only a 
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‘thing with a thing’ (Gadow, 1989: 539). 
 
What is more, Gadow (1995) makes clear that the disengagement can extend 
to also include the patient, that is, the patient can adopt the same 
disengagement that is used to maintain a reflective distance from subjectivity 
as, in the example above, the surgeon or for that matter a nurse. In this way the 
patient and the nurse can collaborate in the translation of experience into 
categories to the point where both the nurse and the patient talk about, using 
the example above, the patient’s leg as if they were engaging in a discussion 
about an inanimate object, a ‘thing’. In this type of; 
‘ . . disengagement the force of immediacy is countered by a new force, 
the power of objectification - a force so strong that experience itself can 
be objectified, reduced to its simplest parts’. (Gadow, 1995: 28) 
 
In the health industry Gadow (1984, 1985), identifies the impact of technology 
on the dignity of the patient, what she refers to as the technologizing of care. 
The claim is that technology and its required professional application, 
particularly that which is highly sophisticated, serves to reduce the person to 
their objectness. The technologizing of care thus poses a dilemma for the 
nurse, as in how to enact moral commitment to the dignity of the patient at the 
same time as attending to their objectness. In response, Gadow (1985) poses 
two solutions, the use of truth telling and also touch, which she says requires 
the participation of both the patient and the nurse in the expression of their 
subjectivity. More precisely, ‘the ideal of caring is an ideal of intersubjectivity, in 
which both nurse and patient are involved’ (Gadow, 1985: 38-39). 
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The embodiment of the nurse and the patient makes possible access to their 
subjectivity, which is the basis for moral commitment to act as an advocate in 
order to enhance autonomy (Gadow, 1989). Here, the nurse and the patient 
exchange in a sharing of values and views and so enable bridging of both the 
objectivity of the patient being treated as an object and also the isolation 
associated with pure subjectivity. For Gadow (1985), the empathetic or caring 
ideal, means that mutuality becomes the moral foundation of nursing: that it is 
commitment to the dignity that distinguishes persons from objects. In the 
modern clinical context where objectness can so easily undermine dignity, 
understanding caring as the moral ideal of intersubjectivity makes possible the 
restoration and maintenance of the patient’s dignity (Gadow, 1985). It provides 
insight into the realm of human intersubjectivity and the relation that enables a 
person to rise above their own subjective isolation and be concerned with more 
than just their self. This ability of our being to transcend its subjective isolation   
is an idea that will be further explored in this thesis. 
 
Gadow’s (1988, 1995) theory of existential advocacy also includes the belief 
that care is the alleviation of vulnerability. In particular, care is identified as the 
moral end and cure as the means to that end (Gadow, 1988). The view 
postulated is that the alleviation of a patient’s vulnerability is only made possible 
when both the nurse and patient have a relationship that includes an expression 
of their embodied selves, their shared subjective reality (Gadow, 1988, 1995). 
In practical terms it may be the sharing of their body’s significance, disclosing 
their own anguish, fear and bewilderment as a testimony to the body’s 
subjectivity (Gadow, 1988). As Gadow (1995) notes, the relational narrative 
engaged in by both the nurse and the patient extends beyond their particularity 
as a person concerned only with itself, but not beyond their relationship which 
she says ‘. . . creates a new objectivity in the form of intersubjectivity, an 
advance beyond the subjectivity of vulnerability and the antisubjectivity of 
objectivism’ (Gadow, 1995: 33). Therefore, as long as the nurse and patient ‘... 
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remain engaged in each other’s vulnerability and its alleviation, the existential 
distance between them diminishes’ and caring is possible (Gadow, 1988: 13). 
The theory of existential advocacy suggests that in the moral party of two the 
nurse and midwife respond to the vulnerability of the patient. It requires them to 
be concerned with more than themselves and instead be committed to protect 
and enhance the dignity of the patient. The view presented suggests morality is 
at the centre of the nurse-patient relation and is what makes it possible for a 
nurse and midwife to be concerned for more than their own project. 
 
Rosemarie Rizzo Parse’s original scholarship in the 1970’s centered on the 
formulation of a theory of nursing called man-living-health which has continued 
development to the point where Parse (1998: ix) herself now refers to these 
ideas as a ‘school of thought’. While it is not a specific theory of caring, it is a 
theory of nursing which contains easily identifiable elements that relate to the 
moral imperative of caring in nursing. To this end, this account is not a thorough 
description of Parse’s theory of nursing but a brief acknowledgment of her 
contribution to the understanding of caring in nursing or more specifically, the 
relation between the nurse and the patient. 
 
Of note in her theory is the inclusion of tenets and concepts derived from 
existential-phenomenology, that is, the concepts of intentionality, and human 
subjectivity, and the concepts of coconstitution, coexistence, and situated 
freedom that inform her thinking about nursing and in particular, caring in 
nursing (Parse, 1978, 1981 , 1998). In other words, Parse (1978, 1981, 1998) 
adopts the view that a person is by nature an intentional being that is open, 
knows and is present to the world in the creation of the self as a project of 
personal becoming. Here, being situated in the world consists of two 
components, a presence as a being and a not-yet but open presence to the 
world, which it is claimed is evidence of the freedom and desire of a being to 
reach beyond their self (Parse, 1981, 1998). Thus Parse (1978: 20, 1998: 17) 
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says that, ‘man experiences existence as coexistence’, that is, a person exists 
with others in their becoming as a self-project and that without such others it 
would be impossible to know about oneself. 
 
As a self-project, a person is responsible for both their choices and their 
omissions about the situations in which they find themselves. In these 
situations, the freedom to choose and the responsibility that comes with it, exist 
because of the need to take a stand about a way of being. It is a stand that is 
representative of one’s values, feelings, and desires (Parse, 1981, 1998). 
However, Parse (1981: 21, 1998: 18) equally acknowledges the risk that comes 
with such situated freedom and the accompanying responsibility; one always 
chooses and such ‘… choices are made without full knowledge of the outcomes 
yet with full responsibility for the consequences’. 
 
Next, the tenet of human subjectivity holds that ‘. . . conscious man (sic) by 
nature is no-thing but, rather, a unity of being and non-being’ (Parse, 1981: 19),  
‘. . . living what is and what is not-yet all-at-once’ (Parse, 1998: 15). As Parse 
(1981, 1998) notes, it is a Heideggerian view of subjectivity. The claim is that a, 
human can only be present with the world by means of a dialectical relationship , 
which makes possible the cocreation of personal becoming by way of the 
meaning given to the projects that emerge during the process of choosing to 
live in a particular way as an expression of one’s values, beliefs and desires. 
Thus living in relation to others or coconstitution, is what makes possible 
meaning. It is a meaning that is reliant on the constituents of that situation. It is 
a meaning that arises from the human-world dialectic, the mutual process with 
its various perspectives on situations, others and one’s own presence, which 
results in the cocreation of the world (1981 , 1998). It is these postulates about 
human becoming that provide the foundation for understanding the 
interrelationship of the nurse and the patient that are encapsulated in Parse’s 
definition of caring and description of ‘true presence’ (Parse, 1981). 
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However, as stated above, while not a specific theory of caring, Parse’s work is 
premised on a foundation that has as its central tenet the interrelationship of the 
nurse and others (Parse, 1998). More particularly, it focuses on the concern of 
the nurse with the patient’s lived experience of health as is reflected in patterns 
of expression and the idea of ‘true presence’ as an intentional reflective love 
(Parse, 1978, 1981, 2001). 
 
Specifically, Parse (1978: 130) says ‘…caring is risking being with someone 
towards a moment of joy’. Here the term risk is used to capture the idea of 
threat to the self-project. In coconstituting, the nurse and the patient engage in 
a relationship of authenticity through which both have the potential to grow, but 
while the patient’s values, beliefs and desires may not necessarily be those of 
the nurse, the subject-to-subject relationship, Parse (1978) says, has the nurse 
reach out to the patient’s call even though the reaching out exposes the nurse 
to change and the possibility of negative consequences to the self. Thus, the 
term ‘risk’ as is used here, is related to the chance of the nurse and the patient 
‘. . .growing toward the possible, as well as in the possibility for rejection’ (Parse, 
1978: 131). From this description it appears that intentional reflective love is 
what enables the nurse and the patient to be truly present to each other and is 
of the quality that enables the nurse to risk and therefore potentially sacrifice 
their own welfare for the sake of another. What exactly the love is then, that 
Parse speaks about, that enables such commitment and responsibility to 
another person that is also specific to the profession of nursing and midwifery, 
is unclear. 
 
The second element of Parse’s (1978) definition of caring is linked to the 
concept of ‘being with’ or authentic and open engagement, and has the nurse 
reach out to understand the patient’s experience. Here ‘being with’ relates to the 
subject-to-subject relationship which is said to be unique in nursing. While both 
the patient and nurse have the possibility of growth as a self-project, in nursing, 
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Parse (1978) says, the nurse takes the responsibility for their choosing to 
participate with the patient in the health-related situation. It is a choosing that 
arises from the responsibility the nurse feels toward the patient, making the 
responsibility chosen, moral, but what is the explanation for why a nurse should 
feel morally responsible. What makes the nurse feel this way? 
 
Notably, Parse (1978: 131) states, that ‘each experience of participation is a 
source of self revelation toward growth for both nurse and client’. Here, Parse 
(1978) identifies that there is reciprocity involved in the nurse-patient relation 
but she does not speak about its effect on the motive of responsibility felt by 
the nurse. What is the relationship of the responsibility the nurse feels for the 
patient on reciprocity? For example, is the motive for risking the nurse’s self- 
project first about the possibility of self improvement and can this be otherwise? 
 
While the dialectical relationship makes possible the coocreation of personal 
becoming, if the nurse’s self-project is their first priority and the project of the 
other is second, caring is simply the means to their collective ends. It appears 
that the responsibility felt by the nurse in the nurse-patient relation is of two 
distinct types, one is where the nurse’s self-project is their first priority and the 
second is where the patient’s self-project comes first. What determines the 
responsibility the nurse has for the patient and how is it possible that a nurse or 
midwife is able to sacrifice their own good for the patient? 
 
The idea of ‘true presence’ is described by Parse (1992, 1995, 1997, 1998) as  
a special way of ‘being with’ a patient, an attentiveness to the patient in the 
moment-to-moment changes of their living of their value priorities as they relate 
to their changing health patterns. Thus, ‘true presence is an intentional 
reflective love, an interpersonal art grounded in a strong knowledge base. . . ‘ that 
respects the uniqueness of the personal way of being of the patient (Parse, 
1998: 71). It requires of the nurse ‘free-flowing attentiveness’ to the patient and 
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is not something that arises from effort or a focus of attention, because trying 
would be a distraction that would take the focus off the patient (Parse, 1998). 
To this end, ‘true presence’ is described as requiring ‘preparation’ and ‘attention’ 
(Parse, 1998). ‘Preparation’ means that the nurse empties themself in order to 
be available to bear witness, to be flexible, and to be gracefully present from 
their centre (Parse, 1998: 71). However, given this brief description, it is difficult 
to understand Parse’s ideas about the concept ‘preparation’ (Parse, 1992, 1995, 
1997, 1998). Similar to comment made earlier, perhaps she is suggesting that 
in order to have a chance at being truly present to a patient, a nurse and 
midwife requires moral commitment of a quality that enables them to be 
concerned with more than just their self. 
 
The second concept, ‘attention’, is easier to comprehend and means to focus 
on the moment at hand, to be immersed in the moment, and so cocreate 
attentiveness to the patient’s situation (Parse, 1998). Thus according to Parse 
(Parse, 1998), this coming-to-be-present moment that incorporates the ideas of 
‘preparation’ and ‘attention’, is what enables the nurse to enter the patient’s 
world. It enables the patient to share with the nurse only that which they desire, 
the nurse working with that version of reality in the belief that each person 
knows ‘the way’ somewhere within themself (Parse, 1992, 1998). Parse (1992: 
40) makes clear her ideas when she says, ‘it is essential to go with the person 
where the person is rather than attempting to judge, change, or control the 
person’. Here Parse concentrates on what appears to be a conscious relation, 
where the nurse and midwife focuses on the moment at hand and is attentive to 
that situation, but, should she be speaking about attention that is other than 
conscious, her description is incomplete. 
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The third concept that Parse (1978) identifies as an essence of caring in 
nursing, in addition to ‘risking’, and ‘being with’, is called ‘moment of joy’, that 
is, the quality of ‘being with’ in the subject-to-subject relationship Parse (1978) 
says gives rise to the dynamic of ‘suffering-joying’. She (Parse, 1978) calls this   
a ‘moment of joy’. It is where the nurse risking being with the patient in a health- 
related situation shares in the patient’s suffering-joying. As Parse (1978) says, 
when the nurse realizes the meaning of the risk associated with the position 
taken, the witness of the patient’s suffering-joying and their attention to that, 
coconstitutes moving toward the possible with the patient. All this said, Parse 
(1990: 139) says the focus of nursing practice is the ‘... subject-to-subject 
interrelationship, a loving, true presence with the other to enhance the quality of 
life’. Notable in this summation is the use of the term love as opposed to caring.  
It would appear that for Parse love best identifies the motive that underpins the 
subject-to-subject interrelationship from which caring emanates. Yet throughout 
her text Parse offers little by way of an extant description of love. 
 
Nel Noddings is an educational philosopher who offers a theoretical exposition  
of caring that has contributed significantly to the general scholarship on caring 
and is often cited in the literature of nursing. Explicating Noddings’ (1984) ideas 
in some detail is a worthy task because she is one of a handful of scholars that 
offer such a comprehensive perspective of the content of caring that is able to 
be applied to nursing. Noddings’ (1984) thesis presents a feminine perspective 
of practical ethics that requires a person to place themselves in a concrete 
situation, or as close as possible to it, so as to assume personal responsibility 
for the choices made from the relation (Noddings, 1984). 
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In view of that, Noddings (1984) believes that human caring and the memory of 
caring and being cared for form the foundation of our ethical responses. Caring 
involves a psychic relatedness that in a feminine view is understood to be 
rooted in the ideas of receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness that begin 
with a moral attitude and a longing for goodness (Noddings, 1984). She seeks 
an understanding of what it means to care and to be cared for, and in doing so 
explores the concept of relations, which is interpreted as ontologically basic, 
and the caring relation, as ethically basic. 
 
Here the term relation is defined by Noddings (1984: 3&4) as ‘a set of ordered 
pairs generated by some rule that describes the affect - or subjective 
experience - of the members’. As for relation as ontologically basic, Noddings 
(1984) says, it simply means that the human encounter and affective response 
is a basic fact of human existence. Thus what it means to care and to be cared 
for involves two parties in relation, where my caring can only be completed in 
the other if the relation is a caring relation. As can be seen, the reciprocity of the 
relation is important, for it defines how we meet the other morally (Noddings, 
1984). 
 
This said, Noddings (1984) is of the view that ethical caring is the relation in 
which we meet the other morally. It arises from our natural caring, the relation 
where a person responds as one-caring (one-caring is the term used to  
describe the feminine perspective of caring), out of love or natural inclination. 
Here the relation of natural caring is perceived (consciously or unconsciously), 
in the human condition, as ‘good’ and is a condition that a person strives and 
longs for (Noddings, 1984). It is a longing in the sense of wanting to be in that 
special caring relation, a relation that motivates a person to be moral. 
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To be moral is our aim because it enables a person to be in a caring relation 
and so enhances the ideal of ourselves as one-caring (Noddings, 1984). It is 
this ethical ideal that enables a person to form a realistic impression of themself 
as one-caring, which is what guides the meeting of the other person morally 
(Noddings, 1984). For Noddings (1984), everything depends on the ethical ideal 
because it, and not absolute principles, is what guides people. To this end, 
Noddings (1984) rejects the notion of universalizablility because her focus is not 
on judgment and the particular acts performed but on how a person meets the 
other morally in each unique human encounter. 
 
Specifically, caring from the ‘inside’ or locating oneself in a relation, where the 
responsibility for decisions about caring is accepted, enables the one-caring to 
displace interest in their own reality to the reality of the other (Noddings, 1984). 
To explain how this may be possible, Noddings (1984: 14) appeals to the ideas 
of Søren Kierkegaard (Kierkegaard, 1941) saying that ‘...we apprehend 
another’s reality as possibility’. Applied to nursing, the possibility of the patient’s 
reality arouses the nurse in such a way that it disrupts their ethical reality 
because it enables the nurse to understand that the patient’s reality could 
possibly be theirs (Noddings, 1984). The relation is not only about the nurses 
self improvement but an acknowledgment of the feeling that is aroused; an 
acknowledgment of the feeling that says ‘I must do something’ (Noddings, 
1984). 
 
The reality of the other, when understood to be possibly one’s own reality, 
evokes responses that are aimed at the elimination of the problem encountered 
(Noddings, 1984). For example, the implementation of activities aimed at 
reducing the pain and suffering of a person (Noddings, 1984). In view of this 
Noddings (1984: 14) says, ‘when I am in this sort of relationship with another, 
when the other’s reality becomes a real possibility for me, I care’. In this way ‘all 
caring involves engrossment’, as this is about endurance and not intensity as is 
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the case in romantic love (Noddings, 1984: 17). 
 
Ethical caring as the response to the feeling that one must do something, 
Noddings (1984) says, has many forms. It can be short or long-lasting, visible 
for all to see, depending on the ability of the relation to be sustained, or it can 
be invisible where one simply acts out of a concern for one’s own ethicality. But 
even in the latter case, where the relation is not sustained, the striving to attain 
or regain the relation results in a person experiencing genuine caring for their 
self (Noddings, 1984). Accordingly, ‘caring for self, for the ethical self, can 
emerge only from a caring for others’ (Noddings, 1984: 14). 
 
What is more, the caring Noddings (1984) speaks of is not universal because, 
as she says, we do not care equally for everyone. For example, in nursing I 
may encounter a patient whom I find repugnant, which may elicit feelings in me 
of disgust and revulsion, and require me to withdraw because I simply do not 
care for this person (Noddings, 1984). Noddings (1984) uses the basis of this 
nursing applied example to explain the idea that should I do something, no 
matter how small, on this person’s behalf, such as an acknowledgment in me 
that this person has a legal right to medical treatment, the same as any other 
person, then it is because I care about my own ethical self which dictates that I 
must try to care. 
 
However, while we may ‘care about’ everyone in the sense of being at the 
‘ready to try’ to care, it is not the same thing as ‘caring-for’ to which she refers 
when using the word ‘care’ (Noddings, 1984). It is a point Noddings (1984: 18) 
makes clear when stating that the caring being referring to is ‘. . . an actuality; in 
the other, it refers to a verbal commitment to the possibility of caring’. It is a 
relation which makes possible the apprehension of an other’s reality as if it were 
possibly one’s own. Applied to nursing, it enables a nurse to feel, as close as it 
is possible, what the patient is feeling. It arouses in the nurse a feeling that ‘I 
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must’ act as though it was for the nurses own good that they were acting 
(Noddings, 1984). But the nurse’s acting is on behalf of the patient. It requires 
of the nurse a commitment to do something that is more than just responding to   
a feeling for it may require the nurse to be committed to act on behalf of the 
other for a long period of time (Noddings, 1984). 
 
However, Noddings (1984) says that while ‘feeling’ is essentially involved with 
caring, there is more. She (Noddings, 1984) uses the term ‘receptivity’ to 
describe the relation that is characterized by one receiving the other and being 
totally with the other. Here receiving the other describes the relation in terms of 
the response to the feeling ‘I must do something’. It is about responding to the 
‘feeling’ (being in a receptive mode), which does not necessarily require 
knowledge of the object because at the time of the responding one is not 
thinking of the other as an object nor is one making a claim of any knowledge of 
the other (Noddings, 1984). She (Noddings, 1984: 33) adds that responding to 
the feeling that ‘I must do something’, involves a shift of motivation. It is not a 
relinquishment of the self, but rather that, ‘allow my motive energy to be 
shared; I put it at the service of the other’. Such a shift in the focus of the motive 
energy makes one vulnerable because one’s good is now partly in the hands of 
the other (Noddings, 1984). 
 
Given Noddings’ (1984: 33) claims ‘that the one-caring is engrossed in the 
other’, is not only about endurance, as was spoken about earlier, but also about 
the ‘. . . appropriate mode of consciousness in caring’. Precisely, the response to 
the feeling that ‘I must do something’ shifts the motivational energy from a 
concentration on the self to the other and so is shared with the other, which is 
what enables one to be engrossed in the other. 
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It results in a particular characteristic and an appropriate mode of thinking that 
is different to an emotional response in caring, it is what Noddings (1984: 33) 
says ‘. . . is a thinking mode that moves the self toward the object’. In other 
words, one uses the various modes of thinking, from rational objectivism to 
irrational emotivism in responding to the situation that is before them. One 
moves between the various modes of cognition and at any given point in time 
there will be one mode dominating the mind giving rise to responses that could 
be classified as appropriate or inappropriate (Noddings, 1984). 
 
In responding, ‘. . . my rational powers are not diminished but they are enrolled in 
the service of my engrossment in the other’ (Noddings, 1984: 35). As Noddings 
(1984) says, it is in this subjective mode that one sees what they have received 
from the other, it is for them to decide what to do because the choices are 
theirs, they can either precede in a state of truth or they can deny the other and 
so talk themselves into feeling comfortable as opposed to feeling guilty. Thus, 
caring according to Noddings (1984: 40), ‘. . . is to be partly responsible for the 
other’. But can one’s engrossment in the other be so complete that they are 
wholly responsible for them and, if this were possible, what would this state be, 
because it would be different to caring? 
 
Here caring is understood to involve the idea that ‘I ought’ to respond to the 
other, which means that one can equally accept or reject the other (Noddings, 
1984). A central tenet of Noddings’ (1984: 4) thesis is that ‘each of us is 
dependent of the other in caring and moral relationships’. She (Noddings, 1984) 
summaries her ideas about our dependence on each other and our   
fundamental relatedness to each other in the sentence, ‘we are both free - that 
which I do, I do - and bound - I might do far better if you reach out to help me 
and far, far worse if you abuse, taunt, or ignore me’ (Noddings, 1984: 49). 
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Noddings (1984) also says, what is more, that the ethical ideal to which she 
refers is incomplete if it only relies on one’s engrossment in the other, the shift 
of one’s motivational energies toward the other and their projects. It is only half 
of the picture, which is a half that is made up of one’s understanding of oneself 
as a caring person, with the other half being located in one’s desire to be 
‘received, understood, and accepted’ by an other (Noddings, 1984). 
 
Noddings (1984: 49) says, ‘I see that when I am as I need the other to be 
toward me, I am the way I want to be - that is, I am closest to goodness when I 
accept and affirm the internal I “must”, which is integral to one’s ethical self. 
Here Noddings (1984: 49) identifies the idea of ‘goodness’, which she says is 
,. . . an assessment of the state of natural caring’. This goodness, to which she 
(Noddings, 1984) refers, is felt, is what guides one’s thinking implicitly, and is 
thus an essential part of the picture of one’s ethical self. As with comments 
made earlier about Eriksson’s use of the term goodness, there is no description 
of what exactly it is and why it is sought. 
 
The ethical self is the active relation between the picture of one’s ideal self and 
one’s actual self as both the one-caring and the cared-for (Noddings, 1984). It 
arises from the natural relation that is founded on goodness. It connects one 
through the other to oneself, that is to say, as one cares for an other they are 
equally cared for by them and so one becomes able to care for oneself, the 
ethical self (Noddings, 1984). Accordingly, the ‘I must’ arises from the ethical 
ideal of myself, which is what sustains one in times where caring for the other 
fails, it also helps rise above moments of uncaring towards caring (Noddings,  
1984). Thus, caring is the picture of the ethical self. It is what caring can be, and 
is what gives rise to the feeling ‘I must’, which is about the struggle toward the 
other over, what Noddings (1984) says, is one’s own apathy, aversion and 
doubts. 
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For Noddings (1984: 51), ‘my very individuality is defined in a set of relations. 
This is my basic reality’. Thus, the caring relation requires of the one-caring, 
engrossment and motivational displacement, and it requires of the cared-for a 
receptivity of caring that results in authentic recognition and a spontaneous 
response to the one-caring (Noddings, 1984). When caring is not perceived as 
caring by the cared-for, or its absence is felt, the cared-for may still, by an act of 
ethical heroism, respond and contribute to the caring relation. However, such 
responses compromise the quality of the relation (Noddings, 1984). 
 
As thorough as Noddings’ (1984) explanation is about caring, there are several 
ideas that require further elaboration. While a central tenet of Noddings’ (1984) 
theory of caring involves the ability of the one-caring to displace their motive 
energy from a caring about self to a caring for an other, she offers little 
discourse on the quality of the sacrifice that is able to be made in such a shift of 
focus. For example, how far is a nurse willing and able to go in shifting their 
motive energy from a concentration of their self-project to the interest of the 
patient when such a shift will place them at risk? 
 
A second tenet of Noddings’ (1984) theory of caring involves the idea of the 
one-caring responding to the feeling ‘I must’, which Noddings says operates at 
the level of one’s reflective consciousness for it is something that must be given 
consideration. What is more, the ‘I must’ is linked to the idea that in some 
situations one not only feel that they must do something but that they also want  
to do something (Noddings, 1984). Here the ‘I want’ to which Noddings (1984) 
refers, is about relatedness and is a must that is born of desire. As Noddings 
(1984) states, the most intimate situations of caring, such as taking care of 
one’s own child, is natural. However, the impulse to act in such a situation is 
innate and may be overwhelming; it still requires a response of the reflective 
consciousness (Noddings, 1984). As a nurse (myself), there have been 
occasions where relations with patients have operated at the preconscious 
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level. Namely, when an event has resulted in my immediate reaction that was 
not a response to the feeling ‘I must’. There was no feeling to which I was to 
respond and there was no choice because it was something I did not have any 
say about. I found myself responding in a relation before my conscious 
consideration, but what is more, that should I have had an opportunity to have 
thought about the way I was to respond, before I responded, I may well have 
responded differently. In hindsight, it seemed that it was something I had to do,    
I had no choice, for it just happened. At the time, it was as though I was a 
hostage to the needs of the patient where my own project was not a 
consideration. In this example there appears an asymmetry in the relation that 
is not fully explained by Noddings’ (1984) theory. Perhaps the event described 
is more akin to Noddings (1984: 5) concept of ‘natural caring’, which she says is 
‘. . . that relation in which we respond as one-caring out of love or natural 
inclination’. 
 
Similar to Nel Noddings the philosopher Stan van Hooft presents a considered 
explanation of the content of caring and also caring as it relates to the practice 
of nursing (van Hooft, 1987, 1988, 1995, 1999a, 1999c). Specifically, van 
Hooft’s (1995) theory of caring is based on the belief that our attitudes to other 
people and toward the world in general take their character from being the 
determinable formation of our own deep caring. In citing Aristotle, van Hooft 
(1995: 2) makes the point that in order ‘. . . to act well we must not only reason 
truly but also desire rightly’, desiring rightly or feeling rightly van Hooft (1995, 
van Hooft, 1999a) claims, are dependent upon our cares, cares that lie deep 
within us and are given their content in our commitments. For van Hooft (1995) 
our cares and our commitments are an expression of our primordial 
motivational field called ‘deep caring’. 
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Deep caring as conceptualized by van Hooft (1995), is a motivational 
comportment that has both an inward function, in that it is responsible for 
defining the self (caring as self-project), and an outwards function, in that it 
defines how our self relates to others and the world in general (caring-about- 
others). It is a motivational comportment that operates at various levels of our 
human existence; at the biological level, where the focus is on our interaction 
with the physical environment; at a perceptual and reactive level that is 
concerned with a cognitive understanding of reality; at an evaluative and 
proactive level where we define our place in the world in which we live as 
reflective, purposive and active beings; and at a spiritual level where we live out 
our hopes, loves, and faith in order to make our life meaningful as relational 
beings (van Hooft, 1995). As a unified being, all levels operate together to form 
the basis of the attitudes and commitments in the various expressions of our 
being as deep caring about caring for the self as a project and a caring-about- 
others (van Hooft, 1995). 
 
Accordingly, van Hooft (1995) claims that morality is directed by what we as 
individuals find important, which of course will vary in significance because of 
how these various things accord with our being as a self-project and caring- 
about-others. Consequently, van Hooft (1995) believes, ethics is an expression 
of our deep caring. However, in his thesis van Hooft does not speculate on the 
origin of the primordial motivational field he calls deep caring. What is at the 
root of deep caring remains a mystery? 
 
The idea of commitment is central to van Hooft’s (1995) thinking about caring. 
The claim is that people care about a variety of matters at a deep level in their 
character, and that these cares, in various ways, are given expression in our 
commitments to our self-project and care-about-others (van Hooft, 1987, 1988, 
1995). Here, the commitment to self and other arise from deep within people 
and forms the foundation on which they make moral decisions about what are 
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their cares (van Hooft, 1995). Put simply, commitment as an attitude gives its 
object a positive and practical importance, in that, we invest ourselves in what 
we are committed to (van Hooft, 1996). In this view, commitment is intentional 
because it is directed at something or someone (van Hooft, I 987, 1995, 1996). 
 
What is more, the force of the commitment of one’s cares is revealed in the 
dedication that comes with professing one’s commitments, and the commitment 
that comes with being called to respond to something outside of one’s self that 
is identified as important (van Hooft, 1995). Commitment, van Hooft (1995: 16) 
believes, comprises both ‘. . . the subjective connotation of to profess and the 
objective connotation of vocation’. It is an intentional and dynamic two-way 
relationship where a person is committed to something or someone (van Hooft, 
1995). It may arise from that to which a person is dedicated and devoted or it 
may arise from a person’s personality or character that is engaged by the object 
through attention to it (van Hooft, 1995). Hence commitment is understood to be 
a relationship that has both objective and subjective content and is based on a 
person’s character (van Hooft, I 987, 1995). 
 
In other words, commitment arises from a ‘given way of life’, which means that a 
person has commitments and is committed to persons and things based on that 
way of life, which itself can give rise to more self conscious commitments (van 
Hooft, 1995). As van Hooft (1995: 18) points out in his model of care, ‘it is out of 
what we are, as described by the way of life to which we are committed, that 
our more focused and specific commitments arise’. 
 
What is more, van Hooft (van Hooft, 1995) makes an important distinction about 
determinate and nondeterminate commitments, such as, for example, the 
difference in commitment to people in general versus a commitment to a 
particular person. Clarifying this view, van Hooft (1995) says that should 
commitment be understood to be a function of subjectivity it is always 
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undetermined (nondescript and vague, a general commitment), but becomes 
focused and determined (commitment that is specific, tangible and has form), 
just to the degree that its intentional object is focused and determined. For 
example, in being committed to a person one is not committed to any particular 
course of action, but to whatever action or actions are necessary to secure the 
well-being of the one to whom we are committed (van Hooft, 1995). In this way, 
commitment may lay dormant and one may not know what one is committed to 
until faced with a choice where the commitment is tested, the testing revealing 
the commitment and what one cares about (van Hooft, 1995). 
 
As van Hooft (1995) says, a person has to care about something or be attracted 
to it if they are to be committed to it. In living a moral life, a way of life, our 
commitments are made, discovered, and rediscovered, and are given their 
content in the decisions made and stance taken about what one cares (van 
Hooft, I 995). He (van Hooft, I 995) makes the point, that a person cares about 
a variety of things at a deep level in their character and that one or another of 
these cares comes to expression in commitment. Put another way, commitment 
is the articulation and specification of deep caring which is grounded in a 
person’s character and is given expression in what a person finds important and 
what they come to care about (van Hooft, 1995). Accordingly, ‘deep caring is a 
mode of our being from which commitment springs’ (van Hooft, 1995). 
 
In applying these ideas to nursing, the professional commitment of the nurse 
has their attention focused on the object of health rather than the person of the 
patient (van Hooft, 1987). The commitment of the nurse is to the health of the 
person and the cares required in preventing, restoring or maintaining that health 
(van Hooft, 1987). Here the ideal of health is the object of the nurse’s 
professional commitment; the patient is the vehicle for the nurse’s general 
commitment to health, which is not to say that the person of the patient is not 
important to the nurse because it is (van Hooft, 1987). However, more important 
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to the nurse is the health of the patient because this is what the nurse cares for 
(van Hooft, 1987, 1999a). But is this postulate over simplistic; is it always the 
case that the health of the patient is the nurse’s first priority and the person of    
the patient second? Is it not equally plausible that what the nurse and midwife 
actually cares for is the welfare of the person who is a patient in need of 
professional health care in order for their welfare to be secured? Is what the 
nurse and midwife cares for as health is only the means to the achievement of 
the end that is the welfare of the person? It is questions like these that lead to 
speculation about the commitment of the professional nurse and midwife to 
the patient. 
 
Continuing, van Hooft (1995) claims that, for the reasons given above, caring as  
a motivational structure has the concepts of caring and commitment intertwined. 
In describing this motivational structure, van Hooft (1995) coined the term ‘deep 
caring’, which acknowledges the existence of an inchoate level of commitment 
in our motivational sets that, when applied to the objects of one’s world, 
changes them to focused commitments of which one is reflexively aware and 
which become one’s intentional forms of caring. In daily living one’s cares are 
object-directed and are determinable, which means that while one may care for 
all one’s cares in a determinate way, when focused to the object of one’s 
caring, one’s caring becomes determinable, it becomes the focus of one’s now 
determinable commitment (van Hooft, 1995). 
 
To explain these ideas further van Hooft (1995) suggests caring can be spoken 
of in three ways. First, caring as a mental state occurs when in the activity of 
caring for something or someone, the caring and the object of one’s caring 
attention are present to one’s mind and serve as a source of motivation (van 
Hooft, 1995). Second, caring as a mental disposition embraces the idea that 
each of us possesses determinable sets of concerns that become conscious only 
as the situation demands. Although the object of one’s caring may be 
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specifiable, it is not usually determinable unless it is reflected on (van Hooft, 
1995). At best, reflection on one’s thoughts, feelings and actions is the only way 
one is able to reveal the objects of their cares (van Hooft, 1995). Third, caring 
as a mental activity relates to the idea that one tries to be careful in what one 
does, which can be either the outward expression of caring as a mental 
disposition or it may itself bring about a mental disposition of caring (van Hooft, 
1995). 
 
In other words, mental activities occur spontaneously from the commitments of 
our deep caring. However as one might expect, they are not preceded by 
volitions or intentions. Rather, the commitment spoken of by van Hooft (1995: 
43) ‘. . . is an act of will determinable by any occasion apt for the enactment of 
that commitment . . .‘, thus, while it is a stance taken it is one that is not one 
preceded by an intention (van Hooft, 1995: 43). So a commitment is made 
before we decide to make it, and therefore we can find ourselves either making 
a commitment or having made a commitment, which we only become aware of  
as we enact it (van Hooft, 1995). As van Hooft (1995: 43) writes, ‘it has no 
phenomenological volume, but is itself directed upon objects and projects of the 
world’. 
 
Accordingly, the commitment to which van Hooft (1 995) refers is expressed in 
our caring without putting that caring into effect deliberately or intentionally for it 
is an activity that is not an action (van Hooft, 1995). What is more, once a 
commitment has been made it continues as a mental disposition that in making 
the commitment and then acting on it, inaugurates the mental disposition. In this 
way, the mental activity has given rise to a mental disposition (van Hooft, 1995). 
Therefore in the course of conducting ourselves in a careful or caring way and 
where we are aware of this quality we may experience a mental state of caring 
that has originated from the mental activity of making of a commitment (van 
Hooft, 1995). Accordingly, the mental disposition of which van Hooft (1995) 
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speaks about is determinably intentional and already an expression of our deep 
caring which is neither determinable nor intentional. 
 
An important feature of van Hooft’s (1995) view is that the commitment of ‘deep 
caring’ is not intentional nor is it determinable because no object can be 
specified for it. For van Hooft (1995: 45) ‘deep caring is present to us as a 
horizon rather than a content of consciousness or an a priori postulate’. Here 
the term horizon is used to explain the idea that interpretation of the inchoate 
commitment of our deep caring is manifest through the commitments of our 
mental activities of caring which give rise to our mental state of caring and thus 
our mental disposition of caring (van Hooft, 1995). Like Noddings (1984), van 
Hooft (1995) holds that caring is reflexive. It is focused inwards toward the self 
as the self is an implicit object of caring and even when determinable caring is 
focused outward toward an object, it is at the same time focused inwards 
towards the self. In deep caring, however, caring is not intentional and therefore 
no distinction can be made within it between self and other because it is sheer 
motivation. It does not have an object on which to act (van Hooft, 1995). 
 
While deep caring is without object it is not without function. The function of 
deep caring is that it constitutes the self; it provides the horizon against which 
caring can be interpreted and so enables the integrity of our commitments and 
the caring that issues from them (van Hooft, 1995). So the primary expression 
of our primordial care that is situated deep within us and called ‘deep caring’ is 
our own being as a self-project (van Hooft, 1995). Besides caring, however, 
what other forms do our commitments take that arise from the motivational field 
that van Hooft (1995) has labeled ‘deep caring’? 
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In van Hooft’s (1995) model of caring, deep caring is said to exist at all four 
level of being human, that is, the ontology of being human functions at the 
biological, perceptual and reactive, evaluative and proactive, and the spiritual 
levels of which deep caring is diffused (van Hooft, 1995). At the biological level, 
deep caring is the motivational impetus to our intentional and purposeful lives 
that enables basic survival and the determinable care required of the self as a 
project (van Hooft, 1995). 
 
The perceptual and reactive level entails the preconscious apprehension of the 
world through the cultural meanings made available to us and so is a perception 
(van Hooft, 1995). Equal to perception is the idea that existence also entails 
reaction, which makes possible practical understanding that is then assimilated 
into the perceptual and cognitive level of our lives as it is lived (van Hooft, 
1995). It is not a two stage process of perception followed by reaction; rather, 
the things that matter to us, such as our determinable cares, are noticed more, 
and therefore reaction is better understood to be a schema through which what 
is perceptually given in the world has significance (van Hooft, 1995). At this 
level of our being, deep caring is postulated to be our ontological relatedness to 
the world that enables development of our self-project (van Hooft, 1995). 
 
Next, the evaluation and proactive level of being human is about praxis (van 
Hooft, 1995). It entails the ways in which we express our attitudes and our 
desires as shaped and motivated by our inchoate deeper level of needs and 
wants that constitute our determinable and determined instances of caring that 
form the reasons for action (van Hooft, 1995). So it is through reflection that we 
bring our reasons for action to our consciousness, actively and self-consciously 
assessing and pursuing the motivations involved in living out our self-project 
(van Hooft, 1995). For van Hooft (1995), our projects and activities are 
important to us because they form part of our life as it is lived, past, present and 
future, which we care about in a deep and inchoate way (van Hooft, 1995). 
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Finally, the fourth level of van Hooft’s (1995) model of caring consists of the 
spiritual level, which embodies the idea of our self-project as an integrated, 
whole (van Hooft, 1995). The spiritual level is where our being is constituted 
whole, wholeness as a person, the wholeness of our life as it is lived, and the 
wholeness of our attitudes and view of the world in which we live (van Hooft, 
1995). It is where our sense of ourselves, as unique individuals and projects in 
the world in which we live, is articulated (van Hooft, 1995). 
 
All this said, intentional caring occurs at all four levels of the caring model, but 
while the objects of our attention and the degree of reflexivity differ, together 
they are expressive of our deep caring as a self-project (van Hooft, 1995). 
While our deep caring always remains intimate and inchoate, it comes to light in 
the cultural form of communication which can only ever be historically and 
therefore reflexively available to us (van Hooft, 1995). As van Hooft (1995: 64) 
says, ‘deep caring is the prereflexive basis of our self-projects which become 
focused as determinable caring and determinate projects and intentions as we 
engage our world’. 
 
What is more, the content of deep caring also takes the form of caring-about- 
others because others matter to us (van Hooft, 1995). Van Hooft (1995) holds 
the view that being as a self-project and also being as a caring-about-others 
provide a preconscious dynamism that forms the projects and commitments 
which constitute our ontological being as it is focused and determined by the 
intentional objects which make up our world. Here caring-about-others and the 
self as a project are equally primordial because as pre-intentional structures of 
our being, they have no determinate content that separates them. At this level 
of our being they are the same (van Hooft, 1995). Our attitudes towards other 
people take their character from being the determinable formation of our deep 
caring and so others matter to us the same as our selves matter (van Hooft, 
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1995). 
 
As a result, in van Hooft’s (1995) model of caring at the biological level, caring- 
about-others is purely bodily and is directed outward towards others. It is where 
there is a prereflexive physical rapport between two people that gives rise to a 
focused desire and affection for the other. At the perceptual and reactive level, 
caring-about-others consists of the spontaneous, preconscious, 
nondeterminable solidarity that is demonstrated through the positive and basic 
cooperative attitude of people toward each other and society in general that is 
shown in the willingness of people to help each other (van Hooft, 1995). This 
level is characterized by the intentions and attitudes of our sociability. It is 
where the equality of our primordial caring-about-others and our self-project is 
so complete that relationships are the only difference, because at this level of 
our deep caring there are no true selves or others (van Hooft, 1995). So it is 
through our sociability or more specifically, our relationships, by which our 
identity is constantly formed and reformed (van Hooft, 1995). While the content 
of our relational reactions may be either positive or negative, because these 
feelings arise preconsciously in our awareness, they are not yet subject to our 
moral judgment for they are not yet something to which we are consciously 
aware or able to deliberate upon. What these feelings do, however, is represent 
the basic mode of our orientation towards the not-self and therefore reflect our 
deep caring as caring-about-others (van Hooft, 1995). 
 
Next, the evaluative and proactive level of van Hooft’s (1995) model is marked 
by praxis. It entails that which we are conscious of as we go about our everyday 
life and is characterized by our culturally formed attitudes and intentions (van 
Hooft, 1995). As van Hooft (1995: 83) says, this level comprises ‘. . . the 
determination of a preconscious determinable comportment arising from our 
being as deep caring effected by suitable objects’. It is at this level we choose to 
cooperate with others in the conduct of living, it requires cooperation, 
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commitment, trust, and other examples of the way we enact our sociability and 
counter the isolation and independence which is not consistent with living or 
reflective of our deep caring as caring-about-others (van Hooft, I 995). 
 
Finally, the fourth level of van Hooft’s (1995) model of caring, the spiritual level 
of our being, is where we live our faith, which centers on positive regard and 
commitment to the ideals that we aspire to in the course of seeking a 
meaningful life. Caring-about-others involves the sharing of this ideal with 
another and so involves interpersonal love (van Hooft, 1995). Interpersonal love 
as spoken of here, is a form of intimate rapport that has its foundation in the 
most profound feelings and commitments of one to another (van Hooft, 1995). It 
is love as consonance of spiritual commitment, shared attitude about the things 
that are important to us, shared faith or stance toward life in general, and the 
passion that comes from a shared spiritual rapport in the living out of our 
deepest commitments and attitudes (van Hooft, 1995). 
 
Given our deep caring does not individuate us, our identity can only be made 
known to us through our commitments, actions, or reactions to the world and 
people with whom we interact in the course of living our life (van Hooft, 1995). 
Deep caring, according to van Hooft (1995), is what makes possible our 
individuality because it is only through our relations that our individuality is 
formed. Thus, ‘our deep caring is our being as a self-project and as a caring- 
about-others ‘. . . and is expressed at all four levels of van Hooft’s (1995: 90) 
model of caring. 
 
Of note, is van Hooft’s (1995) elaboration of the spiritual dimension to his model 
of caring-about-others where he explains his use of the term love, meaning 
interpersonal love. For van Hooft (van Hooft, 1995), love represents the most 
intimate and intense form of caring-about-others because it is the passionate 
expression of our most deeply held attitudes and commitments which arise from 
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our deep caring and become determinable when they are focused upon an 
object or persons in the formation of our identity. In this way, love is understood 
to define our self-project, because as van Hooft (1995) explains, it is like the 
mythical being of Aristophanes (in Plato’s Symposium). We are looking for our 
other half, because caring-about-others is equiprimordial and we need the love 
of another to individuate us. In this way, van Hooft (1 995: 91) says that ‘our 
loves establish who we are’ because they enable our particularity and our 
individuality. 
 
Caring-about-others also has another dimension to it and one that was primarily 
articulated by the philosopher Emmanual Levinas (1981) and explicated here by 
van Hooft (1995). The idea theorized is that both the other and the self are 
infinities, which when applied to van Hooft’s (1995) model of caring as a self- 
project and caring-about-others, means the self and the other are without limits. 
The term infinity is used to capture the idea that we cannot contain our being 
because there are no limits on its aspirations or ideals or on the scope and 
degree of the caring able to be generated because of it (van Hooft, 1995). While 
our relations may vary, the infinity of the other is ever present to us as a 
limitless possibility and is so powerful a presence, that should the other be 
requiring it, we would give up our life for their good (van Hooft, 1995). 
 
When applied to van Hooft’s (van Hooft, 1995) model, deep caring as a caring- 
about-others enables a relation that particularizes an other and so supports the 
development of our self-project, but also, our caring-about-others makes 
possible our acknowledgment of their radical otherness. It is an otherness that 
through my caring-about-others has us reach out to them without reservation so  
as to allow them to be, which also enables recognition of one’s own infinity (van 
Hooft, 1995). As van Hooft (1995: 95) says; 
‘it is because there is limitless depth on the call of the other on my 
infinity, in this appeal of the other to my being as a caring-about-others, 
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that I realize the limitless dimension of my being as deep caring’. 
 
It is a calling that seeks caring-about-others at all four levels of existence and 
so as the other calls to us with their needs equally we are present to them in the 
same way (van Hooft, 1995). 
 
While caring-about-others at the first three levels of van Hooft’s (1995) model 
involves one’s self-project and will to communicate with others based on one’s 
own needs and purposes, the fourth level, the spiritual level, is where we are 
drawn to the other out of the pure fascination of their humanity. In van Hooft’s 
(1995) model of caring, the spiritual level includes Levinas’ idea of infinity, or 
our shared humanity, which helps explain how the limitless commitment of 
caring-about-others is possible. 
 
All this said, deep caring as described by van Hooft (1995) is a prereflexive 
mental disposition that incorporates a pre-intentional motivational structure 
through which our cares for our self as a project and caring-about-others 
acquire their importance. The ideas presented by van Hooft about caring-about- 
others and the self as a project, identify the primordial motivational field from 
which our commitments and therefore our cares arise; that when combined with 
Levinas’ views about infinity, enable a relation with an other that is 
characterized by a limitless commitment to their wellbeing. 
 
While the thesis of both van Hooft and Levinas are significant to thinking about 
the concept of caring in general, how these ideas relate to the profession of 
nursing and midwifery where much of the work of a nurse and midwife is in fact 
tied to the protection of the humanity of the patient is still to be explicated. To 
make this point clearer, by transposing ‘I’ with ‘nurse’ and ‘other’ with ‘patient’, 
infinity makes it possible for a nurse and midwife to sacrifice their self for the 
patient even give their life for the good of the patient, the point being, these 
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ideas allude to a quality of the nurse-patient relation that is beyond the scope of 
the professional duty of care. However, the relation that is beyond that which a 
nurse and midwife may find themselves in is not known yet, except that it is a 
relation that can cause them to sacrifice their life for the patient. What gives rise 
to the commitment that would ultimately enable a professional nurse and 
midwife to sacrifice their life for a patient? Is it, as van Hooft (1995) hints, a form 
of love? 
 
Olivia Bevis is another nurse scholar who has attempted to explicate the 
meaning of caring for nursing. She bases her theoretical position of caring on 
the thinking of two philosophers, Rollo May and Martin Heidegger, who 
understand care as a response to ‘something that matters’ and is the ‘basic 
driving force of life’ (Heidegger, 1962: 237, May, 1969: 289). Adding to these 
ideas, May (1969) claims that ‘care’ is a state in which something does matter 
and is the opposite of apathy. Adopting this position Bevis (1988: 50) 
understands caring to be ‘ . . . a feeling denoting a relationship of concern, when 
the other’s existence matters to you; a relationship of dedication, taking the 
ultimate terms, to suffer for, the other.’ 
 
While caring may begin with a feeling it cannot stay as such if it is to be caring 
because caring compels a person to respond, in a thoughtful way, to the feeling 
that ‘something matters’ (May, 1969, Bevis, 1988). To this Bevis (1988: 50) 
adds the thinking of Heidegger who believes that ‘conscience manifests itself as 
care’ and is the motivating force of life. To this end, caring is presented as a ‘... 
feeling of dedication to another to the extent that it motivates and energizes 
action to influence life constructively and positively by increasing intimacy and 
mutual self-actualization’ (Bevis, 1988: 50). 
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For Bevis (1988), the goal of caring is mutual self-actualization, which can only 
be achieved through developing personal capabilities of patience, kindness, 
compassion, love, trust, and creativity that enable one person to know and 
experience the other person. According to this view, caring is a response to 
something outside of ourselves that matters to us. Here, the mattering is our 
concern and is initiated by us with our response to it also our concern in that it 
matters to the extent that we are moved by it to respond in a particular way. 
However, the extent to which the other’s existence matters to us, which 
ultimately could be more than our life matters to us, that is caring, is unclear. 
For example, the sacrifice of self in suffering for another involves the altruism 
attributed to love. This being the case, what is the relation of caring where both 
persons must be served (egalitarianism), to love (altruism) that would enable a 
nurse and midwife to sacrifice their own well being for the good of the patient? 
 
Bevis (1988) goes on to identify the ideas that embody the concepts of love, 
sex, intimacy, concern and duty as confused with caring. In summary, love, 
while a component of caring, is different to caring because caring is egalitarian 
whereas love is altruistic, (Bevis, 1988). Sex is understood to be intertwined 
with caring because it offers the possibility of overcoming the sense of isolation 
and separateness of being human (Bevis, 1988). However, according to Bevis 
(1988), the concept of ‘concern’ (if personalized) is the one closest to being 
synonymous with caring because concern captures the unmistakable feeling 
that one must take action. Intimacy though is identified as a stage of the 
process of caring and hence a part of caring (Bevis, 1988). 
 
Finally, the concept of duty, while identified as a feeling of responsibility is 
presented more as an external governing factor rather than something germane 
to caring (Bevis, 1988). What is noteworthy is that Bevis (1988) offers a 
discourse that attempts to explain the idea that caring is a life force that 
compels a person to action. It is what she (Bevis, 1988) calls a ‘feeling 
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mandating relationship’ because the ‘feeling compels the caring person to take 
action for that person’s good. However, the egalitarian nature of Bevis’ view of 
caring, that is linked to notions of reciprocity, seems incompatible with the idea 
that a nurse responds to what matters because it is what matters to them, which 
may or may not include what matters to the patient, or visa versa. Is it possible 
that a relation with a patient does not require reciprocity and if so is it caring or 
something else? 
 
The nurse scholar Delores Gaut (1983, 1986, 1988) sought to develop a 
theoretic description of caring as action as a practical activity that included 
explication of the conditions necessary for the accurate use of the term. The 
description offered by Gaut (1988) goes further than just the identification of 
observable performative skills to include ideas around the intention, choices, 
and judgments which underlie the performance of the activity called caring. In 
view of that Gaut (1988) says that because caring is an intentional human 
activity it is best understood as action rather than behaviour. 
 
As a result, Gaut (1983, 1986, 1988) identified five conditions necessary if 
caring in nursing was to occur. These are awareness, knowledge, intention, 
means for positive change, and the welfare-of-x criterion, which she then 
regrouped and presented as three distinct conditions necessary for caring. 
Condition one states that the person undertaking the caring must have 
knowledge about the person for whom they are intending to care in order to 
identify the needs of the person and the activities that can best improve their 
situation (Gaut, 1983, 1986, 1988). But there are occasions where the non- 
specific knowledge about the patient is sufficient such as in the case of 
emergency care where the need to know the patient as a person is secondary  
to responding to their destitute state in order to secure their life. If a requirement 
of caring is knowledge of the patient, then responding to the needs of a patient 
as described here, is not caring. So what is it? 
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Continuing, Gaut (1986, 1988) says that the carer must not only possess 
knowledge of the recipient but also knowledge about what to do in order to be 
able to meet the practical goals identified. What is more, because the goals 
chosen are not static they may continually affect the activities planned (Gaut, 
1986, 1988). Condition two says that, based on this knowledge, the carer 
implements actions that have the best chance of improving the situation of the 
recipient (Gaut, 1983, 1986, 1988). It involves the carer making considered 
choices about what ‘tactic’ is to be taken that will enable the practical goals to 
be met (Gaut, 1986, 1988). Nevertheless, as Gaut (1988) points out, because 
caring is not a basic action that can be directly applied but a mediated action 
delivered through other practical activities, what is considered competent is a 
matter of degrees and related to the achievement of the goals set. Condition 
three is about the evaluation of the success of the improvement in the condition  
of the person which is judged purely on the nonarbitary welfare-of-x (Gaut, 
1983, 1986, 1988). Success at meeting the care goal is based on two factors, 
the likelihood that the activities planned will meet the set goal and the expertise  
of the carer in being able to carry out the planned activities (Gaut, 1986, 1988). 
Together these ideas support the view that for caring to be considered as an 
action the activities of nursing must be related to the need for care to be able to 
bring about a positive change directly related to the need for care that is 
justified on by the nonarbitrary welfare-of-x (Gaut, 1983, 1986, 1988). However, 
Gaut’s thesis, like that of some other scholars listed above, offers no 
commentary about the degree to which a nurse and midwife will go in acting on 
the caring needed to secure the welfare of the patient. While caring as action 
helps describe what the caring is that is specific to nursing and midwifery, the 
description provided does not delineate the range of possible actions that they 
may take to secure the welfare of the patient, nor does it explain why a nurse 
and midwife should care in these ways. 
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The scholarship of Kristen Swanson has recently come to the forefront of 
those following the development of caring in nursing by way of her seminal work 
that focuses on a literary meta-analysis of caring. This work, plus her own 
thinking about caring, is aimed at clarifying the concept of caring which she 
says has existed as a ‘Tower of Babel’ (Swanson, 1999: 31). For her part 
Swanson (1991 , 1993, 1999) presents a mid range factor-naming theory 
consisting of five categories, namely ‘maintaining belief’, ‘knowing’, ‘being with’, 
‘doing for’, and ‘enabling’, that are structured in such a way as to demonstrate a 
caring process. Swanson (1991: 165, 1993: 354, 1999: 49) defined caring as ‘a 
nurturing way of relating to a valued other toward whom one feels a personal 
sense of commitment and responsibility’. 
 
The first category of her theory is ‘maintaining belief’, ‘. . . in the other’s capacity 
to get through an event or transition and face a future with meaning’ (Swanson, 
1991: 165, 1993: 354). Swanson (1993) holds that this is at the base of nursing 
for here is where what matters is defined. Second, the ‘knowing’ category is 
based on the idea that the nurse desires knowledge of the events as they  
impact on the life of the patient, which requires a willingness to recognize the 
other as important (Swanson, 1991 , 1993). Third, the ‘being with’ category or 
being emotionally present attempts to capture the idea of being there, being 
present to the patient in a way that has the nurse open to their reality and that 
matters to the nurse (Swanson, 1991, 1993). It is being with, not only side-by- 
side, but available and able to engage with the suffering of the patient. It 
identifies the responsibility the nurse has toward the patient (Swanson, 1993). 
‘Doing for’, the fourth category, entails all those activities that a person would 
normally do for themselves should they possess the capacity being undertaken 
by the nurse (Swanson, 1991, 1993). Citing Noddings (Swanson, 1991), she 
makes the point that it is the doing for the other what we would want them to do 
for us, which is also linked to the fifth and final category, ‘enabling’. ‘Enabling’ is 
where the nurse brings to bear their expertise on the situation for the betterment 
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of the patient. 
 
Of the three research projects that underpin Swanson’s theory of caring and 
category development, the findings that related to the attachment of the nurses 
in the neonatal intensive care unit, in one of the projects, hint at their being 
more to the idea than has been able to be presented. Swanson (1990) identified 
that nurses working in the neonatal intensive care unit were prone to falling in 
love with the neonates for whom they had primary care. Her postulate was that 
love explains the attachment of the nurses to the neonates but this is all that is 
said about this idea except to add that it was a view that was also validated by 
the parents involved in this research, namely that there was a lot of love in the 
neonatal intensive care unit (Swanson, 1990). This leaves us with the question 
as to what is the love that is specific to the nurses who worked in the neonate 
intensive care unit and therefore what is the love that is specific to nursing in 
general? 
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2.2 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some of the extant literature for definitions of caring 
in nursing and midwifery, and looked for links between these definitions and the 
idea of love. The recent seminal papers of Morse, Bottorff, Neader, and 
Solberg (Morse et al., 1990), and Swanson (1999), which offer a schema for 
conceptualising the literature on caring, combined with Paley’s (2001) critique of 
the content of the literature on caring in nursing, has provided the foundation for 
this analysis. The examination of the contribution of each scholar on the 
concept of caring as it is applied to nursing and midwifery has resulted in the 
identification of the idea of love in nursing and midwifery, and supported the 
introductory and background observation made in chapter one. 
 
Notably, this analysis revealed that much of the scholarship on caring does not 
provide an exact explanation of the concept caring or caring as it applies to the 
practice of professional nursing and midwifery. It is a view that is also shared by 
the philosopher John Paley (2001) who observed that the scholarship on caring 
in nursing and midwifery is little more than an aggregation of ‘things said’ about 
caring, which gives rise to an endless list of associations and attributes of 
caring in nursing and midwifery that through different permutations give rise to 
yet further endless descriptions that together do little more than provide 
confirmation of things already said, repeated over and over again. What is 
more, some literature on caring also includes the concept of love as something 
that is qualitatively different to caring. Like so much of the literature on caring, 
the literature that speaks about love as it relates to caring also does not make 
clear exactly what is meant by the term or its application to the profession of 
nursing and midwifery. 
 96
While Martin Heidegger’s (1962) notion of ‘mattering’ is used to explain the 
origin of caring, this same literature, which also identified the existence of love, 
does not explain the content of ‘mattering’ as it relates to love. The extent of the 
‘mattering’ and just how far a nurse would be prepared to go in responding to 
the things, events, and people outside of them self as both caring and loving is 
unclear. The question posed here is, is it possible for a patient to matter to a 
nurse to the extent that they would forgo their own good for that patient, and if 
this were to be the case, what would be the extent of the foregoing and what 
would it be called, care, love, or something else? 
 
What is more, the literature also shows that caring and ideas about love in 
nursing and midwifery involve risk to their self-project. Because a patient’s 
values, beliefs and desires may be different to those of the nurse and midwife, 
the nurse and midwife in responding to the destitute state of the patient 
exposes themselves to change and the possibility of negative consequences. 
While ‘mattering’ gives rise to different forms of commitment and therefore 
different nurse-patient relations, none of the nurse scholars sampled explained 
the type of devotion that arises from their form of commitment and the relational 
responsibility of another person as something they desire or feel they must do. 
What the premotivational comportment is that enables a professional nurse and 
midwife to rise above their own subjective isolation and move their motive 
energy from a concern about their own self-project as a first priority to that of 
the patient remains unclear. Although the selflessness of the nurse’s and 
midwife’s caring acts have a net benefit for both the nurse and midwife and the 
patient, what of those nursing and midwifery actions where the selflessness or 
absorption of the nurse and midwife in the other is to a level where there is a 
demise of their own being. Is this still caring? Is it caring if a person jumps off a 
bridge into the raging water to save a person when they cannot swim, or is it 
caring if a nurse gives mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to a patient who could be 
HIV positive, or are these examples, examples of some other form of nurse- 
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patient relation? Can the selflessness of caring be of the quality where a person 
is able to shift their motive energy from a concentration on their own self-project 
as their first priority to another person, where there is asymmetry of the relation 
and no expectation of reciprocity nor concern for their own welfare? 
 
When examining the concept of love as it applies to the nurse-patient relation, 
the literature reveals it to have a far deeper meaning than that attributed to it in 
popular western culture. Love in nursing and midwifery is more that 
personalized affection; it is reported as a form of intimate rapport that has its 
foundations in the most profound feeling and commitments of one caring about 
another, but the intimate rapport of a professional nurse and midwife that is love 
is still to be fully explained. What is more, caring is reported as being the active 
expression of love but what is this form of love? Instead of care, the term love is 
repeatedly used to portray the quality that is possible of the nurse-patient 
relation. General depictions of caring suggest caring is understood to be an all 
encompassing term and one that describes a range of different nurse-patient 
relations. While various scholars allude to the idea that love is the motivation for 
caring there is no mention of the motivation of love. If caring is the activity of 
love what is love that is caring or more specifically what is love that is love in 
nursing and midwifery? 
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Chapter 3:  Study Design 
 
3.0  Introduction 
Embarking on study about a topic area as nebulous as ‘love’ is not without its 
challenges, one of which was the identification of a study design that would 
enable the deeply held beliefs of nurses and midwives about love, as it related 
to their professional practice, to be exposed. A reconnaissance about the topic 
question of ‘what is love in nursing and midwifery’ showed that nurses and 
midwives understood their practice to incorporate elements of love but were 
unable to articulate, in any meaningful way, what that was. As a result, the 
design developed for this study incorporated the principles of social 
constructionism, hermeneutic dialectic method, incorporated real case focus 
groups called ‘Neo-Socratic dialogue’, and philosophical inquiry. The 
combination of approaches enabled the researcher to elicit through language 
the tacit and social knowledge constructions (understandings) of nurses and 
midwives about the topic as data for analysis and the subsequent development 
of a thesis about love in nursing and midwifery that is reflective of the 
complexities of real life. 
 
3.1  Social constructionism and Neo-Socratic dialogue 
In this study, principles of social constructionism are combined with a Neo- 
Socratic dialogue process to reveal nurses and midwives understandings of 
love as it is experienced in the practice of nursing and midwifery. Social 
constructionism as articulated by Gergen (1994: 68), ‘. . . traces the sources of 
human action to relationships and the very understanding of ‘individual 
functioning’ to communal interchange’. Gergen (1994: 253) believes that 
conceptions of self and others are derived from and sustained by patterns of 
relationship from which language is born and it is language that makes possible 
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the capacity to render ourselves intelligible. For this reason, relationship 
replaces the individual as the fundamental unit of social life (Gergen, 1994: 
263). As such, Gergen (1994: 263) says, commence with individual subjectivity 
and then work in a deductive way toward an account of human understanding 
through language. This makes possible analysis of the human relationship 
because it is the human relationship . t generates both language and 
understanding. 
‘An individual’s utterances in themselves possess no meaning. In the 
intersubjective account of meaning, the mind of the individual serves as 
an originary source. Meaning is generated within the mind and 
transmitted via words or gestures. In the relational case, however, there 
is no proper beginning, no originary source, no specific region in which 
meaning takes wing, for we are always already in a relational standing 
with others and the world ‘ (Gergen, 1994: 264). 
 
While social constructionism focuses on the micro-social processes of 
interchange as the basis for knowledge generation, the principles that underlie 
Neo-Socratic dialogue reveal the implicit ‘knowing’ of the individual and 
community of others that occurs as a result of social interchange. The Neo -
Socratic dialogue process enables the researcher to reveal the logical reason, 
for instance, as to what nurses and midwives understand as love in the practice 
of nursing and midwifery. Neo-Socratic dialogue seeks to prove nothing but 
make known the logical reasons for acknowledged consequences that are 
accepted conclusions and evaluations of nurses and midwives about their 
clinical practice. It employs a dialogue strategy for the interchange of group 
ideas about love in the practice of nursing and midwifery that support a 
skeptical view of the assumptions that underpin individual understandings; that 
new ways of understanding are generated by active and cooperative 
interpersonal relations; and that conclusions reached are never complete in that 
they can always be improved upon with further social interaction (Gergen, 
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1994). 
 
So what does the social constructionist and the Neo-Socratic dialogue 
perspectives offer this research? They support a relational orientation to 
knowledge generation and the belief that the processes of understanding are 
not natural but rather the result of the active and cooperative engagement of 
people in relationship (Gergen, 1985: 267). The combined approach enables 
this study to focus on the meanings and significances of nurses’ and midwives’ 
relational experiences of love in the practice of nursing and midwifery. 
Specifically, the principles of social constructionism as postulated by Gergen 
(1982, 1985, 1991, 1994, 1995), and applied to this study: 
 
• Support the development of understandings about the relational experiences 
of registered nurses and midwives as understood by those nurses and 
midwives. The emphasis being on the meanings generated by nurses and 
midwives as they collectively generate descriptions and explanations in 
language as opposed to that being in their individual minds. 
• View knowledge (understandings as represented in language) as a product 
of the coordinated activities of individuals, the emphasis being on the inter- 
dependence of understandings that are generated for locally-agreed-upon 
purposes as embedded in the experience of nurses and midwives. 
• Recognize that the quality of knowledge constructions (understandings) is 
dependent on the range, scope and sophistication of information able to be 
communicated by nurses and midwives participating in the research. It is 
accepted that constructions (understanding) are always in a state of 
becoming more informed as a result of new information, time and 
negotiation. 
• Identify the researcher as an integral participant in the generation of 
understanding about the research question. 
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3.2 Social Constructionism and hermeneutic-dialectic method 
Methodologically, social constructionism and Neo-Socratic dialogue are 
congruent with the hermeneutic-dialectic approach which uses the art, skill and 
theory of interpretation to gain insight into human existence (Appleton and King, 
1997, Bullock et al, 1977). When hermeneutic method is applied to the social 
constructionists’ perspective, the focus is on the reconstruction of previously 
and currently held understanding about a phenomenon in order to generate  
new insight. In social constructionism the foundational unit of analysis is not the 
individual and the understanding of this person. Rather the starting point for 
meaning is the linguistic relational understandings of people (Gergen, 1994: 
263). 
 
For this reason individual knowledge constructions (understandings) are 
explored and refined hermeneutically, and compared and contrasted 
dialectically to generate new consensus constructs about a phenomenon  
(Guba, 1990: 27, Cuba and Lincoln, 1994: 112). In this way, my use of 
hermeneutics is to make public the constructions (understandings) of the 
registered nurses and midwives as accurately as possible, which includes them 
formulating answers to the study question. Furthermore, the dialectic aspect 
focuses on a relational exploration of nurses and midwives constructions 
(understandings) by having them engage in a process of comparing and 
contrasting each with the other in an attempt to reach a more informed level of 
knowing (individual and group) about the phenomenon (Cuba, 1990: 26). 
Accordingly, all knowledge constructions (understandings) are understood to 
become more informed over time, and can only ever be considered the most 
plausible view of the moment that is reflective of the registered nurses’ and 
midwives’ experiential reality (von Glasersfeld, 1993: 3). 
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More particularly, the adoption of a hermeneutic-dialectic method and principles 
of social constructionism and Neo-Socratic dialogue supports the 
implementation of a dialogue strategy that uses the continuing dialectic circle of 
iteration, analysis, critique, reiteration, and reanalysis, to develop joint 
consensus constructions about the phenomenon of love in nursing and 
midwifery. Specifically, the method requires participants to come together in a 
group and iterate real life examples of the study phenomena that are then 
analysed in a way that makes the underlying understandings about the 
examples offered understandable to others. Each example offered is critiqued 
by all participants who may either hold similar or different understandings about 
the example. The example is then reiterated in light of this new information or 
new level of sophistication. This may be then subjected to reanalysis and so on 
until consensus of understanding about the phenomena amongst the group is 
reached or as close to consensus as possible (Guba and Lincoln, 1989: 89). 
The method requires participants to: 
• Share a commitment to work from a position of integrity. 
• Communicate their beliefs and possess a willingness to share their 
thinking about the topic. 
• Share equitably the power within the group so as not to dominate 
group- working processes. 
• Possess a willingness to change individual thinking on a topic as a 
response to reasoned argument. 
• Commit the time and energy required to develop an understanding 
about the topic. (Guba and Lincoln, 1989: 149) 
 
In addition, hermeneutic-dialectic method combined with the subjective 
epistemology of social constructionism and Neo-Socratic dialogue includes the 
relationship of the researcher and the participants in the cyclic dialectic process  
of knowledge construction. The method identifies the researcher and the 
participant as intrinsically linked to the outcomes of the study inquiry and 
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acknowledges that the outcomes are a literal co-creation of the inquiry process. 
Interactions are identified as best arising from among and between the 
researcher and participant/s in the natural setting where increased opportunities 
exist for inquiry of a hermeneutical and dialectical nature. Thus hermeneutic 
dialectic method, social constructionism and Neo-Socratic dialogue 
acknowledge the relationship of the researcher and the participant in the study 
process where the aim is ‘the collective generation of meaning as shaped by 
convention of language and other social processes’ (Schwandt, 1994: 127). 
 
3.3  Neo-Socratic dialogue method 
Neo-Socratic dialogue enables the study of the tacit knowledge 
(understandings) of participants and therefore requires the researcher to 
instigate a data sampling strategy that enables tacit meaning to be clarified. 
Further, Neo-Socratic dialogue, as I will explain below, exemplifies the 
hermeneutic-dialectical method and embodies principles of social 
constructionism. Specifically, Neo-Socratic dialogue is the art of philosophizing 
about a topic and was originally developed as an educative process and based 
on the ideas of the German Philosopher Leonard Nelson (1882-1927), and by 
the Philosophical-Political Academy in Germany, the Society for the 
Furtherance of critical Philosophy in the U.K., and Dutch Association for 
Philosophical Practice (Fitzgerald and van Hooft, 2000, van Hooft, 2001). Neo- 
Socratic dialogue is a process that elicits explicitly from participants their implicit 
‘knowing’ (Marinoff, 2000: 262). It attempts to impart to reasoning a practical 
form by reflecting upon it together with other people (Boele, 1997). To do this 
Neo-Socratic dialogue uses the process of regressive abstraction to find a 
collective answer to a fundamental question, in this case, ‘what is love in 
nursing and midwifery?’ (Boele, 1997: 49-51 , Curnow, 2001 : 235, Fitzgerald 
and van Hooft, 2000: 483, Nelson, 1949: 1, van Hooft, 1999d: 2). Regressive 
abstraction reverses the usual method of objective establishment, which derives 
consequences from their reason and rather seeks to identify logical reasons for 
 104
consequences. Nelson (1949) claims that the Neo-Socratic method enables the 
researcher to prove nothing but make known the logical reasons for 
acknowledged consequences that are accepted conclusions and evaluations. It 
is these accepted conclusions and evaluations that are the focus of Neo- 
Socratic dialogue analysis and which serve as data for the construction of a 
thesis about the concept ‘love’ as it relates to the clinical practice of nursing and 
midwifery. 
‘If we choose from the experience of daily life those judgements and 
evaluations on which there is agreement, we can analyse them and thus, 
by a regressive procedure, search out the philosophical principles that 
have been applied in these judgements and evaluations and are 
presupposed in all of them. By a process of continuous analysis and 
abstraction from the specific applications we must eventually reach some 
essential and ultimate assumptions, which we can then separately 
denote’. (Nelson, 1949: 106-107) 
 
In this study Neo-Socratic dialogue was identified as the method best able to 
provide data for an answer to the fundamental question of ‘what is love in 
nursing and midwifery’. The Neo-Socratic dialogue method used in this study 
consisted of three principal components as outlined below by (Boele, 1997, 
Fitzgerald and van Hooft, 2000, van Hooft, 2000, 1999d, 1999b). 
• Step 1: Broad question requiring a specific example. The researcher 
presented the question to the group — what is love in nursing and 
midwifery. Next, each participant provided one personal clinical 
practice example of love in nursing and midwifery. The group then 
chose one example from the list that they believed best-reflected love  
in nursing and midwifery. 
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• Step 2: Specific question of the example. Once the best example of  
love in nursing and midwifery was accepted, the group set about 
formulating an answer to the question; ‘If this example is an example 
of love in nursing and midwifery, then what in this example did this 
nurse do that exemplified love?’ 
• Step 3: Broad question related to specific answer. The group were   
then asked to formulate an answer to the question; ‘If what you have 
articulated to date is what you consider to be love in nursing and 
midwifery in this example, then what is love that is specific to nursing 
and midwifery’?’ 
 
What is more, during the course of the Neo-Socratic dialogue the facilitator or 
any participant is able to initiate a metadialogue. A metadialogue is dialogue 
that is not directly about the formulation of an answer to the questions posed 
but about the dialogue processes itself. In particular, the facilitator or any 
participant, at any time, can call a kind of ‘time out’ in order to temporarily stop 
the dialogue about the topic question and instead initiate dialogue about any 
issue that is hindering the formulation of a group-consensus answer to the Neo-  
Socratic dialogue question. For example, a metadialogue can be initiated if 
either the facilitator or the participant feels they have lost track of the 
discussion, is unable to understand what others are saying, is upset with the 
current line of discussion, feels they are not being heard, wishes to clarify group 
processes, or wishes to identify strategies for resolution of conflict (van Hooft, 
1999d). All this said, the group should not return to the dialogue until all the 
reasons for initiating the metadialogue have been resolved or strategies for 
moving ahead have been identified (van Hooft, 1999d). 
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3.3.1  Neo-Socratic dialogue method: The sample 
This study used a criterion-based non-probability purposive sampling method. 
This sampling method enabled the researcher to obtain data from a specific 
group of people titled Registered Nurse and Registered Midwife. The criteria 
applied to the selection of participants for inclusion in the study was that all the 
participants were required to be: 
• Registered as a nurse and midwife with the Nursing authority of their 
country or endorsed on the nurses register as a midwife. 
• Practicing nursing and midwifery. 
• Interacting with patients at the ‘bedside’ on either a full-time, part-time 
or casual basis. 
• Able to provide an example from their nursing and midwifery practice 
where they believed they used love and be willing to share that 
example with other participants. 
 
Purposive sampling is a sampling method that is congruent with social 
constructionism, hermeneutic dialectic method and Neo-Socratic dialogue 
because the object of purposive sampling is to identify ‘information-rich cases’ 
for in-depth examination (Appleton and King, 1997). In this study, the 
researcher embarked on a process of recruiting registered nurses and midwives 
who were able to provide a specific example from their clinical practice of love  
in nursing and midwifery and were willing to share that example with others. 
Purposive sampling enabled the sampling of both typical and divergent cases in 
order to promote discovery of different constructions about love in nursing and 
midwifery. To this end this study recruited participants from Australia, Singapore 
and Bhutan. In addition, Neo-Socratic dialogue (as explained above) requires 
all participants to share their example of love in nursing and midwifery with 
others in the group and in doing so causes exploration of the examples so as to 
purposively trigger discourse on the typical and divergent views about the 
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phenomenon that are inherent in the various examples. 
 
Snowball technique was used to recruit participants into the study. The 
researcher used four different strategies for recruitment of participants. 
• The study proposal was presented to various groups of nurses and 
midwives inviting them to make contact should they like to participate 
in the study. 
• A handout sheet was provided to Unit Managers of various health care 
settings, titled ‘Research Invitation’, inviting interested participants to 
provide their contact details for the provision of additional information 
about the study and possible inclusion (Appendix I : Research 
Invitation). 
• ‘Word of mouth’, where various nurses and midwives heard about the 
study from a work colleague or friend who had either attended a 
proposal presentation or had participated in a Neo-Socratic dialogue 
focus group or had seen the Research Invitation flyer. 
• A clinician who could identify both registered nurses and midwives 
who would possibly be interested in the topic for the researcher to then 
follow-up. 
 
The demography of the sample population showed registered nurses and 
midwives recruited to the study were very different in that they lived and worked 
in three countries with different cultural backgrounds and possessed different 
levels of education and clinical experience. Some nurses had as little as one 
year postgraduate registered nurse experience, while others had a large  
amount of specialty registered nurse expertise that included; accident and 
emergency nursing, aged care nursing, acute medical and surgical nursing, 
cancer nursing, community nursing, critical care nursing, hospice nursing, 
midwifery, naturopathy, nurse administration , nurse education , palliative care 
nursing, pediatrics/child and adolescent nursing, psychiatric nursing, and renal 
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nursing. Registered Nurse’s (Division 2) were Australian and a second level 
nurse who provide basic nursing care. The Registered Nurse’s (Division 2) had 
large amounts of clinical experience in aged care and acute medical and 
surgical nursing. There were a total of fifty-six registered nurses and midwives 
who participated in the study, eleven were Registered Nurses’ (Division 2) and 
forty-five were Registered Nurses’, (Table I : Demography of the participant 
population). Eight of the eleven Registered Nurses’ (Division 2) were 
undertaking a Bachelor of Nursing (Conversion) program. Of this population 
there were forty-four women and twelve men, which was not reflective of the 
percentage gender mix of registered nurse in any of the countries where this 
study was conducted. 
 
Table 1: Demography of the participant population 
Participant 
Group 
Female Male Registered Nurse 
and/or midwife 
(Division 1) 
Registed 
Nurse 
(Division 2) 
Number of 
participants
Group 1 7 2 7 2 9 
Group 2 0 8 0 8 8 
Group 3 9 0 9 0 9 
Group 4 6 0 5 1 6 
Group 5 12 0 12 0 12 
Group 6 10 2 12 0 12 
Total 44 12 45 11 56 
 
 109
3.3.2 Neo-Socratic dialogue method: Focus group 
This study used the Neo-Socratic dialogue method, which requires use of a 
focus group for the development of knowledge constructions (understandings) 
about love in nursing and midwifery as data for building a thesis about love as it 
applies to the practice of nurses and midwives. The hallmark of a focus group is 
the explicit use of the group interaction to produce data and insights that would  
be less accessible without the interaction found in a group (Morgan, 1988). 
 
The formation of a focus group to conduct a Neo-Socratic dialogue enabled me  
to facilitate group interaction where participants engaged in active thinking 
about what is love in nursing and midwifery. Each focus group enabled six to 
twelve registered nurses and midwives from different backgrounds to come 
together and dialogue on the topic question of ‘what is love in nursing and 
midwifery’. Given the nebulous nature of the topic question, the focus group, by 
using the Neo-Socratic dialogue method, provided participants with a less 
threatening environment in which to express their views and considered 
responses to others. Unlike the conduct of a traditional focus group, which may 
last from between 60 to 90 minutes, each focus group using the Neo-Socratic 
dialogue method normally lasts between 6 to 8 hours, which is the time 
preferred to investigate the topic question in depth. However some were 
shorter. 
 
The dialogue required participants to verbalize in a thoughtful way their specific 
thinking about the question at hand. Participants were required to generate 
reflection, which in turn, required awareness on their part of what they were 
saying and hence gave rise to abstraction. Because each contribution to the 
dialogue required a clearly articulate statement, participants were able to 
identify inconsistencies in their thinking. Social constructionist thinking supports 
the requirement of participants to engage in both interactive and subjective 
dialogue about social reality, revealing meanings, intentions, and purposes in 
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their constructions, and to reach a group consensus position, in this case, about 
love in nursing and midwifery. 
 
The cyclic process of iteration, analysis, critique, reiteration and reanalysis 
achieving group consensus on a knowledge construction (understanding) about 
a topic required significant time. Von Glaserfeld (1993) argues that in 
constructivism (in general), establishment of such a consensus position is 
difficult and what one aims for is more that another’s perspective is at best 
compatible. To this end, I as the researcher encouraged exploration of the 
ideas participants raised in the course of the Neo-Socratic dialogue, supported 
diversity of opinion and fostered shared insight into the different perspectives 
about the study question. Each Neo-Socratic dialogue was able to develop a 
consensus position on an answer to the study question of what is love in 
nursing and midwifery. 
 
Each of the four Neo-Socratic dialogue focus groups conducted in Australia was 
held in a location close to the participants’ place of living. Three were conducted 
at the university and one in the home of one of the participants. All locations 
provided me with central locations to assist recruitment, neutral territory away 
from the politics of the participants’ workplace, and venues suited to serious 
and purposeful dialogue about the study topic. Similarly, the Neo-Socratic 
dialogue conducted in Singaporean was held at the Singapore Nurses 
Association and the Neo-Socratic dialogue conducted in Bhutan was held at the 
Royal Institute of Health Sciences. Both venues enabled the participants to be 
away from the demands of the clinical setting and able to focus on the task at 
hand. 
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Approximately 6-12 registered nurses and midwives participated in each of the 
six Neo-Socratic dialogues. Two of the Neo-Socratic dialogue focus group 
meetings lasted between 6-8 hours and four went for 3-4 hours. I as the 
researcher found it difficult to recruit nurses and midwives able to donate 6-8 
hours of their time. Many potential participants said they would be able to 
provide ‘a couple of hours but not a day’. Requiring 6-8 hours for the conduct of  
a Neo-Socratic dialogue limited the available population base and saw only 
those nurses and midwives who felt strongly about the topic question agreeing 
to participate even for 3-4 hours. For the four Neo-Socratic dialogue focus 
group sessions of 3-4 hours duration, changes to the format were made. 
Participants were prepared before the dialogue session on the process of Neo-
Socratic dialogue, informed consent was obtained prior to the session, and 
participants undertook preparatory reflective thinking about the question posed 
and came prepared with a clinical example of love in nursing or midwifery ready 
to share with the group. With the shorter duration came less need for prolonged 
breaks and during the dialogue, I as the facilitator, increased my interaction to 
ensure the discussion remained ‘on track’. Neo-Socratic dialogue and 
constructionism allows for such facilitator focus group interaction 
acknowledging the facilitator as an integral part of the Neo-Socratic dialogue 
(Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999). This said all groups developed answers to all the 
components of the Neo-Socratic dialogue on the question of ‘what is love in 
nursing and midwifery’. 
 
All focus group meetings were audio taped to assist the accuracy of data 
collection. 
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3.3.3 Neo-Socratic dialogue method: Role of the researcher as facilitator 
In the constructivist paradigm the relationship of the researcher and participants  
is acknowledged as connected, in that the researcher is identified as being 
intrinsically linked to the constructions developed. The Neo-Socratic dialogue 
method also acknowledges the connected relationship of the researcher and 
participants. While the researcher/facilitator does not actively participate in the 
‘content’ of the dialogue, they nonetheless input via a facilitative role that 
requires the dialogue to adhere to a strict format concentrating on identifying 
inconsistencies or the limitations of the conceptions posed. 
 
Regressive abstraction, as applied in this study, sought to reveal individual and 
group constructions about love in nursing and midwifery as exemplified in a 
specific nursing and midwifery example and then applied to nursing and 
midwifery in general. Systematic reflection upon the example was the basis of 
the group’s search for shared judgments about the question. The dialogue 
aimed at consensus and to these ends each participant’s thoughts were  
clarified as the dialogue progressed so as to ensure participants understood 
each other fully. The phases of the dialogue move from describing an actual 
example of love in nursing and midwifery, to drawing out the principles in the 
light of which judgments were made and decisions taken in that example, and 
from there, to the articulation of more general principles which might be 
applicable in other cases. In this way, Neo-Socratic dialogue is congruent with 
social constructionism and the hermeneutic dialectic method (Figure 1: Study 
design). 
 
In order to achieve the outcomes stated above, it was imperative that I as the 
facilitator conducted myself in a particular way especially given the time able to 
be offered by participants to explore the question at hand. As Barbour (1999) 
states, focus groups have their own momentum, and the facilitators role is to 
promote interaction between participants unencumbered by heavy-handed 
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interventions, to be open and prepared to assist ‘sensitive moments’, painful 
exchanges and revelations, yet at the same time provide a safe environment 
where appropriate disclosure is promoted. 
 
Furthermore, given the study topic is about love, I as researcher was 
particularly aware of the potential for very personal disclosures and hence 
established ‘ground rules’ with each group prior to the commencement of each 
Neo-Socratic dialogue session. ‘Ground rules’ focused on providing a safe 
environment for the conduct of the dialogue and made sure all participants 
understood the question. Participants were told that all disclosures would be 
confidential to the group, and that no person was obliged to disclose personal 
information about themselves or their patients that would compromise their own 
wellbeing or the identification of the patient. However, should a participant 
become emotionally distressed by the content of the Neo-Socratic dialogue, a 
process for debriefing and referral to a professional counsellor aware of the 
conduct of the study was established (Appendix 2: Deakin University Ethics 
Committee Plain Language Statement). Owen (2001) supports this initiative, 
making clear that researchers have a moral duty to provide safety mechanisms 
in their conduct of focus groups that protect vulnerable people. 
 
3.3.4 Neo-Socratic dialogue method: Role of the participant 
Neo-Socratic dialogue makes certain requirements of participants (van Hooft, 
1999d). First the facilitator is required to set a well-formulated, general question, 
or statement, before the discourse commences. In this case the question set  
was ‘what is love in nursing and midwifery?’ It is from this point that participants 
are required to collect concrete examples of their experience in which the topic 
plays a key role. Here participants were asked to offer actual examples of 
where love has been used in their practice of their nursing and midwifery. It was 
made clear to participants that the examples were not to be about romantic 
love. The following criteria were provided to participants (Appendix 3: How Do I 
 114
Participate In A Neo-Socratic Dialogue?). 
 
3.3.4.1  Criteria for suitable examples 
1. The example has been derived from your own experience;    
    ‘hypothetical’ or ‘generalized’ examples (quite often it happens to me   
     that . . .‘) are not suitable. 
 
2. Examples should not be very complicated one’s; simple examples are  
    often the best. Where a sequence of events has been presented, it would  
    be best for the group to concentrate on one aspect or one event. 
 
3. The example has to be relevant for the topic of the dialogue and of  
    interest to the other participants. Furthermore, all participants must be  
    able to put themselves into the shoes of the person giving the example. 
 
4. The example should deal with an experience that has already come to an  
    end. If the participant is still immersed in the experience it is not  
    suitable. For example, if decisions are still to be taken, there is a risk  
    that group members might be judgmental or offer advice; and if there is  
    still an emotional involvement, the discussion might re-open emotional  
    wounds. 
 
5. The participant giving the example has to be willing to present it fully  
    and provide all the relevant actual information and answer questions so  
    that the other participants are able to understand the example and its  
    relevance to the central question. 
 
6. Positive examples: i.e., examples that affirm the question or statement  
   are preferred. 
 115
Next, participants came together as a group to engage in the Neo-Socratic 
dialogue. At this point the group was reminded of the rules for the conduct of the 
Neo-Socratic dialogue (Appendix 3: How Do I Participate In A Neo-Socratic 
Dialogue?), they include: 
 
3.3.4.2 Rules of participants 
There are eight basic rules for participants in the Socratic Dialogue: 
1. Each participant’s contribution is based upon what s/he has  
    experienced, not upon what s/he has read or heard. 
 
2. The thinking and questioning is honest. This means that all and only  
    genuine doubts about what has been said should be expressed. 
 
3. It is the responsibility of all participants to express their thoughts as  
   clearly and concisely as possible, so that everyone is able to build on the  
   ideas contributed by others earlier in the dialogue. 
 
4. Participants should not concentrate exclusively on their own thoughts  
   but should make every effort to understand those of other participants.  
   To assist with this, the facilitator may ask one participant to express in  
   his or her own words what another participant has said. 
 
5. Anyone who has lost sight of the question or of the thread of the  
    discussion should seek the help of others to clarify where the group  
    stands. 
 
6. Abstract statements should be grounded in concrete experience or in the  
    example, which is central to the discussion in order to illuminate such  
    statements. 
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7. Inquiry into relevant questions continues as long as participants either  
    hold conflicting views or have not yet reached clarity. 
 
8. It is important and rewarding to participate in the whole of a dialogue  
    even if there is disagreement. Everyone should endeavor not to leave  
    early or cease participating before consensus is reached. 
 
Furthermore, I as the facilitator reiterated the information that describes the 
concept of a metadialogue that was provided in the ‘How Do I Participate In A 
Neo-Socratic Dialogue?’ sheet. 
 
3.3.4.3   Metadialogue 
It is permissible at any time within the dialogue for the facilitator or for any 
participant to call ‘timeout’ in order to direct the attention of the group to any 
problems that may have arisen. It may be that a participant has lost track of the 
discussion, is unable to understand what others are saying, or feels excluded, 
or it may be that one or more participants have become upset with the way the 
dialogue has developed. Alternatively, it may be that the group has lost its way 
and needs to review the structure or content of the dialogues, or the group may 
want to discuss the strategies it is using to seek a consensus of the question. 
Whatever the reason, a discussion about the dialogue, or a ‘metadialogue’, can 
be called for at anytime. If it is thought appropriate, someone from the group 
other than the facilitator may be asked to chair the metadialogue. The group 
should not return to the content dialogue until all the difficulties that led to the 
calling of a ‘timeout’ have been resolved or until strategies for proceeding with 
the content dialogue have been formulated. 
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In addition to the explanation about a metadialogue I as the facilitator identified 
the ‘ground rules’ to apply to the conduct of the dialogue. The ground rules for 
each Neo-Socratic dialogue were established in negotiation with each group 
and focused on the maintenance of confidentiality. The following statement on 
confidentiality contained in the ‘How Do I Participate In A Neo-Socratic 
Dialogue?’ sheet acted as a trigger for discussion and identification of group 
specific ground rules. 
 
3.3.4.4 Confidentiality 
All the content of the dialogue is bound by the rules of research confidentiality.  
Notwithstanding this requirement, it is pointed out to the nurses and midwives 
that their participation in the dialogue bound them to that confidentiality. 
 
In summary, Neo-Socratic dialogue as used here required each participant’s 
contribution to be based on his or her clinical experience, not upon what may 
have been read, heard or postulated about the topic (theory is to be set aside). 
Importantly each contribution and the questioning of others were always to be 
honest and related to understanding the concepts presented. This means that 
only genuine doubts about what has been said were to be expressed. As a 
result each participant was asked to express their thoughts as clearly and 
concisely as possible, so that everyone was able to build on the ideas 
contributed by others earlier in the dialogue. Moreover, participants were asked 
not to concentrate exclusively on their own thoughts but to make every effort to 
understand those of their colleagues. To assist with this, participants 
understood that I as the facilitator, from time to time, may ask a participant to 
express in his or her own words what another participant has said. Furthermore 
it was made clear to participants that should they lose sight of the question or of 
the thread of the discussion they should seek the help of others to clarify where 
the group stands. Another requirement of participants was that any abstract 
statement/s offered was to be grounded in concrete experience or in the 
example focused on in the dialogue. Inquiry into relevant questions continued 
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as long as participants either held conflicting views or had not yet reached 
clarity. Notwithstanding it was a requirement of the dialogue that all participants 
remain for the whole of a dialogue even if there was disagreement. Everyone 
was asked to participate in the entire dialogue and not leave early or cease 
participating before consensus was reached. 
 
Once the above items had been finalized the Neo-Socratic dialogue 
commenced. I as the facilitator put the broad question to the group that required 
of them a specific example, that is, I presented the question to the group — what 
is love in nursing and midwifery. To which each participant provided one 
personal clinical practice example of love in nursing and midwifery. Each 
example that was provided was explored in detail by the group to the point of 
them feeling they have a clear understanding of that example. Once all 
participants had offered their examples the group then chose one example from 
the list that they believed best-reflected love in nursing and midwifery. After the 
specific example was chosen the group embarked on a detailed exploration of 
that example. Participants continued to explore the specific example until they 
believed they had a comprehensive understanding of it and could then consider 
the example to be their example. Hence, the example moved from being the 
participant’s personal example to where it was now considered the groups’. 
 
It is at this point that the Neo-Socratic dialogue enters its second phase, 
entailing the specific question of the example. Participants now focused on the 
formulation of an answer to the question; ‘If this example is an example of love  
in nursing and midwifery, then what in this example did this nurse or midwife do 
that exemplified love?’ This phase of the dialogue process proved to be most 
intense and required, from time-to-time, the restatement of the rules of conduct 
to ensure the group remained focused on formulating an answer to the question 
and did not become sidetracked. This phase particularly challenged 
participants, because it required them to engage in abstract thinking that had to 
be grounded in concrete experiences or in the example itself. It required doubts 
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about what was said by others to be expressed, it required the resolution of 
conflicting views, and it required that they follow a path of inquiry in order to 
reach clarity and group consensus which was challenging. During this phase, 
both participants and I had cause to engage in metadialogues to address a 
variety of issues that included resolution of conflicting views, a focus on the 
question at hand, and a clarification of progress. 
 
In the final phase of the Neo-Socratic dialogue, I as the facilitator put to the 
group the broad question that related to a specific answer. In other words, the 
group were asked to formulate an answer to the question; ‘If what you have 
articulated to date is what you consider to be love in nursing and midwifery in 
this example, then what is love that is specific to nursing and midwifery?’ On 
each occasion participants began with summarizing their thinking to date about 
what they understood to be the love that was practiced in nursing and midwifery 
in the example and then began to clarify their beliefs about how those concepts 
apply to nursing and midwifery in general. The temptation for each group was to 
formulate an answer to the question that was so broad that it was not specific to 
nursing and midwifery. Hence, with each Neo-Socratic dialogue, a 
metadialogue was initiated by me as the facilitator to help the group to remain 
focused on the question to be answered, to provide clarification of the various 
positions of participants, to illuminate strengths and weaknesses of the 
argument and to assist in the summation of the final position and answer to this 
last question. This said, each group was able to formulate a broad answer that 
was specific to nursing and midwifery. 
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It can be readily seen that this dialogue process fulfils the requirements of the 
hermeneutic-dialectical method and is in accord with the theoretical framework  
of social constructionism, which are further developed in the chapters on 
reporting the data. 
 
3.3.5 Neo-Socratic dialogue method: Data collection 
Data collection using Neo-Socratic dialogue took place over a twelve-month 
period and was complicated by the difficulty of recruiting participants willing and 
able to offer such a large portion of their time to a Neo-Socratic dialogue 
session and the difficulty in coordinating the shift roster allocations of the 
participants in order that they could attend. Six Neo-Socratic dialogue sessions 
were conducted and each was audio taped to ensure an accurate transcription 
of the content of each session. 
 
3.3.5.1 Data collection process 
Each Neo-Socratic dialogue followed the three basic steps as outlined by 
Fitzgerald and van Hooft (2000), van Hooft (2000, 1999d, 1999b) and Boele 
(1997) and the study supervisor attended a session to validate my conduct as a 
facilitator of a Neo-Socratic dialogue. Data for this study were collected using 
the following format. 
 
• .Introduction: 
At the beginning of each session, participants were introduced to each other. 
A) 3-4 hour Neo-Socratic dialogue sessions 
Participants in these sessions were each given information about the conduct of    
a Neo-Socratic dialogue and a ‘How Do I Participate In A Neo-Socratic 
Dialogue?’ sheet. After participant introductions, questions were taken on the 
process of Neo-Socratic dialogue as a final check to ensure all participants 
were comfortable with the process. At this time I as the facilitator also collected 
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each of the participant’s signed ‘Deakin University Research Ethics Committee 
Consent Forms’ and again checked with individuals that all their questions and 
concerns about the study had been addressed (knowing that each participant 
had been spoken with prior to the Neo-Socratic dialogue session about the 
study as it related to being informed). It was at this time that I as the facilitator 
also set the ‘ground rules’ for the conduct of the session, that is, reiterated the 
content of the ‘How Do I Participate In A Neo-Socratic Dialogue?’, ‘Rules of 
participants’ and ‘Confidentiality’ statements along with information provided on 
the ‘Deakin University Ethics Committee Plain Language Statement’ sheet that 
made clear the process for assisting any participant who may be distressed by 
any of the content of the Neo-Socratic dialogue. 
 
B) 6-8 hour Neo-Socratic dialogue sessions 
In these sessions the introductory phase was less rushed and participants were 
afforded the time to get to know each other in a relaxed way. Participants were 
educated about the study using the same information as described in the 3—4 
hour sessions. However, given there was less pressure on time, much of the 
questioning about the study in general, and the Neo-Socratic dialogue process, 
took place in the introductory phase of these longer sessions. 
 
• Step 1: Broad question requiring a specific example. 
Each Neo-Socratic dialogue group was presented with the question; ‘What is 
love in nursing and midwifery?’ Each participant of each group provided one 
personal clinical example of love in nursing and midwifery. The group then 
engaged in discussion with the relevant participant about the example in order 
to fully understand the example. On completion of this discussion the group 
then chose one example from the presented list that they believed best- 
reflected love in nursing and midwifery. The time taken by participants to 
deliberate on the best example varied between the four groups. However given 
the time constraint of 3-4 hours, it required that I facilitated an expedient 
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outcome. Each group reached unanimous agreement on what they considered 
the best example. 
 
• Step 2: Specific question of the example. 
Once the best example of love in nursing and midwifery was accepted, the 
group set about formulating an answer to the question; ‘If this example is an 
example of love in nursing and midwifery, then what in this example did this 
nurse and midwife do that was love?’ All groups developed several answers to 
the question that were reflective of group discourse. It must be acknowledged 
that the two groups of 6-8 hours duration produced more answers to the 
question than did the groups of 3-4 hours duration. The groups of 3-4 hours 
duration focused on articulating thorough responses to a smaller number of 
answers whereas the groups of 6-8 hours duration produced several answers 
and over a longer time developed argument to support their responses. Equally 
the quality of argument in support of answers to the question varied both within 
each group and across all groups. 
 
• Step 3: Broad question related to specific answer. 
Each group was then asked to formulate an answer to the question; ‘If what you 
have articulated to date is what you consider to be love in nursing and 
midwifery in this example, then what is love that is specific to nursing and 
midwifery?’ All groups found this part of the Neo-Socratic dialogue difficult and 
required the use of the metadialogue strategy to help keep the group focused 
on the question to be answered, to provide clarification of the various positions 
of participants, to illuminate strengths and weaknesses of argument and to 
assist in summation of the final position and an answer to this last question. 
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3.3.5.2  Record of the data 
All Neo-Socratic dialogue sessions were audiotaped and transcribed in full-text. 
Audiotaping enabled access to the full-text of conversations. It provided 
information about how conclusions were reached, the identification of concepts 
overlooked or not adequately explained, and ideas not logically argued. Given 
that the Neo-Socratic dialogue sessions were lengthy (3-4 hours and 6-8 hours 
duration), audiotaping was essential to enable accurate exploration of the 
concepts and conclusions drawn from the Neo-Socratic dialogue. Audiotaping 
also enabled me to concentrate on the facilitative role, without having to worry 
about trying to record the content of the dialogue as well as facilitate the 
dialogue process. 
 
3.4  Data Analysis 
This thesis used two methods of data analysis; Neo-Socratic dialogue and 
philosophical inquiry. Data analysis in the Neo-Socratic dialogue phase of the 
study was undertaken by the participants, and in the philosophical data analysis 
phase by the researcher. 
 
3.4.1  Data analysis: Neo-Socratic dialogue 
Neo-Socratic dialogue is more than a simple method for the collection of data 
because it requires of the participants some analysis of their own and others’ 
experiences of the phenomena in question. However, unlike other methods of 
data collection and analysis, Neo-Socratic dialogue requires the participants, as 
opposed to the researcher, to engage in the process of constant comparative 
analysis and reflection through hermeneutic dialectic. Appleton and King (1997) 
make clear that both hermeneutic-dialectic and constant comparative analysis 
focus on searching out alternate views, convergent and divergent opinion and 
look for explanations for identified discrepancies. 
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What is more, Neo-Socratic dialogue enables the implementation of a dialogue 
strategy that used the continuing dialectic circle of iteration, analysis, critique, 
reiteration, and reanalysis, to develop joint consensus construction about the 
phenomenon of love in nursing and midwifery (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). The 
regressive procedure used in Neo-Socratic dialogue searches out the 
philosophical principles that underlie the judgements and evaluations of the 
everyday actions and the tacit knowledge that nurses and midwives bring to 
bear in their decision-making (Nelson, 1949, van Hooft, 1999d). Moreover, 
group discourse using the process of continuous analysis and abstraction from 
the specific experiences of nurses and midwives make it possible to reveal 
essential and ultimate assumptions which underlie the practice of nursing and 
midwifery as they related to ‘love’ (Nelson, 1949). By doing this the researcher 
seeks to prove nothing, but rather to expose the logical reasons for 
acknowledged judgements of nurses and midwives in relation to love (Nelson, 
1949). While participants were able to engage in rigorous debate about the 
topic as it related to their own and others’ experiences of love in nursing and 
midwifery, as the abstract nature of the discourse increased so too did the 
difficulty for participants to offer new insights into the questions posed. To this 
end, the process of Neo-Socratic dialogue challenged the ability of some 
participants to think in critical and reflective ways. However this said, all Neo- 
Socratic dialogue groups offered answers to all the questions of the dialogue. 
 
3.4.2  Data analysis: Philosophical inquiry 
In this study the focus was on the development of a thesis of love as it applies 
to nursing and midwifery. Given the nebulous nature of the topic, however, the 
study required a data analysis strategy that enabled critical exploration of the 
data collected. Philosophical inquiry was chosen as a data analysis strategy 
because philosophy focuses on thinking about thinking, or more specifically, 
‘philosophy is rationally critical thinking, of a more or less systematic kind 
about the general nature of the world (metaphysics or theory of existence), the 
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justification of belief (epistemology or theory of knowledge), and the conduct of 
life (ethics or theory of value)’ (Honderich, 1995: 666). It enables exposure of 
the conclusions about what lies behind ‘appearance’ or the ultimate reality that 
transcends appearance (Honderich, 1995). Applying philosophical inquiry, 
therefore, to what nurses and midwives understand to be love in their practice, 
and that of nursing and midwifery in general, makes known the reality that 
transcends the clinical appearance. Thus the outcome of this study is a thesis 
about the nature of love in nursing and midwifery, as understood by clinicians. 
 
3.5 Quality of the study inquiry 
Given this study uses a qualitative research approach that incorporates a social 
constructionist, hermeneutic-dialectic method and a Neo-Socratic dialogue, a 
criteria of ‘authenticity’ was accepted as the vehicle for demonstrating the 
quality of the study inquiry process (Nelson, 1949, Guba and Lincoln, 1989, 
Lincoln, 1995, Seale, 1999, Lincoln and Guba, 2000). Here the claim is that 
authenticity is the most appropriate measure for assessing quality in research 
that uses a qualitative approach. Specifically, this study uses the authenticity 
criteria of fairness, ontological authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic 
authenticity, and tactical authenticity (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, Lincoln, 1995, 
Seale, 1999, Lincoln and Guba, 2000). 
 
3.5.1 Authenticity criteria of fairness. 
The authenticity criteria of fairness require the study to place in the report 
participants’ perspectives, claims, concerns, and voices so ensuring direct 
inclusion of the participants (Lincoln, 1995, Seale, 1999, Lincoln and Guba, 
2000). In this study, the chapters that report the Neo-Socratic dialogues present 
the different perspectives and realities of the participants. These reports enable 
the reader to authenticate the researcher’s representation of both the data and 
the theoretical insights about the conclusions of participants in regard to the 
question of ‘What is love in nursing and midwifery’. 
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3.5.2  Authenticity criteria of ontological authenticity and educative    
authenticity. 
Seale (1999: 3) states that, in order to meet the authenticity criteria of 
ontological and educative authenticity, the study design must engage the 
participants in such a way that they gain a ‘...more sophisticated understanding 
of the phenomenon being studied …‘ and ‘ … appreciate the viewpoints of 
people other than themselves’. Neo-Socratic dialogue as implemented in this 
study, required participants to engage in reflective thinking about the question 
as it specifically related to their practice and also the practice of nursing and 
midwifery in general. It required dialogue that searched for alternate views, 
convergent and divergent opinion and looked for explanations for identified 
discrepancies and in this way fostered in participants more sophisticated 
understanding of the phenomena and others’ points of view. 
 
3.5.3 Authenticity criteria of catalytic authenticity and tactical 
authenticity. 
Lincoln and Guba (2000: 181) claim that catalytic and tactical authenticities 
require the ‘… inquiry to prompt, first, action on the part of study participants, 
and second, the involvement of the researcher/evaluator in training participants 
in specific forms of social and political action if participants desire such training.’ 
To these ends, this study made possible insights into the question of ‘what is 
love in nursing and midwifery’ and as such caused participants to develop a 
stance on what they understood to be ‘love’ as it related to their practice and 
also that of nursing and midwifery in general. The development of this insight 
better enabled participants to acknowledge ‘love’ as a component of the 
practice of nursing and midwifery that up until this study has not been reported 
in this way in the literature of nursing and midwifery. The generation of new 
understandings in participants about ‘love’ as it applies to nursing and midwifery 
has made possible the acknowledgement of ‘love’ as a genuine component of 
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the practice of nursing and midwifery and to this end, should the participants be 
so committed, create change to their own practice of nursing and midwifery and 
to nursing and midwifery in general. 
 
3.6  Ethical issues 
Given this study combines the doctrine of empirical research and philosophy, 
issues related to the ethical conduct of the study with regard to the 
safeguarding of participants, health care organizations, patients, and the quality  
of the study and philosophical inquiry have been addressed. The study obtained 
human research ethics committee approval from organizations, participant 
disclosure and informed consent, and established study conduct procedures for 
the maintenance of confidentiality and the safeguard of participants. The study 
design also enabled the implementation of data collection methods that both 
benefited the participants and the development of a thesis on love in nursing 
and midwifery. 
 
3.6.1  Human Research Ethics Committee Approval 
Approval for this study was obtained from Deakin University Human  Research 
Ethics Committee: Project EC 197-2001 (Appendix 4: Deakin University 
Human Research Ethics Committee Approval). In addition, the researcher 
sought approval from various health care organizations to circulate an invitation 
to registered nurses and midwives to participate in the study. 
 
One health care organization required approval of their research ethics 
committee prior to the circulation of the invitation, which was obtained. The 
research ethics committee of this organization expressed concern about the 
possibility of nurses and midwives providing examples of romantic love that 
could lead to the disclosure of professional misconduct. In order to meet this 
concern and as directed by this research ethics committee, I as the researcher 
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moderated all proposed examples to ensure that no example was of a romantic 
or professional misconduct type. To this end, all documents that were provided 
to participants, and on each occasion where discussion took place about the 
example of love in nursing and midwifery, it was made clear that this study was 
not about romantic love. In addition, information was included on the ‘Plain 
Language Statement’ and the ‘Consent Form’ about confidentiality and this 
romantic love exception. This information also identified my legal and 
professional obligations in regard to the nurses’ code of ethics and those of the 
nurse and midwife participants should an incident of professional misconduct be 
made public that placed a patient at immediate risk of harm. However, at no 
point did any nurse or midwife interpret the research question to mean romantic 
love nor was there any occasion where an example of romantic love was 
posed, discussed informally with myself, or offered as an example of love in 
nursing and midwifery. No example of love in nursing and midwifery was offered 
that could be identified as an example of professional misconduct. 
 
3.6.2  Disclosure and informed consent 
All participants were provided with: 
• Information in verbal and written format about the study (Appendix 2: 
Deakin University Ethics Committee Plain Language Statement); 
• The Neo-Socratic dialogue process and their role in that process 
(Appendix 3: How Do I Participate In A Neo-Socratic Dialogue?); 
• The means for ensuring confidentiality and the need to maintaining 
confidentiality (Appendix 3: How Do I Participate In A Neo-Socratic 
Dialogue? and Appendix 5: Deakin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee Consent Form); 
• The process to be implemented should a participant become distressed 
at the content of the Neo-Socratic dialogue (Appendix 2: Deakin 
University Ethics Committee Plain Language Statement); 
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• The safe storage, content use, and destruction of the audio-tapes of the 
Neo-Socratic dialogue sessions (Appendix 2: Deakin University Ethics 
Committee Plain Language Statement); 
• The voluntary nature of their participation which included the opportunity 
to withdraw from the study at anytime without malice or prejudice 
(Appendix 2: Deakin University Ethics Committee Plain Language 
Statement, and Appendix 5: Deakin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee Consent Form); and 
• The benefits of the study and the dissemination of results (Appendix 2: 
Deakin University Ethics Committee Plain Language Statement). 
 
Prior to the commencement of the Neo-Socratic dialogue, each participant was 
asked to provide his or her informed consent (Appendix 5: Deakin University 
Committee Ethics Committee Consent Form). A documented record of consent 
has been kept in a locked filing cabinet dedicated to this study, so maintaining 
confidentiality and the safe storage of consent approvals. 
 
3.6.3 Confidentiality and safeguard of participants 
In addition to the confidentiality clauses listed in the informed consent and plain 
language statement, the nature of a Neo-Socratic dialogue necessitates the 
sharing of information that may be personal and of a sensitive or confidential 
nature and therefore at the commencement of each Neo-Socratic dialogue, I as 
the facilitator establish ‘ground rules’ for maintenance of confidentiality and 
respect for the comments of other participants. All participants were required to 
abide by the confidentiality rules established by the group otherwise they would 
not be included in the dialogue. As the dialogue facilitator I acted as a 
gatekeeper with regard to issues of a sensitive or confidential nature, 
maintaining the right to stop discussion on such matters and where necessary, 
to provide the participant/s with an opportunity to obtain counselling support. At 
the commencement of this study a counselling team was established, made 
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aware of the project, and invited to act as a referral source should it be 
required. Participants were made aware of the strategy for dealing with any 
distress should it eventuate verbally at the commencement of the Neo-Socratic 
dialogue session as part of obtaining informed consent (Appendix 5: Deakin 
University Committee Ethics Committee Consent Form). 
 
3.6.4  Confidentiality of audiotapes and records 
All group conversations were audio taped and transcribed and have been 
stored in a locked filing cabinet in the research office. The researcher and 
supervisor were the only two people with access to the audio tapes and 
transcription file. Pseudonyms have been used to disguise the participant’s 
identity in the transcription file. The supervisor has checked the transcription file 
for analytical thinking about the concepts raised but has not had access to 
participant identifying schema. On completion of the study all materials that 
identify people or places will be destroyed once the six-year data holding rules 
for Deakin University have been fulfilled. 
 
3.6.5  Benefits and obligations to the study participants 
Neo-Socratic dialogue conversations about love in nursing and midwifery and 
the human relatedness issues it has raised provided nurses and midwives with 
a forum that was sensitive to their practical experiences that would otherwise 
have remained hidden from the discourse of nursing and midwifery. The study 
has also given nurses and midwives the opportunity to identify (in their group) 
others of a like mind, and the opportunity to share their thinking about the topic, 
to explore inconsistencies in their own thinking, and given the opportunity to 
move toward a greater personal understanding of ‘love’ as it applies to their 
practice of nursing and midwifery. At the time of writing this report there was no 
significant research on love in nursing and midwifery that is not related to 
romantic love. This study offers an explanation of what is love in nursing and 
midwifery that has not been reported in this way before. 
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3.7  Conclusion 
This study aimed to gather data from nurses and midwives on their perceptions, 
understandings and responses to the concept of love in nursing and midwifery. 
The study also gathered participants’ judgments about love in nursing and 
midwifery and about those of their actions, which were seen to put love in 
nursing and midwifery into effect. The method rested on the belief that the 
processes of understanding are not natural but rather the result of active and 
cooperative engagement of people in relationship (Figure l: Study design) 
(Gergen, 1985: 267). The conclusions drawn were the result of philosophical 
analysis that resulted in the development of a thesis of ‘What is love in nursing 
and midwifery?’ 
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Figure 1: Study design (adapted from the authors Guba and Linclon (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1989: 174, Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 188)). 
 
 
 133
 
 
Chapter 4:  Group 1: Report on a Neo-Socratic 
dialogue on the question of what is love  
in nursing? (Australia) 
 
 
4.0  Introduction 
This was the first Neo-Socratic dialogue undertaken on the question of ‘what is 
love in nursing’. It is presented in a way that allows the reader to follow the 
progress of the participants thinking and the development of their answers to 
the question posed. The group of nine nurses and midwives together developed 
four answers to the specific question of what is love in nursing in the example 
offered, from which they develop a universal statement that makes clear their 
answer to the question in general. In particular, the group understood that love 
in nursing requires of them a willingness, commitment, and intention to place 
the good of the other before the self without reciprocity. The dialogue makes 
clear that these qualities are given expression through an act of nursing in 
which the intention is to nurture a relationship of understanding of people which 
accepts or tolerates the will of the other where that other’s choice is based on a 
well informed health belief. What is more, the dialogue shows that nurses 
understand that they bring their own self to a relationship of understanding and 
feeling with the patient in order to nurture a state of health, well-being and 
comfort. It is an intention that expresses the nurse’s own health beliefs in the 
light of the desires of the other. The following is a description of the Neo -
Socratic dialogue about this content. 
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4.1   The sample group: setting the scene 
The Neo-Socratic dialogue on ‘what is love in nursing?’ was conducted in one 
six hour block of time with nine participants, seven of them being registered 
nurses (Division I ) and two second year students undertaking a Bachelor of 
Nursing who were also Registered Nurses (Division 2). One participant was 
both a Registered Naturopath and a Registered Nurse (Division 1). All 
participants were currently practicing nursing on a part-time, casual or full-time 
basis. The background of participants was purposefully varied in an attempt to 
elicit a greater range of views about the topic. They included acute care, 
oncology and palliative care, aged care, mental health nursing, naturopathy, 
women’s health, nurse education, midwifery and student undergraduate clinical 
experience. Seven participants were women and two were men. The Neo- 
Socratic dialogue was undertaken at the university, which provided an 
environment conducive to serious discussion about the topic. Light 
refreshments and a luncheon were provided to help keep participants focused 
on the purposes of coming together and also to assist with the creation of a 
friendly atmosphere that was conducive to a thoughtful discussion about the 
topic. The following is a report of the Neo-Socratic dialogue. 
 
4.2  Dialogue question 
The focus of the Neo-Socratic dialogue was on the question ‘what is love in 
nursing?’ 
 
4.3  Phase 1: Dialogue example 
In this Neo-Socratic dialogue, rather than each participant identifying an 
experience that related to the question, one participant (whom we will call Lee) 
offered an example, which was accepted by the group as an example of love in 
nursing and as the focus of the dialogue. What is more, rather than offering a 
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specific example that described one single nursing event that was identified as 
love in nursing, the example offered spanned a period of weeks that together 
was understood, in this example, to be an example of love in nursing. 
 
It was obvious from the example offered that Lee had thought seriously about 
the question prior to the Neo-Socratic dialogue and came prepared to offer a 
detailed account of the example of love in nursing. Not only did Lee provide the 
group with a detailed oral account, she also provided newspaper articles about 
the event, a personal diary record, and photographs of the nursing home 
residents, family and other nurses involved in the event, which together helped 
create a clear image of the experience in the minds of all participants. The 
event described below was accepted as an example of love in nursing because 
of the prima facie plausibility of seeing that action as an expression of love in 
nursing. 
 
Lee: ‘We took a group of nursing home residents with varying degrees of 
debility on a five day holiday to the seaside’. 
 
4.4  Phase 2: Exploring the selected example 
 
4.4.1 The example: 
Lee: ‘We took a group of nursing home residents with varying degrees of 
debility on a five day holiday to the seaside’. 
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4.4.2  Further details of the example: 
Next, the example was described in detail to the point where all participants 
could imagine themselves participating in Lee’s example of love in nursing. In 
order to make progress in the dialogue, all members of the group have to come 
to ‘own’ the example as if it was their own experience. Only in this way can they 
come to understand Lee’s intuition that this was an example of love in nursing. 
To this end, Lee now provided a detailed account of the episode, circulated a 
set of photos of the holiday that showed examples of people in relationship and    
a personal diary that outlined what Lee thought were the important experiences. 
 
During the description of the event Lee said the motivation for initiating the 
event arouse out of a concern that the residents in the nursing home where she 
worked were denied many of the normalized features of independent 
community living which she believed impact in significant ways on the health 
and wellbeing of the residents. It became clear from this and other similar 
comments made by Lee that something inside her demanded that she act. 
 
More specific details about the chosen example were disclosed: 
• ‘I saw a publication in the Australian Nurses Journal about a holiday that 
was had by a group of nursing home residents and thought that this was 
something that we must do’. 
• ‘Approval to take the residents out of the nursing home and on a holiday 
was obtained from the hospital executive and each resident’s family’. 
• The invitation to participate in the activity was open to all residents and 
family members without prejudice to the degree of mental or physical 
debility. 
• No person was coerced into participating. Lee explained the frailty of the 
residents was such that of the originally 10 people wishing to participate, 3 
died before the event was initiated. 
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• ‘Because anyone could come, we had several residents wanting to 
participate who had serious problems. One person suffered dementia, 
another was mentally retarded and prone to aggressive outbursts, another 
was a very heavy man who had suffered a CVA and was very debilitated 
and a couple of others were very frail.’ 
• ‘Several of the very frail residents died before the holiday took place, but 
they had the enjoyment of helping plan it and looking forward to it’. 
• ‘Three other nurses thought it a good idea and were prepared to help’. 
• ‘In all seven residents came on the holiday, plus one resident’s wife and 
their little dog’. 
• The holiday consisted of a mini bus trip of 200kms with a trailer loaded 
with the equipment need to care for the residents. 
• Accommodation was at a beach house designed for disabled people and 
close to the seaside and shops, but 30 kilometers from a hospital. 
• ‘About four days before the holiday the idea was really Poo Who’d by 
a lot of the nursing staff that weren’t interested...’ 
• ‘The hospital was good and paid for the beach apartment and provided 
the hospital bus and trailer’. 
• ‘Beside myself, One Registered Nurse (Division 1) and Two Registered 
Nurses (Division 2) volunteered their time’. 
• ‘I had never driven a minibus before, and never packed up a trailer with 
a mountain of equipment’. 
• Residents dictated their wake up, meal times and choices, evening 
bedtime, bath and showering preferences, clothing, activity program 
and sleeping arrangements. 
• ‘Together we shared the night cover’. 
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• We took the residents: 
o On the Queenscliff Ferry and had chips in paper on the deck. 
o Went to the hotel and had a counter lunch and played the pokies. 
o Went shopping. 
o One resident just wanted to put his feet in the sand at the beach, 
so we pulled his wheelchair down to the beach and put his feet 
in the sand and sat some seaweed on his head. 
o Along the coast road for a short drive. 
o Sat up late in the evening and sat around the kitchen table 
drinking coffee and biscuits with a couple of residents just 
talking about everything and planning the next day. 
• We had to: 
o Toilet residents at the back of the minibus. 
o Give out medications on the run in different circumstances. 
o Be aware of the effects of the public on the residents especially 
the people with dementia, aggression and antisocial behaviour. 
o Lift and move people around in difficult places, which was 
physically hard. 
o Monitor one resident’s diabetes. 
o Had to push beds against walls at night to reduce risk of falls in 
a strange environment. 
o Keep a constant watch on the residents with dementia so they 
didn’t wander off from the house or get harmed. 
• ‘There was a bit of anxiety from the hospital’s point of view and a little bit 
of anxiety from the nurses’ point of view that something might go wrong’. 
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• The residents changed in that: 
o One resident hardly used his oxygen. 
o There was less incontinence. 
o Less dementia and no aggressive outbursts. 
o Residents talked to each other, were more tolerant of each other 
and respected each other’s needs more. 
• ‘Everyone was sad on return’. 
• ‘On return I was crying because I felt as though now I have opened up 
all these new ways of being for the residents and us as nurses are going 
to be changed as a result of this. And I feel as if I’ve let people down, 
I’ve just put them back in to how it always was.’ 
• ‘We took a video of the trip so all the residents and nurses could watch 
it later’. 
• ‘We made a photo album up of the holiday and gave it to the residents’. 
 
4.5  Phase 3: Exploring the question in the light of the example 
Phase 3 of the dialogue: ‘What is love in nursing in this example?’ In asking 
the question, the respondent group offered four answers. 
 
Question:  What is love in nursing in this example? 
Answer 1:  ‘It is going beyond the traditional duty of care’. 
Answer 2:  ‘Being prepared to take a risk’. 
Answer 3:  ‘She was prepared to put herself up to have to think differently’. 
Answer 4:  ‘Respecting the choice of the other’. 
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4.5.1  Answer 1: It is going beyond the traditional duty of care 
The first answer saw one nurse reply immediately with, ‘it is going beyond the 
traditional duty of care’. In this statement the respondent identified two 
important notions namely, ‘duty of care’ and love as ‘going beyond’. In legal 
terms, the group understood duty of care to relate to the provision of a minimum 
standard of nursing care, a standard that is measured by what one can 
reasonably expect, in this case, of all similar nurses. The measure of duty is 
benchmarked at the level of the group called registered nurse, that is, individual 
nurses may offer a level of care that exceeds the minimum standard expected, 
but they are not to fall below it. All this said, the group concluded that ‘duty’ can 
only have a tangible measure if the caring is outcome based, able to be 
demanded of the other, and then able to be compared to some criterion or 
standard. Given this position, it would seem that these nurses identify love in 
nursing as something outside of these parameters, something that is 
unquantifiable and therefore unable to be demanded. It is, in there words, 
‘going beyond’ the traditional duty of care. 
 
Adding to this view, the group also identified the norms of professional health 
care practice, as defined by Australia’s health care system and supporting 
health care bureaucracy, to be the result of the development of a system of 
health care founded on a duty of care that places boundaries on the role of the 
nurse, and in their words, ‘limits the possibilities of human caring’. This, along 
with what was described as the community’s increased awareness of the legal 
obligations of health professionals, resulted in the view that many nurses base 
their practice on what was labeled as the ‘safe ground’; the ground that protects   
a person from legal liability, professional critique, and personal harm. It was felt 
that to step outside the norms of professional practice was to move away from 
the ‘safe ground’ and place oneself at risk. While it was not disputed that the 
practice of nursing should be none other than safe, the group were of the 
opinion that the parameters set by the term ‘professional’ define safe practice in 
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such a way as to focus caring on the accepted minimum. It was postulated that 
duty of care has caused caring in nursing to be benchmarked at the level of 
what is reasonable rather than of what is admirable; of what is observable and 
measurable, not of what is invisible and unpredictable. As a consequence, the 
group felt that it was difficult for love in nursing to emerge in such a 
professionally constrained setting. 
 
The second part of the first answer to the question of ‘what is love in nursing in 
this example’ suggested it is ‘going beyond’, and is something that is offered 
outside the current definition of duty of care. In fact, to ‘go beyond’, it was 
stated, was to ‘give of yourself’. It was to do something that was ‘not asked’. It 
was ‘to give freely to another something of yourself’ in the act of professional 
caring that ‘cannot be asked nor paid for’, and is more than the minimum 
standard of care because it is, as the participants described, where the nurse 
goes ‘out of her way’. Group responses suggested that love in nursing involves 
‘going outside yourself’ or a ‘personal commitment outside that for which one is 
paid’. But what is ‘giving of your self’ and what then is the further quality that 
marks this example as an example of love in nursing? The question of what this 
extra element is remained unanswered. At this point of the dialogue, however, 
the group had not fully realized that it was opening such deep questions and it 
did not pursue that line of inquiry further. 
 
4.5.2  Answer 2: Being prepared to take a risk. 
Returning to the question of the definition of love in nursing in this example, the 
group formulated a second response. It was suggested that love in nursing in 
this example, involved the nurse ‘being prepared to take a risk’. Again, two 
notions were identified in this second answer, namely ‘being prepared’ and ‘to 
take a risk’. The ensuing discussion focused on two points of view about ‘being 
prepared’. The first point related to competency and the second related to 
motivation. The group understood that the registered nurse in this example, like 
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all nurses, was prepared formally for the challenges of caring for people who 
are in the traditional sense ill or unable to care for themselves. Put another way, 
‘all the registered nurse’s caring actions arose from a foundation of her being a 
competent registered nurse’. In this example ‘being prepared’ meant this nurse 
was identified as competent. Also bedded in the discussion was the idea that in 
‘being prepared’ this nurse was motivated by her moral condition to take action. 
In other words, as one respondent stated, ‘something inside her demanded she 
act in accordance with her belief where that belief was for the betterment of the 
residents in her care’. ‘As a registered nurse she willingly chose this action 
even though she knew it could result in professional critique of her caring’, not 
that the demand to act was either binding or something she could ignore. It was 
just the opposite. The group understood this to be an example of love because 
this nurse chose to respond to her deepest motive. The group decided that 
those nurses who enact professional caring, like the nurse in this example, are 
those motivated by something deep inside them that then results in a response 
that places the other before their own self. What in this example is love in 
nursing? The group concluded that love in nursing requires, on the part of the 
nurse, the ability to place another before them self. More particularly, what 
constitutes this, as an example of love in nursing was that, not only could it not 
be paid for or demanded by another, it was not even felt by the nurse herself as 
a sacrifice. 
 
At this point the group introduced two new ideas that related to the risk 
associated with the conduct of the event. The suggestion focused on the belief 
that the self-sacrifice associated with taking the residents on the beach holiday 
was in itself a quality of love in nursing, but what is more, the foregoing of self 
interest was seen to be particularly significant because it showed this nurse did 
not feature at all in the motive to act. Specifically, participants understood the 
term sacrifice to relate to the idea that while taking residents on a beach holiday 
was a risky business, one that contained both a risk that she was professionally 
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prepared for and also risk she could not be fully prepared for, in that she could 
not predict what would transpire in each and every situation, the event required 
more. It required her to forgo personal activities that would benefit herself. As 
the group explained, she sacrificed the enjoyment of her family by being away 
from home. She sacrificed her own relaxation by being professionally 
responsible for the welfare of the residents 24 hours a day while she would 
have otherwise been off duty. She sacrificed her physical rest by being at the 
residents constant call 24 hours a day, and she risked her personal safety by 
driving the bus and trailer, with which she was unfamiliar. The opinion was that 
this nurse did all this and more because the motive to act was not out of self- 
interest, which was exemplified in the fact that no reciprocity was considered. 
This was an act of love in nursing not because the nurse was able to forgo 
personal benefits to herself but because her welfare did not feature at all in the 
motive to act. As interpreted by the group, love required something of this nurse 
that caring did not. It required the ability to put the welfare of the other person 
before her own without consideration of her own needs. All this said, the group 
did not continue with this line of inquiry and therefore no discussion was had 
about the limits of the sacrifice the nurse was prepared to take. The group now 
turned its attention to a third answer to the question of what is love in nursing in 
this example. 
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4.5.3  Answer 3: She was prepared to put herself up to have to think 
differently. 
Discussion in the Neo-Socratic dialogue continued about the motive for the 
beach holiday, and resulted in a third answer to the question namely, ‘she was 
prepared to put herself up to have to think differently’. In this answer, being 
‘prepared’ was not related to competence (as discussed above) but rather 
volition, or as one respondent replied, ‘she was willing to put herself up to think 
differently’. The introduction of the term ‘willing’ was an attempt to capture the 
notion that this was a voluntary act. Respondents held the view that it is one 
thing to have a ‘good idea’ as in the beach holiday, but entirely another matter 
to ‘live out’ the motive. The beach holiday was only a good thing to do if the 
residents wanted it. What made this an example of love in nursing was that, 
while this nurse was committed to the idea, she was able to empower the 
residents to decide whether or not it was good for them and then act on that 
outcome. The group believed that love in nursing requires, on the part of the 
nurse, the ability to empower the other to direct their care even in situations 
where the nurse may not agree with the outcomes. The issue as to whether a 
nurse could do this in all situations was only given brief consideration. 
 
The final part to this third answer read, being prepared to put herself up ‘to think 
differently’. Participants were of the opinion that the nurse in this example was,  
in a prepared way, initiating nursing care of a type different from that normally 
offered to these nursing home residents, that is, the decontextualization or de- 
institutionalization of the nursing experience required this nurse to reorient her 
thinking about the provision of nursing care to the residents. The residents had 
the full attention of the nurses. In this example, the group understood the 
residents to be the focus of the experience, as opposed to being residents in a 
nursing home where they share the focus of orientation with the demands of 
institutional care. As one respondent reported, ‘the ability to think differently 
required her (the nurse) to blend the normal everyday goals of a holiday with 
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the provision of professional care to severely debilitated people’. To ‘think 
differently’, it was suggested, was an indicator of her willingness to put the care 
of the other before herself. What in this example was love in nursing? It was 
said that this was an example of love in nursing because the focus of nursing 
was on meeting the needs of the residents in ways that challenged thinking 
about nursing. Love in nursing requires flexible thinking about what constitutes 
care in nursing. 
 
4.5.4  Answer 4: Respecting the choice of the other 
Finally, a fourth answer to the question of ‘what is love in nursing in this 
example’ arose from discussions regarding the previous two answers and 
culminated in the statement, ‘respecting the choice of the other’. In the example 
offered, the nursing home residents and their families were consulted as to their 
views on the proposal of a nursing home resident beach holiday. It was 
explained that the invitation was open to any person in the nursing home and 
nobody was to be rejected on the grounds that they would not be suitable 
because of severe cognitive disability or physical debility. As was reported, ‘if a 
nursing home resident or family member wanted to participate they would be 
included, no pressure was placed on any resident by nursing staff or their 
families, thinking the holiday would benefit a particular resident where the 
resident refused or was reluctant’. The view expressed by this nurse in 
organizing the venture was that if this was to be a holiday in the true sense of 
the term holiday then that included participation in planning and the anticipation 
associated with the forthcoming event. Respondents saw these and other 
descriptions of the event as evidence of her ability to accept the will of the other 
person even if she did not agree with their decision. The idea expressed was 
not about the legal rights of residents and their authority in the control of their 
nursing home care but on the nurse’s preparedness to accept the outcome of 
their decision and its impact on her. While the decision to go on a beach 
holiday was a decision that could safely be left to the discretion of the residents, 
this was not the point. The point was that this was an act of love in nursing not 
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only because this nurse was able to accept the desires of the residents about 
their participation in a beach holiday but also because she did this without 
feeling any loss to herself. As one participant commented, ‘the act is loving 
when the will of the other is accepted despite your distress’, that is, while the 
beach holiday was an idea she was committed to it was only a good idea if the 
resident also thought it was. As with the previous answers, the focus of the 
nurse was not on her self and her feelings but on the feelings, thoughts and 
desires of the residents. What is more, the comment ‘. . .despite your distress’, 
alluded to the idea that love in the example required this nurse to do for the 
other person something that ‘cost’ her. The nurse, in respecting the will of the 
residents, was also willing to sacrifice her own beliefs about the value of the 
event. Peter (a participant) made this point clear when he said, ‘it is putting 
aside your own belief system and respecting the belief system of the other 
person, and I consider this to be the ultimate sacrifice’; respect, as a component  
of love that puts the other person first. 
 
4.6  Phase 4: The general question 
The next stage of the Neo-Socratic dialogue required broadening the question 
from the specific form of, ‘what is love in nursing in this example?’ to the more 
general form of the question: namely, ‘if this is what we understand to be love 
in nursing in this example, then what is love in nursing in more general terms?’ 
 
The group found this a formidable task since the dialogue had now reached the 
point of saying that nurses are only able to do their ‘job properly when they go 
beyond duty. . . and nurse in a loving way’. It was not disputed that one can 
nurse without being loving in that one ‘might be able to get through the day of 
work and draw a salary’ and care for patients in a way that meets the formal 
duty of care. However, the new claim was that, for one to be an ‘effective’ 
nurse, one needs to go beyond the legalist view of the duty of care and to love 
in the act of professional caring. What is to be identified here is what the love is 
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that is specific to nursing, as opposed to other caring professions, and how this 
can be seen as being beyond duty. 
 
In an attempt to answer this question, discussion commenced from the 
participants’ own understanding of their professional nurse roles. Peter offered     
a broad statement to begin this portion of the dialogue, the content of which is a 
blend of Peter’s understanding about his role as a nurse and what he saw to be 
love in nursing. For Peter ‘the intention of nursing is to benefit the health and 
wellbeing of patients where the nurse is able to accept the views of the other 
despite their own belief system’ . Yet how is this statement related to the 
identification of what love is in nursing? It seemed the group first needed to 
come to some general consensus about the role of the professional nurse since 
only then could they look to identify what love is in nursing, if love involves 
going beyond the strict requirements of the role. Consequently, as it developed, 
the answer moved from a depersonalized statement about the nursing role to 
one that took on a more connected view. For example, the group in responding 
to Peter’s statement changed the word ‘benefit’ to ‘promote’, and then from 
promote to ‘nurture’. Participants believed that the earlier terms were not 
specific enough to nursing and failed to capture the human relations that are 
reflective of nursing and love. 
 
Similarly, the group changed the term ‘health’ in favor of ‘people’ and then from 
‘people’ to ‘understanding of people’. In this way the statement came to read: 
‘the intention of nursing is to nurture an understanding of people where the 
nurse is able to accept the views of the other despite their own belief system’. 
This more personalized statement suggests that nurses nurture people in a 
relationship, but more, that they nurture in a relationship of ‘understanding with 
people’. Of course, the objective of health should not be lost sight of. The group 
came to the view that love in nursing is evidenced in the relationship a nurse 
has with the patient where the nurse is able to express a personal value system 
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as it relates to health and life in the light of understanding, respecting, and 
accepting the will of the other. One participant commented that ‘it is a 
relationship of respect for the self-expression of the other’s value system and of 
accepting that value system despite yourself’. While it is obvious that love 
requires, on the part of the nurse, competence, personal commitment,  
openness to the other, and the ability to place the other before oneself, the key 
point here is that the nurse should overcome an insistence on their own point of 
view so as to accept that of the patient. However, this raised the difficulty of a 
possible clash between the views of the patient on such matters as their own 
treatment on the one hand, and the professional view of the nurse of that 
treatment on the other. Is it really a requirement of love that the nurse should 
suspend personal professional judgment in favor of the views of the patient - 
especially in such cases where the patient is suffering from some degree of 
dementia? The group concluded that there is room for a nurse’s professional 
judgments about the wellbeing of the patient. Accordingly, love is an act in 
which the intention is to nurture a relationship of understanding of people where 
that intention implies acceptance or tolerance of the will of the other where the 
other’s choice is based on a well informed health belief. It is bringing the nurse’s 
own self to a relationship of understanding and feeling with the patient in order  
to nurture a state of health, wellbeing and comfort. It is an intention that 
expresses the nurse’s own health beliefs in the light of the desires of the other. 
 
I felt at this point that the discussion had moved to a general level too quickly. 
The group was now grappling with the question of what love is in nursing 
without making reference back to the example. The insights that had been won 
during the earlier phase of the discussion: namely, that love in the example 
involved going beyond the duty of care, giving of oneself, preparedness, risk 
taking, sacrificing oneself, and taking the point of view of the other seriously, 
should now have been absorbed into a more general understanding of what 
love is in nursing. However, given the time constraint on this dialogue all that 
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could be articulated related to the notions of willingness, commitment, intention, 
and sacrifice of the self for the other, that is, love in nursing was seen as the 
willingness and commitment of the nurse to want the good of the other before 
the self without reciprocity. This is a complex statement requiring still further 
analysis. 
 
One thing that does seem clear about this statement is that ‘love’ as understood 
by the group is something qualitatively different from ‘caring’. Whereas caring is 
seen as the fundamental professional and ethical stance of nurses towards their 
patients, love was seen as something more. This is not to suggest that the 
concept of caring is not rich in moral dimensions and deep in its levels of 
engagement and rapport with patients, but it does suggest that love is a 
supererogatory level of such caring which takes nurses beyond what caring 
indicates and into a further dimension of commitment and dedication. Just what 
this means and whether it can be morally demanded of nurses is a question yet 
to be explored. 
 
4.7  Commentary on the dialogue 
The format and structure of the dialogue ensured that every participant’s 
contributions were thoroughly explored and tested against the insights of 
others. Nevertheless, there were a number of assumptions that were not called 
into question or made explicit. As a result the dialogue raised a number of 
questions that could not be explored in the context of this dialogue. 
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4.7.1 If love is something beyond the duty of care, what is this extra 
element? 
While all the participants agreed that love in nursing is something that is 
offered outside the current definition of duty of care in that it is to go beyond 
the duty of care and give of yourself that which cannot be asked nor paid for, 
no answer was provided. 
 
4.7.2  Is it acceptable for a health professional to knowingly place the 
good of another at risk? 
Significantly, the notion of risk taking in the example provided, was only 
considered from the nurse’s point of view. No dialogue took place that sought 
an answer to reconcile as to whether or not it was an example of love if the 
patients were placed at risk even though the motive for such was admirable. 
 
4.7.3  What is the quality of the sacrifice that makes an act of nursing 
loving? 
Although sacrifice was identified as a prerequisite of love, little consideration 
was given to the nature or measure of such sacrifice. It was agreed that love in 
nursing requires, on the part of the nurse, action that places the other before 
themselves without conscious consideration of themselves and without 
consideration given to reciprocity. However, no one asked whether there were 
limits to the degree to which nurses should sacrifice their own interests in 
favour of their patients. 
 
4.7.4  Is it a requirement of love in nursing that a patient be empowered 
o direct their own care in all situations? 
The key point around the discussion of the patient being empowered to direct 
their own care was related to the overcoming of the nurses’ insistence on their 
own point of view. Little discussion occurred around the ability of the nurse to 
do this in all situations such as in dementia or possible clashes between the 
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views of the patient on such matters as their own treatment on the one hand, 
and the professional view of the nurse of that treatment on the other. The group 
concluded that there is room for a nurse’s professional judgments about the 
well-being of the patient. No discussion took place that sought to identify the 
parameters of empowerment that should be engendered by an act if it is to be 
considered loving. 
 
4.8  Conclusion 
The culmination of the four answers to the question what is love in nursing in 
this example showed that Lee gave more of herself than was asked or could be 
paid for, in that she went beyond the duty of care and in a prepared way placed 
the good of another before herself. In so doing, she placed her own well-being 
at risk. When translated to nursing in a more general sense, this suggests that 
the qualities of love in nursing require on the part of the nurse a willingness, 
commitment, and intention to place the good of the other before the self without 
consciously seeking something in return. These qualities are given expression 
through an act of nursing in which the intention is to nurture a relationship of 
understanding of people which accepts or tolerates the will of the other where 
that other’s choice is based on a well informed health belief. It is bringing the 
nurse’s own self to a relationship of understanding and feeling with the patient 
in order to nurture a state of health, well-being and comfort. It is an intention 
that expresses the nurse’s own health beliefs in the light of the desires of the 
other. 
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Chapter 5:  Group 2: Report on a Neo-Socratic 
dialogue on the question of what is love  
in nursing? (Australia) 
5.0  Introduction 
This Neo-Socratic dialogue is a report of nine Registered Nurses’ (Division 2) 
answers to the question of what is love in nursing. The group offered three 
specific answers that together showed that the group believed love in nursing 
arises out of the conscious recognition of their subconscious connection to the 
patient, occurring as a response to witnessing the patient’s suffering. The 
dialogue describes the group’s understanding of how a nurse uses professional 
skills and judgment to respond in a selfless way to the needs of the patient, 
action that is not without its risk to either their own welfare or that of the 
patient’s. However, it is also explained that risk, if associated with nursing 
interventions that are considered acceptable, is itself acceptable when the 
motive for the action is for the ‘good’ of the patient. What is more, the dialogue 
shows the group understands that the level of the professional commitment 
required for nursing action to be considered love cannot be demanded because 
the commitment is in being morally responsible for the vulnerable patient. 
 
5. 1  The sample group: Setting the scene 
Participants of the Neo-Socratic dialogue were Registered Nurses (Division 2) 
undertaking a Bachelor of Nursing (conversion program) to Registered Nurse 
(Division I ). As a result of the invitation to participate in the study, eight (8) 
Registered Nurses (Division 2) agreed. By coincidence, all the participants were 
male. While the clinical experience of the participants varied, they all had 
currency of practice by way of either part-time or casual employment as a 
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Registered Nurse (Division 2). Two participants were employed in the acute 
health care sector, working on an acute medical or surgical ward, with the 
remainder working in aged care in nursing home areas. Because all the 
participants were enrolled in the third year of the Bachelor of Nursing 
(conversion program), they also had a wide range of clinical experiences of 
nursing in areas such as mental health, community nursing, palliative care, and 
a plethora of acute health care specialty areas. The Neo-Socratic dialogue 
reported on here was undertaken at La Trobe University campus and was 
conducted in a room conducive to discussion. Light refreshments and a 
luncheon were provided to assist with the creation of a stress-free environment 
but, at the same time, one that was favorable to serious discussion. 
 
From the participants’ point of view their arrival at the Neo-Socratic dialogue 
session heralded the revelation that the group was all male. To participate in a 
group that was all male was seen by them as something of a novelty, given the 
population of men in nursing in Australia remains relatively constant at around 
8% of the total population of nurses and midwives (Nurses et al., 2001). As a 
consequence of this revelation, an aura of camaraderie seemed to traverse the 
room. Most notably, the camaraderie of the group appeared almost instant with 
joking and laughing and general getting to know each other. The camaraderie 
evident in the group appeared to assist the creation of trust where these men 
felt safe to disclose information about the topic in a serious and very personal 
way. This Neo-Socratic dialogue lasted 3 hours, which was a little short. The 
group made significant insights into the topic and with more time could have 
further developed their final answer to the question. What was notable in this 
Neo-Socratic dialogue was that the group chose to construct a basic mind map 
of their ideas that were to be included in their final answer to the topic question. 
The following is a report of their Neo-Socratic dialogue. 
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5.2  Dialogue question 
The focus of the Neo-Socratic dialogue was on the question of ‘what is love in 
nursing and midwifery’. Given the demographic of this group the question was 
modified to, ‘what is love in nursing?’ 
 
5.3  Phase 1: Dialogue example 
The discussion began with participants offering an example from their practice 
of love in nursing. The following eight examples were offered: 
 
Lincoln: ‘I was undertaking clinical placement in a child and adolescent unit. 
In answer to the question, I was sitting on the floor holding in a ‘bear type hug’ a 
deeply disturbed 9-year old boy, who was trying to harm himself and myself. 
While he was constantly hitting and punching me, pinching me, scratching me, 
spitting at me, and pulling the hair on my arms, I felt no anger toward him, just 
love.’ 
 
Brian: ‘I was nursing a man of Italian or Greek extraction who had a diagnosis 
of Alzheimer’s type dementia and who, on this day was becoming increasingly 
aggressive. At the time, I was physically restraining him so that he could be 
given an injection safely. When I let him go, he turned and punched me on the 
chin. While it hurt, I felt no anger towards him; rather I felt love, for it was not his 
fault. It was mine.’ 
 
Roy: ‘I had been allocated the care of a terminally ill woman who was near 
death. I had to make sure this lady would not die alone. I remained with her and 
held her hand and talked to her the whole time until she died. I think this was 
love.’ 
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Ron: ‘We had this lady in our nursing home who was quite obese. She was  
bed ridden and she couldn’t move nor speak or communicate. On this particular 
day when she was having her health care assessment she was totally ignored 
by the team of doctors and nurses. I looked at her and she had tears in her  
eyes so I went over to her and all I did was stand there and have direct eye 
contact with her. This was how my love came out.’ 
 
Neil: ‘I was working in an aged care facility and had the care of a 31-year-old 
fellow who had sustained severe brain damage when he attempted suicide by 
jumping off a moving truck. This particular day I turned on some music that he 
had by his bed while we were caring for him and I just started chatting to him as 
if he was a person with whom I could communicate normally. For some reason 
the music, which I knew, caused in me a connection which I think was love.’ 
 
Ernie: ‘I was allocated the care of a woman who was diagnosed with cancer 
and she had a huge pressure sore on her buttock, which was infected, and 
resulted in her being isolated from the rest of the ward. One day she said to me, 
‘I’ve had enough. I don’t want anything. I don’t want you to do my dressing. I 
don’t want you to wash me or anything’. Hearing this, I just sat down with her 
for about half an hour and chatted with her about her life. Nothing more was said 
but after that she improved dramatically and eventually went home. At the time I 
never thought anything of it but now, on reflection, I feel it was an example of 
love in my nursing.’ 
 
Daniel: ‘I came across a lady who was in an aged dementia unit, with moderate 
confusion. We built up a good relationship because she had run a milk bar for 
much of her life and similarly I had grown up in one. I felt she had been dealt a 
pretty hard hand when you see how she has ended up; worked hard all her life 
and now in a nursing home with dementia. On reflection, I found myself putting 
more into the care of this women and I always seemed to be a bit more 
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concerned about her. I liked to keep her mood up and when it was low I just 
wanted to be there ‘for’ her.’ 
 
Ryan: ‘I was on a nightshift with two Division I nurses and we had a patient 
who was dying and drifting in and out of chain stokes breathing. While she had 
her daughter present most of the time, her daughter left regularly to call family 
members, so when she was away, I made sure I was with her, just holding her 
hand so she knew that someone was there and that she wouldn’t be alone at 
death.’ 
 
At the conclusion of offering examples the group engaged in general discussion 
about all the examples. The group took approximately 15 minutes to reflect on 
each of the examples offered and after some discussion on each example they 
selected Lincoln’s example as the one that, in their collective opinion, best 
exemplified the concept of love as exemplified in their own clinical practice. 
 
5.4  Phase 2: Exploring the selected example 
The next stage of a Neo-Socratic dialogue is for the group to explore the 
chosen example in such detail that they are able to imagine themselves in the 
example. Hence, after the example has been explored in depth the group is 
sufficiently informed about the example that they are able to individually take 
ownership of the example. Thus at the conclusion of this phase the example is 
no longer ‘just’ Lincoln’s example but the group’s. 
 
5.4.1  The example: 
Lincoln: ‘I was undertaking clinical placement in a child and adolescent unit. In 
answer to the question, I was sitting on the floor holding in a ‘bear type hug’ a 
deeply disturbed 9-year old boy who was trying to harm himself and myself. 
While he was constantly hitting and punching me, pinching me, scratching me, 
spitting at me, and pulling the hair on my arms, I felt no anger toward him, just 
love.’ 
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5.4.2 Further details of the example: 
The following details about the chosen example were disclosed: 
• ‘I arrived on the unit for an afternoon shift at this acute care hospital’. 
• ‘The boy was fast tracked through accident and emergency to the child 
and adolescent unit because he was disruptive’. 
• ‘I walked in and saw a room on the unit that was completely dismantled 
with a child in the room who was ‘deeply’ disturbed.  The contents of 
the room were strewn all over the room. 
• ‘There was a nurse holding the door closed looking in through the 
window at this boy’. 
• ‘He was violently trashing around in his room trying to harm himself’. 
• ‘He was having suicidal ideations and trying to abscond from the unit’. 
• ‘Another student who had been caring for this child on day shift had a 
split and fat lip and bruises to the arms and legs’. 
• ‘There was mayhem on the ward and they were doing their damdest to just 
keep the door to his room closed and keep him confined to that room’. 
• ‘He has a fair bit of Diazepam and other sedatives but with no apparent 
effect’. 
• ‘I could not just look in the window and watch on [sic].  I had to go 
into his room’. 
• ‘Later, at handover, I was asked if I would take on the care of this child 
because I was a ‘bloke’ and bigger than all the females’. 
• ‘Within 20 minutes of being with this child I could see that there was 
no way that this child could be left alone, not even for a minute’. 
• ‘After handover we had to physically strip everything from the room 
because he was trying to use everything he could to harm himself.  He 
was left with a mattress on the floor, that’s all.’ 
• ‘He had assaulted 3 or 4 of the staff, and for their own safety they 
simply refused to attend him’. 
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• ‘I was told, for my own safety, to stand outside the window and hold 
the door shut’. 
• ‘I couldn’t stand the thought of this child running around the room like 
a moth at a light, at a plate glass window, which was cracked, trying to 
do himself harm’. 
• ‘I wasn’t prepared to just sit and watch him harm himself’. 
• ‘I sat on the floor with him hugging him for about two and half hours. He was 
so strong and he fought me, trying to injure me. I was absolutely knackered’. 
• He constantly tried to spit on me, pinch me, scratch me, kick me, punch 
me, pull my hair, do anything he could to hurt me’. 
• ‘I said to him nothing you can do would make me leave you’. 
• ‘I couldn’t feel anger toward him, even though he was really hurting 
me. I could only feel love’. 
• ‘After two and a half hours he calmed down and we began to talk about 
our pets’. 
• ‘If staff came in and interrupted us he would jump up and begin his 
self- harming behaviors again’. 
• ‘At the end of my shift I didn’t want to let him go but followed him to 
the Acute Psychiatric Unit where he was being transferred’. 
 
5.5  Phase 3: Exploring the question in the light of the example 
The group now confronted the question of ‘What is love in nursing in the 
example offered’. The group presented three answers to the question as listed 
below. 
 
Question:  ‘What is love in nursing in the example?’ 
Answer 1:  ‘It’s a selfless, subconscious calling’. 
Answer 2:  ‘Love is more than duty’. 
Answer 3:  ‘Being content in your vulnerability’. 
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5.5.1  Answer 1: It’s a selfless, subconscious calling 
The first answer that was offered had two components to its content, the first 
was the idea that love is a ‘subconscious calling’ and second was that love 
requires ‘selflessness’ on the part of, in this case, the nurse. With this answer, 
much discussion took place on the motive behind Lincoln’s reaction to his 
witness of the boy attempting self-harm where he stated ‘I could not, not go in’, 
to the boy. The group believed that this event had triggered something deep 
within Lincoln to cause him to not only take action, but action that both ignored 
personal warnings about his own safety, and action that had him place the other 
person’s welfare before his own. To this end, the group offered the following 
insights. 
 
Participants shared a common view that there was some form of ‘connection’ 
between Lincoln and the boy. Moreover, they believed that the ‘connection’ 
between them was below their collective consciousness and only became 
conscious at the point of Lincoln’s witness of the ‘trauma’ suffered by the boy. 
As Daniel explained, it was ‘a selfless subconscious connection that he had, 
wasn’t it really, like a selfless act that would come out in his subconscious, he 
just went in’. Participants had introduced the idea that the reason Lincoln went 
into the room was that there was a metaphysical ‘connection’ between Lincoln 
and the boy and that this ‘connection’ was of an unconditional nature, that is, 
Lincoln’s consciousness had no part in the decision to go to the boy. 
 
Lincoln: ‘... I really didn’t have a choice...’ 
Daniel: ‘Do you think it was the right thing to do?’ 
Lincoln: ‘It was the only thing to do’. 
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The group though struggled to articulate the content of the metaphysical 
‘connection’, except to say that it was something that only became conscious 
after the decision to act was already taken. Thus, Lincoln found himself 
‘committed’ to going to the boy without a reason. As he stated, ‘I really didn’t 
have a choice’, ‘it was the only thing to do’, and ‘I could not, not go in’. 
 
At this point of the dialogue there was general puzzlement at the reason for why 
Lincoln responded to the event in the way he did, which was very different to 
the rest of the nurses on the unit. To this, the group could only suggest that as 
people are different, so they respond differently. Why there was a ‘connection’ 
between Lincoln and the boy remained a mystery to the group. They suggested 
that it was perhaps because Lincoln had a young family of his own and so it 
was an instinctual response similar to a father trying to protect his child. 
However, the group remained perplexed and could not offer an explanation as 
to why only Lincoln responded to the situation in the way he did, which was very 
different to all the other nurses, including other men, on the unit. 
 
Alternatively, the group believed the example made clear the unconditional 
nature of the commitment of Lincoln to the boy. Lincoln placed the welfare of 
the boy before his own but the decision to place the boy first was not a 
conscious consideration of Lincoln’s. The dialogue around the phrases, I really 
didn’t have a choice’, ‘it was the only thing to do’ and ‘I could not, not go in’ left 
the group in no doubt that Lincoln was compelled to respond to the boy and that 
this compulsion was a pre-requisite for this to be an act of love. 
 
What is more, it was understood that the act of responding to the boy was a 
‘selfless’ act. The group was of the view that for whatever reason, Lincoln’s 
witness of the boy attempting self-harm resulted in him taking action that placed 
the welfare of the boy before his own. This meant that Lincoln’s welfare by 
inference was no longer his priority. Hence entering the room of the violent boy 
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was identified as a selfless act because it was despite his own welfare and was 
something that he was not conscious of or could control. While the point of   
entry to the room, where he stated, he ‘could not, not go in’ was a decision of 
his subconscious, it was also the point at which he was conscious of the threat 
to his welfare. However, the group understood that Lincoln’s welfare was a 
separate matter to the welfare of the boy. While Lincoln could make conscious 
decisions about his entry to the room that would include nursing actions once in 
the room, he could not have input into the decision to enter. The suggestion 
was that love was exemplified in Lincoln not being able to moderate the 
unconditional nature of his selflessness. However, no discussion took place 
about the limits of Lincoln’s selflessness. While Lincoln would not speculate on 
how far he would have gone to help the boy, he stated that he was extremely 
committed to the welfare of the boy and explained that he ‘could only feel love 
for the boy not anger’ when he was being punched, scratched, spat on, kicked 
and the like. Love, it seemed, enabled Lincoln to rise above a primary concern 
for the preservation of himself to the good of the other person. 
 
The group now introduced the idea of risk, risk associated with the welfare of 
both Lincoln and the boy. However, as explained above, the selflessness 
inherent in the response of Lincoln to the risk of being hurt was not a 
consideration, not even when he became conscious of it. Both Lincoln and the 
group spoke little about the event and the risk to Lincoln’s welfare. It was as 
though it was accepted that such events require selflessness on the part of the 
nurse. As Lincoln later disclosed, ‘I would say that I’ve never had so many 
physical assaults in all my life…‘. Neil added, ‘that physical danger isn’t deemed 
important. It’s putting yourself second to the needs of someone else’. This 
suggests that love acts in such a way as to have the respondent not identify any 
risk of possible danger to the self because the focus of attention is not on the 
self but on the other person. At this point the group were not aware that they 
had introduced the notion of altruism in nursing and no further discussion of this 
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concept took place. 
 
Rather, the group identified the idea of ‘risk’, not only to Lincoln but also to the 
boy. In the example Lincoln risked not only his own welfare but also the welfare 
of the boy. For example, it was stated that Lincoln went into the room and held 
the boy in a ‘bear type hug’ for two and a half hours, but as Lincoln stated, at 
that time he had no idea the boy had had a history of sexual abuse and that the 
boy may have interpreted his actions as yet another abuse (restrained against 
his will). What is noteworthy is that the group appeared unconcerned with the 
possible negative implications of Lincoln’s restraint of the boy. It was as though 
the risk associated with Lincoln’s actions was acceptable because it was well 
intentioned. Thus, it is acceptable for a nurse to put another at risk when the 
motive for action is the ‘good’ of that other person. The group understood that 
the circumstances Lincoln found himself in were extreme and out of the 
ordinary and as such warranted action that was equally not of the normal or 
everyday nature of nursing. As a consequence the potential benefits to the boy 
of Lincoln’s actions outweighed the possible negative consequences for the boy 
and Lincoln and therefore were acceptable. The group however did not venture 
into an examination of what equates to an acceptable risk for a professional 
nurse and or midwife and what is the unacceptable risk that is associated with 
professional misconduct. 
 
Finally, some discussion was had around the idea of the ‘connection’ made 
between Lincoln and the boy during the two and a half hour period when they 
sat on a mattress on the floor and Lincoln held the boy in a ‘bear type hug’. The 
group were of the view that the ‘bear type hug’, was not only the way Lincoln 
believed he could lessen the physical and psychological impact of the event on 
the boy but one in which he could establish a ‘connection’ with the boy. It 
appeared that the idea of connecting with the boy, or establishing a 
relatedness, was important. The example offered centered on ‘pets’. Both 
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Lincoln and the boy had a pet animal that had died and caused them to be very 
upset. From the discussion of the example it was obvious that their 
communication about the shared suffering of the death of their pet was the 
moment in which the relationship changed. Lincoln reported that from this time 
on the boy was more settled and the intensity of his physical assaults lessened. 
The group was of the opinion that Lincoln’s actions demonstrated his love 
because all of his energy was directed at the relief of the suffering of the boy 
through the establishment of a ‘connectedness’. 
 
5.5.2  Answer 2: Love is more than duty 
In this answer participants identified love as ‘something extra’. Discussion about 
the interaction between Lincoln and a nurse senior to him made it clear that 
placing the welfare of the boy before his own was something that was not 
expected of him. In fact, he was advised to the opposite when he was told, ‘I 
would be taking it on my own back if I went in there and sustained an injury 
because it’s not what is required of me’. While there was no professional 
requirement for Lincoln or any other nurse to place at risk their welfare or to act 
in a selfless way, Lincoln did so willingly. Professional duty cannot require the 
obligation that love can. The implication is that love as ‘something extra’ is 
‘more than professional duty’ because it is something that cannot be expected 
or required but is at the same time respected and admired. This attitude was 
shown in the fact that, while Lincoln was advised against going into the room, 
when it was made clear to his superiors that he had gone in and wanted to care 
for the boy, his superiors supported his endeavors and encouraged his action. 
The group were of the view that, while Lincoln’s superiors could not compel him 
to go into the room and place his own welfare at risk, once he had made that 
decision he was supported, encouraged and respected for the decision. 
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Without articulating it clearly, the group were of the opinion that professional 
duty places boundaries on ‘compassion’ and so limits the participation of the 
nurse and/or midwife in the suffering of another whereas love does not. Love, it 
seemed, enabled the nurse to share the suffering of the other person, in this 
case with the boy, and as such is more than duty. 
 
5.5.3  Answer 3: Being content in your vulnerability. 
At this point in the dialogue, the group engaged in a reflection on the ideas that 
had been discussed to date which culminated in a third answer to the question 
of what is love in nursing. As mentioned above, significant discussion took 
place around the idea that there existed a ‘connection’ between Lincoln and the 
boy, in that, the group continued to believe that Lincoln was in relationship with 
the boy before they met. As Lincoln stated, the relationship ‘had no start nor 
finish’ because, ‘it was already happening’. Both Daniel and Lincoln understood 
this to be ‘a subconscious connection’ that ‘was already there’. The point being 
made was that this was an example of love because there existed in Lincoln a 
moral state of his being that had him connected to the boy before and after the 
event because they were always ‘connected’. Yet what exactly this connection 
was that went before and after them was not made clear but continued to be a 
significant theme of the dialogue. 
 
Having again accepted the idea that there existed between Lincoln and the boy 
a ‘connection’ that made possible their relatedness, the group continued their 
interest in the nature of this relationship and the selflessness that accompanied 
it. As was earlier explained, Lincoln did not think about going to assist the boy 
because it was just something that he had to do. Lincoln understood this to 
mean that he was the one who was responsible for helping the boy in that the 
responsibility was his responsibility and it was a responsibility he could not 
ignore. The group understood nursing to be a unique profession; one where 
nurses encounter people with serious health related problems that affect their 
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life. The group believed Lincoln found himself in just such a situation; he was in 
the presence of a boy who was attempting self-harm. It was a situation that 
Lincoln understood called him to action. 
 
Extending this idea further Daniel believed there exists among nurses ‘the 
willingness to accept that people almost put their lives in your hands and that’s 
a big responsibility… and we willingly take that responsibility, we accept it, we 
want to accept it’. The group again digressed momentarily and engaged in a 
discussion about the nursing profession in general and how nurses respond to 
situations with patients where their own welfare is threatened. A nurse may be 
called on to respond to a situation, which they feel they are not professionally 
prepared for but do so because they feel the responsibility of the patient. It was 
acknowledged that some nurses choose to not take up the responsibility, where 
others like Lincoln feel compelled; they feel a deep responsibility for the patient. 
 
Returning to the example, the group held the view that Lincoln responded to his 
moral conviction. The fact that it may have caused him to respond in a less than   
a competent way and possibly threaten his own personal or professional 
wellbeing was something he was not concerned about. As Lincoln stated, ‘you 
are content in your vulnerability’, meaning his moral concern for the boy 
overrode any rational concern he had for himself. As he went on to say, he was 
not concerned that his actions may well have lead him to be, in his words, ‘open 
to degrees of criticism from your peers and hierarchy and the patients family…’ 
because he was more concerned for the boy. This was an example of love in 
nursing because Lincoln responded to his moral conviction to take responsibility 
for the suffering of the boy. While he brought all his professional skills to bear 
on the situation, he knew this may not have been enough and his actions would 
be open to professional critique. Lincoln’s vulnerability to professional critique 
was not something that concerned him because he was able to place the 
welfare of the boy as his first priority ahead of any concern for himself. 
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5.6  Phase 4: The general question 
This phase of the Neo-Socratic dialogue requires broadening of the question 
from the specific example of love in nursing to the general. Therefore, the group 
was asked that if what had been identified in the example was love, then what 
was love in nursing in general? To this question, the group responded with a 
mixture of thoughts that, while related to the question in general, did not 
necessarily relate to each other in any logical form. It was at this point a Meta 
dialogue was undertaken with the group in order to implement a process 
strategy that would facilitate the development of an answer to the question, and 
that ensured each person’s contribution was considered. To this end, it was 
decided that agreed ideas would be incorporated into a mind-map of thinking 
about the answer to the question. Specifically, the group constructed a mind 
map of the concepts raised in the specific example that they wanted to include 
in their answer to the general question (Figure 2: Group 2 Mind-map of the 
concepts underpinning the answer to the general question of what is love in 
nursing). Having said this, specific reference is made throughout this report that 
explains the content of the mind-map and the answer to the question. 
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Figure 2: Group 2 Mind-map of the concepts underpinning the answer to the 
general question of what is love in nursing (as formulated by the group). 
 
 
Question: What is love in nursing? 
Answer: Love in nursing is the response of the nurse to the suffering person 
that is characterized by an unconditional subconscious connection of their 
respective beings that has neither start nor finish. It is where the nurse engages 
in selfless action as a response to the trauma, suffering, vulnerability and fear of 
the patient that no one else can bear because the responsibility of the 
vulnerable is my privilege. 
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Dialogue about the general question of ‘What is love in nursing’, started with the 
idea that the profession of nursing has nurses alert to the ‘trauma’ suffered by 
people or, reflecting the groups thinking more accurately, the ‘suffering’ of 
people (Figure 2: Group 2 Mind-map of the concepts underpinning the answer 
to the general question of what is love in nursing). It was suggested that, unlike 
other professions, nurses spend long periods of time interacting with patients in 
‘intimate’ and ‘intense’ ways and for that reason are immersed in their suffering. 
As such, suffering is the object of the attention of the nurse. While it was 
understood that any nurse, by way of professional education and clinical 
experience, might be able to identify the ‘trauma’ being suffered by another 
person and respond to it in a professional way, it is an entirely different thing to 
identify the ‘suffering’ of the sufferer. 
 
While the group understood the witness of the ‘vulnerability’ and ‘fear’ of the 
suffering patient to be at the level of the ‘subconscious’, they were unable to 
clearly identify what causes this response in certain nurses and not others. 
However, earlier in phase 3 of the Neo-Socratic dialogue, participants identified 
the concept of responsibility. In the specific example offered, the nurse saw 
himself as being responsible for the other person, more responsible than any 
other nurse and that his responsibility for the patient was his responsibility 
alone. When applied to this part of the dialogue the answer to the question of 
what causes one nurse to respond to the suffering of a person and not another, 
must be the moral state of this particular nurse. In other words, this nurse’s 
‘responsibility’ to the suffering of the patient is what triggered his moral state of 
being as a nurse with the outcome as was shown in the specific example. To 
put it simply, a nurse’s response to a clinical situation is both rational and moral. 
It would have been rational not to go in but moral to do so. The discussion to 
this point inferred that the appeal of the other person’s suffering, which is an 
appeal of their helplessness, is a moral appeal that each nurse can only  
respond to in their own way. As such, love in nursing is the expression of the 
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moral self of the nurse. 
 
Yet does this mean Lincoln was more moral than the other nurses on the ward 
who also witnessed the event? While not a point specifically explored in the 
dialogue it is one that is nevertheless worthy of brief comment. It seemed that 
the group understood Lincoln’s moral response to be unique. Lincoln was no 
more moral than anyone else, but his moral state of being identified something 
of the suffering of the boy that required him to act in the way he did, which was 
different to others. Was Lincoln more moral than the other nurses? All that can 
be said at this point is that his morality required him to take the action he did, 
whereas the morality of the other nurses required of them something different. 
 
Furthermore, the group also believed that while there is no choice in accepting 
or rejecting the responsibility of the other, there is a certain ‘contentment’ that 
comes in the ‘responsibility’. The group recognized that with the responsibility 
comes ‘trust’ of the patient’s life, which they understood as a ‘privilege’ (Figure 
2: Group 2 Mind-map of the concepts underpinning the answer to the general 
question of what is love in nursing). To be clear, the privilege was not identified 
as some type of feeling of satisfaction or honor, for this would compromise the 
selflessness of the moral response, just the opposite, the privilege highlights the 
depth of the selflessness. It was about the nurse responding to the trust of the 
patient who gives over their life to the nurse, the responsibility of their life, with 
the nurse responding to the trust of being entrusted with the responsibility of 
that patient’s life by selfless action. It is a privilege because the nurse responds 
to the trust with all that they are. They respond in a selfless way by willingly 
offering themselves for the good of the patient (Figure 2: Group 2 Mind-map of 
the concepts underpinning the answer to the general question of what is love in 
nursing). 
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The idea that love in nursing is characterized by an ‘unconditional’ 
‘subconscious’ ‘connection’ of the nurse’s and patient’s being that has ‘no start 
nor finish’ further added weight to the view that love in nursing is the moral 
response of human to human relatedness (Figure 2: Group 2 Mind-map of the 
concepts underpinning the answer to the general question of what is love in 
nursing). The group shared the view that there exists between all humans a 
state of constant relatedness. It seemed that without knowing it they had once 
again entered the field of metaphysics in articulating the idea that humans exist 
as more than subjective beings but as ‘connected’ beings concerned not only 
with their own welfare but also the welfare of others. What is more, they also 
held the view that this relatedness was ‘unconditional’. The participants harked 
back to the example where Lincoln believed he had no choice in the matter of 
going to the boy when he stated that ‘I really didn’t have a choice’, ‘it was the 
only thing to do’, and ‘I could not, not go in’. As was articulated, the 
unconditional nature of the relatedness has the nurse committed to responding 
to the other person without concern for his or her own welfare. However, as a 
professional nurse the limits to the selflessness remain unclear as explained by 
Lincoln whose last word about the event was: 
‘ . . . there is nothing I would have done I mean, it’s hard for me I did 
everything that I had to do like that was needed to be done and I was 
able to do and I don’t know about it, like I needed to jump out of a 
window to stop him from falling out of a window, I may have done that I 
don’t know, I don’t know I can’t say but I know of what I lived through in 
that shift um my own well being was of a very low priority so maybe it’s 
possible, I just don’t know’. 
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One postulate that arises from this dialogue is that the degree of selflessness is 
unclear because there is no way of knowing what a nurse’s moral response will    
be to the suffering of another person. The suggestion here is that love in 
nursing is unconditional and therefore unlimited. 
 
5.7  Commentary on the dialogue: 
This section provides a brief commentary on the dialogue and makes clear the 
questions that arose in the course of the dialogue that were unable to be 
explored, they included: 
 
Answer 1:  ‘It’s a selfless, subconscious calling’. 
Answer 2:  ‘Love is more than duty’. 
Answer 3:  ‘Being content in your vulnerability’. 
 
The group understood that there exists between people a metaphysical 
connection that only becomes conscious after the commitment to the other 
person has been given. However, while the content of the relatedness that all 
humans share was identified as one person being responsible to another 
person, the exact nature of the responsibility was not broached. What is more, 
no explanation could be offered for what triggers this responsibility in one 
person and not another. Furthermore, no discussion was had on the moral 
nature of the relatedness given that the group held the view that the 
connectedness was something that was always present between them and the 
patient both before and after the event. 
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5.7.1  What is the limit to the unconditional nature of the selflessness of 
love in nursing? 
While Lincoln made it clear the severely disturbed boy was his first priority, the 
level of his sacrifice of his self was neither tested nor able to be postulated 
about. Lincoln knew he was committed to the boy but just how far he would 
have gone in his selflessness remained a mystery to both him and the group. 
 
5.7.2  Is it ever acceptable for a nurse to put a patient at risk even when 
the motive for action is the ‘good’ of that person? 
What equates to an acceptable risk for a professional nurse and what is an 
unacceptable risk that is associated with professional misconduct was not 
explored. It seemed that the group understood risk if associated with a motive 
of charity was acceptable, even if the outcome of the action that risks the 
welfare of the patient was negative. Is it ever acceptable for a professional 
nurse to risk the welfare of a patient even when they believe it is in the patient’s 
best interest? 
 
5.7.3  If love in nursing is ‘something extra’ what exactly is the extra 
element that cannot be demanded? 
It was clear from the dialogue that the group understood love to be ‘something 
extra’ than professional duty and also something that cannot be demanded of 
the nurse. While the group identified the idea that obligation is a component of 
love in nursing and something different to the obligation of professional duty of 
care, exactly what the differences were remains unclear, except to say that the 
obligation associated with love appears to be an obligation without boundaries, 
and linked to notions of responsibility, whereas the obligation associated with 
professional duty is definable and something able to be demanded. 
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What is more, the group also touched on the idea that ‘compassion’ is an 
element of love in nursing that enables the nurse to share in a deeper way the 
suffering of the patient more than professional duty is able. However, just what 
the content of the shared suffering of love is, that is different to professional 
duty, was not discussed. 
 
5.7.4  Can a decision of our consciousness override a moral decision? 
While in the example Lincoln stated that he had no choice but to go to the aid of 
the boy, could he have changed his mind? While Lincoln suggested he could 
not have changed his mind because, using his words, ‘he could not, not go in’, 
the fact that he was advised to the opposite suggests there was an opportunity 
for him to opt out. While it was one thing to feel the way that he did, it was a 
different matter to act upon it. No discussion was had about what made Lincoln 
follow his moral judgment of the situation and not change his mind. 
 
5.7.5  Does feeling a sense of self-satisfaction after the event compromise 
the selflessness of the love act? 
The group momentarily spoke about Lincoln’s feelings at the end of his shift 
after the boy was transferred to the Acute Psychiatric Unit. Lincoln said that he 
felt good about what he had done and that it was all worth it. While it was 
believed that Lincoln’s feeling good about his actions and the outcome was not 
the motivation for what he had done, there was no discussion about how feeling 
good about the outcome related to the selflessness of the love spoken about. 
What is the relationship of self-satisfaction to the selflessness of love in 
nursing? 
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5.8  Conclusion 
This group of nine male Registered Nurses (Division 2) offered three answers to 
the question of what is love in nursing. Their answers showed that the content 
of love in nursing, as revealed in the example offered by Lincoln and 
understood by the group, comes about by their conscious recognition of their 
subconscious connection to the patient as a response to their witness of the 
patient’s suffering. The group understood that love in nursing requires on the 
part of the nurse, use of his or her professional skills and judgment to respond 
in a selfless way to the needs of the patient. However, it was equally 
understood that a selfless response may not be without its risk to both their own 
welfare and also that of the patient’s. Yet it is a risk that is understood by them 
to be acceptable if the motive for the nursing action is for the ‘good’ of the 
patient. What is more, it is understood that the level of the professional 
commitment required for action of this type is more than can be required of the 
nurse, because the responsibility of the vulnerable patient is moral and not just 
rational. 
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Chapter 6:  Group 3: Report on a Neo-Socratic 
dialogue on the question of what is love  
in midwifery? (Australia) 
 
6.0  Introduction 
Yet different again to previous dialogues, this Socratic dialogue was made up of 
nine registered midwives who sought to answer the specific question of ‘what is 
love in midwifery’ The dialogue went over one day with participants offering two 
answers to the question as it related to the specific example offered, plus the 
development of one answer to the general question of what is love in midwifery. 
The group understood that love in midwifery requires of the midwife both 
personal and professional commitment in advocating the health needs of the 
woman who, during child birth, cannot always advocate for themselves. It 
requires the midwife to willingly place their self at both considerable personal 
and professional risk during the management of birth that the woman desires 
and is able to achieve. As such, love in midwifery requires the midwife to place 
his or her needs second to those of the woman and hence requires of the 
midwife both personal and professional sacrifice. This said, a characteristic of 
love in midwifery is its selflessness. The following is a description of the 
Socratic dialogue about these ideas. 
 
6.1  The sample group: Setting the scene 
The participants of group 3 were all Registered Nurses (Division 1) and 
endorsed on the Nurse’s Board of Victoria Register to practice midwifery. When 
the initial invitation to participate in the study was made, midwives saw it as an 
opportunity to develop a midwifery perspective on the topic. As a result of the 
invitation to participate in the study, nine (9) midwives agreed. While the clinical 
experience of the participants varied greatly all participants had currency of 
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practice. Eight participants practiced midwifery in a midwifery unit in an acute 
care hospital and one participant was an independent practicing midwife. All 
midwives had varying degrees of experience across the range of midwifery that 
included; antenatal, labor ward, birth suite, postnatal, special care unit, and 
community midwifery. In addition, the midwife who was an independent 
practicing midwife had experience with home birthing that included antenatal 
and postnatal care. The Socratic dialogue reported on here was undertaken in 
the home of one of the participants and was conducted in a relaxed 
environment that encouraged a sharing of thoughts about midwifery. Similar to 
other dialogues, light refreshments and a luncheon were provided to help keep 
participants focused on the purposes of coming together and also to assist with 
the creation of a friendly atmosphere that was conducive to a thoughtful 
discussion about the topic. This Socratic dialogue was of six hours duration and 
concluded with what participants considered a well-articulated answer to the 
topic question. The following is a report of this Socratic dialogue. 
 
6.2  Dialogue question 
The focus of the Socratic dialogue was on the question: ‘what is love in nursing 
and midwifery’. This group consisted entirely of midwives practicing only 
midwifery, and therefore the question was rephrased to read ‘what is love in 
midwifery?’ 
 
6.3  Phase 1: Dialogue example 
The dialogue commenced with participants offering an example from their 
practice of love in midwifery. The following nine examples were offered: 
 
April: ‘This day I was caring for a couple, Loretta and Joe and we quickly 
established a rapport. It was the couple’s first baby and they where going to 
have the labor induced because she was of 42 weeks gestation. They originally 
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wanted a homebirth but that wasn’t to be. She labored really well and 
everything was fine. She ruptured her membranes and that heralded the onset 
of second stage, and there was meconium stained liquor. The Resident Medical 
Officer wanted to intervene and was edgy about the meconium (to him it 
indicated fetal distress). Again, my assessment showed everything to be fine. 
There was no bradycardia; there was nothing that made me feel that there was 
any need to intervene, as she was about to start pushing. I was happy to keep 
going but the doctor wasn’t and he was standing at the end of the bed clicking 
his fingers and the husband wasn’t amused. I thought ‘I’ve got to get rid of you’, 
so I just suggested that he perhaps go off and have some morning tea as it 
would be a little while. Everything’s fine. Just go. Off you go and have a cup of 
tea, and he did. He was quite happy about that. I knew she was going to be a 
couple of hours pushing, as it was a big baby. We had about 15 minute’s peace 
and quiet and he came back. He had rung the consultant and of course the 
consultant said get a scalp clip on if there’s meconium. That’s the only piece of 
information he took any notice of. . . I could not see any reason to do that, so I 
suggested that he go and have another cup of tea. I think I suggested he was 
dehydrated actually and he got the hint. He was someone I got on well with and 
he went out. I really think deep down he would have gone with it but he had the 
consultant in on it now. It put this guy in an awkward position. I talked to Loretta 
about the meconium and what it meant. . . she trusted that I would tell her if I 
thought something needed to be done. She would be quiet happy to do 
whatever I recommended or what the medical staff recommended, with good 
reason... She trusted my judgment... She had a large normal well baby.’ 
 
Lyn: ‘I got to know this couple late in the antenatal period. I came on duty on 
an evening shift and she was laboring and then when she presented in labor 
there was no fetal heart sound so the end result of that labor was a forceps 
delivery under epidural. I stayed in contact with this couple, got to know the 
family, went to the funeral and within a couple of months she was pregnant 
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again and I was at the delivery at theatre. I’ve stayed in contact with the family 
and my husband has also been included. I fully expect to be at their next birth.’ 
 
Helgar: ‘I was asked to go to theatre and collect a dead baby of 32 weeks 
gestation. I just walked into theatre and found out that there had been a horrific 
car accident. Their 4 year old son had been killed, father was practically 
unscathed, and the mother was critically injured and her uterus had ruptured 
resulting in the death of her baby. Here am I with this dead baby and I thought 
well what do I do? I took the baby in to a designated single room on the unit. I 
hadn’t had contact with the father at this stage. So I involved the Chaplin at the 
hospital and asked him to seek out the father and he duly arrived with the father 
carrying a pair of little boy’s shoes. He didn’t want to know about the baby. He 
was just so traumatized and in such deep shock, as you could all well imagine. 
So anyway we just sat down and we talked quietly about it and as I say, he 
didn’t want to see the baby. Another midwife who was experienced with stillbirth 
babies and neonatal deaths helped and we both realized the impact of our 
practice on these families. We used the single room to help the family come 
together and start the grieving process and the father gradually became 
involved. We eventually bathed the baby, took foot and hand prints, and got as 
much detail about the baby as we could and started their little book as a 
keepsake and we had the baby christened. At the end of the shift I felt 
somewhat, well certainly, traumatized by it, but I felt as though I did all in my 
power. I had done everything I could to perhaps set up the grieving process and 
make the situation the best it could be for this family. I look back on that and 
feel I could have walked away and just left the baby and did what I had to do as   
a midwife to the baby without involving the family, but I see my love for my 
midwifery that kept me and supported me through this time. I did have 
subsequent contact with the family and they have moved on.’ 
 179
Sandra:  ‘I was attending a homebirth for a primigravida woman who 
wanted to birth in water. She had a history of sexual abuse, early death of a 
parent, and other significant health related problems. . . I could tell she was 
nearly full on labor. They’d nearly used up all their hot water system with 
showers, and she desperately wanted to have the baby, at least labor in water, 
have the baby in water, this was her dream. . . I did a fetal heart and its way 
down and I thought oh no we’ve got to move (go to hospital). I just did it again,  
to check that it was right and it really was what I heard and what it was in 
relation to the contractions . . . I said I think we’re going to have to go, you don’t 
feel like pushing. . . I rang the second midwife, got the oxygen and suction 
ready, and did a vaginal examination. . . I said you don’t think you could push do 
you, cos I’ didn’t really want her to push, cos there would have been no point if 
the baby’s distressed and I just said you couldn’t do that could you just by this 
look in her eye and she said, she just looked wide eyed and went ‘ARH’ and out 
came the baby, like I just had to grab it and just rescue it from falling in the 
water, literally and out it came.’ 
 
Sharnee:  ‘I was working in an antenatal clinic and got to know this woman 
who had a history of trauma. She had been a bank teller and experienced two 
separate armed robberies, which had affected her deeply and now she was  
very untrusting of people. She had previously had a caesarean section for fetal 
distress and desperately wanted a normal birth this time round. We met several 
times before she came into labor. Unfortunately she was in breach at 39 weeks 
and would have to have another caesarean section. What I wanted for her was 
what she wanted, a normal birth, but in the end all she wanted was a healthy 
baby. On this particular day, night staff told me that a girl was requesting me 
and she was not going to theatre unless I was there. So lucky I was on, and I 
went to theatre and she had a beautiful birth and just the look of trust, 
appreciation and gratitude was a reward for me.’ 
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Julie: ‘I came into labor and I got the midwife I didn’t want, the midwife we had 
not got on with and I thought, that’s it. I’m going around to the labor ward but 
what happened was over night, the trust and, you know, the relationship that 
was formed in a short time and things went beautifully.’ 
 
Nina: ‘I had been on duty almost 3 consecutive shifts with this woman who was 
having a stillbirth fetus at 15 - 16 weeks. A relationship had certainly developed 
but in the night after working with her for many hours where she thought she 
was going to die, and there was this real intensity of stillbirth as you all know, 
it’s like the rest of the world is closed off and it’s just the midwife and the couple 
are just there, and it’s a very intense environment. They’d settled down to sleep 
and he was on the floor and she was on the bed and she was actually grabbing 
some sleep after many hours of tears and trauma and whatnot and it was a very 
profound moment when I was sitting in the room in the dark quietly listening. . . I 
was thinking of the processes the couple would have to still go through where 
everything stops and where the dead baby sits in the cervix for a time. . . I was 
thinking about my role as a midwife and birth and death and the whole thing 
with my particular job I love so much… So much emptiness there is in this 
sensation, this terrible sensation… There I was thinking of this woman’s life and 
my care as a midwife and it’s really love of my work and caring very much for 
this woman who I hardly knew at the time…’ 
 
Mandy:    ‘Well, love exists within me of the unknown baby and mother. On 
this particular day I helped the mother through a difficult labor and the ‘freaking 
out stage’ and she turned to me and said, ‘I love you’. You don’t have to be with a 
woman long to have that level of trust.’ 
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Madalya: ‘I was a first year midwifery student and came across a couple in 
antenatal classes. This particular day I was on duty in the birthing suite and 
there was this same couple and they were just wrapped to see me. I had my 
preceptor with me and they just had so much trust in me, with so little 
experience, and I just wanted to give them the best I could, with so little 
experience, because their trust was so unreal. The husband just about dogged 
every step that I took and I was thinking does he know how little experience I 
have? At the end of my shift I had to go off duty because I was on a day next 
day. I didn’t want to go. She had the baby at 2 am, but I couldn’t wait to get to 
work the next morning and they couldn’t wait to see me and it was just, it was 
so unreal, but I still see them and they actually live close to me. They worked 
out my home address, but it was just wanting to be the best you could that was 
important…’ 
 
With the completion of example offering, the group set about identifying the 
example they believed was the example that best exemplified love in the 
practice of midwifery. While each example was briefly reflected on, the group 
quickly concluded that the choice of one example was one out of two. The 
group found favour in Madalya’s example because of the commitment of 
Madalya to the woman and the ‘deep trust’ of the woman of a stranger. 
However, the group concluded that April’s example was the specific example 
they wanted to explore in depth. 
 
6.4  Phase 2: Exploring the selected example 
As with each Socratic dialogue the next stage required the group to explore the 
April’s example in such detail that they could place themselves in the example. 
That is, after the example has been explored in depth each member of the 
group should be able to take ownership of the example and imagine it as their 
own. Thus at the conclusion of this phase the example is no longer ‘just’ April’s 
example but everyone’s. 
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6.4.1  The example: 
April: ‘This day I was caring for a couple, Loretta and Joe and we quickly 
established a rapport. It was the couple’s first baby and they where going to 
have the labor induced because she was of 42 weeks gestation. They originally 
wanted a homebirth but that wasn’t to be. She labored really well and 
everything was fine. She ruptured her membranes and that heralded the onset 
of second stage, and there was meconium stained liquor. The Resident Medical 
Officer wanted to intervene and was edgy about the meconium (to him it 
indicated fetal distress). Again, my assessment showed everything to be fine. 
There was no bradycardia; there was nothing that made me feel that there was 
any need to intervene, as she was about to start pushing. I was happy to keep 
going but the doctor wasn’t and he was standing at the end of the bed clicking 
his fingers and the husband wasn’t amused. I thought ‘I’ve got to get rid of you’, 
so I just suggested that he perhaps go off and have some morning tea as it 
would be a little while. Everything’s fine. Just go. Off you go and have a cup of 
tea, and he did. He was quite happy about that. I knew she was going to be a 
couple of hours pushing, as it was a big baby. We had about I 5 minute’s peace 
and quiet and he came back. He had rung the consultant and of course the 
consultant said get a scalp clip on if there’s meconium. That’s the only piece of 
information he took any notice of. . . I could not see any reason to do that, so I 
suggested that he go and have another cup of tea. I think I suggested he was 
dehydrated actually and he got the hint. He was someone I got on well with and 
he went out. I really think deep down he would have gone with it but he had the 
consultant in on it now. It put this guy in an awkward position. I talked to Loretta 
about the meconium and what it meant. . . she trusted that I would tell her if I 
thought something needed to be done. She would be quiet happy to do 
whatever I recommended or what the medical staff recommended, with good 
reason... She trusted my judgment... She had a large normal well baby.’ 
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6.4.2  Further details of the example: 
• ‘The mother was a primigravida (first birthing experience)’. 
• ‘The couple wanted a home birth but were overdue (42 weeks) and the 
pregnancy needed to be induced’. 
• ‘Both Loretta and Joe wanted a spontaneous non-interventionist birth’. 
• ‘I did an assessment during first stage of labor and was happy everything 
was normal and happy to go with the mother’s wishes for a non- 
interventionist birth’. 
• ‘I established a quick rapport with Loretta and Joe and was able to work 
pretty easily with them’. 
• ‘The onset of second stage resulted in rupture of the membranes and lots 
of fluid with meconium stained liquor’. 
• ‘I got rid of the meconium, just in case a doctor saw it, but he did’. 
• ‘Assessment of the baby showed it to be fine’. 
• ‘The medical staff were keen to intervene believing they had to monitor 
the fetus for fetal distress’. 
• ‘The baby was obviously large and a long second stage was anticipated 
which bothered the medical team but did not bother me’. 
• ‘The RMO (Resident Medical Officer) was hanging around creating a 
negative atmosphere so I had to get rid of him, nicely, but firmly, twice’. 
• ‘The consultant physician said to the attending medico to place a scalp 
monitor on the baby to monitor the fetal distress’. 
• ‘My assessment did not reveal fetal distress’. 
• ‘I maintained the mother’s confidence that there was no need for 
technology’. 
• ‘She felt secure that her baby was safe; she trusted I would tell her if I 
thought something was needed, she trusted my judgment’. 
• ‘After 2 hours of pushing the Medical Officer wanted to do a forceps 
delivery, but there were no indications except the mother was becoming a 
little tired’. 
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• ‘Another half an hour passed and she was becoming tired so I suggest an 
episiotomy would help and she was happy to have the episiotomy. She 
trusted me, she was happy to go along with it because I suggested it was a 
good idea.’ 
• ‘I was later reprimanded for asking the Medical Officer to leave the room 
a couple of times and for also having a clash with one of the consultants’. 
• ‘I base my practice on evidence and that gives me the confidence to stand 
my ground’. 
• ‘I was told after the birth by the medical staff that I wasn’t fit to practice’. 
• ‘The normality of birth is something that I love about my practice’. 
 
6.5  Phase 3: Exploring the question in the light of the example 
The group now confronted the question, ‘What is love in midwifery in the 
example offered?’ The group provided two answers to the question as listed 
below. 
 
Question:  What is love in midwifery in the example? 
Answer 1:  ‘When I asked the Medical Officer to leave the room’. 
Answer 2:  ‘Love in midwifery is being there for the woman and being with 
the woman doing what needs to be done to help her birth in a 
way she wants’. 
 
6.5.1  Answer 1: When I asked the Medical Officer to leave the room 
The conversation commenced with attempts to identify what in the example 
was love. However, the group strayed around this topic area for some time and 
rather than identifying what in the example did the midwife do that was love, 
participants spoke about professional commitment as love of midwifery. The 
midwives described their commitment to the ethos of woman-centered birthing 
and saw themselves as advocates of ‘natural birthing’ for women in an 
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environment dominated by medical obstetrics. Accordingly, these midwives 
found themselves in many situations making professional arguments against 
what they considered unnecessary obstetric interventions. The midwives 
believed April, knowing the woman’s desires for a natural birth, acted as an 
advocate for the woman who was in a compromised state by laboring. She 
acted as a mediator between the woman and the medical staff about the 
obstetric care required, so guarding against the use of what have become 
known as routine type interventions such as ‘scalp clip monitoring’ 
(electrocardiography), use of vaginal examination to assess progress of labor, 
use of forceps for delivery of the fetal head at birth, need for episiotomy, and 
the like. The professional bantering between the midwife and the medical staff 
of the competing beliefs saw the care of the laboring woman a matter of 
negotiation. However, the group understood April to be very committed to her 
beliefs about the practice of midwifery and as such agreed with her 
preparedness to put herself in a position of ‘risk’ of criticism of professional 
judgment about the obstetrics required, which was evidenced by her actions of 
asking the medical officer to leave the room and the resulting retort of the 
medical staff who stated she was not fit to practice midwifery. 
 
However, was asking the medical officer to leave the room an example of love 
in midwifery? The group offered this as the first answer to the question because  
in asking the medical officer to leave the room where there was possible fetal 
distress was not only evidence of the high degree of professional commitment 
and skill of the midwife, but was also something she described she ‘had to do’. 
In other words, April had to take the action she did because if she did not her 
professional integrity would have been compromised. However, in answer to 
the question above, was asking the doctor to leave the room love in midwifery, 
it was suggested that it was not, it was love of midwifery. It was understood that 
the love of midwifery elicited in this midwife a level of professional commitment 
that saw her willingly ‘risk’ critique of her duty of care. What remained unclear 
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was the relationship of love of midwifery to love in midwifery. The group 
understood a requirement of the love of midwifery was a high level of 
professional commitment that made it possible for the midwife to risk critique of 
their professional practice in order to maintain her integrity as a midwife. While 
not directly articulating it, it seemed that the midwives were of the belief that the 
professional commitment of April was a prerequisite of love in midwifery. In 
other words, for love in midwifery to be present the midwife must be committed 
to the profession of midwifery. In light of this general acknowledgment the group 
offered a second very different answer. 
 
6.5.2 Answer 2: Love in midwifery is being there for the woman and 
being with the woman doing what needs to be done to help her 
birth in a way she wants. 
 
The group fleetingly but repeatedly spoke about the relationship of the midwife  
to the woman in labour. The relationship was described as one of ‘trust’, one 
that was built on the woman’s acknowledgement of the midwife being ‘present’ 
to her needs that was understood as ‘help to birth in a way that the woman 
wanted’. While April’s love of midwifery saw her committed to a particular ethos 
of midwifery (women centred birth), one that required a high degree of 
professional commitment, the group identified that love in midwifery required 
something different, that is, as April described it in the example, her 
professional integrity resulted in her being committed to using all her 
professional skills and judgement to help the woman birth in a way that she 
desired. However, what made this an example of love in midwifery was that it 
required her to not only commit herself as a professional midwife to the 
relationship, but also more. It required she respond to the woman’s trust of her 
by being responsible for her. The midwife by way of her professional 
commitment to midwifery used her skills and judgement in being responsible for 
the welfare of the labouring woman who was at that particular time not able to 
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be responsible for her own welfare. Furthermore, the midwife was also 
responsible for the accomplishment of the birth the woman desired and was 
able to achieve. As such, responsibility is understood to be a quality of love in 
midwifery. 
 
However, the group was clear that ‘love in midwifery is not always doing what 
the woman wants’. For instance, in the example, April stated that the woman 
needed to know that there was meconium liquor present at the rupture of her 
membranes, which indicated amongst other things possible foetal distress, and 
the effect this complication could have on her labour and birth. The midwife in 
understanding the type of birth the woman wanted then applied each clinical 
decision about the labour to that model of birth. In this example the midwife 
made a clinical judgement about the type of obstetric care that best met with the 
woman’s desired model of birth and also her current circumstances. The 
midwife made the professional judgement that ‘scalp clip monitoring’ was not 
required and while she sought to inform the woman of both the positives and 
the negatives of this obstetric intervention she participated with the woman in 
the decision. 
 
Moreover, what made this an example of love in midwifery was that the women 
trusted the midwife with her welfare and that of her baby, in that, she entrusted 
the midwife with the responsibility for the decision and the midwife responded 
with a response that required no less than the midwife placing the welfare of the 
woman before her own. As April stated, ‘it is putting our own needs second’. It 
seemed that April understood love to be expressed at the moment when she 
became responsible for the management of the clinical situation that now 
included the welfare of the woman as understood by the woman. As she 
described it, ‘love is in that snippet of time’. . . ‘doing what needs to be done 
according to her circumstances’. This statement was part of the dialogue 
around the taking up of the responsibility, the revelation of the responsibility. 
Love in midwifery requires the use of professional skills and judgement on the 
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part of the midwife in being professionally accountable. It requires placing the 
concern of the woman first without even thinking about it. 
 
However, at this point in the dialogue, the group did not pursue a discussion 
about the concept of responsibility and the selflessness that accompanies it but 
rather turned their attention to a discussion on the risk to the autonomy of the 
midwife. In taking the stand that she did on behalf of the woman, when she 
rejected the intervention of ‘scalp clip monitoring’ for possible foetal distress, 
she put at ‘risk’ her own welfare by way of critique of the decision, particularly in 
regard to the woman, should it have been a choice that was later proven to be 
the wrong choice, and critique on the part of the medical staff who disagreed 
with her professional judgement of the situation. As one participant stated, ‘we 
risk a lot making those sorts of decisions because we risk the trust of our 
colleagues, risk offending our colleagues and offending the woman. We risk 
trust, so in a sense we’re doing it out of love because it is not necessarily going 
to benefit us.’ Accepting this statement, the group acknowledged that love in 
midwifery requires on the part of the midwife action that is not inspired by a self- 
benefiting motive because there is no expectation of reciprocity. The midwife 
did not engage the clinical situation thinking about the risk to her own welfare, 
for if she did she may well have not done what she did. Rather, as April stated, 
it was something she had to do to maintain her integrity. The statement ‘we risk   
a lot. . . ‘ further supported the degree of selflessness associated with love in 
midwifery. 
 
6.6  Phase 4: The general question 
This phase of the Socratic dialogue requires broadening of the question from 
the specific example of love in nursing and midwifery to the general. The group 
was asked that if what had been identified in the example is love then what is 
love in midwifery in general? 
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Question:  What is love in midwifery? 
Answer:  ‘Love in midwifery is empowering the woman to do as much as 
she can for herself by being there with and for her, doing what needs to be 
done, maintaining a balance between professional judgment and respect for the 
woman, including an understanding of her innate ability to give birth’. 
 
Initial discussion focused on the professional commitment of the midwife group 
to midwifery. They spoke at length about their love of midwifery, which centered 
on a belief in a woman’s innate ability to give birth. The midwives believed this 
ethos often caused them to be at odds with their medical colleagues who use 
the medical model in the practice of obstetrics. This said, the picture painted 
was one of an environment laden with conflict. On the one hand there are 
midwives who advocate a non-interventionist approach to the practice of 
childbirth akin to natural birth and on the other hand medical practitioners, and 
also some midwives, who apply a medical interventionist approach to the 
practice of obstetrics. Consequently the group was of the opinion that to 
practice women centered birth required of them a high level of professional 
commitment. Without knowing it the discussion at this point centered on their 
professional autonomy and the commitment required of the midwife if they are 
to practice woman centered midwifery in the medically dominated environment 
of a maternity unit situated in a hospital. 
 
However, the group eventually made the distinction between the commitment 
associated with ‘love of midwifery’ and the commitment associated with ‘love in 
midwifery’. While ‘love of midwifery’ and ‘love in midwifery’ were understood 
to require both a high degree of professional and personal commitment the 
attention of each was different. Discussion around love of midwifery focused on 
the midwife’s understanding of their personal and professional commitment to 
the practice of midwifery and associated professional autonomy, whereas love 
in midwifery focused the midwife’s attention on the relationship with the woman. 
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That is to say, love in midwifery was understood to be about the midwife’s 
personal-professional commitment to the woman giving birth, which requires 
something very personal of the midwife. While the commitment required to 
practice a particular model of midwifery can be professionally required, the 
commitment associated with love in midwifery cannot. While midwives use their 
professional judgment and skills to respond to the health needs of a woman in 
labor in a professionally committed way, the relationship they have with the 
woman may demand more of them to which they may or may not respond. 
Commitment was seen to be the outcome of the midwife’s identification of the 
trust of the woman in labor. As such, the group understood that a prerequisite of 
love in midwifery is the midwife being entrusted with the woman’s vulnerability 
caused by her labor. From this, it was postulated that the commitment of love in 
midwifery is a commitment to the woman and the responsibilities inherent in a 
relationship in trust of the midwife. 
 
While it was understood that love in midwifery requires the midwife to respond   
to the trust of the woman in a responsible way, by using all his or her  
professional skills and judgments in the management of the labor, the response 
may require more; it may require the woman’s welfare to come first. It was a 
point iterated by different group members and is exemplified in April’s following 
comment, ‘. . . it comes back to us putting our own needs second. . .‘ and ‘. . . act 
selflessly’. However, the implications of the idea of a midwife acting selflessly 
were only partially explored. For example, no discussion was had about what 
transpires between a woman and a midwife at the point of the midwife taking    
the responsibility for the woman’s welfare that would cause a midwife to adopt 
such a selfless attitude. Equally, there was little discussion about the content of 
the self-sacrifice to be made by a midwife, except to say that, the group 
understood that the requirement to be selfless places both themselves and   
women at risk. However, rather than discuss the idea of risk to the woman, the 
group turned its attention to the risk to themselves and the accompanying 
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selflessness. As was stated above, placing the welfare of the other person     
before your own necessitates a degree of self-sacrifice, and the dialogue  
around this point made it clear that it was something the midwives were 
prepared to do. As midwives they are prepared to do what is needed in order to 
help the woman birth in a way she wants from a professional point of view. To 
exemplify this idea further, the group harked back to the specific example of 
where April took a professional stand about the type of obstetric care she 
believed was in the best interest of the woman, which resulted in her later being 
both reprimanded and berated by the medical staff who told her she was not fit 
to practice midwifery. As she further explained, ‘we risk the trust of our 
colleagues, we risk offending our colleagues and we risk offending the woman 
too’. While there was general agreement that by responding to the woman by 
being ‘with’ and ‘for’ her, the midwife places herself or himself in a position 
where sacrifice of their own self may be required, just how far a midwife is 
willing to sacrifice themselves other than professionally, remained unclear. 
However, April provides a glimpse as to the level of personal-professional 
sacrifice midwives offer when she, in referring back to her specific example, 
stated, ‘I was prepared to put my head on the chopping block’ for the woman. 
This statement indicates the midwife was perhaps even prepared to do more 
that sacrifice her professional standing, but again, exactly what the content of 
the sacrifice would be remains unknown. The dialogue around the concept of 
risk and self-sacrifice culminated in the statement that appears in the final 
answer to the general question of what is love in midwifery. It is ‘doing what 
needs to be done’. 
 
The culmination of opinion around the type of relationships midwives develop 
with women gave rise to the view that love in midwifery requires the midwife to 
be both ‘with’ and ‘for’ the woman. More precisely, ‘for’ is related to ‘doing for’ 
or, as expressed by the group, doing what needs to be done but maintaining a 
balance between professional judgment and her innate ability to give birth. In 
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this context, doing ‘for’ requires the midwife to advocate on behalf of the woman 
who is unable to advocate for herself. It is an advocacy that is based on the 
professional expertise of the midwife, where he or she does what needs to be 
done, but in doing so, understands the risk involved and the selflessness 
required. In regard to the use of the term ‘with’, it was understood to mean 
‘being with’, or as expressed by the group, supporting the natural innate abilities 
of the woman to give birth. Together, these and the ideas above ended in the 
group understanding that, ‘love in midwifery is empowering the woman to do as 
much as she can for herself by being there with and for her, doing what needs 
to be done, maintaining a balance between professional judgment and respect 
for the woman including an understanding of her innate ability to give birth’. 
 
6.7  Commentary on the dialogue: 
The following commentary briefly identifies questions that were raised in the 
course of the dialogue but not answered, they included: 
 
6.7.1  Is love of midwifery a requisite for love in midwifery? 
During the course of the dialogue the midwives spoke at length about their 
ethos of midwifery and its effect on their practice and the relationships they 
have with women. Whilst it was not directly articulated, it seemed that the group 
was saying that if one was not committed and passionate about their profession 
they would not be able to engage in the selflessness required for love in 
midwifery. For example, is it possible for a midwife to approach the practice of 
midwifery as nothing more than a job for which she or he is paid and still 
engage in a relationship of love in midwifery? 
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6.7.2  What is the quality of the personal-professional sacrifice of a 
midwife? 
April, in sharing her example of love in midwifery, identified several defining 
moments in the example that showed she placed at risked both her personal 
and professional self for what she believed was for the ‘good’ of the woman. As 
April later went on to say, she was prepared to put her head on the chopping 
block for the woman, but nobody questioned the measure of her sacrifice nor 
did they question why she should do this. What was the motive for April 
adopting the responsibility for the woman’s birthing that enabled her to put the 
woman’s welfare before her own, and is the taking of such risks on the basis of 
an intuitive judgment acting responsibly? 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
The group understood the principles of April’s example of love in midwifery to 
be centered on a belief about woman-centered birthing and the associated 
personal and professional commitment required of a midwife if she or he is to 
advocate on behalf of the woman who, it was understood, cannot always 
advocate for herself. It requires a midwife to willingly place their self at both 
considerable personal and professional risk during the management of a birth 
that the woman desires and is able to achieve. The group understood that love 
in midwifery requires on the part of the midwife a willingness to place one’s self 
at both personal and professional risk and, what is more, a preparedness to put 
oneself second to the needs of the birthing woman which may require both a 
personal and professional sacrifice. A characteristic of love in midwifery is its 
selflessness. 
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Chapter 7:  Group 4: Report on a Socratic dialogue 
on the question of what is love in nursing 
and midwifery? (Australia) 
 
7.0  Introduction 
A notable feature of this Socratic dialogue was the diversity of the participant 
population in age, years of nursing and midwifery experience, areas of 
specialization, current work environments, and the personal belief systems of 
individuals and their ability to all share their thinking about the study question. 
As with previous dialogues, the question posed to the group was; ‘What is love 
in nursing and midwifery?’ 
 
In this dialogue, love in nursing and midwifery was understood to arise from the 
moral character of the nurse that enables the identification of the unique value 
of the person of the patient and so gives rise to the commitment that is required  
to respond to the destitute condition of the patient. In other words, the group 
understood that love in nursing and midwifery is present when the nurse-patient 
occasion elicits in the nurse a feeling of being deeply responsible for the 
patient’s welfare. It is a responsibility that causes the level of the nurse’s 
commitment to the patient to increase in response to perceived threats to the 
patient’s welfare, as is evidenced in the determination of the nurse to help. As 
such, the character of the responsibility that is felt by the nurse is something 
that cannot be transferred, shared or ignored. Furthermore, it is a responsibility 
that requires the nurse to place the welfare of the patient before his or her own. 
For these reasons love, in nursing and midwifery was understood to demand 
more than the simple performance of the professional duty of care. It requires 
the nurse to ‘go beyond’ the professional duty of care and enter a ‘special 
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reIationsh that is evidenced in the commitment and the compassion shown. 
The following is a description of the Socratic dialogue about these beliefs. 
 
7.1  The sample group: setting the scene 
Six participants made up group 4, which comprised one Registered Nurse 
(Division I ) who was endorsed on the Nurse’s Board of Victoria Register to 
practice midwifery, four Registered Nurses’ (Division I ) and one Registered 
Nurse (Division 2). All participants were currently practicing nursing and 
midwifery on either a full-time or part-time basis. The professional experience of 
the group was diverse and included acute medical and surgical nursing, high 
dependency and critical care, aged care, accident and emergency, child and 
adolescent nursing, and gynecology and midwifery. In addition, it also became 
clear that participants had recent or concurrent experience in palliative care, 
nursing administration, nursing education, operating room and day surgery, and 
mental health nursing. Furthermore, it was notable that the group possessed a 
variety of different beliefs about health, healing and the nurse’s role in the 
contemporary health care system. In addition, different as the individuals were, 
they were also similar in that all the participants expressed their commitment to 
developing an answer to the study question and its importance to the practice of 
nursing and midwifery in general. All participants were equally represented in 
the expression of thinking about the study question. All the participants were 
women. 
 
For this dialogue the participant sample was obtained by a random sampling 
technique. Invitations to participate in the study were sent to hospitals where 
Human Research Ethics Committee approval had been obtained or permission 
by hospital administration had been given. Each hospital circulated the 
invitations to all areas of their health service where Registered Nurses were 
employed. The area manager of each health service collected the responses to 
the invitation and returned them to the researcher. Each of the respondents was 
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then contacted by the researcher and provided with additional information about 
the study question that would enable them to make an informed decision about 
their participation in the study. Information provided to respondents included a 
‘Deakin University Ethics Committee Plain Language Statement’, as information 
sheet on ‘How Do I Participate In A Socratic Dialogue’, and general information 
about the conduct of the Socratic dialogue session. Lastly, respondents were 
contacted and asked for their decision about possible participation. While fifteen 
participants consented to participate, attrition throughout the recruitment 
process resulted in six participants undertaking the Socratic Dialogue session. 
 
The Socratic dialogue reported on here was undertaken at La Trobe University 
campus and was conducted in a room conducive to discussion. Light 
refreshments and a dinner were provided to assist with the creation of a relaxed 
environment favorable to serious thought on the topic. This Socratic dialogue 
was of three and a half hours duration plus time out for the short dinner and 
concluded with what participants considered was a well-articulated answer to 
the topic question. 
 
7.2  Dialogue question 
This Socratic Dialogue was on the question of ‘what is love in nursing and 
midwifery’. 
 
7.3  Phase 1: Dialogue example 
The dialogue commenced with participants offering an example from their 
practice of love in nursing and midwifery. The following six examples were 
presented: 
 
Sue: ‘I work in a nursing home and the only love many of the residents get is 
from us nurses. This particular example of love in nursing is related to an 
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elderly woman who I regularly care for. She has no family to visit her. She is 
very alert to her circumstances. She is obese and has a large leg ulcer that has 
a purulent discharge and must be dressed daily. The daily dressing of her 
wound is very painful and because it has been going on for some time she 
suffers from clinical depression. The dressing is complex to care for and takes 
considerable time to do and she often cries throughout the procedure. The 
procedure is very distressing for everyone. To make things worse, we have to 
use the lifting machine to transport her to the treatment room, which she finds 
most undignified. I have made a ‘connection’ with this lady. I have felt her pain 
and how depressed she gets with the whole thing. To make her feel better, I 
bring in a rose or butterfly type clip to uplift her. That is what I consider my love 
in nursing.’ 
 
Rita: ‘I was caring for a 63 year old man with a history of mental illness and 
now some dementia. At this particular time, he was on IV morphine and he 
pulled out the IV drip and broke the cannula. He had to go off to x-ray, where in 
the process of locating the cannula tip, they revealed he had lymphoma. This 
man had no family and no friends. We nurses were the only people he had 
around him and he had been with us for a long time. The decision by the 
medical and nursing team to tell him of his situation fell to me. I had to tell him 
that he was not going to be with us for much longer, to which he replied that, he 
knew something was wrong, and he cried. Then I asked him, is there anything 
you would like to do? We both cried. He said; yes, I’d like to go for a ride in a 
‘fast car’ and go to a ‘strip club’. While extremely difficult, we organized it and 
then escorted him. To me, my love in nursing was when I believed I had to tell 
him that he was going to die and I cried with him and against all the difficulties  
of organizing it, made his wish come true.’ 
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Jan: ‘I was caring for a lovely elderly man who was in the unit dying of end 
stage cardiac failure. The medical team had identified that there was nothing 
else they could do for him and that he would die soon. It was left to us nurses to 
prepare him for his certain death. In the unit, we normally don’t get to care for 
people in this way. They are usually transferred to the ward, but on this 
occasion we were not busy and he was kept with us. We became very tolerant 
of his every wish, and we listened actively about how he had lived his life. We 
listened over and over again to ever aspect of his life. But nothing was ever said 
about how he wanted to die, but over this time we became one-with-him. My 
love for him was shown in the tolerance of his constant need to talk about his 
life and my feeling one-with-him and sharing his suffering (Jan crying as she 
recalled this event). Even when they wanted to transfer him to the ward, we did 
all we could to keep him with us and he wanted to be with us also. We wanted 
to protect him and make sure every thing was done the right way. We wanted to 
comfort him.’ 
 
Pam: ‘I am somewhat ashamed of this story, but here goes. This night I was in 
charge of hospital admission and was contacted by the Ambo’s (Ambulance 
Offices) about admitting an elderly man who was found unconscious, and I 
agreed. We had a spare bed in a four-bed room and I thought that would be ok. 
On arrival this man was in an appalling state. He was unkempt, filthy, his 
clothes were stuck together with vomit, urine and faeces, his hair was matted, 
he had not had a wash for a very long time and he smelt terrible. The other men   
in the ward were all middleclass type people and I thought it was wrong to inflict 
him on them, so I felt bad for them too. I did not want to care for this man. The 
other nurse I was working with was very busy so I could not palm him off onto 
her and I suddenly realised, in amongst all my middleclass prejudice, that if I did 
not respond to his need for care, which was his right, he may not get the care 
he should. I had to make a transition from seeing him as he was to seeing his 
uniqueness. Love was overcoming my initial repulsion of him in his unkempt 
state, then go beyond that to see him as a unique person, not that which was 
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on show to society. I was able to extend myself by overcoming my repulsion of 
him and care for him as a unique person, which I believe, was my love as a 
nurse.’ 
 
Cristal:  ‘This particular day I was allocated the care of a 53 year old 
woman who had a history of repeated admissions related to alcohol abuse, 
drug abuse, and mental illness that included depression and personality 
disorder. On this occasion, she had taken an overdose of Diazepam and some 
type of antidepressant. The other nursing staff labelled her a ‘loser’ and, it was 
said to me that, if I could not care for her, they would get rid of her (discharge 
her). I couldn’t believe what I was hearing. Up until this time, I had great respect 
for these nurses and didn’t think they would say such a thing! I remember 
thinking to myself that I wanted to make a difference to this woman. I was 
determined to care for her in spite of the prejudice coming from my colleagues. 
So, besides all the prescribed care, I just sat and listened to her. I listened to 
her life story in between all the other patients and tasks I had to do. I just kept 
going back to her every moment I had and spent the time listening to her, made 
her coffee, held her hand, put my arms around her and held her close, and let 
her cry. I learnt about how she despised herself because of her life and 
problems and how she had tried to kill herself. We talked about what could be, 
so giving her hope. I believe I helped her try again to overcome some of her 
problems. She saw herself as a loser and we talked about that and the 
transition was amazing. On leaving, she just looked at me and at that moment 
something touched me deep inside and she held my hand and said thank you.’ 
 
Tam: ‘I was on the mid floor (midwifery ward) this night and a 40-year-old 
gravida 4 woman presented in labour with an unstable lie. It became obvious 
that she was a very nervous person and relied on her husband to cope and 
suffered poor self-esteem. She constantly asked the same questions over and 
over again while we were trying to organise her to go to theatre for a caesarean 
section. At this point, one of the midwifery staff grabbed me and said, we have 
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a problem, quick. She had ruptured her membranes and had a cord prolapse. 
We immediately went into emergency procedure mode and set about getting 
her to theatre while I tried to push the baby’s head back off the cord. Anyway, 
we got her up to theatre and she had a healthy normal baby. Because I had 
pushed back on the baby she connected with me, in that, I had played an 
intimate role in saving her baby. But later, when things had calmed down, she 
felt a loss of control and felt angry at what had happened to her. She wanted to 
blame everyone for the embarrassment of the way she was whisked to theatre 
and all the emergency activity that was associated with the birth. We spoke at 
length because she wanted me to fill in all the gaps with what had happened. 
We went over and over the sequence of events to help overcome her anger and 
make everything right, that she thought was wrong. Each night I spent between 
1-2 hours talking through her emotions. From her behaviour, I knew she was 
not going to have counselling or have any professional assistance for her 
problem and I just knew that I had to ‘take it on’. I felt an overwhelming 
responsibility to help this woman. 
 
With the completion of the offering of examples of love in nursing and 
midwifery, the group set about choosing the example they believed best 
captured their understanding of love in nursing and midwifery. To this end, the 
group settled on Cristal’s example because of the way she responded to the 
perceived hopelessness of the patient’s situation that was presented to her by 
both her colleagues and also the women. 
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7.4  Phase 2: Exploring the selected example 
As with each Socratic dialogue, the next stage required the group to explore the 
Cristal’s example in detail to the point where they could see themselves in the 
example. At the completion of phase 2, the example became everyone’s. 
 
7.4.1  The example: 
Cristal:  ‘This particular day I was allocated the care of a 53 year old 
woman who had a history of repeated admissions related to alcohol abuse, 
drug abuse, and mental illness that included depression and personality 
disorder. On this occasion, she had taken an overdose of Diazepam and some 
type of antidepressant. The other nursing staff labelled her a ‘loser’ and, it was 
said to me that, if I could not care for her, they would get rid of her (discharge 
her). I couldn’t believe what I was hearing. Up until this time, I had great respect 
for these nurses and didn’t think they would say such a thing! I remember 
thinking to myself that I wanted to make a difference to this woman. I was 
determined to care for her in spite of the prejudice coming from my colleagues. 
So, besides all the prescribed care, I just sat and listened to her. I listened to 
her life story in between all the other patients and tasks I had to do. I just kept 
going back to her every moment I had and spent the time listening to her, made 
her coffee, held her hand, put my arms around her and held her close, and let 
her cry. I learnt about how she despised herself because of her life and 
problems and how she had tried to kill herself. We talked about what could be, 
so giving her hope. I believe I helped her try again to overcome some of her 
problems. She saw herself as a loser and we talked about that and the 
transition was amazing. On leaving, she just looked at me and at that moment 
something touched me deep inside and she held my hand and said thank you.’ 
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7.4.2  Further details of the example: 
• ‘I was working in the Accident and Emergency Department’. 
• ‘She was a regular visitor to the hospital’. 
• ‘Her drug addiction had resulted in her losing touch with her family. She 
said she had no one close to her, and she was alone.’ 
• ‘People had given up on her and she had given up on herself’. 
• ‘It seemed the medical and nursing profession had also given up on her. 
She was in and out all the time with no one helping her get off the merry-
go- round.’ 
• ‘As she said, ‘she had nothing to live for’, and she described her living 
conditions as a pig sty’. 
• ‘She had tried rehabilitation programs such as ‘detox’ but dropped out’. 
• ‘On this day she had already received her initial treatments before I came 
along and started caring for her’. 
• ‘She was crying constantly, buzzing, and wanting attention’. 
• ‘The staff said she is an annoying lady, just comes in and wants attention’. 
• ‘I was told, ‘look, if she is too much for you, I will take her over and get 
rid of her’. I had respect for this nurse up to this point, but no more.’ 
• ‘I was shocked and disappointed at this response. This person used 
language to describe her and to get her out. They were angry at her.’ 
• ‘I was not prepared to hear this from this nurse’. 
• ‘This nurse was prepared to abandon her’. 
• ‘My response was very quick. I wanted to see what I could do. I did not 
want to abandon her like this nurse had. I saw it as a challenge, to make a 
difference to this woman.’ 
• ‘I believe we have a duty of care, despite the ‘state’ in which some people 
present’. 
• ‘I was very busy but in between my other patients and duties I kept going 
back to her and I always did what I said I would do for her, even if it was 
just making her a cup of coffee’. 
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• ‘Once I established a connectedness with her and sat down with her, she 
became willing to trust me and open up’. 
• ‘I let her know I was willing to listen to her and let her finish her story’. 
• ‘The other staff were looking at me and talking about me for giving her 
this time, and therefore it took some courage to continue, but in spite of 
the negative comments being made about my actions, which they showed 
by their body language, I continued.  But I never saw it as courage as the 
time just something I had to do.’ 
• ‘I was not going to palm her off and just ignore her’. 
• ‘But I do remember feeling very isolated and I did not have any peer 
support in all of it’. 
• ‘They didn’t talk to me afterwards but I felt talked about’. 
• ‘I felt victimized because of what I did’. 
• ‘Staff told me that after I have been here for some time I would become 
like them, but I never will’. 
 
7.5 Phase 3:  Exploring the question in the light of the example 
The group was very responsive to the question of ‘what is love in nursing and 
midwifery in the example offered’ and immediately replied with several answers 
to the question, which were then explored in more depth. 
 
Question: What is love in nursing and midwifery in the example? 
Answer 1: ‘She had the courage to go beyond her colleagues’ negative 
expectations in caring for this woman and beyond the duty of 
care’. 
Answer 2: ‘Accepting the person unconditionally, and was non-judgmental’. 
Answer 3: ‘Being determined to show compassion and not concerned with the 
consequences of her actions upon herself’. 
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Answer 4:  ‘Love is a willingness to connect, be open, sensitive and show 
understanding of the patient’s plight by giving hope’. 
Answer 5:  ‘The nurse was prepared to form and enter a ‘special’ relationship 
that was characterized by her feeling deeply responsible for the 
woman’. 
 
7.5.1  Answer 1:  She had the courage to go beyond her colleagues’ 
negative expectations in caring for this woman and beyond the duty  
of care. 
This answer was aimed at capturing the idea that this nurse placed the welfare 
of the woman before her own and this, it was concluded, took ‘courage’ 
because placing the others welfare before her own had a personal-professional 
cost which she was willing to bear. While it was understood that the 
professional code of ethics compels a nurse to act in a professional way, that is,   
a patient is able to expect that nursing staff will respect their need for health 
care and trust that nursing staff will act in their best interest, the example 
offered showed this was not the case. As one member of the group said, the 
woman was the recipient of prejudicial health care, or more particularly, while 
she was in receipt of nursing care that was aimed at meeting her immediate 
physiological health care needs, the prejudice shown her made it likely that her 
psychosocial needs would not be met. The group was of the opinion that, 
because the patient was labeled ‘a loser’, nursing staff willingly dismissed her 
care needs in favor of others they believed were more deserving. Specifically, 
the prejudicial attitudes of the nurses immediate to the situation resulted in an 
attitude that this patient was not deserving of their time and care. Evidence of 
this attitude was captured in the response of one nurse who said to Cristal ‘look,  
if she is too much for you I will take her over and get rid of her’. From this and 
other comments, Cristal believed her colleagues expected that she would share 
a similar view to them, and ‘tow the line, so to speak’, and when she did not, 
she too became a victim of their prejudice. As Cristal said, ‘I felt isolated. . . and 
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victimized’. To this the group concluded that Cristal also was the recipient of the 
nurses’ prejudice and it took ‘courage’ for her to act out her professional duty of 
care, let alone do what she did. 
 
But why was this an example of love in nursing? The group believed that this 
was an example of love in nursing because Cristal was able to place the 
welfare of the women first, which did not change when she began to experience 
the disapproval of her colleagues about her response to the needs of the 
woman. The group were of the opinion that in this clinical situation it would have 
been easy for Cristal to have bowed to the pressure of the group and so 
conform to the prevailing attitude. It was thought Cristal could have provided 
nursing care that met the woman’s needs at the minimal level and so met her 
professional duty of care but Cristal did more. She, according to the group, went 
‘…beyond the duty of care’ which they understood took ‘courage’. To place the 
welfare of the woman first, knowing the disapproval of her professional 
colleagues. 
 
What triggered the ‘courage’ in Cristal to take the action she did? Throughout 
the dialogue Cristal made comments such as, ‘my response was very quick’, ‘I 
didn’t really think about it’, ‘it just happened’, ‘I found myself just wanting to see 
what I could do’, ‘I saw it as a challenge, make a difference’ to this woman. The 
group believed that something deep inside Cristal caused her to respond to the 
hopelessness of the patient, a hopelessness that was expressed by both the 
patient herself and also the nursing staff. It was a hopelessness that had 
culminated in the patient trying to commit suicide, and a hopelessness that was 
identified by the nursing staff who were prepared to abandon her. As Cristal 
said, ‘she had given up on herself and nursing staff had given up on her too’. To 
this the group concluded that the content of the hopelessness was 
‘abandonment’. The patient had abandoned herself, as evidenced in her 
attempt to commit suicide and her disclosure about how she hated her life and 
 206
hated herself. Nursing staff had abandoned her in terms of improving her health 
situation, seeing any attempt to help her as a waste of time because, as Cristal 
explained, they had tried so many times before to help her without any success. 
Their abandonment was characterized by the label ‘looser’. However, Cristal’s 
identification of the hopelessness triggered not abandonment but the opposite. 
It triggered a commitment to the betterment of the patient’s condition and in 
doing was aimed at the restoration of hope. The group believed Cristal’s love in 
nursing was evidenced in the way she responded to the destitute woman, that 
is, she responded with the courage to commit herself to a course of nursing 
actions that would benefit the woman but knowingly cost her personal- 
professional self. It required her to commit herself to a course of action where 
the degree of self-sacrifice was not known and this required she ‘go beyond the 
duty of care’. To this end, the group understood that a quality of love in nursing  
is ‘commitment’, which can be interpreted by others as ‘courage’. It is to 
knowingly sacrifice one’s own self for the sake of another. However, as to the 
amount of say Cristal had in accepting or rejecting the commitment she felt 
toward the women, or the degree of sacrifice she would have made, was not 
discussed. 
 
7.5.2 Answer 2: Accepting the person unconditionally, and was non-                 
j udgemental. 
This answer followed immediately after the offering of the first answer and 
focused on Cristal’s identification of the sanctity of life and uniqueness of the 
other person without all its worldly encumbrances. As the participants 
commented, Cristal did not ‘label’ the person but rather accepted her for who 
and what she was. The group believed that Cristal was able see the person 
behind the label ‘patient’, a unique person, a person like any other, a person 
with a variety of personal problems that effected her health. To this end, the 
group agreed that, unlike the other nurses, Cristal showed love in nursing when 
she identified in the woman her uniqueness and value as a person per se that 
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other nurses could not and that this non-judgmental identification, and that 
uniqueness and value of this woman’s life and her destitute state resulted in 
Cristal being committed to nursing actions to better the patient’s condition. The 
group believed that, Cristal was able to identify in the woman what others could 
not, and that a quality of love in nursing is the ability to identify the unique value 
of the person and respond to their destitute condition. However, the idea of 
moral responsibility was not discussed. 
 
7.5.3  Answer 3: Being determined to show compassion and not 
concerned with the consequences of her actions upon herself. 
It was clear to the group that something happened between Cristal and the 
patient that resulted in Cristal being determined to show compassion toward the 
patient, and that this ‘something’ happened before they had time to form a 
relationship, or as Cristal said before they ‘established a connectedness’. Here 
the connection Cristal spoke of related to a reciprocal relationship, whereas, 
what the group had identified was the non-reciprocal relationship of Cristal to 
the women. As was shown in the answer above, it was Cristal’s identification of 
the value and uniqueness of the person of the patient that gave rise to her 
feeling committed to the betterment of the woman’s condition. To this, the group 
believed that commitment is a quality of love in nursing because commitment is 
what enabled Cristal to place the woman’s needs first, in that, Cristal’s first 
concern was with the welfare of the woman and not her own. However, the 
degree to which Cristal would have been able to sacrifice her own welfare for 
the woman’s remains, for the most part, unknown but for Cristal’s comment that 
she was determined to make a difference to the woman. The group thought this 
statement showed that she knowingly placed herself at odds with her 
colleagues about the care of the woman in spite of the effects it would have on 
her. Love in nursing is shown in this example by Cristal’s commitment to the 
woman that had no expectation of reciprocity. In fact, it was just the opposite. 
The quality of the commitment was such that it had Cristal place the welfare of 
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the other person before her own which did not change when the effects became 
known to her. 
 
Moreover, the ‘commitment’ she had to the woman was given expression in her 
‘being determined’. Here, ‘being determined’ explains Cristal’s unwavering 
commitment to the woman’s cause. As one participate pointed out, Cristal’s 
consciousness played little or no part in the establishment of her commitment. 
As Cristal said, ‘I didn’t really think about it’, ‘it just happened’, ‘I found myself 
just wanting to see what I could do’ for this woman. As Jan (a participant) 
pointed out, Cristal only became aware of her commitment to the woman after it 
was already made, which was evidenced in Cristal’s later comment ‘I remember 
thinking to myself that I wanted to make a difference’ to this woman. The group 
thought that Cristal’s ‘unconscious’ commitment to the woman’s welfare was a 
quality of love in nursing. 
 
In addition, the group repeatedly raised the issue of Cristal not being concerned 
with the consequences of her stand upon herself. It was obvious that they 
thought that Cristal’s actions were admirable and that such selfless action on 
the part of any nurse is to be praised. However, what the group particularly 
noted was that, while Cristal’s commitment to the woman arose from her 
unconsciousness, when she eventually became conscious of how she felt 
toward the woman and the possible consequences to herself, she remained 
unwavering in her commitment. In addition, as she began to experience the 
negative consequences of her action, her commitment took the form of being 
‘determined’. However, no further discussion was had about the concept of 
‘determination’ and its relationship to love in nursing. 
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7.5.4  Answer 4: Love is a willingness to connect, be open, sensitive and 
show understanding of the patient’s plight by giving hope. 
There was little dialogue around answer four except to say that it continued to 
support the groups’ general thinking about the specific example. The theme of 
this part of the dialogue was on the idea that love made it possible for Cristal to 
hear the call of the destitute woman. Here the group focused on Cristal’s good 
character as the means for identifying the destitute condition of the woman and 
did not speak about the woman’s call on Cristal, identifying Cristal’s moral 
character as making it possible for her to identify the destitute nature of the 
woman’s condition, which she could not ignore. The group believed that it was 
Cristal’s moral character that enabled her to be ‘open and listen’ and to respond  
to the woman. However, nothing further was added to the idea that love is a 
‘willingness’ to connect, to be open, sensitive and show understanding and give 
hope. Likewise, there was no meaningful discussion about the idea that to be 
open, listen and give hope required a certain moral character, one that allowed 
Cristal to be ‘non judgmental and allowed her to listen to the woman’. Rather 
the group, without discussion, accepted the idea that ‘hope’ is the remedy of 
hopelessness and Cristal’s moral character made it possible for her to identify 
the destitute nature of the woman’s condition and so give hope. Cristal 
understood that her love in nursing was evidenced in the way she gave the 
hope. ‘Love was to give her hope’ and ‘I responded with hope the way I did and 
this is what made this love in nursing’. Hence, love in nursing in this example is 
where Cristal’s good character enabled her to respond to the destitute woman 
by way of a ‘willingness to connect, be open, sensitive and show understanding  
of the patient’s plight by giving hope’. 
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7.5.5  Answer 5: The nurse was prepared to form and enter a ‘special’ 
relationship that was characterised by her feeling deeply 
responsible for the woman. 
Answer five arose from the group’s dialogue about the previous answers and 
represented a natural progression of their thinking. This said, in offering this 
answer the group understood the term ‘prepared’ was related to Cristal’s 
‘willingness’ to respond to the destitute woman and to risk her own wellbeing. It 
was linked to the idea that it was the moral state of her being that had her 
obligated to the woman. It was as though being ‘prepared’ meant she 
possessed a moral state of being ‘ready-at-hand to the other person as a nurse 
and, what is more, being ‘prepared’ also meant she had no say in it, which was 
evidenced in her comment that it was not something that she thought about, it 
just happened. 
 
Clearly the group had identified the thought that this was not an ordinary type of 
nurse-patient relationship. It was more because it was a ‘special relationship’. 
However, at this point in the dialogue what the group understood the phrase ‘a 
special relationship’ to mean remained largely unknown except to say that they 
saw the moral character of Cristal’s relationship to the woman central to what 
made this relationship ‘special’. Thus, Cristal’s concern was for the woman as a 
first priority and not for herself, which the group believed was a characteristic 
that is not ordinary to every nurse-patient relationship. Furthermore, the term 
‘special’ acts as a marker for ‘exceptional’, in that, the relationship required 
Cristal to go ‘beyond the duty of care’ which is more than can be ordinarily or 
professionally asked of any nurse or midwife. 
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The group was clear that what made this relationship ‘special’ was the fact that 
Cristal felt ‘deeply responsible’ for this woman. Here the term ‘deeply’ was used 
to communicate the thought that the responsibility was moral. As the group 
said, it was a responsibility that was tied to who she was as a person, and that it 
required she take action to assist the woman. What is more, the group also 
identified a second element to the responsibility, which was that, as the clinical 
situation unfolded and Cristal became cognizant of her colleagues’ 
abandonment of the woman, her responsibility became known to her. As Cristal 
told the group, her knowledge of her colleagues’ abandonment of the woman 
made her fearful for the woman’s welfare. Cristal’s fear was related to the fact 
that she believed that it was very likely the woman would not obtain the care 
she needed or was entitled to. Therefore, if she did not advocate on behalf of 
the woman, the woman’s welfare would be compromised. Knowing this, Cristal’s 
responsibility for the woman took on the characteristic of being ‘determined to 
show compassion’, a compassion that was rooted in her feeling ‘deeply 
responsibility for the woman’, a responsibility the group understood was her 
responsibility because it was tied to who she was as a fellow human being and 
then later a professional nurse. The responsibility inherent in the clinical 
situation was a responsibility that was Cristal’s, and Cristal’s alone, a 
responsibility that could not be transferred, shared or ignored. As Cristal came 
to realize, she was alone in her responsibility for the woman because it was her 
responsibility, which she said did not worry her, but the others’ prejudice did. 
 
7.6  Phase 4: The general question 
This phase of the Socratic dialogue requires broadening the question from the 
specific example that was provided to the general question ‘what is love in 
nursing and midwifery?’ The content of phase four was the culmination of the 
groups thinking about the specific example and its relationship to nursing and 
midwifery in general. 
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Question:  What is love in nursing and midwifery? 
Answer:  ‘Love in nursing and midwifery is when the nurse is prepared to 
form and enter a special relationship that is characterised by 
feeling deeply responsible for a person and demonstrates 
compassion, and is beyond what is normally expected’. 
 
Dialogue commenced around the idea that love in nursing and midwifery 
requires, on the part of the nurse, the ‘taking on a responsibility’, or more 
specifically, being responsible for your responsibility. Here the group was 
speaking about the moral responsibility of the nurse to the patient. As one 
participant said ‘it is where you feel deeply for them and their wellbeing, you feel 
a responsibility for them, a responsibility for that person and their entire family 
unit’. To be clear, what the group was speaking about was not the responsibility 
inherent in a nurse’s professional duty of care but the moral responsibility of the 
person of the nurse to another. The act of ‘taking on’ a responsibility was not 
about a ‘choice’. The group did not speak about it as though a nurse has a 
choice in whether they either accept of reject the responsibility, but rather, the 
impression given was that the ‘taking on’ related to the idea that the 
responsibility was already present and now it was more a matter of what the 
nurse does with the responsibility of the other person. This idea harked back to 
the groups’ earlier thinking about the concept of responsibility, where they 
spoke of the nurse being ‘determined’, the nurse being ‘prepared’ and the nurse 
having the ‘courage’ to act for the betterment of the patient as a first priority. 
However, as one participant said, ‘love can be simple, don’t have to be a huge 
sacrifice. . . ‘ It was at this point the group added the proviso that, while ‘courage’ 
may be required in being responsible, it is not always necessary for an act of 
love in nursing to occur. In summarizing their thinking to date, the group 
believed that ‘responsibility’ is a prerequisite for the ‘special relationship of love 
and caring in nursing’. As was stated, ‘it is that special thing that happens 
because you love and care’ and is something that can only be achieved by a ‘... 
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nurse who is prepared to accept people unconditionally, and does not judge 
others’. While there was no further discussion of these concluding remarks, it is 
noteworthy that the group in formulating their answer to the question what is 
love in nursing and midwifery, understood it to be the ‘special relationship’ they 
have with their patients. As one participant stated, it is a ‘special relationship’ 
that is characterized by both ‘love’ and ‘caring’. Given there was no discussion  
on this point, all that can be said is that the group understood that love in 
nursing is something that is qualitatively different to caring in nursing. What is 
more, love is a motivational force that is able to overcome a nurse’s own needs 
as a first priority that a caring cannot. 
 
In reposing the question of what is love in nursing and midwifery in general, the 
group replied by continuing to summarize their thinking to this point in the 
dialogue. Participants all agreed that the health care system provides nurses 
with the unique opportunity to witness people in various situations of need that 
require a response, in that, the profession of nursing provides nurses with the 
occasion for identification of the destitute condition of the patient. More 
specifically, love in nursing is said to be present when the nurse-patient 
occasion elicits in the nurse a feeling of being deeply responsible for the 
patient’s welfare, to the point where if called on the nurse is able to place the 
welfare of the patient before their own, because the nurse is morally committed  
to the welfare of patient without reciprocity. Moreover, the commitment of the 
nurse to the patient increases with adversity because love in nursing requires 
more than the simple performance of the professional duty of care. It requires 
the nurse to ‘go beyond’ the professional duty of care and enter a ‘special 
relationship’ that is characterized by the nurse feeling deeply responsible for the 
patient as is evidenced in the compassion shown. 
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7.7  Commentary on the dialogue: 
The following commentary briefly identifies questions that were raised in the 
course of the dialogue but not answered. They included: 
 
7.7.1  What is the relationship of commitment to responsibility and 
rational choice? 
In the specific example of love in nursing and midwifery, Cristal was adamant 
that she had no say in the commitment that she felt for the woman, which was 
partly evidenced in her statements ‘I didn’t really think about it’, and ‘it just 
happened’. This and other brief comments made by the group suggest that 
Cristal was committed to the benefit of the woman before she was conscious of 
this knowledge. What is more, when she became conscious of how she felt 
toward the welfare of the woman, which was in opposition to her colleagues, 
her commitment did not change. She was not concerned for herself as a first 
priority, which was demonstrated in the fact that when she became aware of her 
colleagues prejudice toward the woman and the associated negative 
consequences of her peers disapproval of her action, her commitment did not 
weaken, but in fact it increased, as can be seen in, ‘it made me more 
determined to make a difference’ to the woman. 
 
Thus, without saying it, it seemed that the group believed commitment has two 
forms, that which arises from deep within a person and is linked to the idea of 
responsibility and initiation of actions before their conscious consideration, and 
the commitment that is known and subject to rational thought. In this clinical 
example, Cristal’s rationalization of the situation had her increase her 
commitment to the welfare of the woman, which overrode her own needs as a 
first priority as was evidenced in the selflessness that she demonstrated. While 
the full extent to Cristal’s selflessness remains largely unknown, it went beyond 
common friendship, collegiality and the professional duty of care. Thus, is it the 
case that, in human relations, commitment and responsibility are able to reorder 
 215
a person’s priorities from a motive of selfishness to selflessness? Is it also the 
case that commitment and responsibility changes the principle base from which   
a person rationalizes? What is more, ‘courage’, as a trait of commitment, 
appears to be something that is identified by others and not the person 
themselves. It acts as a signal to others of the personal risk associated with 
their commitment. 
 
7.7.2 How can one person respond in a moral way to the destitute state  
of a patient and others not? 
It was generally thought that Cristal responded to the needs of the woman 
where others were prepared to abandon her. However, the dialogue on this 
point was related largely to the conscious decision-making that went on 
between the nurses about the woman’s health care. The group did not explore 
the notion of the human response to the destitute other, not why this nurse 
responded and not other nurses or indeed all the nurses. 
 
7.7.3 What is the character of the ‘special relationship’ that is described  
as love? 
At the end of the dialogue the group, in formulating their answer to the general 
question, introduced the idea that the relationship of love in nursing is ‘special’, 
in that, ‘it is that special thing that happens because you love and care’, and ‘it 
is a special relationship’. However, no specific discussion was had about the 
character of the ‘special relationship’ except to say that it appeared to be used 
to capture the idea that the relationship of love in nursing is something out of 
the ordinary, because it causes the nurse to ‘go beyond the duty of care’. It 
seemed that the term ‘special’ acts as a flag to highlight the fact that love in 
nursing is different to care in nursing because love requires more than the 
everyday performance of the duty of care. 
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7.7.4  What is the content of the ‘beyond’ of the duty of care? 
It was clear that the group believed that love in nursing and midwifery requires a 
nurse to ‘go beyond the duty of care’. While not discussed as an item in itself, 
the group identified courage, compassion and selflessness as three traits 
required of a nurse in order for them to go ‘beyond’ the duty of care. However, 
as to what was meant by each term, this was not discussed in any detail except 
to say that the term ‘courage’ appeared to be related to the idea that actions of 
love in nursing involve a ‘risk’ to the personal self of the nurse. 
 
7.7.4 What is the difference between love in nursing and care in nursing?  
It was clear from the group that love and care in nursing are different. The 
group was also observed to use the terms care and caring in two ways. The 
term care was used in relation to the ‘doing’ of nursing, such as, a ‘care plan’ 
directing nursing action, whereas the term caring was used to describe the 
emotional relatedness of the nurse to the patient. However, in this specific 
example, the nurse’s caring appeared to be motivated by more than some form 
of emotional relatedness, because the group understood that the clinical 
situation caused this nurse to place the welfare of the patient before her own. 
The motivation to act in this way is what the group called love in nursing, 
because love in nursing appears to arise from a moral foundation of one person 
being for the other person before they are for themselves. However, while the 
group was adamant that caring in nursing is different to love in nursing, they did 
not engage in any significant dialogue about the specific differences. 
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7.8  Conclusion 
In this Socratic dialogue, love in nursing was understood to arise from the moral 
character of the nurse. It enables the identification of the unique value of the 
person of the patient which gives rise to the commitment needed to respond to 
the patient’s destitute condition. Thus, love in nursing is said to be present when 
the nurse-patient occasion elicits in the nurse a feeling of being deeply 
responsible for the patient’s welfare. It is a responsibility that causes the level of 
the nurse’s commitment to the patient to increase in response to perceived 
threats to the patient’s welfare, as is evidenced in the determination of the nurse  
to help. The character of the responsibility that is felt by the nurse is such that it 
cannot be transferred, shared or ignored. Moreover, it is a responsibility that 
requires the nurse to place the welfare of the patient before his or her own. 
Hence love in nursing requires more than the simple performance of the 
professional duty of care because it requires the nurse to ‘go beyond’ the 
professional duty of care and enter a ‘special relationship’ that is evidenced in 
the commitment and the compassion shown. 
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Chapter 8:  Group 5: Report on a Neo-Socratic 
dialogue on the question of what is love  
in Nursing? (Singapore) 
 
8.0 Introduction 
Exploration of the study question has centered, up to this point, on the 
perspectives of nurses and midwives who work in the modern western styled 
health system of Australia. What the researcher had not done was obtain a 
sample of the views of nurses and midwives from countries other than Australia. 
This Neo-Socratic Dialogue is a report of twelve Registered Nurses who live in 
Singapore and work in the Singaporean health care system and their answers 
to the question what is love in nursing? 
 
8.1  The sample group: setting the scene 
This Neo-Socratic Dialogue took place in Singapore. As a result of the invitation 
to participate in the study, twelve (12) Registered Nurses agreed. At the 
commencement of the dialogue, when identifying themselves, the first few 
participants made reference to their religious belief system and this was a 
pattern the rest of the group followed. There were three Muslim, three Buddhist, 
four Christian, and two participants who described themselves as non religious. 
What is more, the participants also spoke about their education in their 
introduction to the rest of the group; one participant had attended pre-university 
education in the United States of America, one in Hong Kong, one in Singapore, 
two in Malaysia, and seven in China. Furthermore, the group described 
Singapore as a culturally diverse country and referred to themselves in the 
following way, one said she was Singaporean/Singaporean, three identified 
themselves as Malaysian/Singaporean, and eight said they were 
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Chinese/Singaporean. While the clinical experience of the participants varied 
they all worked full time as Registered Nurses in clinical practice in the 
Singaporean health care system. One participant was employed as a  
psychiatric nurse working in an inpatient acute psychiatric ward, two worked in 
theatre and recovery room, one in accident and emergency, one in pediatrics, 
two in an intensive care unit, three in the general medical and surgical wards of 
hospitals, and two in community clinics. 
 
The Neo-Socratic Dialogue reported on here was undertaken at the Singapore 
Nurses Association in Singapore and lasted 4 hours. The first 30 minutes were 
taken up with an explanation of the conduct of a Neo-Socratic Dialogue and the 
importance of the example to be offered being an example of love in nursing as 
has been practiced by them. The conduct of the dialogue was made easy by  
the fact that the group used the available time efficiently staying on-task all of 
the time. The more difficult part of the dialogue was having participants 
volunteer their examples and talk about themselves. The outcome saw five 
examples offered. 
 
8.2  Dialogue question 
Because there were no midwives in the group the question posed was ‘what is 
love in nursing?’ 
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8.3  Phase 1: Dialogue example 
The question put to the group was, what is love in nursing in Singapore? 
Five examples were volunteered: 
 
Pricilla: ‘I work in a Community Clinic. One day an old single lady of 72 
years of age visited my outpatient’s clinic needing medication but she had no 
money to buy it. She told me that she had no money for the medication or for 
food. She was dirty and frail and not in good physical health. I felt for this 
women and it was important for her health that she had her medication, so 
much so that I was going to buy the medications for her myself. I accompanied 
her to the pharmacy to get the medications and when I went to pay the 
Pharmacist said that if I sign a waiver form and then got the authorization 
section on the form signed by my superior she could have the medications free 
of charge. Given the Pharmacy was soon to the close for the evening and my 
superior had left work, he gave me the medications because I promised to get 
the authorization and return the form to him tomorrow. This was unusual but 
accepted. The next day when I went to the nurse manager to get authorization 
she was very angry with me for what I had done because procedure was not 
followed. While I was upset by her outburst and knowing this could go against 
me, it was more important that the lady got her medications and her health and 
living conditions were organized.’ 
 
Hong Fang: ‘On my pediatric ward one evening, an Indian child was crying for    
a long time. I (Chinese/Singaporean) responded by changing the child, singing 
to the child, carrying the child around while I did my other work, cuddling the 
child and patting and talking to the child. The child stropped crying. The family 
was initially untrusting of the nursing staff (they were Indian/Singaporean and 
we nurses were all Chinese/Singaporean), but when they could not stop the 
child from crying and I was successful they were most grateful and respectful. 
The parents, after this, felt we nurses could manage the child and they could 
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leave and go home. Given differences in cultures, this was an example of how 
love can cross the barriers between peoples.’ 
 
Jamaliah: ‘A young unmarried women who was pregnant with twins had 
difficulties in her relationships and was booked into theatre for a termination of 
the pregnancy. I was called to this theatre to attend her. On noting her situation 
I talked to her about her problems and how they may be able to be solved in 
other ways and recommended some solutions, like the help that was available 
to her. She was very worried and I held her hand all the time. We spoke for only 
about 15 minutes. It didn’t seem that long before she was to have the operation. 
Just before she was to go in to have the operation she changed her mind. She 
wanted to consider her situation further. I didn’t think that I did much, but we 
seemed to connect and straight away talked about what was really important to 
her. Staff wondered what I said that made her change her mind. It was obvious 
that they did not approve but nothing was said to me about that.’ 
 
Sam: ‘I was in the operating room and I was very busy with the needs of my 
room. Another nurse came to me for help because she could not communicate 
with a woman in her operating room and I could speak the language, so I could 
not refuse her request. I agreed to go to this woman and speak with her. She 
was shaking, her voice was trembling, and she was very, very frightened. I 
stayed with her and reassured her. I went and got blankets for her which no one 
had bothered to do (she was freezing). She was extremely grateful and wanted 
me to stay. Even though I had so much to do and people waiting on me I could 
not leave this woman I had to stay with her.’ 
 222
Chinhula: ‘A women who was intubated and could not talk and was 
considered a difficult patient, what we nurse’s routinely called a FON (full of 
nonsense) patient. No nurse wanted to look after her. I was assigned to her for 
this shift and I took the time to communicate with her through writing and finding 
out what her needs were. I was able to tell from her writing how frightened she 
was and so responded to her. I spent a lot of time with her even though I had a 
lot of other work to do. The reward for me was the smiles on her face and later 
the less call bells.’ 
 
At this point it was obvious that the remaining participants were to shy to offer 
an example in public and therefore we moved to the next stage of the dialogue. 
The aim was to encourage interaction from those who had not offered 
examples. This said participants were quick to come to agreement on which 
example they preferred, it was Pricilla’s. The group believed ‘it was the best 
example because of how Pricilla responded to the old woman’. 
 
8.4  Phase 2: Exploring the selected example 
The group was asked to speak with Pricilla about the example and obtain 
information that would enable them to think of the example as their own. 
 
8.4.1  The example: 
Pricilla: ‘I work in a Community Clinic. One day an old single lady of 72 
years of age visited my outpatient’s clinic needing medication but she had no 
money to buy it. She told me that she had no money for the medication or for 
food. She was dirty and frail and not in good physical health. I felt for this 
women and it was important for her health that she had her medication, so 
much so that I was going to buy the medications for her myself. I accompanied 
her to the pharmacy to get the medications and when I went to pay the 
Pharmacist said that if I sign a waiver form and then got the authorization 
section on the form signed by my superior she could have the medications free 
 223
of charge. Given the Pharmacy was soon to close for the evening and my 
superior had already left work, he gave me the medications because I promised 
to get the authorization and return the form to him the next day. This was 
unusual. The next day when I went to the nurse manager to get authorization 
she was very angry with me for what I had done because policy and procedure 
was not followed. While I was upset by her outburst and knowing this could 
go against me, it was more important that the lady got her medications and her 
health and living conditions were organized.’ 
 
8.4.2 Further details of the example: 
Pricilla provided the following additional information about her example: 
• ‘I have worked for a long time in community nursing’. 
• ‘We have a lot of poor people in our clinic area’. 
• ‘She was very old, frail, dirty and in poor physical health’. 
• ‘She said that she was not well’. 
• ‘She didn’t know what she was going to do’. 
• ‘She had no family she was alone’. 
• ‘I gave her some money to get a taxi home from the clinic which was 
about 15 minute’s way’. 
• ‘My nurse manager was very angry with me and reprimanded me for 
my actions. She left me thinking that this was going to count against 
me in the future if I was to apply for a promotion. I was very upset by 
her response but I knew what I did was right and I would do it again if I 
needed to.’ 
• ‘The nurse manager eventually authorized the form for the free 
medications and I returned it to the pharmacist as I promised I would’. 
• ‘The manager made me go to the woman’s flat in my lunch break to get 
her to also authorize the form that we did not have the night before, 
which did not bother me, in fact I was very happy with that because I 
wanted to see the woman again to make sure she was ok. I was going to 
go and see her 
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anyway.’ 
• ‘While in her one room flat I saw it was nearly empty of furniture, it 
was unclean, and there was only a little bit of food that was old and 
semi- spoiled’. 
• ‘She would just take a little bit of food out of the refrigerator at a time 
and eat it each day’. 
• ‘She had no money and could not get a job to buy her medications 
which were expensive’. 
• ‘She went to her former employer and begged him for a job but he 
refused’. 
• ‘After work I collected donations from other nurses to buy her some 
food’. 
• ‘I went to her flat again and filled her cupboards with the food and gave 
her some money for other things she might need to buy’. 
• ‘I helped the woman apply for social work support and tried to get her 
application considered quickly’. 
• ‘I did all this in my own time’. 
• ‘All I wanted to do was help this woman. I was worried about her, not 
about myself, not at any time. I just knew I had to help her.’ 
 
8.5  Phase 3: Exploring the question in the light of the example 
Next, the question, ‘What is love in nursing in the example that Pricilla offered?’ 
was put to the group. Three answers to the question were obtained and are 
listed below. 
 
Question:  ‘What is love in nursing in the example?’ 
Answer 1:  ‘Going the extra mile, putting the women before her self’. 
Answer 2:  ‘It is responding to the helplessness of the women’. 
Answer 3:  ‘There is no expectation of a reward’. 
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8.5.1  Answer 1: Going the extra mile, putting the women before her self 
The person who offered this answer ‘going the extra mile … ‘ immediately went 
on to explain what she meant by the phrase to the rest of the group who then 
agreed with her answer. From the start the group were committed to the idea 
that Pricilla did more than is normally expected of a nurse in Singapore and that 
this was ‘special’. As they explained, it is very unusual, in fact, rare for a nurse 
in Singapore to behave in this way. 
 
While Pricilla may have simply responded in a professional way and within the 
confines of her role as a community nurse by providing the health care services    
of the clinic, she did more because responding to the helplessness of the 
woman required a different response. It required a deep personal-professional 
response. ‘Going the extra mile’ was understood to explain the idea that Pricilla 
as a community nurse exceeded the Singaporean expectation of duty and role. 
‘Going the extra mile’, also described the fact that Pricilla was prepared to do 
what ever she needed to do in order to overcome the woman’s helplessness. 
However, the extent of how far Pricilla would have gone was not able to be 
tested in the example offered. What the group identified was that Pricilla went 
as far as she thought was required to overcome the threat to the woman’s life, 
no more and no less. As the group stated, Pricilla went the extra mile which was 
evidenced in the things that she did, sacrificing her lunch break, collecting 
donations of money to buy the woman food and other items in her own time, 
and risking her professional credibility and standing by arranging the 
prescription of medications for which she was not authorized, and the devotion 
expressed in her statement ‘that she had to do whatever she could to help this 
woman’. The group understood this to mean that love in this example was 
demonstrated by Pricilla ‘going the extra mile’, a response to a motivation that 
was triggered from deep within her. At this point, the final word was left to 
Pricilla who said that ‘I was simply doing what I had to do to help the lady’. 
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The second part to this answer was ‘putting the woman before herself’ which is 
exemplified, in part, by Pricilla’s, above concluding remark, where she says, ‘I 
was simply doing what I had to do to help this lady’. Unfortunately no dialogue 
was had that directly related to this statement or the idea that she ‘had’ to 
respond in that there was no choice about to respond or not. Rather, the group 
focused on the second part of the first answer, ‘putting the woman before 
herself’, which they believed required sacrifice on the part of Pricilla, in that, 
they said that Pricilla ‘gave up’, which they later changed to, ‘sacrificed’, her 
lunch break, her own money, her own time, and her own wellbeing (in risking 
her professional standing and future opportunities for promotion). Notably, the 
group said that this ‘giving up’ or ‘sacrifice’ was not identified by Pricilla as such 
because, they said, ‘that is our perspective as outsiders looking on and giving it    
a label’. Rather, the group thought Pricilla’s response to the woman was in fact 
an opportunity, ‘she saw it as an opportunity’, ‘she was willing’, and ‘it was not 
difficult it just happened’. ‘There was no expectation of a reward’, and ‘it never 
crossed my mind that there would be any repercussions’, which they thought 
was just the opposite to ‘giving up’ or ‘sacrifice’ because she was not giving up 
anything she could identify for ‘it never crossed her mind’. These ideas 
expressed the thought that ‘something inside her’ (Pricilla), responded to the 
woman which was something that enabled Pricilla to put the woman before her 
self as something she wanted to do. However, the group had no idea as to what 
this ‘something’ might be and so moved on to the second answer to the 
question which was an answer that was offered almost at the same time as the 
first answer. 
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8.5.2  Answer 2: It is responding to the helplessness of the woman. 
Questioning Pricilla further about the example the group honed in on the idea 
that when this woman fronted her at the clinic for help, Pricilla immediately 
identified in the woman her need for help, not help for a medical problem, but 
help to overcome a perceived helplessness. The group struggled with this idea 
because they thought that the helplessness Pricilla saw was the result of a 
conscious assessment when what had actually happened was at the level of 
Pricilla’s subconscious. Pricilla subconsciously identified the destitute woman’s 
life as important and at risk. As Pricilla said, ‘while on the surface she appeared  
to have a life of no value her life was valuable, she was someone’s daughter, 
mother, sister and perhaps wife’. It was felt that while the professional duty of 
the nurse may have centered on providing the professional services of the clinic  
to meet the woman’s health needs, overcoming her helplessness required more 
because it required responding to what the group called ‘all of the woman’. The 
phrase ‘all of the woman’ was used to identify her personal being. As Pricilla 
went on to say, ‘thinking back on it now I found myself just doing what I had to 
do to help this woman, it wasn’t something that I thought about’. The group 
believed the identification of the woman’s helplessness which was not 
something Pricilla was consciously knowledgeable of motivated her to respond  
by doing whatever was needed, routine or otherwise, to overcome the threat to 
this woman. It was thought that Pricilla’s response was a response of who she 
was as a person who was also a community nurse. Pricilla understood what 
was needed to restore the wellbeing of the woman which also included actions 
to restore her health. Responding to the health care needs of the woman was 
simply one of the means by which Pricilla was trying to ameliorate the threat to 
the well-being of the woman. Finally, the group concluded that the ‘things’ 
Pricilla did were examples of the physical manifestation of love that show this 
example to be an example of love in nursing. Love, they said, was not 
contained in the things Pricilla did, which were also more than her professional 
duty or role obligations required, but the reason she did them. 
 228
8.5.3  Answer 3: There is no expectation of a reward. 
The group said that there was no expectation of a personal reward because 
Pricilla willingly ‘gave up’ or ‘sacrificed’ her lunch break, her own money, her 
time outside work, and risked her professional credibility with her nurse 
manager. To this, Pricilla and others followed with dialogue that made it clear 
that she did not see this as a sacrifice. In fact, Pricilla said that was the groups 
words and not hers. Using her lunch break, giving the woman some of her own 
money for a taxi, collecting donations in her own time, buying her food and 
other things and stocking up her cupboards were things she was happy to do. 
As Pricilla explained, if there was a reward to be had it probably was received 
by her being able to do what she desired to do which was to help this woman. It 
was concluded that while Pricilla may have obtained some personal satisfaction 
from doing what she did for the woman, it was not a reward in the sense that it 
was the motivation. The group believed that what motivated Pricilla to help the 
woman was the identification of her helplessness not this as an opportunity for 
personal gain. If there was a personal gain this was incidental because the 
woman’s self-project was Pricilla’s first priority. It was thought that Pricilla had 
‘gone beyond herself’. In this they meant that she was not concerned with 
herself as her first priority and this is what enabled her to disregard her own self 
and risk her own well-being for the sake of the woman. In this example there 
was no expectation of a reward because Pricilla was focused on the woman as 
her first priority and not on herself or what she could gain from the situation. But 
as to what enabled Pricilla to move her motivation from a concentration on her 
own self-project to that of the woman’s was not able to be answered. 
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8.6  Phase 4: The general question 
This phase of the Neo-Socratic dialogue requires broadening of the question 
from the specific example of love in nursing to the general. The group was 
asked that, if what has been identified in the example is love, then what is love 
in nursing in general? 
 
Question:  What is love in nursing? 
Answer:  Love in nursing is a self sacrificing intuitive act of responding to 
the helplessness of a fellow human being without expectation of 
self gain. 
 
The group were quick to seize on the ideas that had already been identified in 
Pricilla’s specific example of love in nursing. The answer to this general 
question of what is love in nursing started with one participant saying ‘love in 
nursing is an act that helps a person go all the way, go beyond themself and 
respond intuitively to the helplessness of not only one, but to everybody, in 
order to promote their well-being.’ It was at this point that further discussion was 
had around the idea of going beyond oneself. By this they meant going beyond 
one’s normal everyday self, a self concerned with only its priorities. Pricilla’s 
example was important to the group, as they repeatedly said, it was an example  
of nursing that did not happen often in Singapore, because people in Singapore 
are on the whole self centered and tend to be only concerned with their own 
needs and do not normally do things for no gain. The idea of being able to go 
beyond self interest was seen as a highly desirable nursing attribute because 
the group thought that not all nurses could do this, meaning not every nurse is 
able to enact an expression of love in nursing. Accordingly, love in nursing is 
not something that is able to be controlled by conscious thought, nor is it 
something that every nurse is able to express. 
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Following this theme, the group added that ‘love requires commitment and 
sacrifice to enable a nurse to go the extra mile.’ Rather than ‘sacrifice’, it would 
have been more descriptive to have stayed with the first term they identified, 
‘giving up’, which more accurately captured what they meant. Sacrifice indicates 
something lost whereas ‘giving up’ indicates that it was something the nurse 
desired. To freely give up something that is a priority for their own self is not 
seen as difficult, because their priority has shifted from a concern about them to   
a concern for the patient. Summarizing these ideas, participants said ‘love is 
responding to the helplessness of another person. It is putting the other person 
before oneself without any consideration of a benefit’. 
 
Throughout this dialogue the group struggled with the idea of how a nurse is 
able to subconsciously identify the helplessness of a patient. In the process of 
formulating an answer to this question they incorporated, for the first time, the 
word ‘intuitively’, which they believed, best explains the subconscious act of 
identifying the helplessness of a patient. Their final answer to the general 
question of what is love in nursing was ‘love in nursing is a self sacrificing 
intuitive act of responding to the helplessness of a fellow human being without 
expectation of self gain’. 
 
8.7  Commentary on the dialogue: 
This section provides a brief commentary on the dialogue and makes clear the 
questions that arose in the course of the dialogue that were unable to be 
explored. They included: 
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8.7.1  What is the limit on going the extra mile? 
From the example it seems that this nurse went as far as she identified was 
needed and did not appear to stop until she was satisfied with the outcome that 
resolved, in her mind, the threat to the woman’s wellbeing despite being warned 
by her supervisor to the contrary. Just how far a nurse will go in responding to 
the helplessness of their patient was not tested by the example nor challenged 
by the group and therefore remains unknown. All that can be said is that this 
nurse responded by using all her professional nursing knowledge, skills and 
personal attributes for the betterment of the woman. While it is hypothesized 
that there is no limit to what a professional nurse will do to assist a patient, the 
current example does not exemplify this. In the example, Pricilla stated that she 
did what she needed to do in order to get the medications for the woman, which  
in this case meant that she broke policy and procedural rules, albeit 
unknowingly. The question not explored in this dialogue was, is it every 
acceptable to act outside the professional boundaries of nursing when to do so 
may benefit a patient? Are the defining boundaries of what it is to be a 
professional nurse the same boundaries that define an act as an act of love in 
nursing? In this example, ‘going the extra mile’ was understood to be the 
phrase used to describe the motivation of love and was within the scope of 
practice of the professional nurse. 
 
8.7.2  What is the responsibility Pricilla enacted on behalf of this woman? 
Pricilla and the group struggled with providing a plausible explanation for what 
they believed happened in the relation between Pricilla and the woman where 
without thinking, Pricilla identified the helplessness of the woman as something 
she was compelled to respond to, without any consideration of her own needs 
and desires. As she said, ‘I was simply doing what I had to do to help this lady’, 
but the group were unable to explain the responsibility Pricilla assumed for the 
woman’s welfare or how this was affected in her having no choice about to be 
responsible or not. However, the idea of ‘responsibility’ was not specifically 
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identified in the dialogue. 
 
8.7.3  To go beyond self interest is a desirable trait in nursing, or is it? 
As stated above, the idea of being able to go beyond self interest was seen as   
a highly desirable attribute for a nurse to possess. The extreme of ‘to go beyond 
self interest’ though is death. Is sacrifice of oneself to the point of causing one’s 
own death the ultimate expression of love? If correct, the ultimate expression of 
love in nursing is the sacrifice of a nurse’s life for a patient, as in, for example, 
to give a HIV positive patient mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. From this dialogue 
the ability of a nurse to place a patient’s interest before their own is identified as  
a pre-requisite for an act of nursing to be also love. While not identified by the 
group, understanding the altruism involved in being able to go beyond self 
interest is relevant to the formulation of an answer to the question what is love 
in nursing. 
 
8.7.4  Love in nursing is not something that is able to be controlled by 
conscious thought. 
It is postulated that love arises from deep within a person and is not subject to 
thought because it is not available to a person’s consciousness. Accordingly, 
what exactly is the motivation of love is unknown and not speculated on except 
that, in the last moments of the dialogue, the group accepted a statement made 
by one participant who said, love is an intuitive act. Because the dialogue was 
ending, no discussion was able to be had about this new idea that was 
wholeheartedly accepted by the group. 
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8.8  Conclusion 
This group of twelve Singaporean Registered Nurses offered three answers to 
the question what is love in nursing? Their answers showed that the content of 
love in nursing, as revealed in the example offered by Pricilla and understood 
by the group, is the ability of a nurse to go beyond concern only for their self- 
project and place the welfare of the patient first without any consideration of self 
gain. Love in nursing is not something that is able to be controlled by conscious 
thought because it is not privy to a person’s consciousness nor is it something 
that every nurse is able to express. 
 234
 
 
Chapter 9:  Group 6: Report on a Neo-Socratic 
dialogue on the question of what is love  
in Nursing and Midwifery? (Bhutan) 
 
9.0  Introduction 
This Neo-Socratic Dialogue took place in Bhutan and offers an initial 
understanding of the views of twelve Bhutanese Registered Nurses’ about what   
is love in nursing and midwifery. The report is constrained because of the 
limited time available to conduct the dialogue, given the complexity of the ideas 
raised about the question what is love in nursing and midwifery, in a health 
system that incorporates a mixture of traditional Buddhist healing and western 
medicine. 
 
 
9. 1  The sample group: Setting the scene 
The Bhutanese health care system incorporates a mixture of traditional 
Buddhist healing and western medicine to service the health care needs of its 
people. The presence of monks practicing traditional Buddhist healing in the 
health system is commonplace, particularly in rural and remote Bhutan. 
Participants stated that both traditional Buddhist healing and western medicine 
are equally respected as legitimate healing methods in Bhutan. 
 
All participants were of Bhutanese origin and lived and worked in Bhutan. 
Originally eight male and ten female nurses agreed to participate but six of the 
male participants from the border regions of Bhutan withdrew due to being 
required by the minister for health to stay in the rural and remote hospitals and 
health clinics to receive casualties from insurgent terrorist activity. The final 
twelve participants were leaders of nursing from across Bhutan who came 
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together for their studies into nursing and midwifery and consented to 
participate in this study for their self confessed enlightenment. Buddhism is 
central to life in Bhutan and all the participants said they practiced, to varying 
degrees, Buddhism. Six participants were from the capital Thimphu and worked 
at the major teaching and referral hospital of Bhutan, and six participants were 
from rural and remote areas and worked in small rural hospitals and remote 
area health clinics. The clinical experience of the participants was very similar 
for all of them in that they all worked full time as registered nurses and 
midwives and all but one were in clinical practice in senior positions of nursing 
such as in charge of a ward/area, hospital or health clinic. All six of the nurses 
working in the rural and remote areas routinely practiced both nursing and 
midwifery. Of the six participants who worked at the major referral hospital in 
Thimphu, one worked in and was responsible for operating and recovery room, 
one held a senior post in the accident and emergency department, three were  
in charge of or held a senior posts in the acute medical and surgical wards, and 
one was a nurse educator who worked with students of nursing in the major 
teaching hospital of Thimphu. 
 
The Neo-Socratic Dialogue reported on here was undertaken at the Royal 
Institute of Health Sciences in Thimphu and was of 3 hours duration, which in 
hindsight was to short a time given the complexities of this dialogue. 
Participants were prepared the day before about the conduct of the dialogue 
and the importance of the example to be offered being an example of love in 
nursing and midwifery as had been practiced by them. While the conduct of the 
dialogue was made easy by the fact that the group were leaders of nursing and 
midwifery in Bhutan and spoke English, they were shy and hesitant to talk about 
their practical experience of love in nursing and midwifery. Similar to other 
dialogues, the challenging part of this dialogue was having participants 
volunteer their examples and then talk about themselves in public. Eight 
practical examples of love in nursing and midwifery were offered but only six 
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participants agreed to talk about their example. The following is a report on the 
six examples offered to the group. 
 
9.2  Dialogue question 
‘What is love in nursing and midwifery?’ 
 
9.3  Phase 1: Dialogue example 
The question put to the group was, ‘what is Love in Nursing and Midwifery in 
Bhutan?’ Six examples were presented: 
 
Honey: ‘A patient came into my hospital and was bleeding due to an abortion. 
She had no one with her to donate blood and she was in a serious condition 
and shocked. If she did not get the blood that she needed she probably would 
die. Without thinking of the consequences to myself I donated my blood to save 
this woman. After doing this, I felt weak and very tired as I kept working for the 
rest of my duty.’ 
 
Somana: ‘A woman came into hospital with intra fetal uterine death. I just 
finished my day duty and was called to attend to this woman. She wanted me to 
stay with her till delivery because she said I made her feel safe. I stayed all 
night until she delivered at 0730 hours the next day. At 8am I went and changed 
my uniform ready for day duty. I started day duty at 8.30 and was so tired that I 
vomited, I was so tired I felt sick all my duty but I could not leave this woman 
when she asked me to stay.’ 
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Maya: ‘A female patient 68 years old came into hospital alone for hemodialysis. 
She had children but they were not able to be with her to help her while she 
was in hospital. Patients in hospital have a family person to help look after 
them. She was frightened and depressed about her condition. On seeing this I 
went to her bedside, held her hand, and talked and listened to her problems. I 
introduced her to other patients because she was lonely. I established a village 
person as a friend and then scheduled dialysis with her new village friend. The 
patient was happy.’ 
 
Lipnee: ‘I had finished my duty and was outside the emergency room about to 
go to a party with friends. While waiting for the ride, I noticed outside of the 
corner of my eye a boy with his mother standing at the pharmacy window. The 
boy began to collapse. Before I realized it, I was running toward the boy and 
grabbed him before he fell to the ground. We then took him to emergency 
where he was treated. I stayed with them to make sure everything was done 
and make them happy.’ 
 
Treen: ‘There was a nine year old boy in hospital who had no family in 
Thimphu and came from a village in a remote part of Bhutan. He had leukemia 
and required regular blood transfusions. He was kept separate (isolated) and he 
was worried and alone. So I went to him regularly and played and talked with 
him. I also took him home when well enough to play and give him a sense of a 
home. When we walked back to hospital he would get so tired we would sit 
beside the road till he felt well enough to continue to get back to the hospital. I 
took him home a lot which he enjoyed.’ 
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Mana: ‘I was nursing a boy who was a case of leukemia. He was alone most of 
the time and sad so I use to go and talk to him often. Later he would ask for 
things and I would try to get them for him. He was very close to me and during 
my night duty hours he would come to the nurse’s station and be there with me. 
And one day during his ‘last breath’ I had some kind of feeling of loss.’ 
 
The participants agreed that Mana’s example was the one they thought best 
exemplified love in their practice of nursing and midwifery because of her 
commitment to the boy. 
 
9.4  Phase 2: Exploring the selected example 
The group was asked to speak with Mana about the example and obtain 
information that would enable them to think of the example as their own. 
 
9.4.1  The example: 
I was nursing a boy who was a case of leukemia. He was alone most of the 
time and sad so I use to go and talk to him often. Later he would ask for things 
and I would try to get them for him. He was very close to me and during my 
night duty hours he would come to the nurse’s station and be there with me. 
And one day during his ‘last breath’ I had some kind of feeling of loss. 
 
9.4.2  Further details of the example: 
Mana provided the following additional information about her example: 
• ‘The boy had no family other than an older brother who lived far 
away’. 
• ‘His older brother would rarely visit and when he went the boy was 
really all alone’. 
• ‘I would visit him and talk with him often’. 
• ‘We had 1 nurse to 36 patients and I only had I student to help but I 
would find time to be with him mainly by not having my rest but going 
to the boy 
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and talking with him after my duty’. 
• ‘He would ask for things, like a radio, which I would then get for him.  
He needed these things because he was alone.’ 
• ‘Sometimes I would bring him simple things like foods and things like 
that’. 
• ‘Out of all the patients, he was in the most need’. 
• ‘I had a previous life connection with this boy’. 
• ‘Sometimes I felt that he was almost my child or like my younger 
brother and I was his big sister’. 
• ‘He would come to the nurses’ station and sit with us and would have 
tea and talk with us’. 
• ‘He was on chemotherapy and becoming very sick’. 
• ‘I talked with the doctor to see how I could help him and check on his 
care’. 
• ‘I became closer to him as he became sicker and I visited and stayed 
with him more and more’. 
• ‘He died on my duty and I felt very sad and had a feeling of loss’. 
• ‘I had some kind of attachment to this boy’. 
 
9.5 Phase 3:  Exploring the question in the light of the example 
Next, the question, ‘What is love in nursing in the example that Mana 
offered?’ was put to the group.  Two answers to the question were offered. 
 
Question: ‘What is love in nursing and midwifery in the example?’ 
Answer 1: ‘A sense of responsibility for the boy as a big sister’. 
Answer 2: ‘Responding to the identification of the loneliness and isolation 
of the boy’. 
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9.5.1  Answer 1: A sense of responsibility for the boy as a big sister 
In discussing this answer the group thought love was exemplified by Mana 
responding to the call by the boy, which they concluded was a call to be 
responsible for him and his need to be cared for at all levels of his being. 
Furthermore, the responsibility for him was not as a stranger but as a family 
relation, his ‘big sister’. As the group said, what a big sister does is to care for 
and protect her ‘little brother’ when he cannot take care of or protect himself. 
While not specifically stating it, the group were talking about the idea that the 
responsibility and the commitment that issues from a family relation is more 
than and different to that of a non-family relation. 
 
In answer to the question of why she should be responsible in this way, Mana 
stated that she understood her response to the boy to be a response to a 
previous life connection with him (Buddhism). No explanation for this idea was 
offered. It was presented as a simple fact. All that was said was that her 
understanding of how she felt toward the boy was because of her previous life 
connection and was one that could not be ignored for it was her responsibility. 
As Mana explained, she was his ‘big sister’ and no body else could be this ‘big 
sister’ because she was. The responsibility that Mana was describing was a 
responsibility that was hers and nobody else’s. She was responsible and 
nobody could take her place, nor could she hand over her responsibility to 
anyone else. However, not only was Mana responsible for the boy, but the 
degree of responsibility was something that was dictated by the boy and not 
her. As was explained, ‘she didn’t stop doing what she believed she had to do 
until the boy was satisfied’. While not directly stated, it appeared that what 
Mana was saying was that the boy dictated how far she went. It was not her call 
because she went as far in caring for the boy as was required to satisfy his 
needs which he ultimately knew and she did not. Listening to the discussion 
about these ideas, it was as though Mana did whatever she thought the boy 
needed and as long as he needed it because, in effect, she was a hostage to
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his needs. While the ideas raised were profound, the group did not explore 
them any further, which with more time may have been possible. 
 
Continuing, one participant said that Mana made time for the boy; ‘you sacrifice 
your free time and instead of sitting down you use that time for the boy’. The 
responsibility Mana assumed for the boy was of the quality that enabled her to 
place the priorities of the boy before her own. As she stated, ‘I would go to the 
boy because his needs were greater than my own. It was more important to do 
these things for the boy than think of my own needs’. And as another participant 
said, ‘whatever the boy wants she tries to give ... there was a cost (financial) in 
meeting his needs but she still did those things’. Mana replied saying ‘the gifts 
made him feel happy’. The dialogue continued around the boy and his needs 
which were, for Mana, needs to make him happy. While the boy’s happiness 
was a priority no other discussion was had about what was meant by happiness 
or the degree Mana would have gone to (as a big sister) in placing the boy’s 
needs before her own as her first priority. As she stated, she didn’t stop doing 
what she believed she needed to do until the boy was satisfied. She sacrificed 
her free time and rest periods so that they could be used for the benefit of the 
boy. As another participant said, ‘this was not normal because we do not do this 
for every patient’, meaning it was not an everyday event. 
 
In the course of the dialogue Mana said that when the boy died on her duty. 
She felt a sense of ‘loss’, ‘emptiness’, and ‘sadness’, and ‘a heaviness in the 
heart’. However, other than these brief comments, no explanation was offered 
by the group as to why Mana should feel the way that she did, except that Mana 
reiterated that it was ‘as his ‘big sister”, meaning his death meant she lost her 
little brother which made her feel the way she did. It was at this point that a brief 
but intense discussion was had by the group in Bhutanese that culminated in 
the response; it will take too long to explain in English, so we should move on. 
This was interpreted as a polite response and meant that Mana preferred not to
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speak about it any further in public so we respectfully moved on. 
 
9.5.2  Answer 2: ‘Responding to the identification of the loneliness and 
isolation of the boy’. 
In responding to this second answer one participant said that ‘where you have 
previous experience of conditions this makes you sensitive to matters specific 
to the condition, not only the physical condition of the patient but also their self 
condition’. The ‘self condition’ related to the response of the boy to his illness, 
physical surrounds and his general spiritual being. It was felt that the boy’s 
loneliness and isolation was the outward manifestation of his ‘self condition’, a 
condition of his being that connected with Mana through a previous life 
connection. As they said, it was a connection that had her responsible for him 
as a ‘big sister’. While the loneliness and isolation of the boy were the physical 
manifestations of his state, what Mana saw, what she was responding to, was 
something far deeper in their beings connectedness. However, at this point the 
group found it difficult to articulate in English what they exactly meant and so 
again spoke in Bhutanese with each other, which after a short time resulted in 
the answer that it was too difficult to explain in English. They apologized, ending 
the dialogue with the statement, ‘it is our belief’. 
 
9.6  Phase 4: The general question 
This phase of the Neo-Socratic dialogue requires broadening of the question 
from the specific example of love in nursing to the general.  The group was 
asked that if what had been identified in the example is love, then what is love 
in nursing in general?  
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Question:  What is love in nursing and midwifery? 
Answer:  It is where the nurse identifies in the patient a connection which 
triggers a feeling of responsibility and a relationship with the 
patient that is characterized by closeness, honesty and frankness. 
It requires the nurse to be responsible for them, ‘take care of’, to 
protect, and to give of themselves till the patient is satisfied. Love 
requires the nurse to be concerned with the patient as their first 
priority and not themselves. 
 
9.7  Commentary on the dialogue: 
The format and structure of the dialogue ensured that every participant’s 
contributions were explored and tested against the insights of others. However, 
there were a number of assumptions that remained unclear. As a result the 
dialogue raised a numbers of questions that could not be explored in the 
context of this dialogue given the limited time and difficulties that surrounded 
the explanation in English of several complex ideas. 
 
9.7.1  What is the motivation of the responsibility of love in nursing and 
midwifery that arises from a previous life connection? 
From what Mana had said, the responsibility of the boy was not something she 
chose, for it was not for the choosing because it was related to a previous life 
connection and beyond her capacity to input. Mana said that the responsibility 
she felt was as a ‘big sister’, which is akin to the responsibility of a family 
relation, again, something that is not for the choosing or otherwise because it is    
a given. However, the group were unable to explain, in English, the origin of the 
responsibility that they said arises from a previous life connection’ and part of 
their Buddhist belief system. However, this aside, what was clear was that all 
members of the group did share the view that they experience from time to time 
‘a previous life connection’ with patients for whom they care. Equally the 
group was also clear that this life connection also makes them responsible, a
 244
responsibility that is acted out in different ways depending on the situation of 
the patient. However, the motivation for the responsibility that arises from ‘a 
previous life connection’ that is understood as love was not explained. Where 
does this type of responsibility originate and what impact it has on the practice 
of a professional nurse and midwife remains largely a mystery. 
 
9.7.2  Is asymmetry and selflessness a requirement of love and therefore 
love in nursing and midwifery? 
From Mana’s description of her relationship with the boy, it was clear that her 
focus was toward doing whatever she needed to do to make him happy. While 
the relationship was not all one-way and there were occasions where she 
received affection and the like from the boy, this she said was not her 
motivation. From what Mana said, her focus was on the boy and because it was 
on him it was not on her. What the motivation is, that enables a selflessness of 
the type that a person, in this case a nurse, is able to shift their focus from a 
concentration on their self-project to another person as their priority, was not 
discussed. Accordingly, what is the altruism of love in a nurse or midwife? 
 
9.7.3  How can someone else dictate your responsibility to them, and is 
this a desirable quality of a professional nurse and midwife? 
In the first instance, Mana spoke about her responsibility to the boy as a given. 
She was responsible for him because of ‘a previous life connection’. However, it 
appeared that while she had no say in the original call to be responsible, she 
did have a say in what she did when responding to his individual needs as part 
of acting out her responsibility. Without saying it, it appeared the group had 
identified two different levels of patient responsibility. At one level the nurse and 
midwife has no say about the responsibility they feel and at the other, they do. 
While the first seems beyond the nurse and midwife’s ability to comprehend, the 
second is subject to their professional judgment. However, if the original 
responsibility that was described by Mana for the boy was something she had
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no say about, what the potential impact is on an individual nurse and midwife is 
not known. 
 
9.7.4  What is the result of the death of a patient who a nurse and 
midwife loved? 
At the death of the boy Mana said she felt a sense of ‘loss’, ‘emptiness’, and 
‘sadness’, and ‘a heaviness in the heart’. While it was not discussed, it appears 
that the death of a patient a nurse and midwife loved leaves them with a similar 
feeling to that of the death of a family member. If this is the case, the impact of 
the death of a patient on a nurse and midwife will be significant and something 
that perhaps should be explored further. 
 
9.8  Conclusion 
The conclusion to this dialogue showed that Mana identified a deep connection 
between herself and the boy that resulted in her being responsible for his 
welfare. While the motivation for this responsibility remains unclear, it was a 
responsibility of the quality of a family relation and was characterized by 
closeness, honesty and frankness and the requirement, ‘to take care of’, to 
protect, and to give of herself to his needs. The dialogue showed that a 
requirement of love in nursing and midwifery is the ability of the nurse and 
midwife to have the welfare of the patient as their first priority and before a 
concern for themselves. While the extent of the selflessness of a nurse and 
midwife was not tested in this dialogue it was identified as a quality of love in 
nursing and midwifery. 
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Chapter 10:  Theoretical framework: love as  
responsibility ‘for the other’ 
 
10.0.  Introduction 
In the previous chapter the report of the dialogues identified that nurses and 
midwives understood love to be an integral part of the moral character of a 
person. Love it was said is a response to the deep connection between the 
nurse or midwife and the patient that arises from the identification of the unique 
value of the person of the patient. The nurses and midwives believed this form 
of love results in a unique responsibility because it is characterized by a 
selflessness and a willingness to risk their own welfare in doing whatever is 
necessary for the ‘Good’ of the patient. The responsibility spoken of and 
understood to be a form of love is not open to conscious thought. It is not able 
to be commanded, nor is it expressed by every nurse or midwife because of the 
inordinate level of professional commitment and responsibility required. The 
question that now follows is what is this form of love that is a form of unique 
responsibility that these nurses and midwives speak about? 
 
In this thesis, the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and, in particular but not 
exclusively, that set out in his text titled the ‘Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence’ (1981) provide the theoretical framework for the interpretation of what 
nurses and midwives understood as the love that is specific to their practice of 
nursing and midwifery. Given that nurses and midwifes understood this form of 
love to be a unique form of responsibility it is more accurate to say that what 
these nurses and midwives enacted was a ‘being-for-the-other’, or a 
‘responsibility for the other’. This exchange of terminology is important because 
it more closely represents the views of the nurses and midwives in this study 
and is also a view that is shared by Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas (1985,
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Levinas, 1998 #961) believes the word love has been compromised to the point 
that its myriad of meanings and common place usage serve only to confuse the 
explication of ideas that underlie the concept. Specifically, Levinas (1998: 103)  
is of the belief that it is ‘. . . responsibility for my neighbour, which is, no doubt, 
the harsh name for what we call love of one’s neighbour; love without Eros, 
charity, love in which the ethical aspect dominates the passionate aspect, love 
without concupiscence’. In this thesis nurses and midwives understood that the 
form of love that they were speaking about was a unique form of responsibility. 
In fact it was an ethical responsibility, a ‘being-for-the-other’, a being 
‘responsible for the other’ or, as Levinas (1998) refers to it, a taking on of the 
fate of the other, which in its simplest form is a depiction of what nurses and 
midwives did. 
 
10.1 Elucidation of Emmanuel Levinas metaphysics of Otherness 
Emmanuel Levinas was a French philosopher, Jewish scholar and a survivor of 
the Holocaust of WWII, which I mention because it had a profound effect on 
his belief about the failure of ethics. According to Murray (Murray, 2003), 
Levinas took the view that ‘ethical’ categories can make possible moral 
justification for atrocities like the holocaust, where ethical rules and principles 
failed to prevent ‘normal’ everyday German people from engaging in torture and 
murder. In response to this experience and what he perceived as the failure of 
ethics, Levinas developed his philosophical work titled the ‘Otherwise than 
Being or Beyond Essence’, which is a part of his magnum opus on the 
‘metaphysics of Otherness’. It incorporates theory that recaptures the summons  
to ethical obligation that traditional ethics fails to provide. In short, it is a work 
that articulates the original form of responsible subjectivity (Levinas, 1981). It is 
a phenomenological description of my relation with the ‘Other’ and the 
commandment ‘thou shalt not kill’ (Levinas, 1998), which is grounded in my 
ethical responsibility and the non-symmetrical relation that enables me to place 
the needs of another person first without any expectation of reciprocity. The 
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radical nature of Levinas’s philosophy of ethics is that relationship rather than 
existence, subjectivity, or Being itself, is what grounds everything (Murray, 
2003). More specifically, my knowledge of the other by way of my perception 
and comprehension of them, is only part of who the other is because there is 
also an ethical dimension to the other, their ‘Otherness’ (alterity), an ‘Otherness’ 
that is outside my capacity to take possession of in knowledge. My relation with 
the ‘Other’ is a relationship of ethical responsibility. Moreover, the responsibility 
I have is not my responsibility because it belongs to the ‘Other’ who commands 
me to be ethically responsible. This ethical responsibility that is inside me, as 
though somebody had placed it there, does not originate from an act of 
subjectivity. Rather it originates from my incarnation as responsible. It requires I 
answer the question ‘am I my brother’s keeper’, with a ‘yes’. The philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas provides a foundation for understanding ethical 
responsibility that nurses and midwives interpret to be a form of love. 
 
In scientific terms, humans exist as separate living entities, in that, as humans 
we are marked by our separation one from an other, where, at best, we can 
only ever be ‘with’ an other, side by side, and never able to share the same 
space. I am I and you are you. It is like the severed beings in Aristophanes’ 
myth in Plato’s Symposium (Plato, 1994). The Greek God Zeus split the original 
androgynous being into two separate beings. Although the two separated 
beings had an unfillable desire to be reunited into one being, no matter what 
they did they could not bridge their separation. Being human is like this, it is to  
be a separate living entity. At the level of our everyday life, the relationships we 
have can be no other than those of a ‘with’ nature, because the space that 
exists between our human being is a space that can only be bridged by 
relatedness activities that have one person’s being ‘for’ an other as opposed to 
being ‘with’ an other. If Aristophanes’ account of love is accurate, relatedness 
activities that are of a ‘for’ nature are unachievable as an outcome of conscious 
human endeavour. Indeed, the experiences reported by nurses and midwives of 
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love also suggest this is the case. 
 
What then is a relation of being ‘for’ another person as opposed to being ‘with’ 
them? Relationships that are characteristic of one person’s being ‘for’ an other 
have their foundation embedded in what Emmanuel Levinas calls the 
‘preontological territory of the otherwise than being’. What Levinas is describing 
is a metaphysical state, that is a state of our ‘being’s other’, a state different 
from ‘being otherwise’, and also different from both ‘being’ and ‘not being’ 
(Levinas, 1981). 
 
Levinas’s idea of an ‘otherwise than being’ is radical because it suggests that 
consciousness emerges from the anonymity of ‘il y a’ (‘there is’ or more 
specifically ‘existing without existence), which is the impersonality of 
expression, of anonymous or impersonal existing. ‘Consciousness, along with 
subjectivity and identity, are secondary, emerging from the ‘ii y a’ rather than 
pre-existing it’ (Davis, 1996: 23). In this view, consciousness is an event in 
which something as yet unidentified acquires a separate existence. Everything 
that comes to me from outside of myself is experienced by me as something of 
my making and therefore becomes part of the world as I construct it and so it 
becomes more of the ‘Same’. However, my being’s ‘Other’ is very different to 
this because it exists outside of what I have knowledge in the ‘otherwise than 
being’, the ‘yet unidentified’, and for that reason remains a mystery to me. In 
this territory of the ‘otherwise than being’, ‘to be or not to be’ is not the question 
because here Levinas is speaking of the ability of my being to transcend its 
physical form to a metaphysical state of ‘otherwise than being’. It is from this 
territory that my being ‘for’ arises in the form of moral responsibility. It is a form 
of responsibility that resides in me as though it has always been there and is a 
responsibility that commands me to act for the welfare of the other person. 
However, it is the personal act of taking responsibility ‘as if’ I was the one and 
only one responsible, more responsible than any one else is what makes my
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responsibility moral. Thus, taking responsibility in this way is an act of creating 
the moral space. A mode of human ‘being’ that enables me to be ‘for’ an other 
person as my first priority, which is the only way I can bridge my isolation as 
a separate living entity. 
 
More precisely, the realm that gives birth to moral responsibility is identified by 
Levinas as the ‘there is’ and describes existence without existents. His claim is 
that for creation to occur there had to be a ‘there is’, an anonymous space, a 
space not a space, a space devoid of our personal being (Levinas, 1985). 
Accordingly, the ‘there is’, is not referring to a there is this or that which would 
allude to some matter of form, but rather, the ‘there is’ refers to what Levinas 
(1985) describes as the ‘excluded middle’, in that it is neither nothing nor being. 
To help explain the concept of the ‘there is’ and the idea of ‘nothing being 
something’, Levinas (1985) applies two examples. First, Levinas (1985) says 
that the ‘there is’ is similar to the sound that is present in an empty shell, it is as 
though the emptiness is full. While I may understand the empty shell to be 
devoid of any objective contents, when it is placed to my ear I am able to 
identify the presence of something (noise) that is at the same time nothing. The 
existence of nothing that is at the same time not nothing is present in the shell. 
In the second example, Levinas (1985) describes the ‘there is’ as similar to the 
night. The ‘there is’ is like the dark of the night, in that in the darkness there 
seems to be no existence. There is nothing present in the moment but the 
darkness of nothing, yet the darkness itself is something that is at the same 
time nothing. Both the noise of the shell and the dark of the night that has no 
content is what Levinas (1985: 48) calls the ‘excluded middle’, ‘one can neither 
say that it is nothingness, even though there is nothing’. 
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Notably, Levinas’s ‘there is’ breaks apart the dichotomy of nothing or 
something. It enlightens me to the fact that there is no longer only this or that to 
which we attach our independent existence but also there is a ‘not something 
that is not nothing’. Lingis (1989: 30), in his interpretation and translation of 
Levinas, makes this ‘not nothing’ image clearer with the statement, ‘universal 
absence is in its turn a presence, an absolutely unavoidable presence’. What 
this means is that the nothingness of the ‘there is’ diffuses my existence as an 
independent being. Like the dark of the night in the example above, the 
nothingness of the dark is itself an unavoidable presence of something that is 
beyond my capacity to have knowledge of. The ‘there is’ is what Levinas 
(Lingis, 1989) describes as the impersonal form of being that submerges every 
subject, person or thing. It is the ‘there is’ in which my personal being is 
situated. 
 
In Levinas’s text of the ‘otherwise than being or beyond essence’ the ‘Good’ is 
presented as an example of impersonal being, but the ‘Good’ spoken of here is 
not the same good as in good versus evil. The ‘Good’ to which Levinas is 
referring is a ‘Good’ that cannot become present or enter into a representation 
(Levinas, 1981). While my subjectivity by way of my personal being gives me 
freedom, that is, a consciousness and knowledge of being an ‘I’, the ‘Good’ is 
external to my personal being and beyond my comprehension. As Levinas 
(1981: 122) says, ‘the Good is before being’ and is what my personal being is 
submerged in. A responsibility that was given to me before I had a choice 
because as Levinas says, ‘it is as responsible that one is incarnated’ (Levinas, 
1981: xiii). As the ‘Good’ is external to me and is what I cannot initiate by my 
own accord, access to the ‘Good’ is by way of the approach of the ‘Good’ to me 
and not me to it, but because of my submersion in the ‘Good’ of the ‘there is’, 
like the dark of the night in the above example, the ‘Good’ is already present. It  
is as though this ‘Good’ chose me before I was in a position to be able to 
choose because it is present to me in the ‘there is’ and therefore before my
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personal being is realized. As Levinas (1981: 11) explains, ‘the present is a 
beginning in my freedom, whereas the ‘Good’ is not present to freedom; it has 
chosen me before I have chosen it’. As such, I have no access to the ‘Good’ 
because it is external to what I can ever think. But the ‘Good’ of the ‘there is’ 
is always present, even though I am not aware of it as such. 
 
Does this mean that every person is ‘Good’? If I were to answer this question 
from Levinas’s ‘preontological’ perspective, which is before my personal being 
as an ‘I’ is realised, the answer would be yes. Thus, every person is ‘Good’ in 
the sense that the ‘Good’ spoken of here is before ‘I’ comes onto the scene and 
has the freedom to choose, and before good versus evil is presented as a 
choice. The claim is that my personal being arises from a foundation of ‘Good’,   
a ‘Good’ that is before choice in that the ‘Good’ chose me not me it (Levinas, 
1981). As Levinas (1981: 11) says, ‘no one is ‘Good’ voluntarily’. 
 
Moreover, the idea of the ‘Good’ is important because it offers an explanation 
for my yearning to be the support of an others’ being. The ‘Good’ is the 
susceptibility to being the one effected by an other’s personal being that is 
expressed in the ‘passivity of supporting’ (Levinas, 1981: 122). It assigns me to 
approach the other, what Levinas describes as a ‘non-erotic proximity’, a ‘desire 
of the non-desirable’ (Levinas, 1981: 123). In other words, the ‘Good’ is what I 
yearn for without knowing it, what I strive for but cannot ever attain, because the 
moment I try, I become sidetracked and the producer of some type of good, 
which is not the ‘Good’ spoken about here. For example, Levinas is not 
referring to a good that is initiated by me wanting to do ‘X’ as an opportunity to 
achieve some greater good. It is not a good of my making for, as I repeat, it is 
not me who makes the approach to the other person in order to do some matter 
of good. To the contrary, the direction of the approach to do good work is from 
the ‘Other’ who commands me by way of the expression of their personal being, 
which Levinas says is the approach of the ‘Face’ of the ‘Other’, an idea that is
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explained later in this text. The ‘Good’ as it is conceived by Levinas is a ‘Good’ 
that does not emanate from my initiative nor can it become present or enter into   
a representation. It is a ‘Good’ that exists outside my personal being and is 
what I cannot have knowledge of, even though it impacts on me by way of the 
passivity of being the support of an other’s personal being. 
 
Then how is the ‘Good’, as spoken of by Levinas, given personal expression? 
The ‘Good’ is found in the ‘passivity of supporting’ and is expressed in my love 
for my neighbour, which is being responsible for my neighbour. To be precise, 
the ‘Good’ is enigmatically suggested in the ‘Face’ of the ‘Other’ (Hutchens, 
2004). In the ‘Face-to-Face’ encounter, which is the encounter of our personal 
being, the ‘Good’ seeks me out and desires a response to it and is the only 
place where it is possible to catch a glimpse of this type of ‘Good’. Thus, the 
‘Good’ expressed in my ‘passivity of supporting’ an other’s personal being, my 
incarnation as responsible, is my love for my neighbour, a love without ‘eros’. 
However, rather than use the term love, which has many different meanings, 
Levinas says use the word responsibility. 
‘From the start, the encounter with the Other is my responsibility for him. 
That is the responsibility for my neighbour, which is, no doubt, the harsh 
name for what we call love of one’s neighbour; love without Eros, charity, 
love in which the ethical aspect dominate the passionate aspect, love 
without concupiscence. I don’t much like the word love, which is worn-
out and debased. Let us speak instead of the taking upon oneself of the 
fate of the other. That is, the “vision” of the Face. . .‘. (Levinas, 1998: 
103) 
 
Similarly, nurses and midwives in this study offered examples of love in their 
professional practice that were founded on the taking upon themselves the fate 
of their patients. Without stating it, each example of love was an expression of 
the responsibility of being ‘for’ the patient. In acknowledgement of this 
observation and Levinas’s claim about the corruption of the word love, the word
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responsibility will instead be used. To be clear, the responsibility spoken of here 
is not the responsibility we associate with our everyday life, that is, a 
responsibility defined by societal laws and codified rules, nor is it a 
responsibility situated in time, place or object. Rather, the responsibility that 
Levinas speaks about is moral responsibility, a responsibility that arises 
because of the ‘Good’ of the ‘there is’ in which my personal being is submerged. 
While the ethical part of the self (the self based on societal codified rules and 
laws), allows me to either accept or reject the responsibility of an other, moral 
responsibility does not. Moral responsibility is where I am ‘for’ my neighbour as 
determined by chance proximity and not as something I am able to plan or have 
thought about. As Peperzak et al, (1996: 140) say, moral responsibility as 
spoken of by Levinas involves; 
‘. . . an undoing of the nucleus of the transcendental subject, the 
transcendence of goodness, the nobility of a pure supporting, an ipseity 
of pure election. Such is love without Eros’, such is my responsibility’. 
 
Replacing the term love with the concept of moral responsibility appears entirely 
consistent with the views reported by nurses and midwives in this study. Hence, 
the concept moral responsibility as opposed to love, offers a theoretical 
framework for the development of insight into the clinical experiences of nurses 
and midwives where their professional love was expressed in the form of being 
morally responsibility ‘for’ the patient’s in their care. 
 
To recap, tying the ideas spoken about thus far to the unique language of 
Levinas, my human ‘being’ is submerged by the ‘Good’ of the ‘there is’ or 
‘otherwise than being’ and has me responsible ‘for’ the ‘Other’ as a matter of 
fact. This statement contains one of the centrepieces of Levinas’s philosophy of 
ethics which is the relation of the ‘Other’ and the self. That is, the self, my self,   
is constituted by my ability to identify my self in an other as in all others even 
though the self I identify in an other is different in its many alterations to me. As
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a human being I live as one among many.  In contrast, the concept of the ‘Other’ 
is very different to the self.  As was alluded to earlier, the ‘Other’ is not an other 
self it is ‘Other’, an ‘Otherness’ of an other.  Levinas uses a capital ‘O’ in the 
word ‘Other’ to alert the reader to the fact that he is not referring to an other 
person in their everyday form but to an ‘Otherness’ of an other or what could be 
loosely referred to as a state of being different.  This ‘Otherness’ that Levinas 
has identified is like the ‘Good’ also external to me and the world that I can 
know.  Being external to me is another way of saying the ‘Other’ is outside what I 
understand to exist and so is what I do not and cannot have knowledge of.  
Therefore not only are the ‘Other’ and self completely different they are also 
completely separate to each other.  To be separate, the ‘Other’ must not be able   
to be personalised.  If it were, it would not be ‘Other’ because it would be a part 
of the world as I understand it and therefore part of the same.  The ‘Other’, being 
so completely external to me, is what makes learning possible.  If it were not, it 
would be learning that was constrained by my capacity to think and therefore be 
more of the same.  rather, the ‘Other’ makes learning possible by way of the 
presence of something completely new to me, something completely foreign 
and something that I could not have possibly thought; a revelation.  A learning 
that is only made possible when the self and the ‘Other’ come into contact, a 
point highlighted by Davis (1996: 44-45) who says; 
‘…the self exists because the Other is irreconcilable with it.  Otherwise, 
both self and Other would be parts of a greater whole or totality which 
would invade and invalidate their separateness.  So, although the self 
may feel that its separateness ensures both its mastery and freedom in 
the world, that separateness depends upon the possibility of an 
encounter which will put both mastery and freedom into question…’.
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What is more, Davis (1996) also makes the point that the difficulty for 
Levinas’s was to identify the way that the self and the ‘Other’ are able 
to come into contact with each other and yet still be able to preserve 
their independence and self-sufficiency. According to Levinas the 
contact of self and ‘Other’ is not a physical contact but a contact made 
by way of a relation that is not a relation as we would normally 
understand it. For Levinas, the relation of the self and the ‘Other’ 
cannot be a mechanism for making the ‘Other’ a part of my personal 
world which would diminish its mystery of what is external to me and 
unknowable. Instead, Levinas’s describes the relation of the self and the 
‘Other’ as a ‘relation-without-relation’ (Levinas, 1979). His point is that 
my relation with the ‘Other’ is not something that I have a say about. I am 
passive with regard to the approach of the ‘Other’. I simply wait at the 
ready for the approach. As Levinas (1981: xvii) says, 
‘the approach of the other is an initiative I undergo. . . It is then not to an 
apprehensive or comprehensive initiative that alterity is given, but to 
sensibility. One is passive with regard to the approach of alterity, one 
sustains its impact without being able to assimilate it, one is open to it, 
exposed in its direction, to its sense, susceptible to being affected…’. 
 
Consequently the impact of the ‘Other’ on me is in its approach and results in 
my response as obedience. However, it is an obedience that is already active 
before any pronouncement or understanding of the effect of the ‘Other’. In this 
relation the effect of the ‘Other’ on me is ‘sensuality’, a susceptibility to be 
affected, a vulnerability that has me open to the ‘Other’ in a way that makes me 
responsible before I know it. As Levinas is often known to say, it is as 
responsible that I am incarnated (Levinas, 1981: xiii). This means that my 
personal being is given to be always open to the approach of the ‘Other’ and 
therefore to be responsible. This being the case, my responsibility for the 
‘Other’ is what I have no say about. However, it is the next step, which is the 
personal act of taking responsibility ‘as if’ I was already responsible, which is
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the act of creating the moral space, a point Bauman’s (1993) in his reading of 
Levinas says is the only foundation morality can have. Putting these ideas 
another way, responsibility is a relational bond that results from a non- 
cognizable recognition of the ‘Other’ effected in the expression of being that 
results in an exposure of oneself to the other, a giving of one’s subsistence to 
the other (substitution) in living out the unspoken command to be responsible, 
morally responsible. In this way ‘taking’ responsibility, that responsibility I 
already have, or as Bauman (1993) says, responding to the ‘urge to do’, is what 
founds me as a moral person. 
 
At the level of my personal being, where at best, I can only be ‘with’ another, 
the I-thou relationship is symmetrical; I am ‘with’ them as they are ‘with’ me. 
Yet, at the level of Levinas’s ‘Otherwise than being’, the relationship of our 
respective beings is not symmetrical but asymmetrical. It is a relation that 
contains the hallmarks of a moral stance, in that the relation is one-sided, has 
no expectation of reciprocity and is not subject to reversal. It makes possible 
being ‘for’ as opposed to being ‘with’. In a note of caution, Bauman (Bauman, 
1993): 50) also makes the point in his commentary on Levinas that ‘... in a 
moral relationship, I and Other are not exchangeable, and thus cannot be 
‘added up’ to form a plural ‘we”, any codified rules or duties apply only to me. 
Therefore, being a moral person I am my brother’s keeper whether or not he is 
for me because his relation to me is his business and not mine. Being ‘for’ the 
‘Other’ means I am ‘for’ the ‘Other’ whether or not the ‘Other’ is ‘for’ me. The 
impetus to be ‘for’ the ‘Other’ clearly lies with me because while my neighbour 
may change, nobody can take my neighbour from me, for it is not my 
neighbour who holds me fast. It is, in Levinas’s view, my responsibility which 
holds my neighbour fast. Here the notion of reciprocity does not exist because my 
being ‘for’ the ‘Other’ is not based on the Other’s being ‘for’ me. Levinas 
(Levinas, 1998); (cited in (Bauman, 1993) makes this point even clearer by using 
the example in the Christian faith where God asked Cain the question, ‘where is
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your brother’. Cain answered from his own point of view with, ‘Am I my brothers 
keeper’. Personal being is the territory without morality, and therefore, at best, 
Cain’s relationship to his brother was of a ‘with’ nature, I am I and he is he 
(Levinas, 1998): 110). However, if Cain was able to respond from the 
‘Otherwise than being’ (where I am ‘for’ the ‘Other’), the ground of morality, he 
may well have answered very differently. To be a moral person means Cain 
was his brothers keeper and therefore responsible for his brother. Cain’s 
responsibility for his brother was always more than any other person’s. Being a 
moral person means it would have been impossible for Cain not to have been 
responsible (Bauman, 1993). Cain was his brother’s keeper whether or not his 
brother saw his duties toward Cain in the same way. Being ‘for’ the other 
means, like Cain I am ‘for’ the ‘Other’ before I am ‘for’ myself, making my 
relationship to an ‘Other’ a moral one. Thus, the moral self comes into being by 
my ability to rise above a concern only for myself. It moves the focus of 
attention from the self to the other in a relational bond that, as previously 
explained, has me ‘for’ an ‘Other’ so creating the moral state of the self, or more 
specifically, moral responsibility. This explanation of moral responsibility is 
consistent with the experiences reported by both nurses and midwives, and is 
an idea that will be explored in more depth in the next chapter. 
 
The mechanism that enables moral responsibility arises from my attention not 
on the other person as a specimen nor as an isolated being among other    
beings but on what Levinas identifies as the ‘Face’ (‘Call’) of the ‘Other’. The 
‘Face’ of the ‘Other’ is that which is the same as me but is also different to me in 
that it is not me; it is them. The ‘not me’ spoken of here is not referring to my 
subjective status as an individual person but to my ‘Otherness’ which is not an 
other’s ‘Otherness’ by the simple fact that it is mine. The relation of the ‘Face’, 
the ‘Face-to-Face’ relation, is where the depth of the Other’s personal being is 
revealed to my ‘Other’. However, my relation to the ‘Face’ is not the relation 
we normally associate with the conduct of our everyday interpersonal life. The
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‘Face’ cannot be seen, thematizied or appropriated. A repeated phrase of 
Levinas is that the ‘Other’ always remains ‘Other’, meaning the ‘Other’ is always 
a mystery or unknowable to me. So the ‘Face’ of the ‘Other’ is not an object and 
it is not what I am able to experience because if it were it would be reducible to 
phenomena and therefore a product of my knowledge, ceasing it to be ‘Other’. 
Again, the ‘Face’ of the ‘Other’ is always external to my personal being and is 
what is irreducible to phenomena and therefore my knowledge. The ‘Face’ 
though is what enables the encounter our beings ‘Otherness’, the ‘Face-to- 
Face’ relation. 
 
Furthermore, Levinas’s concept of the ‘Face’ is not referring to a surface or the 
physical attributes associated with the head of a person and all its expressive 
characteristics or for that matter the uniqueness of the other person as a being 
with physiological and psychosocial form. Rather, the ‘Face’ is a metaphor for 
the expression of the moral summons of the ‘Other’ to me. ‘The face is 
signification, and signification without context’ (Levinas, 1985: 86). It is what 
enables two beings to encounter each other without reducing that encounter to 
an experience and therefore an object of their making. It is from the first ethical, 
or put another way, the ‘Face’ that is revealed by way of its signification 
summons my ethical obligation. As Levinas (1985: 87) says, the epiphany 
revealed in the ‘Faces’ consists of saying ‘thou shall not kill’. This manifestation 
of the ‘Other’s’ right to be is a fact, a primordial command that is not open to my 
interpretation because it comes to me from outside what I am able to know. 
Thus, the moral summons of the ‘Other’ is an appeal that I cannot ignore. 
However, Murray (2003) in his analysis of Levinas’s philosophy makes the point 
that while the ‘Face’ appears to me by way of a moral summons, is not open to 
my personal interpretation and therefore any potential distortion or silencing of 
it, and is something that must be ‘heard’, I am able to refuse to respond to it’s 
appeal. The identification the difference between the appeal of the ‘Face’ and 
my response to it, will in the next chapter, help explain the different types of
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nurse and midwife patient relations. 
 
Typical of the relation with the ‘Other’ as a ‘Face’ is my at-the-ready obedience 
to the approach of the ‘Other’. This means that I am passive toward receiving 
the approach of the ‘Face’; I am at-the-ready to receive it and I am open and 
susceptible to being affected by it. I do nothing toward either receiving it or 
acting upon it. Thus, the ‘Face’ of the ‘Other’ is what impacts on me by way of  
its expression. The ‘Face’ is expression. The ‘Other’s’ personal being is 
expressed to me by way of the ‘Face’s’ approach; it is what is sensed. The 
source of meaning that comes to me by way of this sensing though is external 
to me and the world as I know it and to all that I could think. It is a sensing, a 
sensibility that first involves ‘sensuous affection’ which is then followed by 
‘sense-ascription’ (Levinas, 1981). Levinas’s idea of ‘sensuous affection’ is 
comprised of contact, immediacy and assimilation, which is given to ‘sense 
ascription’, the act of perception that involves envisaging and viewing from a 
distance, and objectification. In ‘sensuous affection’ there is a sensuous contact 
with the material, which Levinas (1981) identifies as more like the ‘savouring’ 
that takes place prior to any ‘sense ascription’. Sensing the expression of the 
other’s personal being by way of the ‘Face’ is this savouring. It is a ‘savouring’  
of the material being sensed which is then given meaning through ‘sense 
ascription’. But in a note of caution, Levinas (1 981) says that sensibility or 
savouring is not an act in itself, rather it is a susceptibility to being affected. It is 
being open to being effected, a being passive toward the approach of the 
‘Face’. Thus, ‘the face is a living presence; it is expression . . . a discourse, it 
speaks by its mere presence, to present oneself by signifying is to speak’ 
(Levinas, 1979: 66). 
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The ‘Face’ is a source of language or as Levinas says above, the ‘Face’ speaks 
because its manifestation is already discourse. But again, like much of the 
language used by Levinas, the discourse he is referring to here is not about 
reasoning or for that matter the spoken word, as the ‘Face’ speaks in that it is 
already discourse. Here, discourse is the ‘first word’, which is not 
communication as something given to a sign or an interpretation but 
communication by way of an exposure to being effected. Before the ‘Face’ of 
the ‘Other’ is presented to me I am at the ready to receive it, open to its 
approach. Levinas calls this state of openness, and hence passivity to being 
effected, the ‘Saying’. To be clear, he uses two main terms to explain his 
thinking around discourse, one is the ‘Saying’ and the other is the ‘Said’. The 
‘. . .saying is a state of openness to the other’, a ‘here I am’ prior to any 
commitment being made (Hand, 1989: 6&7). The ‘Said’ is the giving of a sign to 
a communication. The meaning given to the ‘Saying’ is very different to 
anything communicated by the ‘Said’. In terms of the ‘Face’, the ‘Saying’ is a 
form of greeting the ‘Other’, which Levinas (1985) says is to already answer for 
him. It is the first word presented that says ‘here I am’ (Levinas, 1981: xxxiv), a 
passivity of being open, of being exposed to being effected by the expression of 
the depth of ‘Other’s’ personal being. 
 
The ‘Saying’ by way of my passivity to being effected by an ‘Other’ also 
enlightens me to the fact that I exist as more than a separate living entity, an 
isolated person concerned only with mastery of its atomistic self. It ‘awakens’ 
me to the fact that I am more than a solitary being; I am a being that is in union 
with the ‘Other’ of all others (Levinas, 1998). As Bauman (Bauman, 1993: 76) 
succinctly puts it; 
‘awakening is not in the ‘I am I’, but in the ‘I am for’. It makes it possible 
for my personal being to ‘awaken’ from its egology, from egoism and 
egotism to the realisation that I am I, a unique and irreplaceable I, only 
through my unity with the Other’. 
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The ‘Face’ by way of the ‘Saying’ awakens me to the responsibility I have for 
assisting the ‘Other’s’ personal being. This idea of awakening or at least the 
very chance to awaken from a concern only for my self to a responsibility for an 
‘Other’ adds to a foundation for understanding why nurses and midwives were 
able to rise above a concern only for themselves and place the patient at the 
centre of all their professional endeavours. 
 
Responsibility for the ‘Other’ is not the responsibility associated with everyday 
life where one is able to make certain choices about the responsibility that 
fronts them. For Levinas, responsibility for the ‘Other’ is exactly what I do not 
have any say about, because it is as responsible that I am incarnated, meaning  
I am responsible whether or not I like it because the responsibility that I have is 
not of my making, it chose me not me it. The fact is, I am responsible for the 
‘Other’. This responsibility that I have, as though someone placed it inside me, 
is a form of recognition of the authority of the ‘Other’, an acknowledgement of a 
claim to arise and present oneself. To be precise, responsibility is the response 
to the concrete act of ‘Facing’ (Levinas, 1981). As was explained earlier, the act 
of ‘Facing’ is not a cognitive act. It is an act of expression. Meeting the ‘Other’  
as a ‘Face’ involves the way one expresses oneself, exposes one’s being to the 
‘Other’, exposes oneself to the ‘Other’ (Levinas, 1981). These incarnate 
concrete acts of the exposure of one’s being, of opening one’s self to the 
‘Other’, of giving of one’s substance to the ‘Other’ are what Levinas (1981) 
says, is my responsibility. Responsibility communicated by way of the ‘Face’ is 
how our being’s ‘Otherness’ is able to come into contact. It breaks through the 
sphere of the exteriority associated with the ‘Otherness’ to the sphere of 
phenomena.
 263
Levinas suggests that maternity is an authentic figure of responsibility (Levinas, 
1981). In maternity one does not choose one’s responsibility to an other. One is 
chosen by the very nature of one’s being. As in maternity, the command to act 
for the ‘Good’ of the ‘Other’ is a preexisting command, a command that requires 
me to give something of my very being to the other in support of them. Here, my 
responsibility has me offer my being to the other without holding back and 
before it is asked. It is a passive giving, an openness of the quality that I give 
everything to them whatever they need for their sustenance even if it is at my 
own peril. As in maternity, my responsibility for the ‘Other’ is not what I initiate 
because it has always been the case, it is not something that is started or 
stopped nor is it something that I know I do. Like maternity, what signifies my 
responsibility is that I bear all the responsibility for the bearing. My exposedness 
to the other is so complete that I bear all the demands of their being and also 
the consequences of the bearing of their being. As in maternity, responsibility 
makes possible the life of an other, where the food from one’s own mouth is 
given for the betterment of the ‘Other’, something Levinas (1981) describes as 
the maternal support for the material destitution of an other. Thus, my 
responsibility is ‘for’ the ‘Other’s’ welfare and expressed in concrete acts that 
are for the support of their personal being. It is to make my subsistence the 
support of their order and needs for without responsibility our respective being 
would not be possible. As is the case with maternity, I have been chosen by this 
responsibility which I bear alone; it is a responsibility I cannot compare against 
any standard because the experience of being responsible is mine and mine 
alone. I am always responsible for the situation and what went on before it and 
more responsible than anyone else. What is more, like maternity, I am always 
haunted by the possibility that I am not being responsible enough. 
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Just how far does this responsibility of being ‘for’ the ‘Other’ extend? First, 
because my responsibility for the ‘Other’ is already in tow and not something I 
can have a say about, I am already responsible and therefore will always be 
responsible. My responsibility will not cease. Second, citing the Danish 
philosopher Knud Løgstrup, Bauman (Bauman, 1993) makes it clear that 
Levinas’s responsibility for the ‘Other’ is endless because ‘the moral self is a 
self always haunted by the suspicion that it is not moral enough’. That is to say, 
the moral self has to be the judge of what is ‘enough’, the interpreter of ‘could I 
have done more’ in the absence of codified rules, laws and the like that place 
boundaries on what is acceptable in a society and therefore of me. Here though 
the moral self is to answer to itself. There are no rules, conventions or 
parameters that necessarily apply. Each situation is unique, which makes the 
task of defining what is ‘moral enough’ difficult. Adding to this difficulty the 
‘Other’ has no right to demand anything from me and so they cannot offer me 
any help in the decision of ‘what is enough’. The moral self is without appeal to 
anyone or anything. This moral anxiety and uncertainty that I experience is what 
underpins morality, a self always unsure if it has been moral enough. 
 
In sum, while responsibility in the everyday sense of the word has me focus 
upon my own atomistic self and what it is to be human and ‘alive’, Levinas’s 
idea of responsibility embraces a self able to transcend its being as only 
concerned for itself to a caring ‘for’ an ‘Other’. In Levinas’s philosophy 
responsibility is moral. Moral responsibility involves the metaphysical ‘call’ of the 
‘Other’ to me and it precedes any responsibility that my self, in its everyday 
form, is summoned to. It is a form of responsibility that does not issue from me 
but comes from the ‘Other’ in the form of a command to be ‘for’ the ‘Other’ as 
my first priority. It is a command that issues from the ‘Face-to-Face’ relation. It  
is a relation of moral responsibility and it has two communicative parts, what 
Levinas calls the ‘Saying’ and the ‘Said’, which were briefly touched on earlier 
and now to be explored in more detail. 
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The ‘Face’ speaks in that it is already discourse. Here, discourse is the ‘first 
word’, which is not communication as something given to a sign or an 
interpretation but communication by way of an exposure to being effected. 
Before the ‘Face’ of the ‘Other’ is presented to me I am at the ready to receive 
it, open to its approach. Levinas calls this state of openness and hence 
passivity to being effected, the ‘Saying’. To be clear, he uses two main 
concepts to explain his thinking around discourse, the ‘Saying’ and the ‘Said’. 
They represent a model that explains how ‘ethics signifies within ontological 
language’ (Critchley, 1992: 229&234). Specifically, the ‘Saying’ is a verb and is 
the ‘act’ of ‘Saying’ something. The ‘Said’, a noun, is ‘what’ is being said. More 
particularly, the ‘. . .saying is a state of openness to the other’, a ‘here I am’ prior 
to any commitment being made (Hand, 1989: 6-7). The ‘Said’ is the giving of a 
sign to a communication. The meaning given to the ‘Saying’ though is very 
different to anything communicated by the ‘Said’. In terms of the ‘Face’, the 
‘Saying’ is a form of greeting the ‘Other’ which Levinas (Levinas, 1985): 88) 
says, is to already answer for him. As I reiterate, it is the first word presented 
that says ‘here I am’, a passivity of being open, of being exposed to being 
effected by the expression of the depth of ‘Other’s’ personal being and their 
demands on us. 
 
The terms ‘Saying’ and ‘Said’ show how communication and language, which 
convey meaning, can be problematic for responding to the ‘Call’ of the ‘Other’. 
Levinas believes that ethics as a first philosophy occurs in the ‘approach’ the 
‘Other’ makes to me which precedes any response I am able to make. The 
‘approach’ made to me by the ‘Other’ is what he refers to as the ‘Saying’. The 
‘Saying’ is the antecedent to verbal signs and linguistic systems, ‘. . . it is the 
proximity of one to the other the commitment of an approach, the one for the 
other, the very sign ifyingness of signification’ (Levinas, 1981: 5). The ‘Saying’ 
is a communicative event because the ‘approach’ of the ‘Other’ by way of the
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‘Face’ is expression, a sense, a savouring, and a sensibility that is ‘sensuous 
affection’. A phenomenological encounter of the call of the ‘Other’, which ‘... 
can only be experienced genuinely through a non- or pre-discursive 
phenomenological encounter (the saying) and it is the movement toward 
discourse (the saying) rather than its content (the said) that assists in that 
disclosure’ (Murray, 2003: 57). 
 
Because the content of communication cannot reveal the ‘Face’ of the ‘Other’ 
Levinas seeks a structure of communication that enables the ‘Saying’ to be 
heard. This means that to be able to respond ethically to the Face (call) of the 
‘Other’ the communication of the ‘Saying’ must not be corrupted by the ‘Said’. 
The ‘Said’ is the move from phenomenology to ontology, or the ‘signifyingness’ 
or ‘signifiance’ of the expression of the ‘Other’ to my signification of that 
signifying expression. Significance (saying) is what lies behind signification 
(said) and is what makes it (said) possible. The ethical ‘Saying’ is given 
linguistic representation ‘as’ the personal interpretation expressed by the ‘Said’. 
The ‘Said’ is the content and form of communication that makes up the 
response to the ‘Saying’. Important in Levinas’s thinking is that the ‘Saying’ is 
dominated by the ‘Said’. For example, as soon as the other’s ‘Otherness’ is 
revealed by way of the expression of the ‘Face’ it becomes a response (the 
said) to the response (the saying), an interpretation that is subject to 
misrepresentation and distortion. The ‘Saying’ has its own meaning which is 
different from the ‘Said’. It is a point Murray (Murray, 2003) clarifies by way of 
yet another example of human behaviour in WWII ; that if someone was to ask 
you to ‘please shoot me in the head’, Levinas would say there is no ethical 
requirement on you to follow this command. Hence, the ‘Said’ of discourse (the 
message conveyed in the ‘please shoot me in the head’) does not fully 
represent the true message of the ‘Other’ (the saying). In fact, it is a distortion.
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The ‘Said’ is subject to distortion and misrepresentation. In the above example 
the rhetoric of the Nazis and the supporting ideology functioned to misrepresent 
the ‘Saying’ which resulted in a ‘Said’ that enabled normal everyday German 
people to commit atrocities and murder. The ethics of Levinas’s first philosophy 
insists that the ‘Saying’ as a response, a commitment of an approach, is what is 
required of my responsibility ‘for’ the ‘Other’. In short, Levinas’s ‘Saying’ 
means, to be responsible for the ‘Other’ before I know I am. This responsibility 
though is purely sense and is something that must be sensed prior to any 
interpretation of it. The conceptual apparatus that supports the interpretation 
and communication of my responsibility though may or may not be a response 
that is an accurate representation of that responsibility or obligation to respond. 
 
Moreover, because ‘there is no saying that is not the saying of the said’ 
(Levinas, 1993: 141), the ‘Saying’ is not the original ‘Saying’. It is but an 
interpretation and a representation of it. The suggestion is that discourse and 
the straightforwardness of ‘everyday language’ and not rhetoric and eloquence 
are what best enables one person to communicate with another person in a  
way that is open and better able to represent the ‘Saying’ of the ‘Said’. Rhetoric 
and eloquence support a form of communication that is self-serving and 
contaminates the response to the call of the ‘Other’. Discourse and ‘everyday 
language’, on the other hand, is the form of communication that helps keep at 
bay the totalising of the other and is more akin to representing the ‘truth’. These 
ideas are particularly relevant for nurses and midwives who care for people in 
the health care environment that is laden with medical jargon and rhetoric 
burdened by the politics of health. As Levinas clarifies, ‘everyday language’ 
incorporates words whose meaning is due to ‘. . . their usage surrounding 
interhuman relations that are based on custom and tradition and the everyday 
repetitions they entail. Those are the meaning of words according to usage, as 
if the language were nothing but a ‘tool” (Levinas, 1993: 137), a tool that can 
lessen distortion and misrepresentation. While the summons of the ‘Other’ is
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something that is always heard as pure expression, communication by way of 
the ‘Said’ is different, it is either the response to and therefore an interpretation 
or a representation of the ‘Saying’ of the ‘Said’, or equally it may be the failure  
to respond at all. 
 
As an addition to the thinking of Levinas about the function of rhetoric, Murray 
(Murray, 2003) posits the view that rhetoric can have a positive effect and thus 
be used to either facilitate the disclosure or re-disclosure of the Face of the 
‘Other’, which he labels a ‘rhetoric of disruption’ and a ‘rhetoric of supplication’. 
Communicatively (re)disclosing the Face of the ‘Other’ is an additional 
mechanism to Levinas’s Face as a phenomenological given, and is the product 
and goal of ongoing discourse (Murray, 2003). 
 
The rhetoric of disruption is a form of communication about the ‘Other’ that 
challenges and redresses ideological assumptions that work to distort, mask or 
silence the call of the ‘Other’. The idea is that, after the call of the ‘Other’ a 
rhetoric of disruption is implemented by this other to work against ideology that 
would disrupt, mask, or silence their phenomenological call to respond. It is a 
targeted rhetoric in that it is implemented after the response to the call of this 
‘Other’ is heard and responded to. It is at this point the rhetoric of disruption 
takes effect by challenging communicated ideological assumptions, cultural 
stereotypes and the like in an attempt to recover the original phenomenological 
unsettling of discourse, by itself unsettling the discourse that settled that 
unsettling (Murray, 2003). As Murray (Murray, 2003: 77) claims; 
‘... I suggest that only through an ongoing dialogical engagement can 
assumptions, beliefs, and values be kept under constant scrutiny, and 
the potentially oppressive effects of cultural stereotypes and prejudices 
be monitored’. 
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Murray’s idea is that dialogue enables the ‘Other’ to be, bit by bit, re-disclosed. 
However, in a point of note, Murray (Murray, 2003: 88) says that ‘there is an 
insurmountable and unavoidable risk here, because dialogue can never 
disclose the ‘Other’ in its absolute ‘Otherness’, in its purity. Instead, such a 
mode of communication can only work to recover the ‘Face’ one bit at a time, as 
it targets particular masking one at a time. As a consequence, this dialogue by 
way of a rhetoric that seeks and a rhetoric that reveals is never ending, never 
sure that it is a representation of the ‘Saying’. 
 
For its part, a rhetoric of supplication is about the self’s role in practicing a 
dialogue that supports the ‘Other’s’ rhetoric of disruption (Murray, 2003). It is a 
targeted form of communication that uses a variety of communication 
strategies, such as active listening, to help reveal the ‘Face’ of the ‘Other’ by 
way of creating a communicative environment conducive to supporting the 
‘Others’ investigation of ideas through their implementation of a rhetoric of 
disruption. A rhetoric of supplication assists the recovery of the ‘Face’ after the 
fact of its appearance and its masking or distortion (Murray, 2003). Again, this 
view purports that the dialogical form of communication with ‘Others’ is never 
ending because it is always haunted by the idea that we can never be certain 
that we have the content of the response to the original call of the ‘Other’ 
accurate enough. But as Bauman (Bauman, 1993: 80) says; 
‘what makes the moral self is the urge to do, not the knowledge of what 
is to be done; the unfulfilled task, not the duty correctly performed. But it 
all adds up to the fact that a person can never be entirely sure that he 
has acted in a right manner’. 
 
But being human means we are one among many. The relations we have are 
not only with one other but many different others who are called a ‘Third party’. 
What Levinas (Levinas, 1981: xxxv) describes as ‘... not simply a multiplication 
of the other, from the first the ‘Third party’ is simultaneously other than the
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other, and makes me one among others’. What is more, the discovery of the 
‘Third’, ‘tertiality’, only occurs after the encounter with the Face. That is to say, 
while the ‘Third party’ is also an ‘Other’ they are not an ‘Other’ of the ‘otherwise 
than being’ that has me responsible for them as a matter of fact. The ‘Third 
party’ is one step removed from me, so removed in fact that I can only 
encounter them when I leave the moral realm and enter the world of ‘Social 
Order’ ruled by a social form of justice and not morality (Bauman, 1993). 
Introduction of the ‘Third party’ is what disturbs the one to one relation and 
introduces a world outside of my relationship with the neighbour, that is, it 
introduces society and questions the limits of my responsibility. 
‘I now live in a world populated by All, Some, Many and their 
companions. Similarly, there is Difference, Number, Knowledge, Now, 
Limit, Time, Space, also Freedom, Justice and Injustice, and certainly, 
Truth and Falsity’. (Bauman, 1993: 112) 
 
Once the ‘Other’ is dissolved into the ‘Many’ their ‘Face’ is lost to me. This 
means that; 
‘the third party is other than the neighbour, but also another neighbour, 
and also a neighbour of the other, and not simply his fellow. . . the other 
and the third party, my neighbours, contemporaries of one another, put 
distance between me and the other and the third party’. (Levinas, 1981: 
157) 
 
Although the ‘Third party’ is distant to me they can equally be present to me as  
an ‘Other’, or conversely the ‘Other’ is never only my ‘Other’ but an ‘Other’ to an 
other and therefore potentially a ‘Third party’ to me. Levinas’s point is that the 
possibility of the ‘Other’ being a ‘Third party’ to me has me realise that the 
‘Other’ does not only exist for me because the ‘Other’, who is also my 
neighbour, is also an ‘Other’ to an other. They are never simply my ‘Other’. The 
other as a ‘Third party’ disturbs the closeness and the asymmetry of my
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responsibility in the ‘Face-to-Face’ relation. 
 
The appearance on the scene of the ‘Third party’ introduces a questioning into 
the relation which changes the nature of my responsibility. It means I am no 
longer a hostage to the needs of ‘Other’ but now can expect some form of 
reciprocity, as in, the asymmetry characterised in the moral relation of being 
‘for’ the Other is all but lost in the other as a ‘Third party’, because now 
objective criteria are able to be applied to the relation that seeks just reasons 
for what they do. As such, ‘Third party’ relations are able to be thermatized. 
While the selves may be unique and irreplaceable in the moral party of two of 
the ‘otherwise than being’, in the social world of the ‘Third party’ the others, as  
in all others, are able to be compared and contrasted. 
 
The other being a ‘Third party’ is what enables my deliberation on the relation 
which itself comes to form part of socially accepted standards and normative 
measures and what Levinas say’s makes the ‘Third party’ a judge. The ‘Third 
party’ is the personal form of the other because their ‘Face’ is hidden from my 
view or as it relates to nursing and midwifery, a patient, the persona that hides 
their ‘Face’, which is a topic that will be taken up in the next chapter. In other 
words, my relation to the other as a ‘Third party’ deals with either their persona  
or the presentation of themselves as they want everyone to see them. This 
means my relation to them is now tied up with responding to stereotypes and 
the like that determine how I am to act toward them; what Bauman (Bauman, 
1993) refers to as a ‘Mask’ (persona) and not to their ‘Face’. Dissolving of the 
‘Other’ into the ‘Many’ results in the loss of their individuality because my focus 
is on responding in an objective way to them as a group (one of many) and so 
sets up the demands of justice and impartiality. 
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‘The third party introduces a contradiction in the saying whose 
signification before the other until then went in one direction. It is of itself 
the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question: what do I have to 
do with justice? A question of consciousness. Justice is necessary, that 
is comparison , coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, 
thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the 
intellect, and in intentionality and the intellect, the intelligibility of a 
system, and thence also a copresence on an equal footing as before a 
court of justice’ (Levinas, 1981: 157). 
 
As mentioned above, the appearance on the scene of the ‘Third party’ is the 
appearance of society. It encompasses the idea of justice because I am now 
responsible for an ‘Other’, as in many ‘Others’ and must weigh up all the 
competing ‘calls’ on my responsibility. It is to discover the necessity for justice, 
because the question becomes, who in this plurality comes first. What is the 
order of the responsibilities, which is also the birth of the demand for justice 
(Levinas, 1981, 1998)? As Levinas (Levinas, 1998) says, justice must therefore 
take precedence over the taking upon myself the fate of the other. I must judge 
where in the moral party of two I assumed responsibility as a given. This, he 
(Levinas, 1981) believes, is a question of consciousness, the birth of the 
theoretical. It starts from the responsibility ‘for’ the other and then requires 
judgement and a comparison of the unique other which is incomparable. As 
stated, this is the moment of knowledge, consciousness and intentionality 
(Levinas, 1998). 
 
Levinas (Levinas, 1998) is of the belief that our ethical obligation, which arises 
from the ‘call’ of the ‘Other’, is the starting point for justice. As such, justice is 
not about the application of some external set of principles or laws. Instead, 
justice is made possible by way of the dialogical prioritisation of ‘calls’ that 
encompass the community of others in which each is responsible for all. For
 273
his part, Murray (Murray, 2003) is of the view that the problem for justice is that 
the response to the ‘call’ of the ‘Other’ is subject to ideology which can give rise 
to a response that in no-way resembles a response equal to the original ‘call’ to 
be responsible, as revealed in the ‘Saying’. There is a potential for 
misrepresentation of the ‘Saying’ revealed in the ‘Said’. What is of note is that 
Murray (Murray, 2003) claims that, in order to overcome this problem, a 
rhetoric of ‘disruption’ and ‘supplication’ can facilitate the re-disclosure of the 
‘Face’ by way of the development of a response that is more akin to the 
‘Saying’. Complicating this idea however, is the fact that the ‘call’ of the ‘Other’ 
is most often part of a larger context where there are multiple ‘calls’ of many 
‘Others’ to be responsible. It is a point that Levinas (Levinas, 1985: 90) 
responds to when he says; 
‘If I am alone with the Other, I owe him everything; but there is someone 
else. Do I know what my neighbour is in relation to someone else? Do I 
know if someone else has an understanding with him or his victim? Who 
is my neighbour? It is consequently necessary to weigh, to think, to 
judge, in comparing the incomparable. The interpersonal relation I 
establish with the ‘Other’, I must also establish with other men; there is 
thus a necessity to moderate this privilege of the Other from whence 
comes justice. Justice, exercised through institutions, which are 
inevitable, must always be held in check by the initial interpersonal 
relation’. 
 
Thus, ethical obligations arise from ‘Others’ as in each ‘Other’, not from 
situations involving numerous ‘Others’, nor from groups who possess the same  
or similar beliefs or, for that matter, a collective of others represented in an 
organisation. But as to how Levinas’s interpersonal account of ethics is 
translated to justice for the multiple ‘calls’ of ‘Others’ is unclear in his 
philosophy. As he (Levinas, 1985) says above, I do not only have a single 
interpersonal relation, I have many, and therefore it is necessary that I
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moderate this privilege of the ‘Other’, and keep it in check by the initial 
interpersonal relation. Just how this is to be done is not explained. It is a point 
that Peperzak (1996) and Murray (2003) have also identified, with Murray 
suggesting that dialogue is a way of managing justice because it can enable 
one to ‘hear’ the ‘Call’ of the ‘Other’ as in all the ‘Others’. Dialogue makes 
possible the prioritisation of the ‘Calls’ of ‘Others’, in that, it enables the 
unsettling of ideology that can mask, distort and silence the ‘Call’ of ‘Others’. 
Moreover, dialogue, he argues, makes possible the unsettling of my own 
preconceptions, justifications, arguments, and rebuttals and thereby discloses 
and tests my prioritisation of the ‘Call’ of the ‘Other’. But equally it means that 
justice requires I always be at the ready to ‘hear’ the ‘Call’ of the ‘Other’ and in 
all ‘Others’, given those ‘Calls’ may be silenced by ideology. What this means 
for nurses and midwives is that dialogue can help reveal a ‘Said’ that is a more 
accurate representation of the ‘Saying’ of not only one ‘Other’ but many 
‘Others’. In this way dialogue can assist the just prioritization of the multiple 
ethical summonses that I confront. 
 
To summarise, the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas morality is what makes 
possible the transcendence of being. It explains how a person is able to 
transcend their being as a separate living entity, concerned only with mastery 
of its atomistic self, to being ‘for’ the being of another person where the self is 
not a consideration. It is an asymmetrical relation where there is no expectation  
of reciprocity because it is founded on the ‘Good’, a ‘Good’ expressed in the 
‘passivity of supporting’ an other’s personal being as a result of my incarnation  
as responsible or, put another way, my love for my neighbour. In a moral 
relation the ‘Good’ seeks me out and is presented to me in the form of the ‘urge  
to do’ that desires a response, and is the only place I am able to catch a 
glimpse of this ‘Good’. Like the example of maternity, the fact is I am 
responsible and could always be more responsible. My responsibility is to 
respond to being ‘for’ the ‘Other’. It is what I am obedient to before I know I am
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because it is not privy to my conscious thought and therefore is not what I am 
able to have a say about. Instead, the approach of the other is an initiative that I 
undergo. I am passive with regard to its approach. As responsible I wait at the 
ready, open and exposed in its direction, susceptible to being affected, and 
make my subsistence the order of their support (substitution). This responsibility  
I have is lived out in the sensing of the ‘Face’ (expression) of the ‘Other’, which 
is a signifyingness that gives rise to my sensing of it as a significance. The first 
word in ethics is ‘Saying’ ‘here I am’, which is my exposure to being affected by 
the expression of the signifyingness of an other’s personal being. The giving of    
a sign (Said) to the significance of the ‘Other’ (Saying) is the point at which I 
enter the scene and is at best only an interpretation and representation and so  
is open to distortion and misrepresentation or it may be a failure to respond at 
all. A rhetoric of disruption and supplication is suggested as one way to help 
rediscover the original Saying. The introduction of the third party disturbs the 
one to one relation and changes the nature of my responsibility to one where I 
can expect some form of reciprocity. Now objective criteria are able to be 
applied to the relation that seeks just reasons for what they do. But equally 
justice means I stay at the ready to ‘hear’ the ‘Call’ of the ‘Other’ of the multiple 
ethical summonses I confront. It all adds up to the fact that a person can never 
be sure they have acted in the right manner. Notably, the personal act of 
responding to the ‘urge to do’, which is to take responsibility ‘as if’ I was already 
responsible and the one and only one responsible, is the act of creating the 
moral space and what grounds me as a moral person or, as is this case here, a 
moral nurse and midwife. 
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Chapter 11  Love as moral responsibility in Nursing 
and Midwifery 
 
11.0  Introduction 
In this chapter nurses and midwives answers to the general question of ‘what is 
love in nursing and midwifery’ are analyzed using Emmanuel Levinas’s 
philosophy of the ‘metaphysics of otherness’. Incorporated into this analysis 
are specific examples of love in nursing and midwifery from the Neo-Socratic 
dialogues plus discussion that addresses the various questions raised in the 
commentary section of each of the Neo-Socratic dialogues and those raised in 
the discursive analysis of the extant literature on caring in nursing and 
midwifery. 
 
To recap, six Neo-Socratic dialogues were conducted in urban and remote area 
locations of Australia, Singapore and Bhutan, which resulted in 56 nurses and 
midwives agreeing to participate in this study. Participants came from across a 
variety of fields of nursing and midwifery that included Aged Care, Child and 
Adolescent Nursing, Accident & Emergency, High Dependency, Critical & 
Coronary Care, Intensive Care, Acute Medical and Surgical Nursing, Operating 
Theatre & Recovery Room, Day Surgery, Oncology, Rehabilitation Nursing, 
Palliative Care, Midwifery, Women’s Health, Mental Health Nursing, Community 
Nursing, Naturopathy, Nurse Administration and Nurse Education.
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11.1  A case of what is love in Nursing and Midwifery 
 
11.1.1 Participants general answer to the question of ‘what is love in  
nursing and midwifery’ 
The combination of the six groups’ general answers to the question what is love 
in nursing and midwifery plus the specific answers to the examples of love 
offered by participants (table 2) support the view that love is an integral part of 
the professional practice of a nurse and midwife. While it was thought love was 
something every nurse and midwife is able to express it is not something that is 
always obvious in the everyday practice of a nurse and midwife. Participants in 
this study believe that love in nursing and midwifery has its origin in the deep 
connections that exists between all people. Love it was thought arises from the 
moral character of the nurse and midwife in response to the witness of the 
destitute state and suffering of a patient. It is not something that is able to be 
controlled by conscious thought, because it is not privy to a person’s 
consciousness, nor is it something that every nurse and midwife responds to in 
the same way. But love is what makes possible the identification of the unique 
value of the person of the patient. It gives rise to the commitment needed by the 
nurse and midwife to do whatever is required for their good and is more than 
the simple performance of the professional duty of care because it requires the 
nurse and midwife to ‘go beyond’ the professional duty and enter a ‘special 
relationship’ that is evidenced in the commitment and the compassion shown. 
Love in nursing and midwifery is not something that is able to be mandated 
because the level of the professional commitment and responsibility is too 
great.
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Love in nursing and midwifery is said to be present when the nurse and 
midwife-patient occasion elicits in the nurse and midwife a feeling of being 
deeply responsible for the patient’s welfare. It is a responsibility that requires a 
nurse and midwife to ‘go beyond’ a concern only for their self-project and 
instead place the welfare of the patient before their own without any 
consideration of reciprocity. It is a responsibility of the quality of a family 
relation, and is characterized by closeness, honesty and frankness and the 
requirement, willingness and commitment needed ‘to take care of’, to protect, 
and to give of their self to the patient, which may require both a personal and 
professional sacrifice. It is a responsibility that causes the level of the nurse’s 
and midwife’s commitment to the patient to increase in response to perceived 
threats to the patient’s welfare as is evidenced in the determination of the nurse 
and midwife to help. The nature of the responsibility that is felt by the nurse and 
midwife is unique; it cannot be transferred, shared or ignored. 
 
A characteristic of love in nursing and midwifery is its selflessness. It is where a 
nurse and midwife use all their professional skills and judgment in responding in 
a selfless way to the needs of the patient. It is a selfless response that may not 
be without its risk to both their own personal and professional welfare and also 
that of the patient’s, but a risk that is understood by the nurse and midwife to be 
acceptable if the motive for the action is for the ‘good’ of the patient. Love in 
nursing and midwifery incorporates the nurturing of a relationship of 
understanding, where the will of the other is accepted when it is based on a 
sound health belief. It is an intention that expresses the nurse’s own health 
beliefs in the light of the desires of the other. 
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Table 2:  Specific group answers to the group specific example of love in 
nursing and midwifery. 
 
Group: 1 
Answer 1: ‘It is going beyond the traditional duty of care’. 
Answer 2: ‘Being prepared to take a risk’. 
Answer 3: ‘She was prepared to put herself up to have to think differently’. 
Answer 4: ‘Respecting the choice of the other’. 
 
Group: 2 
Answer 1: ‘It’s a selfless, subconscious calling’. 
Answer 2: ‘Love is more than duty’. 
Answer 3: ‘Being content in your vulnerability’ 
 
Group: 3 
Answer 1: ‘When I asked the Medical Officer to leave the room’. 
Answer 2: ‘Love in midwifery is being there for the woman and being with 
the woman doing what needs to be done to help her birth in a 
way she wants’. 
 
Group: 4 
Answer 1: ‘She had the courage to go beyond her colleagues’ negative 
expectations in caring for this woman and beyond the duty of 
care’. 
Answer 2: ‘Accepting the person unconditionally, and was non-
judgemental’. 
Answer 3: ‘Being determined to show compassion and not concerned with 
the consequences of her actions upon herself’. 
Answer 4: ‘Love is a willingness to connect, be open, sensitive and show 
understanding of the patient’s plight by giving hope’. 
Answer 5: ‘The nurse was prepared to form and enter a ‘special’ 
relationship that was characterized by her feeling deeply 
responsible for the woman’ 
 
Group: 5 
Answer 1: ‘Going the extra mile putting the women before her self’. 
Answer 2: ‘It is responding to the helplessness of the women’. 
Answer 3: ‘There is no exception of a reward’. 
 
Group: 6  
Answer 1: ‘A sense of responsibility for the boy as a big sister’. 
Answer 2: ‘Responding to the identification of the loneliness and isolation 
of the boy’. 
 
 280
11.1.2 The analysis 
What is love in nursing and midwifery as it was identified in the six Neo-Socratic 
dialogues of this study? Before offering an answer to this question and 
consistent with the rationale outlined in the previous chapter, the words love 
and responsibility are used interchangeably throughout this text. The view 
adopted is both that of the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas who says that my 
incarnation as responsible is my love for my neighbour, and that of nurses and 
midwives, who in this study, offered examples of love in their professional 
practice that were expressions of their ‘Goodness’ in being responsible ‘for’ 
their patient’s. 
 
With this in mind, an initial examination of what nurses and midwives 
understood as love that is specific to their profession shows they believed that 
‘love has its origins in the deep connections that exist between all people’. This 
part of their answer to the question of ‘what is love in nursing and midwifery’ is 
an acknowledgement that as humans we are born into a world of social 
relations that we have no say about and cannot ignore. Here our relationship to 
an other and to all others is of a ‘with’ type, in that, we are with them as they are 
with us but we are all the time separate beings similar to the severed beings in 
Aristophanes’ Myth in Plato’s Symposium (Plato, 1994). In Aristophanes’ 
account of love, the Greek God Zeus split the original androgynous being into 
two separate beings. Being as it were now a separate living entity, the two 
severed beings had an unfulfillable desired (an eros form oflove) to be reunited 
into one being. As a result, they kludged together in an attempt to be reunited 
but no matter what they did they could not bridge their separation. Being human 
is like this. Each one of us is separate from the other and no matter what we do 
by ourselves we cannot bridge that separation. At best our relations can only 
ever be of a ‘with’ nature, side by side never able to inhabit the same space. 
Again, like the severed being, our being ‘with’ each other is what is humanly 
possible, a being among other beings, a social being. 
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As social beings there is an expectation on us to be responsible and to act in a 
responsible way toward each other. For example, in the modern Western styled 
health system the role of a nurse and midwife involves, at the most basic level, 
the responsibility of caring for another human being. The responsibility spoken  
of here is a part of what it is to be a ‘professional’ nurse and midwife as is 
mandated by a country’s government and managed by its statutory bodies. 
 
Being a professional nurse or midwife has a legal requirement that dictates 
what I am obliged to be interested in and responsible for, that is, ‘to be 
responsible’ is what is straight-a-way expected of the nurse and midwife by 
another, be that other a patient, family member, doctor, paramedic, health 
administrator, or anyone who has call upon them in the conduct of their 
professional role. It is what can be expected of a nurse and midwife and is their 
duty to meet, what is owed another and is that person’s right to expect as a 
standard of performance. A feature of the duty of care in nursing and midwifery  
is that my responsibility is able to be stated in terms of expected performance 
standards and can be compared against specified performance criteria that 
results in an outcome measure of the duty that is owed. 
 
While the patient may expect something of me, it is my responsibility in the form 
of my duty toward them that dictates what it is that I will and will not do in being 
responsible. My duty toward the patient as a measure of my responsibility is a 
matter of my business and, while it is what I owe, there is a limit to what can be 
expected of me. In this study several groups believed that love in nursing and 
midwifery requires a person to ‘go beyond the duty of care’ and therefore have 
a relationship with the patient that is more than that of a ‘with’ type. The 
responsibility that can be expected of me as a nurse and midwife in the 
performance of my professional duty of care is very different to the 
responsibility that arises from the deep connections between people that are 
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understood to be love. 
 
Then, what is the form of responsibility that arises from the deep connections 
that exist between people? A general idea that was reported in several of the 
Neo-Socratic dialogues was that love requires a nurse or midwife to enter a 
realm not normally associated with the conduct of everyday life. Love, it was 
said, requires that you to ‘go beyond’ yourself. For example, group one 
concluded that love in nursing and midwifery involves an ability to ‘go outside of 
yourself’ in the act of professional caring, group two said it was a ‘subconscious 
calling’ and ‘deep connection’, group four, ‘beyond’ an everyday relationship, 
group five, a subconscious connection, and group six, understanding this deep 
connection in Buddhist terms, said it was responding to ‘a previous life 
connection’. What nurses and midwives were alluding to was a profound form of 
interhuman relationships and responsibility that can be explained by the 
application of Levinas’s philosophy of the ‘metaphysics of otherness’ or the 
‘primordial’ state of interhuman relations. 
 
According to nurses and midwives, love requires that you ‘go beyond’ or ‘go 
outside of yourself’, which in ontological terms, is an impossibility. The only way 
that a person can go outside of themselves without their being in another form 
is to be able to transcend being by being not another being but by being moral. 
It involves what Levinas refers to as the impersonal form of being, the 
impersonality of expression expressed in a realm that is different to that 
associate with everyday life and also different from the nothingness that is 
associated with death. The realm of impersonal expression where there is an 
existing without existence, is like Levinas’s (1985: 48) example of the dark of 
the night. In the darkness of the night there is nothing but the darkness, which is 
at the same time not nothing. The realm associated with this nothing that is not 
nothing, the realm different to being and not being, is the realm of the 
impersonal form of expression. 
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What nurses and midwives thought was the place that you go to when you ‘go 
outside of yourself’ is in fact a place that you’re personal being is not able to go. 
This place that is no place, like in the example above of the all encompassing 
presence of the nothingness of the dark of the night, is what your being is 
submerged in and is what Levinas calls ‘il y a’ (there is). It is from this realm 
called ‘there is’ (‘il y a’) that your personal being and consciousness emerges 
and where that which is unknowable to you gathers form and becomes your 
knowledge. Therefore, if love requires a nurse or midwife to ‘go beyond’ or 
outside of themselves, it is not an indication of a place to which they go but of 
an ability, the ability of their personal being to transcend its physical form to a 
metaphysical state, the state of being moral. It moves the nurse and midwife 
patient relation from a being ‘with’, which is characteristic of the relations of 
separate living entities, to a being ‘for’, where there exists an ability of the nurse 
and midwife to rise above a concern only for their self, and place the patient as 
their first priority. In this way, being ‘for’ is to be moral and is the only way a 
person can bridge their isolation as a separate living entity. 
 
The initiative to be moral though is not an initiative that is of our own making. 
While the personal act of taking responsibility ‘as if’ I was already responsible,   
is the act of creating the moral space, the initiative that I undergo to be 
responsible comes to me from outside of myself and is beyond what I can 
know. In this study, love in nursing and midwifery is said to be present when the 
nurse-patient occasion elicits in the nurse and midwife a feeling of being deeply 
responsible for the patient’s welfare. It is a responsibility that requires a nurse 
and midwife to go beyond concern only for their self-project and instead place 
the welfare of the patient before their own without any consideration of 
reciprocity, that is, ‘... the responsibility for the others, the relationship with the 
non-ego, precedes any relationship with the ego with itself’ (Levinas, 1981:   
119). If this were not the case and nurses and midwives were in the first 
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instance a self-project and second responsible for their patients, they could say 
no to the responsibility that ‘Faced’ them because they would be first an ego 
concerned for their own welfare. Love as moral responsibility is not something 
that is able to be controlled by conscious thought. Nurses and midwives 
reported that they were not conscious of any decision to open themselves up to 
the plight of their patients. Reflection on the examples of love showed these 
nurses and midwives were already responsible for their patients before they 
knew what that responsibility was. As such, love requires a nurse and midwife 
to be ‘for’ their patient before they are for themselves and this is what makes 
these examples of love examples of moral responsibility. 
 
Notably, in all of the Neo-Socratic dialogues nurses and midwives repeatedly 
spoke about how, in their example of love, they could not recall ‘thinking’ about 
their response or the way of their response to the patient. For example, in 
Group two, Lincoln repeatedly stated that ‘he could not, not go’ to the aid of a 
boy who had a mental health problem and was engaging in self-harming 
behaviour, such as the hitting of his head on the wall of a locked psychiatric 
ward room, even though Lincoln was warned that to do so would pose a danger  
to himself. The double negative contained in the phrase ‘I could not, not go’ 
highlights this as a choice that was no choice, in that Lincoln felt that he had to 
go to the boy despite himself. He lead the way without consideration of himself 
and this was precisely what made this ‘I could not, not go’ an example of moral 
responsibility. 
 
In Levinas’s philosophy, moral choices arise from conscious thought but moral 
responsibility is different because it is what a person has no say about at all. 
Therefore, this ‘I could not, not go’ phrase combined with the absence of any 
‘thinking’ about the original ‘urge to do’ highlights this as an initiative that was 
presented to Lincoln for his consideration of ‘what to do’. The origin of the 
initiative ‘to do’, was not an initiative of Lincoln’s making or for that matter of the 
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other nurses and midwives who offered examples of love because the initiative 
‘to do’ came from the direction of the patient, or more precisely, from the realm 
of impersonal being (there is) to them. 
 
In this study, it was concluded that love is what ‘. . . makes possible the 
identification of the unique value of the person of the patient, which gives rise to 
the commitment needed by the nurse and midwife to do whatever is required for 
their good and is more than the simple performance of the professional duty of 
care because it requires the nurse and midwife to ‘go beyond’ the professional 
duty and enter a ‘special relationship’ that is evidenced in the commitment and 
the compassion shown.’ For example, in group four, nurses and midwives held 
the view that ‘love is a willingness to connect, be open, sensitive . . . ‘. However, 
this again was not something that any of the nurses and midwives could 
actually recall ‘thinking about’ or ‘doing’ in their example of love. What they had 
articulated in the dialogue was exactly what they did not do because the form of 
love they were speaking about was not an initiative of their making. 
 
Instead, the form of love they had identified was what these nurses and 
midwives were ‘Called’ on to do as their moral responsibility in being ‘for’ their 
patients and what they later came to understand that responsibility to be. The 
second answer of group four, to the question of what is love in nursing and 
midwifery, shows the beginning of some insight into the idea of love being moral 
responsibility when they say, ‘the nurse was prepared to form and enter a 
‘special’ relationship that was characterized by her feeling deeply responsible 
for the woman’. The feeling of deep responsibility is what follows the ‘Call’ to be 
responsible and is an interpretation of that responsibility they identified as ‘deep 
within’. The suggestion here is that this ‘deep within’ is not a place, but as 
spoken about earlier, an ability. It is the ability of our being to transcend itself, 
rise above a concern for itself and place the welfare of an other first, in this case 
the patient, and as such, it could be characterized as ‘a special relationship’ that 
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is the state of our being morally responsible. This form of love that is moral 
responsibility is ‘a special relationship’ and is what makes possible the 
identification of the unique value of the patient, or more specifically, the unique 
value of the person of the patient. While it is a separate matter to what is to be 
done in the performance of the professional duty of care, love as moral 
responsibility was understood to be ‘a special relationship’, and what makes 
possible the initiative to be responsible in a professional way. 
 
Another characteristic of all the examples of love that were offered was the 
ability of the nurse and midwife to place the welfare of the patient as a first 
priority. While this was explained in different ways, it was a theme that was 
consistently expressed. For example, nurses and midwives were of the view 
that love requires; ‘selflessness’, ‘being content in your vulnerability’, ‘. . . not 
concerned with the consequences of her actions upon herself’, ‘. . . being there 
for the woman and being with the woman doing what needs to be done to help 
her birth in a way she wants’, ‘going the extra mile putting the women before her 
self’, and ‘a sense of responsibility for the boy as a big sister’. 
 
So how is it possible for a nurse and midwife to place the welfare of a patient 
before their own self-project? In Levinas’s philosophy, the initiative of these 
nurses and midwives to be morally responsible for their patients comes from the 
ability of their being to arise above self interest and be ‘for’ the ‘Other’, which is 
the signifying of their ‘Goodness’. 
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‘This antecedence of responsibility to freedom would signify the 
Goodness of the Good: the necessity that the Good choose me first 
before I can be in a position to choose, that is, welcome its choice. That 
is my pre-originary susceptiveness. It is a passivity prior to all receptivity, 
it is transcendent. It is an antecedence prior to all representable 
antecedence: immemorial. The Good is before being. There is 
diachrony: an unbridgeable difference between the Good and me, 
without simultaneity, odd terms. But also a non-indifference in this 
difference. The Good assigns the subject, according to a susception that 
cannot be assumed, to approach the other, the neighbour. This is an 
assignation to a non-erotic proximity, to a desire of the non-desirable, 
to a desire of the stranger in the neighbour’. (Levinas, 1981 : 122) 
 
The visceral signifying of the ‘Goodness’ of the ‘Good’ is in the ‘desiring of 
desiring’; what Levinas refers to as ‘non-erotic proximity’. As a body of 
‘Goodness’ ‘non-erotic proximity’ has nothing to do with distance, but rather 
refers to a restlessness or a state of permanent attention like a ready-at-hand 
alertness that does not arise from any initiative of mine. The desire of ‘non- 
erotic proximity’ is metaphysical and therefore is not a response to any need 
that I may have. This being the case, the responsibility inherent in this state of 
permanent attention is endless because it is not aimed at satisfying a need, 
there is no end in its sight. Hence, the more I take up my responsibility the more   
I become responsible. My responsibility circles on itself without end so I can 
never be sure that I have been responsible enough. Accordingly, my ‘proximity’ 
to the ‘Other’ is founded on the ‘Good’ and is the birthplace of moral 
responsibility. It explains why all the examples of love portrayed encounters 
with patients that sort their betterment. The ‘Good’ of impersonal being (‘there 
is’) is the foundation of moral responsibility and is before good and evil are 
presented to me as a choice. It is from a foundation of ‘Goodness’ that nurses 
and midwives enacted examples of love that were examples of moral 
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responsibility. 
 
Contrary to the thinking of nurses and midwives, moral responsibility and hence 
metaphysical ‘Goodness’, does not require a personal and professional 
sacrifice as some nurses and midwives thought. Love it was said requires the 
ability to go beyond a concern for the self which may require both a personal 
and professional sacrifice. However, a feature of all the examples of love that 
were offered was that the nurses and midwives who offered their example of 
love saw the example the same way as the rest of their group who were trying 
to understand the example to the point of making it their own. While the 
particular group may have thought there was evidence of a personal and 
professional sacrifice on the part of the nurse or midwife, the originators of the 
examples thought there was no such sacrifice. 
 
A sacrifice is the surrendering of something that is of worth to one’s self-project 
for the sake of the other who is held to be more important. When applied to the 
idea of love, the surrendering contained in the concept of sacrifice is not a 
‘giving up’ of something as in a loss but rather a ‘giving over’ as in an offering. 
To consider something as a loss is to consider its effect on oneself, which is the 
situation of an onlooker. However, in a case of love in nursing and midwifery I 
am not a concern, do not come first and therefore there is no loss and no 
sacrifice. For example, it could be likened to that of the anticipation exemplified 
in group six where Mana, on encountering the boy with leukaemia, thought of 
him as being his ‘big sister’ and he being ‘almost her child’, a relationship that in 
the Buddhist belief system was characterised by a ‘previous life connection’. 
Because a discussion on Buddhism is outside the scope of this analysis, the 
ideas communicated by Mana will instead be interpreted using Levinas’s 
philosophy. Being a ‘big sister’, ‘almost her child’, and having a ‘previous life 
connection’, as was explained by Mana, involved not so much what she could 
do to benefit the boy’s health in terms of medical therapies for the treatment of 
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Leukaemia but being ‘for’ the boy by being the substance of his support, which 
was to be a psychological support to him but moreover by being morally 
responsible. The metaphor of Mana being the boy’s ‘big sister’ expresses the 
idea that she was responsible for the boy in a way that had him come before 
herself. She anticipated his needs before she or he knew what his needs were. 
What the example of Mana shows is that nurses and midwives can experience 
a responsibility that is founded on ‘Goodness’. A responsibility that has them 
first for their patient’s before they are for them selves, because this 
responsibility requires them to offer their substance for the support of the 
patient, like in a case of maternity. If sacrifice is a consideration it is at best 
only an after thought. 
 
Levinas (Levinas, 1981: xiii)} says, ‘the figure of maternity is an authentic figure 
of my responsibility’. In maternity one does not choose one’s responsibility to an 
other. It is a form of responsibility that chooses me by the very nature of my 
being and that being is a body of ‘Goodness’. The command to act for the 
‘Good’ of the ‘Other’ is a pre-existing command, a command that requires me to 
give something of my very being to the support of the ‘Other’. Like in a case of 
maternity, the example of Mana, as described above, showed that her 
responsibility in being ‘for’ the boy involved a giving of her own substance for 
the betterment of the boy without any holding back and before it was asked. To 
onlookers, this giving of their own substance could be interpreted as a ‘giving 
up’, a sacrifice, because like maternity, she bore all the responsibility for the 
bearing of the being of the boy even if it was at her own peril. However, 
sacrifice here is not viewed as a ‘giving up’ but a ‘giving over’, a passive 
opening of oneself to being affected, an exposedness to the ‘Other’ that is so 
complete that in the example of Mana above, she bore all the demands of the 
being of the boy and also the consequences of the bearing of this being. 
 290
So what is love as a ‘sense’ of the patient? In this study it was concluded that 
‘love in nursing and midwifery arises from the moral character of the nurse and 
midwife in response to the witness of the destitute state and suffering of a 
patient’. What is witnessed though is more than that seen by the eyes of a 
nurse or midwife or is able to be experienced because it is what is sensed prior 
to seeing or experiencing anything at all. Nurses and midwives encountered not 
only a patient as a physical entity or for that matter the mask that may be worn 
as a persona or the role played by the patient in a particular situation, or as a 
description of them like that which takes place in a conversation, they were 
exposed to the patient’s ‘Face’, which in ‘Otherwise than Being’, is a 
‘significance’. 
 
In the ‘Face-to-Face’ relation ‘significance’ is what is expressed. In the example 
of Lincoln and the boy, this ‘significance’, which was the expression of the 
‘Otherness’ of the boy’s personal being, is a ‘pure act’ and not a type of a 
message. It is like the sensing that occurs in the metaphor of something being 
on the tip of your tongue which is not a something at all because it is an act that  
is the act of sensing. That which is on the tip of your tongue cannot be 
formulated into anything able to be explained because it remains elusive and 
beyond your immediate grasp. It is one step removed from you and is not what 
you are able to think about because there is no content that is able to be 
applied to the sensing. For his part, Levinas uses the term ‘savouring’ to 
describe this ‘pure act’ in that the sensing is more like the ‘savouring’ that 
takes place prior to any determination of it. Lincoln, without knowing it, encountered 
the boy’s ‘Otherness’ by way of the sensuous expressing of it and it had 
‘significance’. 
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The expression of the ‘Face’ as a ‘significance’ was an initiative that each nurse 
and midwife in this study underwent and was not something they either 
instigated or could initiate. Instead, it came to them as a revelation, for the 
‘signifyingness’ of the ‘Face’ of the ‘Other’ is not something that is able to be 
thought because it is a ‘signification without context’. Being ‘pure experience’ 
this expressive event (‘signifyingness’) that is a presence takes place in the 
realm of impersonal being (there is). It is a presence that cannot be 
experienced because it is beyond comprehension. 
 
Moreover, the ‘Face’ of the ‘Other’ was presented to each nurse and midwife as 
an appeal. It was an appeal of ‘authority’ in that they were obedient and passive  
to being affected by its approach. The nurses and midwives were open to the 
‘Face’s’ expression expressing a ‘significance’ signified as ‘thou shall not kill’ or 
‘right to be’, or put another way, the impossibility of committing murder on the 
‘Other’. As Levinas (1979) proclaims, this ‘significance’ is a revelation because  
it reveals the original relationship as one of peace (Good), that aroused in these 
nurses and midwives their ‘Goodness’. Using Levinas’s terms, the ‘Good’ or 
‘God’ or ‘Other’ chose each nurse and midwife on the patient’s behalf and held 
them ‘hostage’. Like being a ‘hostage’, each nurse and midwife was 
inescapably assigned the one responsible for their patient. They were each held 
accountable ‘as if’ they were the one and only one responsible. It is a 
responsibility that was assigned them before their freedom as a subjective 
being and its obsession with its self-project. For his part, Levinas refers to this 
accountability as an ‘unavoidable assignation’. It was an unavoidable 
responsibility that had each nurse and midwife responsible for their patient as 
though they were the only one, the irreplaceable responsible one. This is how 
these nurses and midwives came to be responsible for the being of the patient 
before being responsible for their own self-project, the unavoidable 
responsibility assigned each of the nurses, and explains ‘why them’ and not 
another nurse or midwife. 
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The unavoidable responsibility of being moral is what enabled each of the 
nurses and midwives in this study to place the patient as their first priority. 
Translated to the delivery of nursing and midwifery care, this meant that what 
others witnessed of these nurses and midwives in the course of caring were 
various expressions of selflessness. Not surprisingly, in this study nurses and 
midwives concluded, ‘a characteristic of love in nursing and midwifery is its 
selflessness. It is where a nurse and midwife use all their professional skills and 
judgment in responding in a selfless way to the needs of the patient. A selfless 
response that may not be without its risk to both their own personal and 
professional welfare and also that of the patient’s but a risk that is understood 
by the nurse and midwife to be acceptable if the motive for the action is for the 
‘good’ of the patient.’ The view postulated is that the selflessness of moral 
responsibility relates not to a self that can be known but to the before of the self, 
which by virtue of our being human, must be in the transcendence of being. 
This means that what each nurse and midwife first sensed as an expressed 
‘significance’ of the patient was ‘goodness’. It was a ‘goodness’ that signified 
their responsibility which was to respond without any consideration of their own 
selves. This being the case, while onlookers identified these nurses and 
midwives enacting behaviour characteristic of selflessness, the nurses and 
midwives themselves did not see this the same way. For example, all of the 
nurses and midwives stated they did not believe they did anything special in 
terms of selfless acts. Contrary to the opinion of onlookers, they thought they 
were simply doing what they ‘had to do’ and in this they did not feature. The 
view of these nurses and midwives is consistent with the idea of them being 
morally responsible for their patients, where the patient was their first priority 
and therefore before any consideration of themselves. As they indicated, in 
moral responsibility the self does not come before the patient. 
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So what is the relation of the nurse and midwife to the patient? The example 
offered by Lincoln who was allocated the nursing care of a boy who had a 
mental health problem and was inflicting trauma upon himself shows that the 
relationship and communication between them was different to what is 
understood of these every day terms. What was communicated between 
Lincoln and the boy was not only language in the form of a spoken word or a 
summons that resulted from some form of interaction or something that Lincoln 
thought about the boy, or the situation that confronted him. Instead, 
communication was by way of the approach of the sensuous expression of the 
‘Otherness’ of the boy’s personal being to Lincoln. Communication between 
Lincoln and the boy had it’s origin in what Levinas describes as the ‘relation 
without relation’. It identifies the fact that there is an encounter, in this case, 
between Lincoln and the boy, but it is not an encounter as an event that is 
situated in a time. The time of an encounter is when I understand what has 
arisen from the relation. At the level of our everyday being Lincoln encountered 
the boy and gained knowledge of him in terms of the characteristics that made 
him the unique and distinctive boy that he was, that was different to all other 
boys. However, the relationship of Lincoln and the boy was different to normal 
because it involved a time of an encounter where neither of them had 
knowledge of each other nor experience of each other in the way of an 
everyday relationship. 
 
Levinas’s idea of the ‘relation without relation’ describes the encounter of the 
‘Otherness’ of our personal being. For example, the encounter of Lincoln and 
the boy was not only an encounter with the boy as an other person it was also 
an encounter with his ‘Other’ in the sense of his Being that was different to the 
Being of Lincoln and is what is unknowable. In the ‘relation without relation’, 
communication is by the ‘Face-to-Face’ encounter. It involves a relation that 
neither Lincoln nor the boy was aware of, because it took place in the sphere of 
impersonal being (there is) and was not privy to conscious thought. The boy did 
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not ask for anything of Lincoln nor for that matter did any of the patients in the 
other examples of love that were offered by nurses and midwives. In fact, in the 
beginning of this example, the boy was unaware of Lincoln’s presence and did 
not have any knowledge of Lincoln at all. Nonetheless there was an approach 
made of Lincoln but it was outside of what Lincoln and the boy could have 
initiated or had knowledge because the encounter took place in the sphere of 
the ‘there is’ (‘il y a’) where, as explained above, personal being does not exist. 
 
In the ‘relation without relation’, Lincoln was responsible for dealing the boy 
signifyingness (Levinas, 1981): 48). It involves the ‘Saying’, which is a form of 
communication that makes possible the phenomena associated with ‘alterity’ 
breaking into the sphere of the world of understanding. The ‘Saying’ is the 
extreme exposure expressed in the phrase ‘here I am’. Levinas often uses this 
phrase ‘here I am’ to exemplify the extreme passivity, openness and receptivity  
to being affected by the ‘Face’ or ‘significance’ of the ‘Otherness’ of an other’s 
being. Communication between Lincoln and the boy was not only 
communication of the type associated with the conduct of everyday life, it was 
also by way of the ‘Saying’, which is not about the utterance of a word, or a sign 
or anything that was of a wilful act or of Lincoln’s ego. Communication by way 
of the ‘Saying’ involved the extreme exposure of Lincoln, expressed in his 
passivity, openness and receptivity to being affected by the boy. As Levinas 
explains; 
‘The saying signifies this passivity; in the saying this passivity signifies, 
becomes signifyingness, exposure in response to. . . , being at the 
question before any interrogation, any problem, without clothing, without 
a shell to protect oneself, stripped to the core. . . ‘ . . . ‘Saying is a 
denuding, of the unqualifiable one, the pure someone, unique and 
chosen; that is, it is an exposedness to the other where no slipping away 
is possible’. (Levinas, 1981 : 49-50) 
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Lincoln’s encounter with the boy was by way of the passivity of exposure in 
‘Saying’ ‘here I am’; a sensitivity and exposed-ness to being affected that 
renders the approach of the ‘Other’ a ‘signifyingness’. The ‘Saying’ of Lincoln is 
this passivity and openness to being affected and not the activity involved in 
taking on the liability for the demands of the boy. In ‘Saying’, Lincoln was open 
to the approach of the boy and this is what made possible the signifying 
impression on him. It was his visceral response to the exposure of being and 
was the very start of language that is ‘Said’ as dialogue, interpretation and felt 
responsibility. In ‘Saying’, ‘here I am’, Lincoln was the one responding, a 
responsibility expressed in his being ‘for’ the boy’s demands. This visceral 
response of Lincoln to the boy was the beginning of language and did not need 
the boy to be aware of Lincoln because, in the ‘relation without relation’, 
Lincoln’s exposure to the boy, his exposed-ness, rendered the boy a 
‘signifyingness’ and this was enough. What preceded the feeling, revealed in 
Lincoln’s statement ‘I could not, not go’ to the boy, was his ‘Saying’ ‘here I am’, 
which was to respond as the one chosen and was what he had no say about. 
 
What Lincoln had a say about was a different matter to his ‘Saying, ‘here I am, 
in that, Lincoln’s encounter with the boy impacted on him in two ways. At the 
level of Lincoln’s personal being, he came to an understanding of the situation 
that confronted him as a nurse and what was his professional duty of care. He 
knew what his duty was and it was the same as other nurses. His response as 
an individual, though, was a different matter because it was not a shared 
response but one unique to him and was what he felt as his responsibility. 
However, what he felt as his responsibility was also different to the un- 
thematizable ‘Signifying’ impression of the ‘Face’ of the boy that was expressed 
to him in the ‘Saying’. 
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In Levinas’s philosophy, the ‘Saying and the ‘Said’ occur together (diachrony). 
The ‘Said’, though, can never be a true representation of the ‘Saying’ because 
the ‘Saying’ cannot be represented in language. The ‘Saying’ is a verb and is 
the ‘act’ of saying something, the ‘Said’, a noun, is ‘what’ is being said. The 
‘Said’ is the giving of a sign to a communication and is, to repeat, dialogue, 
interpretation and felt responsibility. Therefore, the meaning given to the 
‘Saying’ is different to anything communicated by the ‘Said’. What Lincoln ‘Said’ 
was his responsibility was what he felt his responsibility to be. It was at best his 
interpretation of his responsibility, which was not the ‘urge to’ be responsible, 
but rather, the content of his responsibility as to what he thought he was to do. 
Lincoln interpreted his responsibility as going to the boy and then sitting on the 
floor holding him in a ‘bear type hug’ so as to restrain the boy from injuring 
himself. 
 
While it was the ‘Call’ of the ‘Other’ expressed by way of the ‘urge to do’ that 
commanded each of the nurses and midwives to be responsible, it was the 
nurses and midwives themselves who gave a voice to that command. The 
command of the ‘Other’ to not kill is not vulnerability or a command that can be 
commanded to be acted on because there is no means for its enforcement. 
Signifying ‘thou shall not kill’, or more precisely the signifying of the ‘Other’, is 
what I cannot kill because it does not belong to my world. The ‘Other’ is of the 
sphere of impersonal being (there is) and is therefore what I do not have access 
to and so cannot do it any harm. The ‘urge to do’ signifies my responsibility and 
that responsibility is in being ‘for’ the ‘Other’. The choosing of ‘what to do’ in 
being responsible is at best my interpretation of my moral responsibility. 
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In this study nurses and midwives spoke about how, in their examples of love 
they felt they had not sone everything that they could have done for their 
patients.  There was always a feeling that they could have done more in the 
interpretation of their moral responsibility.  For example, Lincoln stated that he 
later was concerned about his action of sitting on the floor with the boy, 
restraining him in a ‘bear type hug’, when he found out that the boy had 
suffered from child abuse.  The self reflection and questioning his actions 
around holding the boy in a ‘bear type hug’ were yet another response to an 
‘urge to’ be responsible in a responsible way as a professional nurse, owing the 
boy a duty of care.  It is an example of how the moral self is always haunted by 
the suspicion that it is not moral enough (Bauman, 1993).  Lincoln’s example of 
love shows that a nurse is never sure that he has acted in the right manner or 
been moral enough.  It explains how love in nursing and midwifery is not a ‘one 
off’ response to a need as is the case of caring.  All the examples of love are 
elongated examples that show nurses and midwives repeatedly going back to 
the patient haunted by the suspicion that they had not done everything that they 
could have done for their patient’s betterment. 
 
Being morally responsible means each nurse and midwife responded to the 
responsibility they felt in a professional way, which was fraught with uncertainty.  
For example, onlookers questioned the wisdom of Lee’s actions of taking the 
nursing home residents on a beach holiday that required the driving of a 
minibus with a trailer, and also a resident that was difficult to manage, when she 
had no experience of this type of enterprise.  A question that followed this group 
dialogue was, ‘Is it acceptable for a health professional to knowingly place the 
good of another at risk?’  The obvious answer is no, but it is not this simple.  
While the professional duty of care is able to be quantified in terms of expected 
and measurable performance outcome standards, when meshed with moral 
responsibility Lee found she had to make an interpretation of both.  At best, 
Lee’s interpretation of the ‘Saying’ of moral responsibility is exactly that.  It is an 
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interpretation that can always be improved on because it is based on the 
desiring of the ‘Good’, but as a professional nurse her interpretation of the 
‘Saying’ was carried out within the boundaries of the professional duty of care. 
The problem for Lee and other nurses and midwives is that they could never be 
sure that the interpretation of their moral responsibility (‘Saying’) and 
professional duty of care was accurate enough or would be seen by others in 
the same way. In group five, Pricilla responded to the elderly woman who was 
in need of medication and had no money. She came to an arrangement with the 
pharmacist to provide the woman with the medications that she required that, 
while legal, was outside the normal mechanisms for providing medications. 
Next day, Pricilla’s superior reprimanded her for this action because the 
supervisor did not feel morally responsible for the woman and was only 
responding to the encounter from the perspective of professional accountability 
which she interpreted differently to Pricilla. The mix of professional 
accountability and moral responsibility results in an interpretation that is 
different to those who only act out of a professional concern. 
 
What exactly, then, is the ‘urge to do’ that nurses and midwives responded to 
as the responsibility they each felt? As explained above, the ‘Call’ of the ‘Other’ 
was expressed as a ‘significance’ and is a communicative event that exceeds 
my ability to contain it. If this were not the case, the ‘Other’ would be an object 
of my knowledge and experience and simply be more of the ‘Same’, that is, 
more of the world as I understand it. It would be of my knowledge and 
experience and therefore what I could have a say about, and that say could be 
no. However, the approach of the ‘Face’ is what I cannot say no to because it 
has no content that I am familiar with and therefore no way of being thematized. 
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‘The manifestation of the kath’auto in which a being concerns us without 
slipping away and without betraying itself does not consist in its being 
disclosed, its being exposed to the gaze that would take it as a theme for 
interpretation, and would command an absolute position dominating the 
object. Manifestation kath’auto consists in a being telling itself to us 
independently of every position we would have taken in its regard, 
expressing itself. Here, contrary to all the conditions for the visibility of 
objects, a being is not placed in the light of another but presents itself in 
the manifestation that should only announce it; it is present as directing 
this very manifestation-present before the manifestation, which only 
manifests it. The absolute experience is not disclosure but revelation. 
..‘. (Levinas, 1979: 65) 
 
The ‘Call’ of the ‘Other’ is an expressive event, ‘pure experience’ that presences 
itself as a ‘signifyingness’, a ‘significance without context’. This ‘signifyingness’ 
arrives to me as a ‘revelation’ because it exceeds my ability to contain it. It is as 
though it immerses the temporal of my personal being and stops me in my track 
of thought. As an expressive event the ‘Call of the ‘Other’ is the only way the 
sphere of exteriority associated with the ‘Otherness’ of personal being is able to 
break into the sphere of phenomena and is the ‘urge to do’. Because the ‘urge 
to do’ is a ‘revelation’ it interrupts the obsession I have for my self-project. In 
this study all the nurses and midwives experienced an ‘urge to do’ that was 
demonstrated in the asymmetrical relation of their patient. A feature of all the 
examples of love that were offered was that the patient was a first priority, a 
relation where reciprocity was not a consideration. 
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As reported in the previous chapter, being ‘for’ the ‘Other’ means that each 
nurse and midwife was ‘for’ the ‘Other’ whether or not the ‘Other’ was ‘for’ them. 
The impetus to be ‘for’ the ‘Other’, their patients, clearly laid with each nurse 
and midwife, for while your (nurse or midwife) patient may change, nobody can 
take the patient from you (nurse or midwife) because it is not your (nurse or 
midwife) patient who holds you (nurse or midwife) fast. It is your responsibility 
that holds your (nurse or midwife) patient fast. In a relation of being ‘for’ the 
‘Other’ the notion of reciprocity does not exist because the nurse’s and 
midwife’s being ‘for’ the patient was not predicated on the patient’s being for 
them. They did not feature in the ‘urge to do’. Thus, moral responsibility 
presences itself to each nurse and midwife in the form of the ‘urge to do’. It 
immersed their temporal being and stopped them in their track of thought, 
demanding a response which did not include any consideration of reciprocity. 
 
In practical terms, because the responsibility of being ‘for’ originates in the 
realm of the ‘there is’ and is from where our personal being arises, the self is of 
no concern. The ‘Face-to-Face’ relation involves our impersonal form of being 
where ‘I’ do not feature, am not a consideration, which as an aside, is different 
to not being concerned about myself or ‘giving up’ something of myself as a 
decision ‘I’ make. To continue with the example of Lincoln and the boy with a 
mental health problem, while Lincoln was warned by other nurses not to go into 
the room with the boy because of the danger this posed to his welfare, he still 
did. Lincoln ignored the danger, not because he was brave, hardy or foolish, or 
had an attraction to violence or some type of altruistic motive, but because his 
being responsible ‘for’ the boy was affected in the ‘there is’ of impersonal being 
where his self-project did not figure. If Lincoln was able to think about himself 
and his responsibility, which he was not, his response may well have been very 
different. The moral self comes into being through our ability to rise above a 
concern only for ourself. It moves the focus of attention from the self to the 
other in a relational bond that, as previously explained, has me ‘for’ an ‘Other’ 
 301
so creating the moral state of the self, or more specifically moral responsibility. 
Thus, in the conduct of nursing and midwifery, an act of love will be a product of 
the interpretation of what the nurse or midwife understands that responsibility to 
be (‘Said’), which to onlookers it may appear to include an act of selflessness. 
However, none of the nurses and midwives thought their response to the 
patient involved an act of selflessness. To the contrary, because, as they said, 
their focus was on the patient and not on themselves. 
 
Being moral means each nurse and midwife had to give a voice to the 
command of the ‘Other’, but this is at the very point the ‘Face’ of the ‘Other’ 
disappears and each nurse’s and midwife’s personal interpretation takes over. 
As explained above, the ‘urge to do’, to be responsible, is different to what ‘I’ 
understand as an interpretation of my responsibility. Therefore, the command to 
be responsible that is expressed in the ‘urge to do’ can result in a number of 
different responses. Each nurse and midwife could have responded by doing 
nothing which is a refusal similar to an apology. As in an apology, there is a 
consideration of the request that is subsequently denied. So to do nothing is to 
do something. It is to do nothing, and is in itself a response to the ‘urge to do’. 
In this study, what makes the examples offered examples of love as 
responsibility is that each nurse and midwife gave a voice to the moral ‘urge to 
do’, not by saying no or for that matter an apology but by way of enacting their 
responsibility by inquiring into the condition of the patient and so responding in   
a responsible way as a professional nurse or midwife. 
 
Applied to a practical example, the ‘urge to do’ was an initiative that Lee in 
group one underwent with a number of the elderly residents she was nursing. 
Lee was affected by the expression of the ‘Otherness of the residents personal 
being, impacted by the institutional living arrangements of the nursing home. 
She said, ‘something inside her demanded she act’. It shows that the relation of 
love as responsibility of being ‘for’ the ‘Other’ is not only a relation of one ‘Other’ 
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but is a relation that can be had with all ‘Others’ whether physically present or 
not. In this case, it was a relation that was had with a number of nursing home 
residents around a common theme, the frailty of old age that resulted in 
institutionalised care, with the denial of many of the normalised features of 
independent community living, such as a change of surrounds and 
individualised routes, like in this example, a holiday. Lee responded to the 
‘Saying’ and the ‘urge to do’, which Levinas describes as Lee being a ‘hostage’  
to the ‘Other’. It is the putting of oneself in the others place, so moving the 
relation from a ‘with’ nature, where one is side by side and never able to inhabit 
the same space, to a being ‘for’ the ‘Other’, where the ‘Other’ becomes a first 
priority. Lee, by way of the ‘urge to do’, gave an interpretive voice to the 
‘Saying’ of the nursing home residents as was captured in the ‘Said’ activity of 
going on a seaside holiday. 
 
When applied to the other groups, the ‘urge to do’ shows that in group two, 
Lincoln responded to the destitute state of the boy with a mental health problem 
who was engaging in self harming behaviour by going to his assistance, which 
meant going into the room with the boy and sitting on the floor holding him in a 
‘bear type hug’ to restrain him from self-harming behaviour. While the decision 
and action to restrain the boy in this way may be questionable, Lincoln 
responded to the urge to be responsible, which was his interpretation as a 
professional nurse. 
 
In group three, April responded to the mother’s call to be responsible by being 
her advocate in birthing. April’s interpretation of this responsibility as the 
woman’s birthing advocate required that she use her professional judgement in 
determining what equated with a safe birth of the baby. Again, April’s response 
was her moral and professional response to be responsible for the birthing, 
which does not protect it from debate because at best it was only her 
interpretation of the ‘Call’ of the ‘Other’ (‘Said’) and she cannot ever be sure that 
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her response is an accurate interpretation of that ‘Call’. 
 
In group four, Cristal responded to the ‘Call’ of the women who had taken an 
overdose of Diazepam and labelled by other nurses in the Accident and 
Emergency Department as a ‘looser’, which simply served to harden her 
resolve to help this woman. Cristal’s interpretation of her responsibility as an act 
of love was in her responding in a professional way with sensitivity and what 
appeared to be compassion for the woman’s plight. 
 
In group five, Pricilla responded to the elderly woman who was in need of 
medication and had no money. On encountering the woman Pricilla responded 
to the ‘Call’ to be responsible by not abandoning her but ensuring she received 
the medications she required and more. Pricilla’s example is important because   
it shows how the interpretation to respond to the ‘Call’ of the ‘Other’, and the 
professional judgements that accompany the response, continue as long as is 
needed to respond to the repeating ‘Call’. In this example, Pricilla made several 
attempts to improve the plight of the woman in order to overcome any potential 
threat to her wellbeing. 
 
In group six, Mana’s example is linked to Buddhism where on encountering the 
boy she was straight away responsible for him, a responsibility that was of the 
quality of a family relation, and in fact, a previous life connection. Without 
delving into the theology of Buddhism, from Mana’s description she had some 
form of metaphysical relation with the boy that had her engage in activities that 
were common to nurses and midwives in the other groups. Mana responded by 
being responsible ‘for’ the boy personally and professionally as best she could 
interpret it. 
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Responding though, for these nurses and midwives, was at best an 
interpretation of the responsibility of the ‘Saying’, which Bauman (1993: 80) 
says, ‘. . . all adds up to the fact that a person can never be entirely sure that he 
has acted in a right manner’. At one level the witness of the destitute state and 
suffering of a patient can be interpreted as the ‘Call’ of the ‘Other’ to be 
responsible that is revealed in the ‘Saying’. At the level of personal being, each 
nurse’s and midwife’s interpretation of the responsibility of the ‘Saying’ is what 
they ‘Said’ it was. 
 
Given a person can never be sure that the responsibility they feel (‘Said’) is an 
accurate interpretation of the ‘Saying’, a rhetoric of disruption and supplication 
can be help. For example, it was through the planning and execution of the 
seaside holiday that Lee communicated with the residents, as well as possible 
given the level of resident debility, a dialogue that over time was aimed at 
revealing a more accurate interpretation of the ‘Saying’ of each resident. In 
other words, without knowing it, she employed a dialogue strategy that Murray 
(2003) identifies as a ‘rhetoric of disruption and supplication’ as a mechanism 
for ensuring the holiday was ‘their’ holiday and not Lee’s interpretation of what 
that should be. While the seaside holiday was an idea of Lee’s, the planning 
and the implementation of the holiday, and its significance for each resident 
was in the hands of the residents themselves. For Lee, her focus was on the 
implementation of, in the first place, a ‘rhetoric of disruption’ that aimed at 
working against communicated ideological assumptions and stereotypes that 
would mask the ‘saying’. Lee used ongoing dialogue to unsettle assumptions, 
beliefs and values that were representations of cultural stereotypes and 
prejudices held by individual nurses and family and supported by the western 
system of health, as for example, including a resident’s partner and dog on the 
holiday and them sleeping together in one bed, which they had not done for a 
very long time. 
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Next, ‘rhetoric of supplication’ was continually applied to the planning and 
implementation phases of the holiday as Lee sought to understand what the 
residents wanted from it. As she said, for example, we ‘sat up late in the 
evenings and sat around the kitchen table drinking coffee and eating biscuits 
with a couple of the residents, just talking about everything and planning the 
next day’. Lee’s example shows a dialogical form of communication that sort to 
refocus her interpretation of the ‘Others’ ‘Saying’ because she could never be 
quite sure that her response to the ‘Call’ of the ‘Other’ was accurate enough. 
 
Nursing and midwifery is not a solitary practice and typically the patient 
situations reported in this study also involved other nurses and midwives 
providing care. It leads to the question as to why nurses and midwives respond 
in different ways to the same patient, or more specifically, as to how one nurse 
or midwife can have a relation with a patient that is characterised by love and 
another not. For example, in Group four, Cristal reported on a relation of love 
with a woman who was admitted to the Accident and Emergency Department 
with an overdose of Diazepam. In the example Cristal was but one of many 
nurses who were attending to this woman’s need for care yet she was the only 
nurse, from the information offered, who had a relation of love with the woman. 
 
As Cristal pointed out, other nurses had a negative view of the woman. They 
saw her as an ‘annoying lady, [ just comes in and wants attention’. Cristal’s 
interpretation of this situation was that ‘people had given up on her and she had 
given up on herself’, ‘but I established a connectedness with her’. From the start 
and without any more information than that offered by Cristal, the other nurses 
in the Accident and Emergency Department appeared to have objectified the 
woman and therefore responded to her as a patient and not a person, and what 
is more, a troublesome patient at that, since the objective relationships other 
nurses had with this woman were governed by the rules, norms, stereotypes, 
prejudices and accepted practices associated with working in this Department. 
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As Cristal said, it seemed as though the medical and nursing staff had given up 
on her. She was in and out all the time. There was no one helping her get off 
the medical merry-go-round. Instead, the staff found her annoying and just 
wanted to get rid of her. Cristal responded differently however. She 
acknowledged the woman’s subjectivity and responded to her as the person of 
the patient. As she said, ‘my response was very quick, I wanted to see what I 
could do . . . to make a difference to this woman’. 
 
The stark contrast of Cristal’s relationship with the woman compared to that of 
other nurses makes clear that while the expression of the ‘Other’s’ personal 
being is an initiative that I undergo (‘Saying’) and is unavoidable, the ‘Said’ as 
an interpretation of the ‘Saying’ and is at best an interpretation which can also 
be a distortion or even a failure to respond to the ‘Saying’ at all. Thus, the 
personal act of taking responsibility ‘as if’ I was already responsible is the act of 
creating the moral space but is also the point at which ‘I’ enter the scene and 
choose either to ignore the ‘urge to do’, or respond to it with some form of 
interpretation. The example of Cristal reinforces the point made above, that 
while the ‘Other’ commands my ‘Other’ by way of the ‘Saying’ it is not a 
command that can be commanded because it is each nurse and midwife who 
must give a voice to that command by acting on the ‘urge to do’. Notably, the 
divergence between Cristal’s response to the ‘Saying’ of the woman and the 
other nurses reveals the spectrum of possible responses to the ‘urge to do’. 
Should Cristal’s group have had access to the views of other nurses working in 
the Accident and Emergency Department there is no doubt that there would 
have been an even greater range of interpretative, distorted or ignored 
responses to the urge to be morally responsible for the woman. 
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In the above example, Cristal demonstrated a commitment to the welfare of the 
woman but it was a commitment that she believed she had no say about. As 
Cristal said, ‘I didn’t really think about it’, ‘it just happened’, and later ‘I wanted 
to see what I could do; I did not want to abandon her like this nurse had; I saw it 
as a challenge, to make a difference to this woman’. Similarly, all the examples  
of love showed evidence of the nurses and midwives being committed to a 
course of action in being morally responsible for their patients, even if it meant 
their actions could, and in some cases did, result in negative outcomes for 
themselves. Yet Cristal’s comments suggest she was committed at two levels of 
her being responsible. First, Cristal’s statements about ‘I didn’t really think 
about it’ and ‘it just happened’, is evidence that she found herself already 
committed to the woman. Here, commitment issued from the ‘Saying’, as the 
signifying impression on Cristal was as the one designated morally responsible 
for the woman more responsible than anyone else. Second, Cristal was also 
committed in a self-conscious way in living out her character as a professional 
nurse. What Cristal ‘Said’ was her responsibility was what she felt her 
responsibility to be as a professional nurse and the content of this responsibility 
was what she was committed to implement. Furthermore, the knowledge of the 
nurse abandoning the woman to whom she was committed resulted in an 
increase in Cristal’s commitment. In this way commitment also issues from the 
object or the person to who one is responsible and is what one is able to think 
about in an objective way. 
 
11.1.3  The general answer to the question of ‘what is love in nursing and 
midwifery’ 
This study presents a case that love in nursing and midwifery is another name 
for moral responsibility. Applying the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas’s 
metaphysics of ‘Otherness’ to the tacit knowledge of nurses and midwives 
clinical practice examples of love show it to be moral responsibility. It is the 
ability or more precisely, the possibility of the transcendence of personal being 
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in its everyday form that enables a nurse and midwife to be ‘for’ the patient 
before they are for themselves. It explains nurse and midwife patient relations 
that onlookers identify as expressions of love that are different to caring. Given 
that the philosophy of the metaphysics of ‘Otherness’ applies to the general 
condition of human being, love as moral responsibility is not unique ‘to’ nursing 
and midwifery but is made unique ‘in’ nursing and midwifery though the 
fulfillment of the professional roles of nurse and midwife. Specifically, the 
relational context has a nurse and midwife constantly exposed to patient 
situations that give rise to expressions of love as moral responsibility. While the 
reason a nurse and midwife is ‘Good’ in their responsibility is no different to any 
other person, the relational context in which the nurse and midwife-patient 
relation takes place is unique and different to the relations of other health 
professionals and the general population. 
 
The various nursing scholars cited in the discursive analysis of the extant 
literature on caring, in different ways, locate caring as a central initiative of what 
it is to be a human being. But love as moral responsibility is not like this 
because it centres on the ability of our being to transcend its physical form to a 
metaphysical state, the state of being moral. Therefore to speak of love as 
moral responsibility is to speak about the ability of our being to ‘go beyond’ or 
outside of itself’, which is not about a place that you go but of an ability. It 
moves the nurse and midwife-patient relation from a being ‘with’, which is 
characteristic of the relations of separate living entities, such as in the case of a 
caring relation, to a being ‘for’, where there exists an ability of the nurse and 
midwife to rise above a concern only for their self, and place the patient as a 
first priority. Thus caring is ontological and love is metaphysical. 
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While every nurse and midwife is capable of an expression of love as moral 
responsibility, the response of every nurse and midwifery is different to the point 
that some responses are not identified as love at all. In a nurse and midwife 
patient relation the initiative of love as moral responsibility issues from the 
sphere of impersonal being (II y a) and is what a nurse and midwife has no say 
about because, in the transcendence of being, they do not feature. In this 
sphere of impersonal being (ii y a), a relationship with the non-ego comes 
before any relation of the ego of the nurse and the midwife and is what enables 
them to rise above their self-project as a first priority. 
 
A central concept in Levinas’s philosophy is our incarnation as responsible. It is  
a moral responsibility that is founded on the ‘Good’ and from which our personal 
being arises. It is a ‘Good’ or ‘Goodness’ that is before choice in that the ‘Good’ 
chose me before I was in a position to choose. This ‘Good’ that is inside every 
person and therefore in every nurse and midwife, without them having 
knowledge of it, is what has them desire to be the support of the patient’s being. 
Thus, the ‘Good’ has a nurse and midwife susceptible to being effected by the 
patient’s conditionof being and is expressed in the passivity and supporting of a 
nurse and midwife in being ‘for’ the patient. The signifying of this ‘Goodness’ is 
the desiring of desiring. It is what each and every nurse and midwife yearns for 
without knowing it, assigning them to approach the patient in that they are open 
and exposed to being affected by the condition of the ‘Otherness’ to the 
patient’s personal being. It is a metaphysical state of permanent attention that 
does not arise out of any need the nurse and midwife may have and therefore 
has no need that is to be satisfied. This being the case, the responsibility 
inherent in this state of permanent attention is endless because the nurse and 
midwife can never be sure they have been responsible enough. It explains how,  
in an example of love that a nurse and midwife feels, there is always more that 
they could have done in being morally responsible for the patient. For these 
reasons love as moral responsibility is analogous to maternity. Like maternity, a 
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nurse and midwife does not choose their responsibility to the patient. It has 
chosen them by the very nature of their being, and the foundation of that being 
is a body of ‘Goodness’. 
 
In a relation of love between the nurse and midwife and the patient there is no 
conscious decision made to open themselves up to the plight of the patient 
because the initiative to be morally responsible comes not from the nurse or 
midwife. It comes from the direction of the patient or more specifically, from the 
sphere of impersonal being (ii y a) to them. The time of this encounter is when a 
nurse and midwife understands what has arisen from the relation. At the level of 
our everyday being a nurse and midwife will engage a patient and gain 
knowledge of them but equally it will also involve a time of an encounter where 
neither the nurse and midwife nor patient will have knowledge of each other, 
nor have experience of each other in the way of an everyday relationship. Thus,  
in an expression of love, the nurse and midwife will be morally responsible for 
the patient before they know it and before they understand what that 
responsibility requires of them. Moreover, they will not be able to recall any 
contemplation of the initiative to act because the initiative does not issue from 
their personal being but instead comes to them. All that a nurse and midwife will 
know is that the responsibility they have for the patient leaves them feeling 
they have not done enough. 
 
What is love as a sense of the patient is more than that seen by the eyes, or  
that able to be experienced, because it is what a nurse and midwife senses 
prior to seeing or experiencing anything at all. As I repeat from the previous 
chapter, a nurse and midwife encounters not only a patient as a physical entity 
or for that matter the mask that may be worn as a persona or the role played by 
the patient in a particular situation, or as a description of them like that which 
takes place in a conversation, they are exposed to the patient’s being ‘Other’, 
which is a ‘significance’. In a nurse and midwife-patient relation of love, 
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communication is a pure act that involves the sensuous expression of the 
patient’s ‘Otherness’ to their personal being, signifying a ‘significance’. This 
‘signification’ that is without a context comes to the nurse and midwife as an 
authoritative appeal. As such, it is what they are obedient to by way of a 
response which is to be open and exposed to being affected by an approach. 
What is signified in the approach is a ‘significance’ and it is a revelation 
because it reveals the original relationship between the nurse and midwife and 
the patient as one of peace (Good), as ‘thou shall not kill’ that arouses their 
‘Goodness’. 
 
In the moral party of two, this ‘Good’ or ‘God’ or ‘Other’, to again use Levinas’s 
terms, assigns the nurse and midwife to be the one responsible, like a hostage, 
inescapably responsible and more responsible than any other nurse and 
midwife could ever be for the patient. It is an unavoidable assignation of 
responsibility that is before their self-project is able to be realized. However, 
should the question be asked as to why it is that this nurse or midwife is the one 
chosen as a hostage of responsibility and not that one, is to miss the point of 
love as moral responsibility. In the moral party of two, the relation of a nurse 
and midwife to the patient is no different to the relation of another nurse and 
midwife to this same patient but that is their business and not mine. Love is a 
moral party of two. 
 
In the sphere of impersonal being (II y a), communication between the nurse 
and midwife and the patient is in the form of sensuous expression. It is where 
the nurse’s and midwife’s being ‘Other’ is made the support of the patient and is 
expressed as an extreme openness and receptivity to be affected by the 
‘Otherness’ of the patient’s personal being. In everyday language it is to say 
‘here I am’, which is a phrase Levinas often uses to make clear this extreme 
exposure to being affected. It is a sensitivity and exposed-ness to being 
affected that deals the ‘Otherness’ of the personal being of the patient a 
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‘signifyingness’. Importantly, in nursing and midwifery, this ability to be affected 
is what enables a signifying impression of the state of the patient’s being ‘Other’ 
that gives rise to a visceral response and so the start of language as dialogue, 
interpretation and felt responsibility, expressed as the ‘urge to do’. Levinas’s 
philosophy explains how emotion is the basis of action and before reason. 
 
Notably, in the nurse and midwife-patient relation love as moral responsibility is 
presented to my personal being in the form of the ‘urge to do’. The 
‘signifyingness’ of my responsibility is a ‘revelation’ for it exceeds my ability to 
contain it. As defibrillation is to the heart, the ‘urge to do’ is to the temporal of 
the brain. Hence, the ‘urge to do’ overwhelms the temporal of a nurse’s and 
midwife’s personal being and stops them in their track of thought. As an 
expressive event, it is how the ‘Otherness’ to a patient’s personal being, that is 
located in the sphere of impersonal being (II y a), becomes phenomena as the 
‘urge to do’, and like defibrillation of the heart, interrupts the obsession a nurse 
and midwife has with their self-project thus enabling the patient to be a first 
priority. 
 
The ‘urge to do’ commands each and every nurse and midwife to be morally 
responsible but it is each nurse and midwife that then must give a voice to that 
command in deciding ‘what to do’. While the ‘urge to do’ is a command that 
cannot be ignored, it is a command that has no means of enforcement. Thus, 
the ‘urge to do’ signifies the responsibility of a nurse and midwife in being ‘for’ 
the ‘Otherness’ of the patient’s personal being, but the choosing of ‘what to do’  
is an act of interpretation and representation of their love as moral 
responsibility. This being the case, choosing ‘what to do’ can result in a number 
of different responses. A nurse and midwife may respond by doing nothing, 
which is in itself to do something that is nothing, or it is to respond by inquiring 
into the condition of the patient in a responsible way as a professional nurse 
and midwife that is based on an interpretation and representation of their love 
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as moral responsibility. Love as moral responsibility means a nurse and midwife 
has to live with the feeling that they have never quite got it right. However, the 
mix of professional accountability and moral responsibility results in an 
interpretation that is different to those who only act out of a professional 
concern. 
 
As the ‘urge to do’ the self is not a consideration, a nurse and midwife will make 
an interpretation of their moral responsibility that would be different should they 
have been able to think about themselves. This explains why it is possible for a 
nurse and midwife to place their own welfare second to that of a patient. It 
explains for example, why a person is able to jump off a bridge in a raging river 
in order to save the life of a person when they cannot swim and it equally 
explains how it is possible for a nurse and midwife to give mouth-to-mouth 
resuscitation to a patient who could be HIV positive. Nevertheless, while the 
moral self comes into being by our ability to rise above a concern only for 
ourself, different nurses and midwives will make different interpretations and 
representations of that moral responsibility. Returning to the above examples it 
means that some people will jump off the bridge into the raging water as an 
expression of ‘what to do’ or will participate in mouth-to-mouth resuscitation of a 
patient who could be HIV positive, and others will call for help and the like and 
still others look to someone else to do something. Being committed to a greater  
or lesser extent to a course of action is a product of conscious thought in living 
out their personal character as a professional nurse and midwife. This 
commitment that also issues from the patient to who the nurse and midwife 
feels responsible and is what they think about in an objective way when 
deciding what that responsibility means in terms of caring about what they do. 
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While in caring for a patient a nurse and midwife may be called on to ‘give up’ 
something of their self-project for the betterment of the patient that is 
understood to be a sacrifice, this is not the case with love, which shows there is  
no personal and professional sacrifice. Because love issues from the sphere of 
impersonal being (ii y a), the self as its project does not exist and so there is 
nothing for a nurse and midwife to ‘give up’ nor for that matter is there any 
expectation of something from the patient in return. In a relation of love there is 
no ‘giving up’ of anything, rather it is more like a ‘giving over’ as in an offering of 
oneself in the support of the patient. A characteristic of love is the asymmetry of 
the relation between the nurse and midwife and the patient where there is no 
expectation of reciprocity. Therefore, the nurse and midwife expects nothing 
from the patient in return for what they do in being ‘for’ them. The asymmetry of 
reciprocity that is characteristic of a relation of love is yet another point that 
differentiates love from caring. While in a relation of love as moral responsibility, 
there is no expectation of reciprocity, whereas in a caring relation there is. 
 
The unavoidable responsibility of being moral is what enables a nurse and 
midwife to place the patient as their first priority, that from an onlooker’s 
perspective may be interpreted as a form of selflessness. From the perspective 
of the onlooker, what is seen as an expression of love is the caring activities of 
a nurse and midwife. These activities show that the self-project of the nurse and 
midwife is second to the project of the patient, which may also involve a degree 
of risk to their welfare and add support for the identification of these acts as 
selflessness acts of love. However, from the perspective of the nurse and 
midwife in the moral party of two, the self as its project is not a concern and 
hence there is no regard or thought about their self because it does not exist. 
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As it is impossible to know if the responsibility a nurse and midwife feels (‘Said’) 
is an accurate interpretation of the ‘significance’ of the ‘Otherness to a patient’s 
personal being (Saying), a rhetoric of disruption and supplication (Murray, 2003) 
can help overcome distractions that can make such interpretation even more 
difficult. The dialogue strategy proposed by Murray (2003) enables a nurse and 
midwife to challenge the assumptions, beliefs and values inherent in the cultural 
stereotypes and prejudices of nurses and midwives and others within the health 
system that mask moral responsibility. Objective relationships are governed by 
rules, norms, stereotypes, prejudices and accepted practices that are   
associated with working in a system of health care and can work to hide moral 
relations and mask or distort moral responsibility. If the subjectivity of the 
patient is lost to only an objective view, the patient becomes an object subject 
to objectification, like a repeated presenter to an Accident and Emergency 
Department for substance abuse who is labelled a ‘troublesome patient and a 
waste of time’. It all adds up to the fact that competing interests for a nurse and 
midwife can serve to mask love as moral responsibility that, if not challenged, 
leads to the objectification of the patient as a thing that has things done to it in 
the name of caring. 
 
The entry of a third person such as another nurse or midwife onto the scene 
disturbs the moral party of two because it introduces the social world and so 
changes the nature of their responsibility. In this new relation a nurse and 
midwife ceases to be a hostage because now there is the potential for another 
nurse or midwife to also be responsible for the patient but this is what they 
cannot know. At this point the relation ceases to be metaphysical because now 
some objective criteria can be applied to the relation that seeks just reason for 
what they do as professional nurses and midwives. Thus, the introduction of the 
third party means that a nurse and midwife must judge among the competing 
‘Calls’ where in the moral party of two they assume responsibility as a given. To 
this end, and as suggested above, a rhetoric of disruption and supplication 
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(Murray, 2003) can assist a nurse and midwife to peel away ideology that can 
further mask, distort and misrepresent the approach of the ‘Otherness’ to a 
patient’s personal being. In this way, dialogue combined with, for example, the 
professional codes of ethics for nurses and midwives, gives expression to the 
need to adjudicate between the conflicting calls to responsibility and the need 
for just prioritization of the multiple ethical summonses that they confront. 
 
Moral responsibility is then the answer to the question of ‘what is love in nursing 
and midwifery’. Moral responsibility is a form of love that centres on the ability 
of our being, or at least the possibility of our being, to transcend its everyday 
form to a metaphysical state of being moral. It enables a nurse and midwife to 
transcend the isolation associated with their personal being as a self-project, to 
be ‘for’ the patient as a first priority. Yet while the ‘Goodness’ of the ‘Good’ 
assigns the nurse and midwife responsible, and is expressed to their personal 
being in the form of the ‘urge to do’, ‘what to do’ in caring for the patient is a 
matter of living out the command to be responsible and will be different for 
each nurse and midwife. However, no matter the outcome, love as moral 
responsibility will always leave a nurse and midwife feeling there is still more 
to be done in being responsible. 
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Appendix 1: Research Invitation 
RESEARCH INVITATION 
Hello, my name is Les Fitzgerald and I am a nurse and midwife undertaking my PhD. 
 
Invitation 
I write in regard to a research project and respectfully ask your participation. 
I am seeking experienced nurses/midwives to participate in one focus group discussion 
with about 6 other nurses/midwives for approximately 2-3 hours duration to provide 
information about the ‘special’ relationships we as nurses/midwives have with some of 
the people for whom we care. 
 
Purpose 
My concern is that this important aspect of our nursing/midwifery practice (nurse/patient 
relationship) continues to be unacknowledged by our policy makers, funding 
departments, and Department of Human Services administrators. However, this said, the 
way we interact in ‘special’ ways with patients/nursing home residents is the very thing 
our community values as shown in the current nurse recruitment advertisements on TV 
sponsored by the Victorian Government. People value human caring and the ‘special’ 
relationships nurses/midwives have with patients/nursing home residents in their charge 
but nobody is undertaking research into this area of our practice. 
 
What is required of you? 
I appreciate that asking you to give 2-3 hours of your time to this project is considerable, 
but in order to obtain the groups considered opinion and beliefs about the ways in which 
we interact with the people for whom we care, in this current health care climate, will 
take time. All you have to be able to do is be willing to share an example of where you 
believed you showed ‘love’ toward a person for whom you were caring. Please note that 
we are not talking about romantic love. 
 
All information will be confidential to the research. 
 
When and where? 
Feel assured that the conduct of the focus group discussion would be at a time that is 
convenient with you. The group-focus discussion will be conducted at La Trobe 
University, Department of Nursing building. Refreshments will be provided. 
 
Contact 
Should you be willing to participating in this project or would like more information 
about the project, could you please make that known to the Unit Manager or simply write 
you name and a contact telephone number below and give this sheet to the Unit Manager. 
I will be contacting the Unit Manager in I week. Please feel free to ring me at any stage 
on (03) 54447538. 
 
I agree to be contacted about the study (my name & contact telephone number is) 
 
Name:……………………………….   Ph: ……………………………….. 
Comment: 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
Thank you for considering this request. 
Regards 
Les Fitzgerald (Researcher) 
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Appendix 2: Deakin University Ethics Committee Plain Language 
Statement 
 
DEAKIN U N IVERSITY ETH ICS COM M ITTEE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Researcher: Les Fitzgerald R.N, R.M, Dip.Teach.(Nurs), BEd, M .Nurs.Stud 
Supervisor:  Associate Professor Stan vanHooft BA (Hons), MA, Ph.D, Dip. Ed. 
 
I am currently a student of Deakin University and this research is for my PhD 
qualification. 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
This research aims to describe the ‘special’ relationships nurses and midwives 
develop with some of the people for whom they care. While the mainstream 
literature on human caring, and Government policy related to the delivery of 
health care, all fail to acknowledge ‘deep caring’ as a component of nursing 
and midwifery practice, conversations with nurses and midwives suggest just 
the opposite. While privately the conversations of nurses and midwives 
support the existence of ‘special’ relationships with people for whom we care, 
public acknowledgement of this deep level of human caring and commitment 
remains unacknowledged, hidden in practice, and to the most part absent from 
the literature in nursing and midwifery and not acknowledged in Government 
policy on health. 
 
Invitation: 
This research invites you, a clinical nurse and/or midwife, to be part of a focus 
group conversation with 6-8 other nurses/midwives. The conversation will last 
approximately 3-6 hours (most likely 3 hours). All participants in the focus 
group conversation will be nurses and/or midwives. 
 
Where and when: 
• Where: The focus group can be organised at a place convenient to you - 
the suggestion is the Department of Nursing at La Trobe University 
Bendigo. 
• When: September, October and November. An exact date and time will 
be organised directly with you. 
•  
What would be expected of me? 
• To be able to identify in your practice of nursing and/or midwifery an 
example of where you believed you showed a ‘special’ deep level of 
human caring. 
• To be willing to share this example to the rest of the group knowing 
that it will remain confidential to the group (refer to the confidentiality 
statement 
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on the next page). 
• To donate your time by attending one focus group discussion with 
other nurses/midwives. The focus group will take approximately 3-6 
hours (most likely 3 hours). 
 
How will the focus group meeting operate? 
The focus group will consist of three parts: 
Part 1: All participants will be asked to provide a clinical practice example 
about the phenomena. From all the examples offered the group will choose 
one to be explored in detail. 
Part 2: The group will explore the chosen example in detail. 
Part 3: The group will develop an opinion about how the concepts identified in 
the specific example apply to nursing and midwifery in general. 
 
Confidentiality: 
I understand that the information I provide will be kept confidential except 
where I disclose information that suggests unethical or improper behaviour 
and/or information that suggests another person is at immediate risk of harm. I 
also understand that the Nurses’ Code of Ethics binds the researcher and other 
nurses and/or midwives who are present at the focus group and requires they 
to act on matters of an unprofessional nature. Should I disclose information of 
this type I understand that the researcher will: 
1  In the first instance raise the matter with myself. 
2. Suggest possible professional assistance with the matter (such as 
counselling) and should I agree to such assistance, help with 
making an appointment. 
3. Report the event to the appropriate senior nurse in charge of the 
clinical situation and/or the Nurses Board of Victoria 
 
While it is not anticipated that your participation in the focus group discussion 
should cause you any distress, should this happen for any reason your 
participation in the focus group will be stopped and with you consent you will 
be assisted with immediate counselling. Should you become distressed after 
the focus group discussion has concluded you may contact me directly on (03) 
5447538 and I will help you to obtain professional assistance. The people 
listed below are aware of the research and are available for assistance should it 
be required. 
 
Reception Ph: (03) 54447223 (9am - 5pm) 
Counselling Service (La Trobe University, Bendigo) 
Chris Kirwan (Psychologist) 
Liz Griffith (Psychologist) 
Lynda Evans (Social Worker) 
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The session will be audio taped but only heard by myself. On 
completion of the research the audiotapes will be destroyed and only a 
hardcopy with pseudonym names kept. Participation in this research is 
voluntary. You may withdraw consent and discontinue participation in 
the research at anytime. If you choose to withdraw you may also 
request any information gathered from you to not be used. 
 
Findings: 
On completion of the research you will be invited to attend a seminar 
outlining the findings of the research. 
The findings of the research will be published. 
 
Contact and answering your questions: 
Should you have any questions or concerns about this research please 
feel free to contact, in the first instance, myself Les Fitzgerald or the 
research supervisor Associate Professor Stan van Hooft. 
Contact Details: 
RESEARCHER   SUPERVISOR 
Les Fitzgerald   Associate Professor Stan vanHooft 
Senior Lecturer   School of Social Inquiry 
School of Health and Environment Faculty of Arts 
La Trobe University, Bendigo Deakin University 
P.O. Box 199   Burwood Highway 
Bendigo, Victoria 3552  Burwood, Victoria 3125 
Ph: 03 54447538 (9am-Spm) Ph: 03 92443973 (9am-Spm) 
Ph: 0408123143 (mobile any time) (Not available July-mid September) 
 
This research has the approval and authorization of the Human 
Research Ethics Committee, Deakin University HREC No: EC I 97-
2001 . The research is also supported by the Department of Nursing at 
La Trobe University, Bendigo. 
 
Should you have any concerns about the conduct of this research 
project, please contact the Secretary, Ethics Committee, Research 
Services, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, BURWOOD VIC 
3125. Tel (03) 9251 7123 (International +61 3 9251 7123). 
 
Thank you for your time. 
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Appendix 3: How Do I Participate In A Neo-Socratic dialogue? 
 
HOW DO I PARTICIPATE IN A NEO- 
SOCRATIC DIALGOUE? 
 
Procedures 
The Neo-Socratic dialogue normally uses the following procedures: 
1. The facilitator sets a well-formulated, general question, or 
statement, before the discourse commences. 
 
QUESTION: What is love in nursing? 
 
2. The first step is to collect concrete examples experienced by 
participants in which the given topic plays a key role. 
 
An actual example of where love has been used in the practice of 
your nursing (not romantic love). 
 
3.  One example is chosen by the group that will usually be the basis of 
the analysis and argumentation throughout the dialogue. 
 
4. Crucial statements made by participants are written down of a white 
board, so that all can have an overview and be clear about the 
sequence of the discourse. 
 
Accordingly, it is useful to now reflect on the topic before the dialogue   
begins and to think of any incidents or examples from your nursing practice 
which illustrates or relate to the question and which you would be willing to 
offer to the group for discussion. 
 
Criteria for suitable examples 
1. The example has been derived from your own experience; 
‘hypothetical’ or ‘generalized’ examples (quite often it happens to 
me that . . . ‘) are not suitable. 
 
2. Examples should not be very complicated ones; simple examples are 
often the best. Where a sequence of events has been presented, it 
would be best for the group to concentrate on one aspect or one event. 
 
3. The example has to be relevant for the topic of the dialogue and of 
interpret to the other participants. Furthermore, all participants must be 
able to put themselves into the shoes of the person giving the example. 
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4. The example should deal with an experience that has already come to an 
end. If the participant is still immersed in the experience it is not 
suitable. For example, if decisions are still to be taken, there is a risk 
that group members might be judgmental or offer advice; and if there 
is still an emotional involvement, the discussion might re-open 
emotional wounds. 
  
5. The participant giving the example has to be willing to present it fully 
and provide all the relevant actual information and answer questions so 
that the other participants are able to understand the example and its 
relevance to the central question. 
 
5. Positive examples: i.e., examples that affirm the question or statement 
are preferred. 
 
Rules of participants 
There are eight basic rules of participants in the Neo-Socratic dialogue: 
1. Each participant’s contribution is based upon what s/he has 
experienced, not upon what s/he has read or heard. 
 
2.  The thinking and questioning is honest. This means that all and only 
genuine doubts about what has been said should be expressed. 
 
3.  It is the responsibility of all participants to express their thoughts as  
    clearly and concisely as possible, so that everyone is able to build on the  
     ideas contributed by others earlier in the dialogue. 
 
4.   Participants should not concentrate exclusively on their own thoughts   
      but should make every effort to understand those of other participants.  
      To assist with this, the facilitator may ask one participant to express in   
      his or her own words what another participant has said. 
 
5.   Anyone who has lost sight of the question or of the thread of the    
      discussion should seek the help of others to clarify where the group    
      stands. 
 
6.  Abstract statements should be grounded in concrete experience or in     
      the example, which is central to the discussion in order to illuminate   
      such statements. 
 
7.  Inquiry into relevant questions continues as long as participants either     
     hold conflicting views or have not yet reached clarity. 
 
8.  It is important and rewarding to participate in the whole of a dialogue  
    even if there is disagreement. Everyone should endeavor not to leave    
    early or cease participating before consensus is reached. 
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Metadialogue 
It is permissible at any time within the dialogue for the facilitator (Les) or for 
any participant (you) to call ‘timeout’ in order to direct the attention of the 
group to any problems that may have arisen. It may be that a participant has 
lost track of the discussion, is unable to understand what others are saying, or 
feels excluded. Or it may be that one or more participants have become upset 
with the way the dialogue has developed. Or it may be that the group has lost 
its way and needs to review the structure or content of the dialogues. Or the 
group may want to discuss the strategies it is using to seek a consensus of the 
question. 
 
Whatever the reason, a discussion about the dialogue, or a ‘metadialogue’, can 
be called for at anytime. If it is thought appropriate, someone from the group 
other than the facilitator may be asked to chair the metadialogue. 
 
The group should not return to the content dialogue until all the difficulties 
that led to the calling of a ‘timeout’ have been resolved or until strategies for 
proceeding with the content dialogue have been formulated. 
 
Confidentiality 
All the content of the dialogue is bound by the rules of research 
confidentiality.  Notwithstanding this requirement it is worthy of note and your 
participation in the dialogue binds you to that confidentiality. 
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Appendix 4: Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee 
Approval 
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Appendix 5: Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee 
Consent Form 
 
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
CONSENT FORM: 
 
I, ………………………………….  of ……………………………………….. 
 
Hereby consent to be a subject of a human research study to be undertaken by 
Les Fitzgerald and I understand that the purpose of the research is to explore 
the question ‘what is love in nursing?’ I understand also that I will be 
participating in a ‘Neo-Socratic dialogue’ for about 6 to 8 hours and that this 
will require me to be forthright and deeply reflective about my professional 
practice as a nurse. 
 
I acknowledge 
 
1. That the aims, methods, and anticipated benefits, and possible 
risks/hazards of the research study, have been explained to me. 
 
2.  That I voluntarily and freely give my consent to my participation in 
such research study. 
 
3.  I understand that aggregated results will be used for research purposes 
and may be reported in scientific and academic journals. 
 
4.  Individual results will not be released to any person except at my 
request and on my authorization. 
 
5.  That I am free to withdraw my consent at any time during the study, in 
which event my participation in the research study will immediately 
cease and any information obtained from me will not be used. 
 
 
Signature:       Date: 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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Glossary 
 
Key words and definitions 
For the purposes of this study the following terms will apply. 
 
Patient 
The literature and contemporary health care practice use various terms to 
describe a person who is the receiver of health care, they include, ‘client’, 
‘health care consumer’, ‘patient’, ‘resident’, and ‘birthing mother’. 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation the term ‘patient’ will be used to refer to a 
person living in a nursing home who is commonly called a ‘resident’, a mother 
recently given birth and referred to as a ‘birthing mother’, a person who is in 
acute hospital and called a ‘patient’, and a person living in the community and 
referred to as a ‘client’ or ‘health care consumer’. 
 
Registered Nurse and Registered Midwife 
Australia The title Registered Nurse refers to a person who is listed with the 
Nurse’s Board of Victoria to practice nursing. There are 5 divisions of 
Registered Nurse, division I includes graduates from accredited university 
courses, midwives, maternal and child health, psychiatric nurses, and nurse 
practitioner, division 2 includes graduates from accredited courses in the 
Victorian Education and Training sector, division 3 is a closed register - 
psychiatric nurses, division 4 is also a closed register for mental retardation 
nurses, and division 5 is a closed register for mother craft nurses (Nurses et al., 
2001: 8). 
 
A Registered Midwife is a person endorsed on the register of the Nurse’s 
Board of Victoria to practice midwifery. 
 
A Registered Nurse (Division 2) may also be identified in other countries or in 
historical terms by the title ‘enrolled nurse’, ‘state enrolled nurse’, or ‘nurse’s 
aide’. 
 
Singapore: The title Registered Nurse refers to a person who is listed with the 
Singaporean Nurses Board to practice nursing and Registered Midwife is a 
person registered to practice midwifery. 
 
Bhutan: The title Registered Nurse refers to a person who is listed with the 
Bhutan Nurses Registering Authority to practice nursing and Registered 
Midwife is a person registered to practice midwifery. 
 
In this study all references made that use the title Registered Nurse will relate 
to a Registered Nurse (Divisioni), Registered Nurse (Division 2), or Registered 
Nurse (Division 3). 
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